Social Justice and Sociology: Agendas for the Twenty-First Century

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The world's peoples face daunting challenges in the twenty-first century. While apologists herald the globalization of capitalism, many people on our planet experience recurring economic exploitation, immiseration, and environmental crises linked to capitalism's spread. Across the globe social movements continue to raise the issues of social justice and democracy. Given the new century's serious challenges, sociologists need to rediscover their roots in a sociology committed to social justice, to cultivate and extend the long-standing "countersystem" approach to research, to encourage greater self-reflection in sociological analysis, and to re-emphasize the importance of the teaching of sociology. Finally, more sociologists should examine the big social questions of this century, including the issues of economic exploitation, social oppression, and the looming environmental crises. And, clearly, more sociologists should engage in the study of alternative social futures, including those of more just and egalitarian societies. Sociologists need to think deeply and imaginatively about sustainable social futures and to aid in building better human societies.

We stand today at the beginning of a challenging new century. Like ASA Presidents before me, I am conscious of the honor and the responsibility that this address carries with it, and I feel a special obligation to speak about the role of sociology and sociologists in the twenty-first century. As we look forward, let me quote W. E. B. Du Bois, a pathbreaking U.S. sociologist. In his last autobiographical statement, Du Bois (1968) wrote:

> [T]oday the contradictions of American civilization are tremendous. Freedom of political discussion is difficult; elections are not free and fair. . . . The greatest power in the land is not thought or ethics, but wealth. . . . Present profit is valued higher than future need. . . . I know the United States. It is my country and the land of my fathers. It is still a land of magnificent possibilities. It is still the home of noble souls and generous people. But it is selling its birthright. It is betraying its mighty destiny. (Pp. 418–19)

Today the social contradictions of American and global civilizations are still immense. Many prominent voices tell us that it is the best of times; other voices insist that it is the worst of times. Consider how the apologists for modern capitalism now celebrate the "free market" and the global capitalistic economy. Some of these analysts even see modern capitalism as the last and best economic system, as the "end of history" (Fukuyama 1992). In contrast, from

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the late 1930s to the 1950s many influential economists and public leaders were committed to government intervention (Keynesianism) as the way to counter the negative effects of capitalist markets in the United States and other countries—effects clearly seen in the Great Depression of the 1930s. The view that a capitalistic market alone should be allowed to make major social and economic decisions would then have been met with incredulity or derision (George 1999; also see Block 1990). Half a century ago, Karl Polanyi ([1944] 1957), a prescient economic historian, critically reviewed the history of the free-market idea: "To allow the market mechanism to be sole director of the fate of human beings and their natural environment, indeed, even of the amount and use of purchasing power, would result in the demolition of society" (p. 73).

Since the 1960s, conservative business groups have pressed upon the world's political leaders, and upon the public generally, the idea of a self-regulating market mechanism, thereby organizing a successful counter-attack against Keynesian ideas (Steinfels 1979). These new apologists for capitalism have heralded the beneficial aspects of a globalizing capitalism and have exported the free-market model in an economic proselytizing project of grand scope. Free marketeers have persuaded many people across the globe that class conflict is in decline and that capitalism and its new technologies will bring prosperity to all countries. Similarly, other influential supporters of the status quo have argued optimistically that major forms of social oppression, such as racial and gender oppression, are also in sharp decline in Western societies.

THE DOWNSIDE OF A CAPITALISTIC WORLD

Nonetheless, many people in the United States and across the globe insist that this is *not* the best of times. Karl Marx long ago underscored the point that modern capitalism creates bad economic times that encompass both social injustice and inequality. Looking at the present day, I will briefly describe a few examples of the troubling conditions currently being created or aggravated by modern capitalism:

Many of the World's People Still Live in Misery

First, while it may be the best of times for those at the top of the global economy, it is not so for the majority of the world's peoples. The pro-capitalist polices of many national governments and international organizations have fostered a substantial transfer of wealth from the world's poor and working classes to the world's rich and affluent social classes. Social injustice in the form of major, and sometimes increasing, inequalities in income and wealth can be observed across the globe. Thus, in the United States income inequality has reached a record level for the period during which such data have been collected: The top one-fifth of households now has nearly half the income; the bottom one-fifth has less than 4 percent. Moreover, the top 1 percent of U.S. households holds more in wealth than the bottom 95 percent, and the wealthy have doubled their share since 1970. Moreover, more Americans live in poverty than a decade ago. As of the late 1980s, 31.5 million people lived at or below the officially defined poverty level, while in 1999 the figure had increased to 34.5 million (Collins, Hartman, and Sklar 1999; Oxfam 1999). In recent decades the number of millionaires and billionaires has grown dramatically. Yet many ordinary workers have seen their real wages decline—even while the costs of housing, transportation, and medical care have increased significantly in real terms.

Of the 6 billion people on earth, a large proportion live in or near poverty and destitution, with 1.2 billion living on less than one dollar a day. The numbers living in poverty are increasing in areas of South Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Today one-fifth of the world's people, those in the developed countries, garner 86 percent of the world's gross domestic product, with the bottom fifth garnering just one percent. In recent years the world's richest 200 people, as a group, have doubled their wealth, to more than 1 trillion dollars for the year 2000 (Oxfam 1999). While there has been much boasting about economic growth among those pushing global capitalism, between 1980 and the late 1990s most of the world's countries saw sustained annual growth rates of less than 3 per-

cent per capita, and 59 countries actually experienced economic declines (*Toward Freedom* 1999). Moreover, in most countries great income and wealth inequalities create major related injustices, including sharp differentials in hunger, housing, life satisfaction, life expectancy, and political power.

Viewed from a long-term perspective, the high levels of wealth and income inequality, and the increase in that inequality, signal yet another critical point in human history where there is a major foregrounding of social justice issues.

Working Families Are Exploited and Marginalized

Second, global capitalism may bring the best of times for corporate executives and the well-off, yet for many of the world's people it brings recurring economic disruption, exploitation, marginalization, and immiseration. The international scene is increasingly dominated by highly bureaucratized multinational corporations, which often operate independently of nation states. Working for their own economic interests, these transnational corporations routinely "develop" their markets—and destroy and discard regions, countries, peoples, cultures, and natural environments. For example, transnational corporations now control much of the world's agricultural system. In developing countries small farmers are shoved aside by large agribusiness corporations or are pressured to produce crops for an international market controlled by big transnational corporations—thereby reducing the production of essential foodstuffs for local populations (Sjoberg 1996:287).

Today there are an estimated 1 billion unemployed or underemployed workers around the world, with 50 million unemployed in the European countries alone. Hundreds of millions, including many millions of children, work in onerous or dangerous workplaces. Some 30 million people die from hunger annually in a world whose large agricultural enterprises produce more than enough food for every person (Ramonet 1999). The real effects of expanding capitalism for a large proportion of the planet's inhabitants are not only greater inequality but also job restructuring, unsafe working conditions, low wages, underemployment or unemployment, loss of land, and forced migration. Ordinary working people and their families—in most nationality, racial, and ethnic groups across the globe—face significant negative social impacts from an encircling capitalism.

Capitalism Imposes Huge Environmental Costs

Third, the global capitalistic economy generates profits at the huge cost of increasing environmental degradation. Since the 1970s, the levels of some greenhouse gases (e.g., carbon dioxide) in the earth's atmosphere have grown significantly because of the increasing use of fossil fuels, widespread deforestation, and industrial pollution. Global warming, which results from this increase in greenhouse gases, is melting polar ice packs, increasing coastal flooding, generating severe weather, creating droughts and reshaping agriculture, and facilitating the spread of disease. In addition, as a result of human actions, the earth's ozone layer is severely depleted in some areas. This alone results in a range of negative effects, including increases in skin cancer incidence and major threats to essential species, such as phytoplankton in the oceans (M. Bell 1998; Hawken, Lovins, and Lovins 1999).

A lack of sufficient water and poor water quality are large-scale problems in many countries. Half the world's wetlands and nearly half the forests have been destroyed in just the last century. The destruction of forests is killing off many plant species, including some supplying the oxygen we breathe. The consequences of these environmental changes will be the greatest for the world's poorest countries, many of which are in areas where the increasing heat of global warming is already having a serious impact on water availability, soil erosion, destruction of forests, agriculture, and the spread of disease (Sachs 1999).

Today, some environmental experts are seriously discussing the possibility that most of the planet's plant and animal species will be gone by the twenty-second century. Jared Diamond, a leading physical scientist, has reviewed the evidence and concludes that movement toward an environmental catas-

trophe is accelerating. The only question, in his view, is whether it is likely to "strike our children or our grandchildren, and whether we choose to adopt now the many obvious countermeasures" (Diamond 1992:362). And there are yet other related problems facing humanity, such as those arising out of the new technologies associated with worldwide, capitalist-led economic development.

Global Capitalism Reinforces Other Injustice and Inequality

Fourth, in addition to the economic and environmental inequalities generated or aggravated by contemporary capitalism, other forms of social injustice and inequality remain central to the United States and other societies. I only have space here to note briefly such major societal realities as racial and ethnic oppression, patriarchy, homophobia, bureaucratic authoritarianism, violence against children, and discrimination against the aged and the disabled. These persisting forms of discrimination and oppression generally have their own independent social dynamics, yet they too are often reinforced or exacerbated by the processes of modern capitalism.

WHAT KIND OF A WORLD DO WE WANT?

The world's majority now lives, or soon will live, in difficult economic and environmental times. By the end of the twenty-first century, it is likely that there will be sustained and inexorable pressures to replace the social institutions associated with corporate capitalism and its supporting governments. Why? Because the latter will not have provided humanity with just and sustainable societies. Such pressures are already building in the form of grassroots social movements in many countries.

A few of the world's premier capitalists already see the handwriting on the wall. The billionaire investor George Soros (1998), for instance, has come to the conclusion that free markets do *not* lead to healthy societies:

> Markets reduce everything, including human beings (labor) and nature (land), to commodities. We can have a market economy, but we cannot have a market society. In addition to markets, society needs institutions to serve such social goals as political freedom and social justice. (P. 24)

As Soros sees it, without a more egalitarian global society, capitalism cannot survive.

In a recent interview, Paul Hawken (Hawken and Korten 1999), an environmentally oriented critic of modern capitalism, has recounted the story of a business consultant who conducted a workshop with middle managers in a large corporation that makes, among other things, toxic chemicals such as pesticides. Early in the workshop the executives discussed and rejected the idea that creating social justice and resource equity is essential to the long-term sustainability of a society such as the United States. Later, these managers broke into five groups and sought to design a self-contained spaceship that would leave earth and return a century later with its occupants being "alive, happy, and healthy" (Hawken and Korten 1999). The executives then voted on which group's hypothetical spaceship design would best meet these objectives.

The winning design was comprehensive: It included insects so no toxic pesticides were allowed on board. Recognizing the importance of photosynthesis, the winning group decided that weeds were necessary for a healthy ecosystem, so conventional herbicides were not allowed. The food system was also to be free of toxic chemicals. These managers "also decided that as a crew, they needed lots of singers, dancers, artists, and storytellers, because the CDs and videos would get old and boring fast, and engineers alone did not a village make." In addition, when the managers were asked if it was reasonable to allow just one-fifth of those on board to control four-fifths of the ship's essential resources, they vigorously rejected the idea "as unworkable, unjust, and unfair" (Hawken and Korten 1999).

Note that this example spotlights the critically important ideas of human and environmental interdependence and of social justice. Even these corporate managers, when hypothetically placing themselves in the closed system of a spaceship, rejected environmental degradation, a boring monoculture, and major resource inequalities.

As I see it, social justice requires resource equity, fairness, and respect for diversity, as well as the eradication of existing forms of social oppression. Social justice entails a redistribution of resources from those who have unjustly gained them to those who justly deserve them, and it also means creating and ensuring the processes of truly democratic participation in decision-making. A common view in Western political theory is that, while "the people" have a right to self-rule, they delegate this right to their representatives—to the government leaders who supposedly act in the public interest and under the guidance of impartial laws (Young 1990:91–92). However, there is no impartial legal and political system in countries like the United States, for in such hierarchically arranged societies those at the top create and maintain over time a socio-legal framework and political structure that strongly support their group interests. It seems clear that only a decisive redistribution of resources and decision making power can ensure social justice and authentic democracy.

The spaceship example explicitly recognizes the interdependence of human beings and other living species. For some decades now central ideas in physics and biology have stressed the interconnectedness of what were once thought to be discrete phenomena. Thus, the "gaia theory" in biology suggests, according to Lovelock (1987), that

> . . . the entire range of living matter on Earth, from whales to viruses, and from oaks to algae, could be regarded as constituting a single living entity, capable of manipulating the Earth's atmosphere to suit its overall needs and endowed with faculties and powers far beyond those of its constituent parts. (P. 9)

This is more than a metaphorical description, for in fact we live on a planet that, we are increasingly realizing, is truly interwoven. All of earth's aspects—from biosphere, to soils and oceans, to atmosphere—are seen as parts of one interconnected living system with important cybernetic features. Thus, environmental irresponsibility in one place, such as the excessive burning of fossil fuels in the United States, contributes to negative effects elsewhere, such as to global warming in Australia.

Perhaps there are clues in the gaia theory for a broader sociological framework for viewing the development of human societies. We human beings are not just part of an interconnected biosphere, but are also linked in an increasingly integrated and global web of structured social relationships. This complex "sociosphere" consists of some 6 billion people living in many families and communities in numerous nation states. Nation states and their internal organizations are linked across an international web. Indeed, we human beings have long been more interconnected than we might think. According to current archaeological assessments, we all descended from ancestors who migrated out of Africa some millennia in the past. Today, most human beings speak related languages; about half the world's people speak an Indo-European language. In recent decades the expansion of telecommunication technologies has placed more people in potential or actual contact with one another than ever before. For the first time in human history, these technologies are rapidly creating one integrated body of humanity (Sahtouris 1996).

Yet, this increasingly interconnected sociosphere remains highly stratified: Great benefits accrue to those classes dominant in international capitalism. Today most of the globe's political and business leaders, as well as many of its academic experts, have come to accept capitalism as the more or less inevitable economic system for all countries. However, at the same time, growing numbers of people are recognizing that, because of globalizing capitalism, the earth is facing a massive environmental crisis, one that has the potential to destroy the basic conditions for human societies within a century or two. Issues of ecological destruction—as well as broader issues of social inequality and injustice—are being forced to the forefront not by corporate executives but by some 30,000 people's groups and movements around the globe. These include environmental groups, indigenous movements, labor movements, health-policy groups, feminist groups, anti-racist organizations, and anti-corporate groups (Klein 2000). Such groups agree on many critical environmental and political-economic goals.

Indeed, many people in other regions of the world seem to be ahead of us in the United States in their understanding of the damage done by the unbridled operations of multinational corporations. These groups are pressing for meaningful international declarations and treaties, such as the various United Nations declarations on the environment and human rights. In the United States awareness of the negative impact of globalizing capitalism is now substantial and may be growing. A 1999 U.S. poll found that just over half the respondents said they were sympathetic with the concerns of activists who had aggressively protested a recent World Trade Organization summit in Seattle (*Business Week* 1999). In many places in the United States today there is growing opposition to the economic and environmental decisions of those executives heading transnational corporations.

Unquestionably, social justice appears as a recurring concern around the globe. For that reason alone, we sociologists must vigorously engage issues of social justice or become largely irrelevant to the present and future course of human history.

A LONG TRADITION: SOCIOLOGY AND SOCIAL JUSTICE

Given impending national and international crises, sociology appears to be the right discipline for the time. Sociology is a broad interdisciplinary field that draws on ideas from other social sciences, the humanities, and the physical sciences. Our intellectual and methodological pluralism, as well as our diversity of practitioners, are major virtues. Such richness gives sociology a particularly good position as a science to examine the complexities and crises of a socially interconnected world. Those sciences with diverse viewpoints and constructive conflicts over ideas and issues have often been the most intellectually healthy. As P. H. Collins (1998) has put it, "Sociology's unique social location as a contested space of knowledge construction allows us to think through new ways of doing science" (p. 10; also see Burawoy 1998).

Views of sociology's goals have long reflected a dialectical tension between a commitment to remedy social injustice and the desire to be accepted as a fully legitimate discipline in the larger society, especially by powerful elites. The lead article in the July 1895 issue of the *American Journal of Sociology*, written by Albion Small, founder of the first graduate sociology department (at the University of Chicago), listed among the major interests of the journal editors the analysis of "plans for social amelioration" (Small 1895:14). A decade later, Small presented a paper at the American Sociological Society's first meeting in which he argued vigorously that social research was not an end in itself but should serve to improve society (Friedrichs 1970:73). Small was not alone in this commitment. In the first decade or two of U.S. sociology, leading scholars advocated the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake *and* the assessment of that knowledge in relation to its current usefulness to society.

Moreover, from the beginning there has been a robust "countersystem" tradition within U.S. sociology—a tradition whose participants have intentionally undertaken research aimed at significantly reducing or eliminating societal injustice. The countersystem approach is one in which social scientists step outside mainstream thought patterns to critique existing society (Sjoberg and Cain 1971). From the perspective of this research tradition, social scientists have all too often accepted the status quo as their standard. It is noteworthy too that much countersystem analysis develops ideas about alternative social systems. For instance, any serious exploration of the countersystem tradition must acknowledge the past and current influence of Marx's critical analysis of capitalism, which included ideas about an alternative social system. Marx's countersystem analysis has, directly or indirectly, influenced many social scientists, including several of the sociologists to whom I now turn.

In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, a number of white women, black men, and black women sociologists—as well as a few white male sociologists—did much innovative sociological research and at the same time took strong informed positions in regard to ending the oppression of women, black Americans, the poor, and immigrants. Among the now forgotten women and black

male sociologists were Jane Addams, Florence Kelley, Emily Greene Balch, Ida B. Wells-Barnett, Charlotte Perkins Gilman, and W. E. B. Du Bois. All were practicing sociologists, and all developed important sociological ideas and research projects. Most were members of the American Sociological Society (Deegan 1987).

Jane Addams was a key founder of U.S. sociology. Head resident of Chicago's pioneering Hull-House complex, she was an active sociologist and charter member of the American Sociological Society. She interacted professionally with other leading sociologists and intellectuals. During the 1890s and later, there was great intellectual ferment at Hull-House. Not only were union leaders, socialists, and other social reformers welcomed there, but a few major male social theorists, such as John Dewey and George Herbert Mead, regularly interacted with the women sociologists there (Deegan 1988:5). Addams was one of the first U.S. sociologists to deal conceptually and empirically with the problems of the burgeoning cities, and she was advanced in her sociological analysis of justice and democracy. She viewed democracy as entailing more than fairness and legal equality:

> We are brought to a conception of Democracy not merely as a sentiment which desires the well-being of all men, nor yet as a creed which believes in the essential dignity and equality of all men, but as that which affords a rule of living as well as a test of faith. (Addams 1902:6)

In her view ordinary Americans had to participate actively in major decisions affecting their lives for there to be real democracy.

Addams and the numerous women (and a few men) sociologists working at Hull-House not only accented a cooperative and democratic model of society but also used their sociological research and analysis to ground their efforts for tenement reform, child-labor legislation, public health programs, feminism, and anti-war goals (Deegan 1988). They worked in immigrant and other poor urban communities and sought to build a grassroots base for social change. Moreover, working in collaboration, they did the *first* empirical field research in U.S. sociology. Like Harriet Martineau earlier in the nineteenth century (see below), Addams and her colleagues accented a new sociological tradition that developed empirical data in order to better deal with issues of both social theory and public policy. Their 1895 book, *Hull-House Maps and Papers* (Residents of Hull-House [1895] (1970), reported on the sociodemographic mapping of Chicago's urban areas well before that statistical approach became important for the University of Chicago's male sociologists. Interestingly, these sociodemographic data were used to help local residents understand their community patterns, not just to provide data for publications in academic journals. Moreover, one indication of the disciplinary impact of these early women sociologists is that between 1895 and 1935 they published more than 50 articles in what was then the leading sociology journal, the *American Journal of Sociology* (Deegan 1988:47).

In 1896 W. E. B. Du Bois became an assistant in sociology at the University of Pennsylvania. Du Bois was hired to do a study of black Philadelphians using, as he noted, the "best available methods of sociological research" (Du Bois [1899] 1973:2). His book, *The Philadelphia Negro* ([1899] 1973), was the first empirical study of a black community to be reported in sociological depth and at book length. Therein Du Bois not only analyzed sociological data on patterns of life in the black community (including racial discrimination) but also assessed what he viewed as the immorality of discrimination. The last part of this pathbreaking book includes a study of domestic workers by Du Bois's white colleague Isabel Eaton, a former Hull-House sociologist. The research collaboration of these early black and white sociologists is also part of the now forgotten history of sociology. Moreover, in spite of Du Bois's stellar qualifications—major sociological research, a Harvard Ph.D., and work with leading European social scientists—no white-run sociology department offered him a regular position. Over time, Du Bois would make very important contributions to the sociological study of community, family, social problems, and class relations, as well as to the historical study of slavery and Reconstruction.

We should recognize too that in this early period there were important black women sociologists, such as Ida B. Wells-Barnett

and Anna Julia Cooper, whose work has recently been rediscovered (Lemert and Bhan 1998; Lengermann and Niebrugge-Brantley 1998). Though neither was affiliated with academic sociology, both were practicing sociologists and theorists of society. In their work they were among the earliest social scientists to analyze data on the conditions of African Americans and of women in U.S. society in terms of social "subordination" and "repression" (Cooper 1892; Wells-Barnett 1895).

By the 1920s and 1930s leading white male sociologists were downplaying or ignoring the pioneering sociological work of the early countersystem sociologists. For example, the dominant introductory textbook of the interwar decades, Park and Burgess's (1921) lengthy *Introduction to the Science of Sociology*, views sociology as an academic and abstract science. This text contains in its 1,040 pages only a few bibliographical references to the work of Du Bois, but no discussion of his research work, and only one terse sentence on, and two bibliographical references to, the work of Addams.

Park and other prominent sociologists were increasingly critical of an activist sociology and were moving away from a concern with progressive applications of social research toward a more "detached" sociology. Their work was increasingly linked to the interests of certain corporate-capitalist elites, such as those represented by the Rockefeller family foundations. While they frequently researched various types of urban "disorganization," usually in qualitative field studies, they rarely analyzed deeply the harsher realities of social oppression—especially gender, class, and racial oppression—in the development of cities. Park and several of his colleagues played a major role in shifting the emphasis from a sociology concerned with studying and eliminating serious societal problems to a more detached and academic sociology concerned with "natural" social forces—without the humanitarian attitude or interpretation of what Park sometimes called the "damned do-gooders" (Lengermann and Niebrugge-Brantley 1998: 15–18; Raushenbush 1979:96).

Moreover, during the 1920s and 1930s support for a detached and instrumental-positivist sociology increased at major U.S. universities. This approach is "instrumental" in that it limits social research mainly to those questions that certain research techniques will allow; it is "positivist" in that it commits sociologists to "rigorous" research approaches thought to be like those used in the physical sciences (Bryant 1985:133). A pioneer in this approach was Franklin H. Giddings at Columbia University. In an early 1900s' *American Journal of Sociology* discussion, Giddings (1909) argued, in strongly gendered language,

> We need men not afraid to work; who will get busy with the adding machine and the logarithms, and give us *exact studies*, such as we get in the psychological laboratories, not to speak of the biological and physical laboratories. *Sociology can be made an exact, quantitative science*, if we can get *industrious* men interested in it. (P. 196, italics in original)

By the 1920s the influential William F. Ogburn, who trained at Columbia University under Giddings and was later hired at the University of Chicago, aggressively argued for such a detached and quantitative research approach. In his 1929 presidential address to the American Sociological Society he called for a sociology emphasizing statistical methods and argued that sociologists should not be involved as sociologists in improving society; instead they should focus on efficiently discovering knowledge about society. Whoever is in power, "some sterling executive," might then apply this objective sociological research (Bannister 1992:188–90). Survey methods and statistical analyses were gradually becoming the emphasized and preferred research strategies in mainstream sociology.

Over the next few decades, most mainstream sociologists, including those in leading departments, did not research major public events and issues, especially from a critical perspective. One study of 2,559 articles appearing in the *American Sociological Review* from 1936 to 1984 examined major social and political events for five periods within this time frame—events such as the Great Depression and McCarthyism—and found that overall only 1 in 20 articles dealt with the major events examined for these periods (Wilner 1985). Moreover, from the 1920s to the 1940s remarkably few of the

leading U.S. sociologists researched, or spoke publicly and critically of, the growing fascist movements in the United States and Europe, some of which would soon help generate a catastrophic war. Apparently, one reason for this neglect was the increasing emphasis on a "value-free," "pure-science" approach to sociology (Bannister 1992:175–89).

Still, some important critics emerged. Writing in the early 1940s in an appendix to his *An American Dilemma*, Gunnar Myrdal ([1944] 1964) specifically criticized the move by Park and Ogburn toward a more detached sociology:

> The specific logical error is that of inferring from the facts that men can and should make no effort to change the "natural" outcome of the specific forces observed. This is the old do-nothing (*laissez-faire*) bias of "realistic" social science. (P. 1052)

Anticipating later discussions and debates, Myrdal developed a critique of the new accent on a "value-free" social science:

> Scientific facts do not exist *per se*, waiting for scientists to discover them. A scientific fact is a construction abstracted out of a complex and interwoven reality by means of arbitrary definitions and classifications. The processes of selecting a problem and a basic hypothesis, of limiting the scope of study, and of defining and classifying data relevant to such a setting of the problem, involve a choice on the part of the investigator. ([1944] 1964:1057)

As Myrdal viewed the matter, value neutrality in social science is impossible, for in making choices about how to assess and research society there is always something of value at stake. While scientific conventions provide guidelines for choices, they necessarily involve value judgements, and no one can avoid value judgments simply by focusing on just social "facts."

By the 1930s and 1940s the critical, countersystem approaches of sociologists like Addams and Du Bois were losing out to a politically safe, academic, and distancing sociology. Sociology was increasingly becoming a discipline whose college and university departments were dominated by white male sociologists and often linked to elite interests—including ties such as grants from corporate foundations and government agencies. As Deegan (1988) has noted regarding the dominant sociologists at the University of Chicago,

> These later men therefore condemned political action for sociologists, while the ideas of the elite, in fact, permeated their work. . . . Rather than condemn the exploitation and oppression of daily life, the later Chicago men described it. They justified it through their acceptance of it. (P. 304)

In the decades after World War II, many mainstream sociologists continued the move toward the pure-science ideal and away from the concerns for social justice and the making of a better society. There was a great expansion of federally funded research in the physical sciences, and leading sociologists worked aggressively to grasp a share of the new federal money, often by stressing an instrumental-positivist sociology that attempted to imitate those physical sciences. In the late 1950s some 15 prominent social scientists, including leading sociologists, signed onto a statement, "National Support for Behavioral Science," which pressed the U.S. government for funds for social science:

> We assume the probability of a breakthrough in the control of the attitudes and beliefs of human beings. . . . This could be a weapon of great power in Communist hands, unless comparable advances in the West produce effective counter-measures. (Quoted in Friedrichs 1970:88)

Contrary to their statements elsewhere about value neutrality, the political orientation of these and other influential social scientists of the time made transparent the centrality of values that were then shaping social science research.

Also evident is the strong interest of leading social scientists in state-funded research. These researchers were largely successful in their efforts, and substantial bureaucracies have developed to fund social science research under the auspices of the federal government and private foundations. This government and corporate underwriting of much mainstream sociological research has fed the emphasis on a quantitatively oriented or instrumental-positivist sociology and on soci-

ologists as research entrepreneurs. Not surprisingly, social scientists who have secured major funding from federal government agencies and large corporate foundations have rarely done research that draws on the countersystem tradition and is strongly critical of established institutions in the corporate or governmental realms. From the 1930s to the present, the accent on academic grant-getting, the heavy emphasis on certain types of quantitatively-oriented research, and the movement away from the social justice concerns of earlier sociologists have been associated trends (see Cancian 1995).

A detached-science perspective has been influential in many areas of sociology for some decades now, but not without strong countering perspectives (e.g., see Vaughan 1993). Since the late 1960s there has been a periodic resurgence of interest in an activist sociology, including an increased concern with research on (and the eradication of) institutional discrimination and other forms of social oppression (e.g., see Omi and Winant 1994). Significantly, the recent history of sociology has been dialectical, with supporters of the detached-science perspective often being central, yet regularly challenged by those advocating a sociology committed to both excellent sociological research and social justice.

AGENDAS FOR SOCIOLOGY: THE NEW CENTURY

Looking toward the next few decades, I see important conceptual, empirical, policy, and activist tasks for which the rich diversity of contemporary sociology can help prepare us. These tasks often relate to questions of social justice. Indeed, one major reason that some subfields of sociology are periodically attacked by conservative, and often ill-informed, journalists and media commentators is that analyses of discrimination, domination, and social justice are generally threatening to those who desire to maintain the status quo. Moreover, we should keep in mind that sociologists have already had a broad impact. Sociological ideas and research are frequently used in public discourse by those grappling with societal problems, and sociology books are more widely reviewed (and perhaps even read) outside the discipline than any other social science books except history books (Bressler 1999:718).

Let us now consider a few of the socially-relevant agendas for the twenty-first century that can be inaugurated or accelerated by sociologists with many different research perspectives and methods.

Bring Social Justice Back to the Center

First, it is time for the discipline to fully recover and celebrate its historical roots in a sociology committed to social justice in ideals and practice. In recent decades no sociologist has published even one substantial article in a major sociology journal (e.g., the *American Journal of Sociology*, *American Sociological Review*, and *Sociological Theory*) on the sociological ideas of the women sociologists in the founding generation (Lengermann and Niebrugge-Brantley 2001). It is time for us sociologists to remedy this neglect and help to reclaim the important ideas of those women sociologists and sociologists of color who are among the founders of our discipline.

A strong case can be made that the British social scientist Harriet Martineau (1802–1876) is the founder of empirical sociology in the West. She was apparently the first social scientist both to use the term sociology and to do systematic sociological research in the field (Hoecker-Drysdale 1992). She helped to invent a new sociological approach that brought empirical data to bear on questions of social theory and public policy. She wrote the first book on sociological research methods (Hill 1989), in which she argued—preceding Emile Durkheim by half a century—that research on social life is centrally about studying social "things" accurately and should involve research on "institutions and records, in which the action of a nation is embodied and perpetuated" (Martineau [1838] 1989:73). She was a contemporary of Auguste Comte and translated his major work on positive philosophy (sociology) into English. Martineau's first major sociological analysis was based on observations from a field trip across the United States—a multi-volume set titled *Society in America* (1837). In that work she developed sociological insights as

penetrating and original as those of her more celebrated male counterpart, Alexis de Tocqueville. Martineau was also a feminist theorist and anti-slavery activist, and wrote extensively and sociologically on social issues for the general public.

Contemporary sociologists should also recognize the importance of, and draw more from, the ideas of early U.S. sociologists like Jane Addams and W. E. B. Du Bois. As I noted previously, these pioneering U.S. sociologists offer solid role models in their dual commitments to social-scientific knowledge and to social justice, equality, and democracy. They gave central attention to the theoretical, empirical, and policy dimensions of sociological research. The work of the early women and African American sociologists, as well as that of progressive white men, may well point us toward a new conceptual paradigm for sociology. Such a paradigm would accent the centrality of differences, oppressions, and inequalities—as well as recurring movements for social justice—within societies like the United States.

It is also time that we recognize these social justice themes in the writings of some of the classical "founding fathers" of sociology. For example, Emile Durkheim has often been portrayed in relatively conservative terms, as being principally concerned with social order and stability. Yet Durkheim wrote eloquently about the impetus for social justice in societies. He argued that a forced division of labor, like that found in a class-riven society, was pathological and made organic solidarity impossible. Social inequality, created by such social mechanisms as routine inheritance across generations, compromises organic solidarity. For Durkheim ([1893] 1933:384–88) organic solidarity and social justice require the elimination of inequalities not generated by variations in personal merit:

> If one class of society is obliged, in order to live, to take any price for its services, while another can abstain from such action thanks to the resources at its disposal which, however, are not necessarily due to any social superiority, the second has an unjust advantage over the first at law. . . . [The] task of the most advanced societies is, then, a work of justice. . . . [O]ur ideal is to make social relations always more equitable, so as to assure the free development of all our socially useful forces. (P. 387)

A successful movement to complex organic societies requires ever more social justice,

> . . . and we can be sure that this need will become ever more exacting if, as every fact presages, the conditions dominating social evolution remain the same. (P. 388)

Nurture the Countersystem Approach

Second, contemporary sociologists need to enlarge and cultivate the long-standing countersystem approach, not only in regard to investigating social inequality and injustice but also in regard to assessing alternative social systems that may be more just.

Today, the sociology handbooks and encyclopedias on my bookshelves have little to say about the concept of social justice. One significant task for social scientists is to document empirically, and ever more thoroughly, the character of major social injustices, both nationally and internationally. We also need more conceptual work that develops and enriches the concepts of social justice and equality. In my view, social justice is not only a fundamental human right but is also essential for a society to be sustainable in the long term. Even the corporate executives in the aforementioned spaceship example developed some understanding that justice and equity are essential to the long-term sustainability of a social system.

As I have suggested above, social injustice can be examined not only in terms of the maldistribution of goods and services, but also in regard to the social relations responsible for that maldistribution. These social relations, which can range from centrally oppressive power relations to less central mechanisms of discrimination, determine whether individuals, families, and other groups are excluded from society's important resources and decision making processes. They shape the development of group and individual identities and the sense of personal dignity. In the end, social justice entails a restructuring of the larger frameworks of social relations generally (Feagin and Vera forthcoming).

We sociologists have made a good start toward understanding certain types of social injustice and inequality. Some of us have done considerable work to document the character and impact of class, racial, and gender subordination. In the United States and in Latin America some sociologists using participatory-action-research strategies have honed countersystem ideas and methods and worked interactively with people at the grassroots level seeking assessments of, and alternatives to, an onerous status quo (e.g., Fals-Borda 1960). The commitment here is to get out of the ivory tower and to help build a resource and power base for the disenfranchised in their communities. The legitimacy of this type of sociological research must be enhanced. As one group of participatory-action researchers has put it, "To map and analyze the dimensions of social problems . . . is seen as scientific research. To discuss and describe alternative practices and develop solutions is seen as moving toward politics and advocacy—areas that are perceived as a threat to the objectivity of research" (Nyden et al. 1997; also see Stoecker 1996). Collaborative research between sociologists and community groups seeking solutions to serious local problems of housing, work, education, poverty, discrimination, and environmental pollution should not be shoved aside, as it sometimes is, with cavalier comments about sociological "do-goodism," but should be placed in the respected core of sociological research—where it was at the birth of U.S. sociology.[1]

In everyday practice all sociology is a moral activity, whether this is recognized or not. In a society deeply pervaded and structured by social oppressions, most sociological research will reflect these realities to some degree, and attempts to deny these realities or their impact on research are misguided at best. All social science perspectives have an underlying view of what the world ought to be. As Moore (1971) noted,

> [Questions] that arouse human passions, especially in a time of change, have had to do with the forms of authority and justice, and the purposes of human life. . . . It is impossible therefore to avoid taking some kind of a moral position, not only in writing about politics but also in *not* writing about them. (P. 3)

A countersystem approach attempts to assess the status quo from a viewpoint at least somewhat outside the frame of the existing society and/or nation state. In practice, social scientists can accept the prevailing nation-state or bureaucratic-capitalistic morality or they can resist this morality by making a commitment to social justice and human rights. Contemporary countersystem approaches often accent a broad human rights framework in which each person is entitled to fair treatment and justice simply because they are human beings, not because they are members of a particular nation-state. Moreover, some social scientists (e.g., Sjoberg 1996) have suggested that the United Nation's Universal Declaration of Human Rights—with its strong array of social, political, and economic rights—may be a good starting place for developing a robust human rights framework for social science research.

We should seek a sociology that is grounded in empirical and theoretical research *and* that hones a critical perspective less restricted by established institutions. Careful data collection, reasoned argument, and critical moral judgments are *not* incompatible. The great sociologist of race and class, Oliver C. Cox, underscored this point:

> Clearly, the social scientist should be accurate and objective but not neutral; he [or she] should be passionately partisan in favor of the welfare of the people and against the interests of the few when they seem to submerge that welfare. (Cox 1948:*xvi*)

Numerous sociologists, from Jane Addams and W. E. B. Du Bois, to Robert and Helen Lynd and Gunnar Myrdal, to more contemporary scholars as diverse as Alfred McClung Lee, Jessie Bernard, James Blackwell, Robert Bellah, and Orlando Fals-Borda have accented the importance of bringing moral discourse and research on "what is the good society" into the center of sociological

[1] Interestingly, one 1990s survey of 12,000 Ph.D. sociologists revealed that over half spent at least 10 hours a week doing what they view as "applied" research (Dotzler and Koppel 1999:79).

debate and analysis. Even more, today we need to look beyond the borders of the nation-state to address the possibility of a world moral community.

Be More Self-Critical

Third, as part of an ongoing self-renewal process, I see the need for accelerated self-reflection in sociology. This is a task closely related to my last point. The communities, colleges, universities, agencies, companies, and other settings in which we practice sociology are shaped in part by the oppressive social relations of the larger society. We need a liberating and emancipating sociology that takes risks to counter these oppressive social relations in our own bailiwicks.

As social scientists, we should regularly examine our research environments, including our metascientific underpinnings and commitments. Critical social perspectives, such as those of feminists, gay/lesbian scholars, critical theorists, anti-racist scholars, and Marxist researchers, among others, have been resurgent since the 1960s. Scholars researching from these perspectives, as well as symbolic interactionists and ethnomethodologists, have called for more internal reflection in the social sciences. In one such disciplinary reflection, feminist sociologists Stacey and Thorne (1996:1–3) argue that, while anthropology and history have incorporated feminist ideas better than sociology, the questioning of androcentric concepts and structures is finally beginning to have a broader impact in sociology. In an earlier critical reflection, Dorothy Smith (1987) argues that mainstream sociology has historically been part of the dominant ideological apparatus, which focuses on issues primarily of concern to men. Mainstream sociology's central themes are "organized by and articulate the perspectives of men—not as individuals . . . but as persons playing determinate parts in the social relations of this form of society . . ." (p. 56). Feminist sociologists have pressured the discipline to view and research the social world from the perspective of women and thereby greatly expand its fund of knowledge.

African American, Latino, Native American, Asian American, gay/lesbian, and other formerly excluded sociologists also have pressed the discipline of sociology to view and research society from their standpoints and thus to broaden sociological knowledge. For instance, in an introduction to the reprint of her pioneering book, *The Death of White Sociology* ([1973] 1998), Ladner notes numerous ways in which the presence of scholars of color, as well as women and gay/lesbian scholars, has forced issues of social subjugation to be considered seriously in both the academy and the larger society. Similarly, racial-ethnic feminists have forced the academy to consider seriously multiple statuses and the intersectionality of oppressions (Baca Zinn and Dill 1994). The goal of all these scholars is not just to develop alternative funds of knowledge, but also to push this knowledge in from the margins, where it too often resides, toward the central trends and debates in sociology. Inside and outside the discipline, this accumulating knowledge can then become part of the process of eroding the historical relations of social oppression.

Hopefully, more self-reflection among sociologists can also lead us and other social scientists to destroy the insidious boundaries we often draw around ourselves, such as the artificial dichotomy of quantitative versus qualitative research, the ranking of basic over applied research, and the valuing of research over teaching.

Recognize and Stress the Importance of Teaching Sociology

Fourth, we need to recognize and accent the importance of teaching sociology—especially the kind of quality teaching that will prepare present and future generations for the coming social, economic, technological, and environmental challenges. Indeed, many of us were recruited into sociology by first-rate teachers. Our graduate programs need to recognize that most people who secure Ph.D. degrees in sociology do not become professors in research universities, but rather become applied sociologists or faculty members with heavy teaching loads in a diverse array of public and private educational institutions (see Eitzen, Baca Zinn, and Gold 1999:57–60).

The majority of undergraduate and graduate students in sociology are looking for

meaningful ways to contribute to making a better society. Thus, it is disturbing to hear reports from some of these students at various colleges and universities that their professors are asserting that there is no room in sociology for idealism and activism. Social scientists who attempt to avoid social betterment issues often defend themselves with phrases like, "We are not out to save the world." C. Wright Mills (1958) once suggested,

> Sometimes this is the disclaimer of a modest scholar; sometimes it is the cynical contempt of a specialist for all issues of larger concern; sometimes it is the disillusionment of youthful expectations; often it is the posture of men who seek to borrow the prestige of The Scientist, imagined as a pure and disembodied intellect. (P. 133)

As teachers of sociology, we should make clear to the coming generations of sociologists not only that there is plenty of room for idealism and activism in the field but that these qualities might be required for humanity to survive the next century or so. We need to communicate the excitement and importance of doing sociology. Alfred McClung Lee (1978) was eloquent in this regard:

> The wonder and mysteries of human creativity, love, and venturesomeness and the threatening problems of human oppression and of sheer persistence beckon and involve those with the curiosity and courage to be called sociologists. Only those who choose to serve humanity rather than to get caught up in the scramble for all the immediate rewards of finance and status can know the pleasures and lasting rewards of such a pursuit. (Pp. 16–17)

In my view, sociology students should be shown how the diversity of theories, methods, debates, and practitioners in sociology is generally healthy for the field and for society. We also should strive to help our students think critically about their social lives and about building a better society. Wendell Bell (1998) has underscored the importance of showing social science students how to engage in debates about important issues, critically assess necessary moral judgments, and explore possible social futures for themselves and their societies.

Study the Big Social Questions

Finally, contemporary sociologists need to spend much more effort studying the big social questions of the twenty-first century. Interestingly, Kai Erikson (1984:306; also see Wilner 1985) once suggested that a review of leading sociology journals over several decades would likely find that many decisive events had been ignored there by sociologists. When social scientists become too professionalized and too narrowly committed to a discipline or area of study, research issues tend to be defined from within their dominant professional paradigm. They rely heavily on a narrow range of theories and methods. Only those research topics and interpretations are accepted that do not threaten the basis of the profession and its established intellectual capital. However, technological and other knowledge developments are now moving so fast that a social scientist who is too narrowly trained or focused may be incapable of making sense out of the ongoing currents of change.

In many U.S. colleges and universities the administratively sanctioned goal of generating grant money—often for its own sake—still distorts too much social science research in the direction of relatively minor social issues. This heavy focus on grant money reduces the amount of research on key public issues and diminishes the potential for colleges and universities to be arenas for critical debate and discussion of those issues (Black 1999).

C. Wright Mills (1958) called for social scientists to challenge dominant ideas:

> If truly independent ideas are not even formulated, if we do not set forth alternatives, then we are foolishly trapped by the difficulties those now at the top have gotten us into. (P. 137)

Sociologists need to formulate more original and independent ideas, and to illuminate and directly and critically address recurring national and global crises. We need to implement Gans's (1989) call for more sociologists to become public intellectuals who will speak critically, and from data, about major societal issues. Especially in our journals, many social scientists need to break from the conventional style of research presentation

and jargonistic writing that targets a specialized audience and move to a style accessible to broad audiences and to an approach that addresses the big social questions and the implications of research for society. At the same time, we should recognize that there are numerous sociologists who write well and accessibly, yet often face the censorship of ideas that are seen as too critical—an experience still common in this society. Thus, we also should insist that the relevant publishing outlets consider and publish important critical analyses of momentous social issues, and not rule them out as "too controversial" or as "only thought pieces" (Agger 1989:220).

Yes, some sociologists do work on the big and tough questions; yet we need many more to ask major questions about such societal trends as the huge and ongoing wealth transfers from the working classes to the rich, the social impact of environmental crises, the impact of globalizing capitalism on local communities, and the human costs of racism, sexism, and other social oppressions.

One major research question requiring much attention relates to the international impact of multinational capitalism and its "free markets." We hear much today about the global capitalistic economy, but all too little social science research is examining its deep structure and broad range of human consequences. Half a century ago, in a foreword to Polanyi's book, *The Great Transformation*, sociologist Robert M. MacIver ([1944] 1957) noted that some research on capitalistic markets already indicated that formulas like "world peace through world trade" were dangerous simplifications:

> Neither a national nor an international system can depend on the automatic regulants. Balanced budgets and free enterprise and world commerce and international clearinghouses . . . will not guarantee an international order. Society alone can guarantee it; international society must also be discovered. (P. *xi*)

Other major research questions deserving more attention from sociologists center on the character, costs, and future of contemporary racism. While some sociologists have pressed forward in researching the white-generated oppression targeting Americans of color, more researchers should address the ways in which racial oppression becomes disguised or subtle in its character and practice, the ideological defense of that oppression, and the social costs for its targets and the larger society.

We should also encourage similar sociological research on other major forms of social oppression that pervade this and other contemporary societies. In recent years sociologists and other social scientists have undertaken significant empirical and theoretical work on sexism, homophobia, ageism, and discrimination against the disabled, yet today these areas cry out for much more research and analysis.

In addition, more sociologists should study societal futures, including the alternative social futures of just and egalitarian societies. The United States spends several million dollars annually on the scientific search for extraterrestrial life, yet very little on examining the possible or likely social futures for terrestrial societies. Today, we should encourage more sociologists and other social scientists to investigate societal probabilities and possibilities, and assess them for the general public. Social scientists can extrapolate critically from understandings of the trends and possibilities already apparent in various societal arenas, as well as probe an array of societal alternatives with imaginative research approaches.

Major societal transformations loom ahead of us. There are, for example, the demographic changes well described by some sociologists, such as the graying of societies. Such trends will likely be associated with other societal changes: Aging societies, for example, may have less interest in war, experience less street crime, and focus themselves more on issues of health care, social services, and euthanasia. Another demographic shift already underway is an increasing racial and ethnic diversity in some national populations. According to some U.S. Census Bureau projections, in the year 2050 the U.S. population will reach about 383 million; just under half will be Americans of color (Murdock 1995:33–47). And by the 2050s, it is estimated, Americans of European descent will become a statistical minority. For the most part, in-depth analysis of the social significance of this demographic trend has been left to journalists or popular

commentators, most of whom have limited sociological knowledge. There is ample opportunity right now for sociological research into the possible or likely societal futures associated with trends such as these, particularly assessments from a countersystem framework accenting the goals of social justice and multiracial democracy.

In addition, more sociologists should be doing research on, and showing the public the social consequences of, the likely technological advances in biomedicine, artificial intelligence, genetics, and telecommunications. A central aspect of human societies is the ability to collect, amass, and analyze information. Today new developments in information generation, storage, and application are emerging at an explosive rate. For instance, technological optimists predict that over the next few decades the biomedical revolution will greatly extend the human life span and augment our mental and physical capacities dramatically. What are the social consequences of such striking biomedical developments for the world's many peoples? A leading medical expert on immunology, Jerome Groopman (1999), has speculated on the inequalities likely to emerge:

> I don't see the wealthy western nations rallying to make major inroads into the developing world, where infant mortality is still high and life expectancy is much lower. Will you have this very lopsided set of populations, where people in America and Western Europe are playing tennis and taking Viagra at 115, while in Zaire people are still dying at 15 from HIV, malaria, tuberculosis, and Ebola? (1999:n.p.)

Moreover, in a provocative article, "Why the Future Doesn't Need Us?" Sun Microsystems' co-founder and chief scientist Bill Joy (2000) has warned of a major technological threat to human beings—the new technologies of robots and other human-engineered organisms. In Joy's informed prediction, uncontrolled self-replication by robots with artificial intelligence could pose a serious threat to human beings in the coming decades. A number of computer scientists have predicted that by the 2030s computers will be ever more human, "conscious," and intelligent (Kurzweil 1999). They predict that computers will have capacities a million times greater in the future than at present, and that computerized robots will be much "smarter" than human beings. A generally cautious computer scientist, Joy (2000) does not see himself as writing science fiction, but as one who asks tough questions about social futures: "Given the incredible power of these new technologies, shouldn't we be asking how we can best coexist with them? . . . [S]houldn't we proceed with caution?" (n.p.).

Reviewing policy options, Joy (2000) suggests the almost unthinkable solution of humans giving up entirely the development of this robotic technology because of its likely negative consequences for human societies. Physical scientists like Joy are questioning the modern faith in the benign character of new technologies. They are asking tough questions about the failure of physical and social scientists, policymakers, and ordinary citizens to be centrally concerned with the social consequences of technologies. Critical assessments of possible or probable social futures for technologically "advanced" civilizations are natural research and analytical tasks for contemporary sociologists.

CONCLUSION

In an 1843 letter, the young Karl Marx suggested that critical social analysis should lay bare the hidden societal realities. The goal must be the "reform of consciousness not through dogmas but by analyzing mystical consciousness obscure to itself, whether . . . in religious or political form" (Marx [1843] 1975:209). Marx added that the task for involved social scientists, as for other citizens of the world, was the clarification of the "struggles and wishes of the age" (p. 209).

For many millennia human beings have been tool-makers, yet in just a few decades we have created economies and technologies—such as polluting industries, fossil-fuel consuming engines, and nuclear weapons—that may well threaten the survival of our species and of our living planet itself. It seems likely that the fate of our planet and its many species will be decided within the next few generations by just one of its species. As moral beings, we need to ask insistently: What would alternatives to our self-destructive societies look like? And how do we get there?

Much of humanity might agree on a new global social system that reduces injustice, is democratically accountable to all people, offers a decent standard of living for all, and operates in a sustainable relation to earth's other living systems (e.g., see Korten 1999; Sahtouris 1996). Determining whether this is the case and how such a just global society might be developed are enormous questions that sociologists—and other citizens of the world—should be tackling.[2] In a pioneering book, *The Image of the Future* (1973), Fred Polak argued that we need a new generation of visionaries who can think clearly and deeply about sustainable social futures:

> Social scientist, intellectual, artist, leader, middleman of any breed, and the Common Man (and Woman) to whom, after all, this century belongs—each must ask himself [or herself], what is *my* vision of the future? And what am I going to do about it? (P. 305)

While social science analysis can help us to understand our ailing societal dreams and decide what dreams to accept or reject, such analysis is beneficial only if it frees us to decide on a better future. Let me conclude by closely paraphrasing Polak (1973:305): Human beings have the ability to dream better futures than we have yet succeeded in dreaming. We have the ability to create much better societies than we have yet succeeded in creating.

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[2] For example, visualizing the path to a better future for the world's poor is not difficult. The 1997 *Human Development Report* of the United Nations indicated that for about 15 percent of the U.S. defense budget, or about $40 billion a year, the basic needs for health, nutrition, education, reproductive health, safe water, and sanitation could be met for the entire population of the planet. Another $40 billion would be enough to bring the poorest residents of the planet out of extreme poverty (Williamson 2000).

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Media and Mobilization: The Case of Radio and Southern Textile Worker Insurgency, 1929 to 1934

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Collective action rests, in part, on group identity and political opportunity. Just how group identity is manifested and perceptions of political opportunity are altered, however, remain unclear, particularly in the case of a geographically dispersed population. An often overlooked mechanism is media technology. This article analyzes an important yet underexamined instance of worker mobilization in the United States: the southern textile strike campaigns of 1929 to 1934 during which more than 400,000 workers walked off their jobs. Using historical data on textile manufacturing concentration and strike activity, FCC data on radio station foundings, and analyses of political content and song lyrics, the authors show that the geographic proximity of radio stations to the "textile belt" and the messages aired shaped workers' sense of collective experience and political opportunity: Walk-outs and strike spillover across mill towns resulted. The implications of the analyses for social movement theory generally, and for the understanding of how media can enable or constrain collective struggle, are discussed.

Between 1929 and 1934, the U.S. South experienced a truly remarkable moment in labor history. Estimates suggest that approximately half a million southern textile mill workers walked off the job during this period, culminating in the General Textile Workers Strike of 1934. Interestingly, this mobilization occurred with little organization by labor unions and in the face of coercive paternalistic practices and state-sponsored violence (Griffith 1988; Hall et al. 1987; McLaurin 1971).

A pivotal moment in U.S. labor history, the movement's eventual defeat has had consequences for labor practices, organizing efforts, economic development, and persistent poverty and inequality in the U.S. South up to the current day (Roscigno and Kimble 1995). Yet, little sociological attention has been devoted to this instance of southern worker unrest. Indeed, much of the research on worker insurgency overlooks the South or treats it as a union-resistant region (Cornfield and Leners 1989). How is it that nearly

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half a million workers, most of whom were geographically isolated in rural mill towns, collectively mobilized in the face of local elite repression? Were collective identity and political opportunity—prerequisites to collective action according to social movement theorists—achieved and, if so, through what mechanism? What networking resource was at the disposal of workers that fostered strike spillover from one mill town to the next?

We extend the literature on collective behavior and social movements, labor insurgency, and class consciousness by addressing these questions. We first embed our analysis in the historical specifics, and then in collective identity (e.g., Melluci 1985; Taylor and Whittier 1992) and political opportunity (e.g., Jenkins 1985; McAdam 1983) frameworks of collective action. We argue that insights from these literatures can be effectively integrated by focusing on a unique and key historical event—the advent of radio.

BACKGROUND: SOUTHERN TEXTILE WORKER INSURGENCY, 1929 TO 1934

In 1921, southern cotton-producing states produced 54 percent of the nation's total yardage of woven cotton goods. This yield increased to 67 percent by 1927, partly the result of the relocation of textile manufacturing operations from the North to the South. This regional shift occurred because cheap labor was abundant in the South and union activity was virtually nonexistent: Southern Chambers of Commerce focused on these facts when enticing northern mill owners to move south. Indeed, wages in southern mills were approximately one-third of those in the North, even after controlling for the cost of living. In addition, southern mill workers worked longer hours (Yellen 1936).

Workers typically lived in villages under the control of mill owners. Whole families labored together for the sake of subsistence, yet housing, food, and medical care remained substandard in many instances (Gellhorn 1933; Hall et al. 1987). Some mill owners, employing paternalistic policies to stabilize their workforces, offered company-sponsored social programs, housing, medical services, credit at the company store, and religious services to workers. These company programs failed, however, to offset low wages and instead came to be seen as an important mechanism of labor control and coercion (Leiter, Schulman, and Zingraff 1991). Exorbitant interest rates were charged at mill stores, ministers and doctors were on the company payroll, and workers who were not performing to the company standard or who got out of line risked losing their homes (Cornfield and Leners 1989; Griffith 1988; McLaurin 1971; Pope 1942). Given such conditions, worker resistance eventually emerged.

Strikes broke out in large numbers in 1929; the main grievances were working conditions, wages, and hours. On March 12, 1929, 500 women walked out of the inspection department at the American Ganzstoff Corporation in Elizabethton, Tennessee. The following day, 3,000 more workers walked out demanding higher pay. Later that week, 2,000 workers walked out of the neighboring Bemberg plant in Gastonia, North Carolina making the same demands. Strikes not immediately related to those in Gastonia and Elizabethton occurred soon afterward in South Carolina: In late March, 800 workers walked out at Ware Shoals Manufacturing Company, and 1,250 workers walked out of the New England Southern plant in Pelzer. Within three weeks, 8,000 workers had walked out of 15 plants in the Piedmont area of South Carolina. Strikes followed shortly thereafter in the North Carolina towns of Pineville, Forest City, Lexington, Bessemer City, Draper, and Charlotte (Hall et al. 1987; Yellen 1936).

Local newspapers tended to be connected to traditional economic interests, such as textiles, and thus took a vehement and aggressive stance against this early wave of worker protest. Indeed, mill owners and local newspapers often worked hand in hand to sway public opinion away from strikers by appealing to anti-Communist sentiments, despite the fact that few workers had such affiliations. Most, in fact, were simply protesting unfair conditions rather than defending or fighting for a broader ideological stance (Salmond 1995). Perhaps most well-known in this regard were the editorials published in the *Gastonia Daily Gazette* entitled "A Deep Laid Scheme" and "Red

Russianism Lifts its Gory Hands Right Here in Gastonia," both of which were published during the infamous Loray Mill Strike of 1929. Such editorials and the red-scare rhetoric they espoused, which continued through the mid-1930s, created public anger toward strikers, caused workers to question their own national and religious loyalties, and had long-term consequences for southern attitudes toward organized labor (Billings 1990; Nolan and Jones 1976; Salmond 1995; Simon 1998).[1] Yet poor conditions persisted into the 1930s, and strikes again emerged.

By June of 1933, newly elected President Franklin Delano Roosevelt signed a bill intended to alleviate the plight of overworked millhands—the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA). This bill seemingly gave mill workers the right to push for decent hours and working conditions through collective bargaining. Section 7a of the Textile Code called for a minimum wage, a 40-hour work week, and prohibited child labor. This effort was part of the newly formed National Recovery Administration (NRA). Both Roosevelt and the head of the NRA, Hugh S. Johnson, were opposed to strikes as a means of solving disputes between workers and mill owners. Instead, they favored controlling work hours and child labor in an effort to limit production, drive up profits for mill owners, and improve economic conditions for workers through the "trickle-down" of profits (Hall et al. 1987; Hodges 1986).

Prices, sales, and employment increased to the highest level in five years by late summer, 1933, but by fall this prosperity soured. The Depression reached its worst period in the winter of 1933–1934, and mill owners, while seemingly supportive of the cooperative message in Section 7a, began to practice old strategies of oppression or in some cases instituted new ones. The "stretch-out," for instance, was used to circumvent laws limiting working hours. This was the workers' term for the cumulative changes that "set them tending machines 'by the acre,' filled every pore in the working day, and robbed them of control over the pace and method of production" (Hall et al. 1987: 211). Spinners, mostly women, were often stretched from 24 to 48 looms, and then from 48 to 96, "without a commensurate increase in pay, often with no increase whatsoever, or even an actual decrease" (Yellen 1936:299).[2] Thus, workers found themselves working as much in the new eight-hour shift as they had in shifts lasting two to four hours longer. Further, by enabling industry to curtail production when mills were producing sufficient product through "short time," the NIRA Textile Code inadvertently led to a surplus of goods and higher rates of unemployment (Tullos 1989). In short, mill owners saw the laws enacted under the NIRA as bothersome but easy to manipulate (Wood 1986).

Unions in the coal mining industry jumped at the chance to take advantage of the NIRA. Yet, in the textile industry, the United Textile Workers (UTW) did not institute a unionization drive (Tippett 1931). Indeed, it

[1] Other print communications, such as pamphlets, labor-oriented newspapers, and underground newspapers did little to foster these strikes. In a few cases, National Textile Workers Union (NTWU) pamphlets were distributed, but only after the strike had already begun; and they reduced strike support among workers because of their emphasis on promoting racial and gender equality in wages. Similarly, certain strikes, such as those in Gastonia in 1929, received coverage in the *Communist Daily Worker*, despite little if any striker affiliation with the Communist Party. This coverage, rather than fostering greater movement cohesion or participation, was used by local papers to criticize strikers and had the effect of reducing support (Salmond 1995). One exception to this generally negative impact of print media was the *Augusta Labor Review*, a small pro-labor paper in the somewhat isolated Horse Creek Valley of South Carolina. This newspaper seems to have had a positive impact on strikes in that area, perhaps because its founder and editor, Paul W. Fuller, a Methodist Episcopal minister, integrated Christian and patriotic discourse and symbolism into the presentation of worker grievances. Thus, the newspaper's message and related worker actions were less easily interpreted or attacked as being Communist-oriented by the local power structure (Simon 1998).

[2] A 1929 South Carolina House of Representatives committee found that in one South Carolina mill, a force of five men, each paid $23 per week, was reduced to three men at $20.23 per week; at another mill, a weaver who had operated 24 looms at $18.91 per week was stretched to 100 looms for $24 a week (Yellen 1936).

had fewer than 10 paid organizers in the South at that time and represented only a small fraction of the entire mill work force (Hodges 1986). According to historical accounts, this was mostly due to a lack of organizational resources and a vast, hard-to-cover rural area. Nonetheless, southern mill workers walked off their jobs, formed local unions, and organized against unfair labor practices. According to Hall et. al (1987):

> [The UTW] launched no Piedmont organizing campaign. Agents did not throng to the southern field. Yet within less than a month after passage of the act, union locals had reportedly sprung to life in 75 percent of South Carolina's mills. From an estimated 40,000 in September 1933, UTW Membership leaped to 279,000 by August 1934. To the shock of labor leaders, government officials, and businessmen alike, southern workers began "organizing just as fast as we can." (P. 304)

Strike activity intensified throughout the South in 1934. On February 12, 1934, a strike broke out at K. S. Tanners Stonecutter Mills in Spindale, North Carolina. Five months later, on July 14, a strike occurred in Guntersville, Alabama, and wildcat strikes soon rolled across that state involving 20,000 workers. On Labor Day, many workers in North Carolina and South Carolina, states that did not observe the holiday, refused to come to work. Newspapers reported 400,000 workers on strike by September 14—the largest strike in American history. What prompted workers across dispersed mill villages to strike despite the lack of clear-cut union support or organization?

COLLECTIVE IDENTITY AND POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY FRAMEWORKS

Collective identity and political opportunity perspectives offer a starting point for explaining how collective behavior was manifested in the case of southern textiles. While both perspectives deal with the development of collective action and the preconditions for insurgency, their foci differ.

Collective identity theorists emphasize ideological, normative, and cultural processes that induce individual participation in collective action and ensure social solidarity, even in the face of harsh countermobilization. These researchers also argue that alternative belief structures provide movement participants with a structure of nonmaterial rewards, not necessarily tied to movement success (Epstein 1990; J. Gamson 1995; W. Gamson 1992a; Melucci 1985; Taylor and Whittier 1992). An alternative belief structure and collective identity have been important in a variety of struggles, including those promoting racial justice (Morris 1984; Nagel 1994; Stotik, Shriver, and Cable 1994), women's rights (Mathews 1982; Meyer and Whittier 1994; Taylor and Whittier 1992), and class-based politics (Fantasia 1988; Hodson, Ziegler, and Bump 1987). Fantasia (1988) makes this focus explicit in relation to working- class politics and highlights the importance of "cultures of solidarity," defining them as "cultural formations that arise in conflict, creating and sustaining solidarity in opposition to the dominant structure" (p. 19).

Discussions of collective identity resonate with classical and contemporary theoretical ideas pertaining to "class consciousness" and when it may emerge. Indeed, "the most important blank spots in the theory of class concern the processes whereby 'economic classes' become 'social classes'" (Giddens 1982:157). Mann (1973) conceives of class consciousness as a complex process, occurring in stages, that is often curbed by dominant ideologies, class ambiguities, concessions by elites, or outright defeat. Mann's stages include (1) class identity, whereby one defines oneself as working class; (2) class opposition, whereby one perceives capitalists and their agents as opponents; (3) class totality, whereby class identity and opposition define the total of one's social situation and society as a whole; and (4) conceiving of an alternative. During this final stage, Mann continues, an "explosive potential" may emerge and create either a "conflict consciousness," which aims to alleviate the immediate problem, or a more "revolutionary consciousness," wherein the needed change involves overall systemic reorganization (also see Giddens 1982).[3] Given the

[3] Many factors can influence the progression of class consciousness through the stages described by Mann (1973), including mobility closure, the division of labor within economic en-

correct progression, the delegitimization of existing ideology, and the existence of an alternative interpretational frame, class consciousness will emerge (Della Fave 1980, 1986; Oliver and Johnston 1999).

In contrast to identity theorists and those dealing explicitly with class consciousness, *political opportunity theorists* focus on the political context in which groups are embedded and the shifting levels of opportunity that emerge across time and place. The likelihood of mobilization and the degree of leverage exerted by insurgents, it is argued, will be heightened in situations in which elites are divided in their defense of the existing order (Gamson and Meyer 1992; Jenkins 1985; Jenkins and Perrow 1977; McAdam 1982; Pichardo 1995; Tilly 1976). When elites are coordinated, in contrast, the reproduction of dominant relations is more likely, as is countermobilization against those engaging in insurgent action (Lachmann 1990; Tomaskovic-Devey and Roscigno 1996). McAdam (1983) emphasizes such countermobilization in his analysis of elite response to tactics implemented by civil rights activists during the 1960s. Barkan (1984) and James (1988) highlight the role of other actors in the civil rights struggle—namely the southern racial state, which constrained movement participants, and the federal government, which eventually intervened on behalf of participants.

Griffin, Wallace, and Rubin (1986) and Montgomery (1987) stress themes of elite response to labor organization in their analyses of capitalist countermobilization during the 1930s and 1940s. Coercion and control through paternalism proved effective as a preventive strategy (Leiter et al. 1991; McLaurin 1971). More obvious were efforts of capital to divide workers racially, to curtail working-class mobilization with subversive activities and violence, and to control labor organization and labor practices through manipulation of the state and state policy (see C. Brown and Boswell 1995; Brueggeman and Boswell 1998; Kimeldorf 1999; Roscigno and Kimble 1995; Wood 1986).

terprises, authority relationships, patterns of resource distribution, geographic dispersion, and patterns of institutional power (see Blau 1977; Dahrendorf 1959; Giddens 1982; Parkin 1979).

For collective identity theorists then, the central task is to explain how interpretation is altered, collective identity manifested, and solidarity maintained. For political opportunity theorists, the focus is on the degree of elite unity, elite countermobilization, and the extent to which these dimensions of political opportunity enable or constrain the collective expression of grievances in a given historical context. Each perspective, however, has problems when applied to Southern textile worker mobilization. How would collective identity theory explain the manifestation of solidarity across this geographically dispersed textile mill population? What was the mechanism through which structural political opportunity, if it existed, translated into and shaped political perceptions and the degree of efficacy among mill workers? We believe that media technology offers a bridge between these two perspectives.

MEDIA AND MOBILIZATION

How were mill worker identity and sense of political opportunity manifested in the 1920s and 1930s despite the geographically dispersed nature of mill towns? This question is integral to those interested in the diffusion of collective action (Oliver 1989; Olzak 1992; Rogers 1995; Soule 1997; Soule and Zylan 1997). Such spatial "spillover" requires some form of network structure through which information is communicated and shared (Fantasia 1988; Morris 1984; Oberschall 1989). Assuming nonparticipants have the same structural relation to the network as social movement participants, nonparticipants become potential adopters (Myers 1998; Strang and Meyer 1993).

While information networks may include family, friendship, or transportation ties, the media may be particularly important for information flow across geographically dispersed populations (W. Gamson 1995; Kahan 1999; Oberschall 1989; Spilerman 1970). Myers (1998, 2000), in his analyses of racial rioting, 1964–1971, characterizes this potential influence as a concentric area around the network origin defined by the range of the medium's distribution, rather than as lines connecting individuals. This is an important theoretical extension of previ-

ous perspectives because it offers a potential mechanism through which group consciousness and perceptions of opportunity may be altered across geographic space.

To assert the media's influence requires specifying the structural and instrumental ways in which it can shape collective action across a dispersed population. On the structural end, the introduction of new media may provide opportunities not directly associated with collective action, but which alter the leverage and/or autonomy of subgroups. This appears to be true in the case of radio station foundings in the South, which had the unintended consequence of creating a relatively autonomous community of musicians, many of whom were ex-mill workers, who traveled from mill town to mill town and radio station to radio station. This group alone, we suggest, represented an important conduit for information flow among mill towns.[4] Indeed, indirect network ties may be as important to social movement diffusion as direct links (Soule 1997).

Media, including the radio, can be more directly influential when it shapes prospective movement participants' perceptions of political opportunity. It is here—in drawing a distinction between political opportunity at a structural level and perceived political opportunity among potential insurgents, and specifying the mechanism(s) through which perceived opportunity may be altered—that political opportunity theory has been limited (Kurzman 1996; McAdam 1982; Tarrow 1988). By disseminating information geographically, media can mold the political perceptions of a dispersed population (Kahan 1999). This was the case with radio and its establishment in the U.S. South. For the first time in U.S. history, a president spoke over this medium to southern workers in the format of "fireside chats," during which a national political commitment to the plight of workers and workers' right to collectively organize was communicated despite local elite repression (R. Brown 1998; Hall et al. 1987).

[4] This resonates with Gurlach's (1999) discussion of "traveling evangelists." By carrying messages, spreading ideology, and building personal relationships across the network, they play a role in social movement links and spatial diffusion.

Media can also be instrumental by altering workers' sense of collective experience and solidarity. Historically, one of the most obvious means through which group identity has been manifested and shared is through language generally, and music specifically (Eyerman and Jamison 1998). Language and vocabularies of motive, of which music lyrics are no exception, are important facts in social action not reducible to individual social psychology. Rather, verbalization, through speech or song, is always conversational and dynamic, often political, and potentially consciousness-altering (Flacks 1999; W. Gamson 1992b; Goffman 1981; Lichterman 1999; Mills 1939, 1940). As such, "the language of situations as given must be considered a valuable portion of the data to be interpreted and related to their conditions" (Mills 1940:913).

Although consistent with classical theory's interest in culture and more recent efforts to develop social movement theory's emphasis on cultural processes (Melucci 1985; Taylor and Whittier 1992), it is notable that so few analyses systematically consider music as a component of the collective action repertoire or as a form of discourse through which collective identity is fostered and movement solidarity is achieved. In a study of American left-wing music, Denisoff (1972) distinguishes between songs that are rhetorical, highlighting discontent, and songs that aimed at recruitment and solidarity maintenance during active, collective protest (also see Flacks 1999; McLaurin and Peterson 1992). Eyerman and Jamison (1998) concur and suggest that the articulation of identity through music is central to movement formation. Indeed, music not only adds an authentic air to the plea for social action because of its emotional appeal (Pratt 1990), but it also builds and reinforces identity and group commitment through ritual and the act of singing collectively (Flacks 1999).[5] In the southern case, the folk

[5] Drawing from symbolic interactionism, Flacks (1999) suggests that singing is a form of role playing, requiring one to take the identity articulated in the song, at least momentarily. This process may be further reinforced by collective singing, a symbolic gesture whereby participants demonstrate membership in, and commitment to, the group.

tradition of storytelling through music has a long and important history (Malone 1979).[6] Thus, we expect to find that music, and its dissemination via radio and ex-mill worker musicians, was an influential part of the social movement repertoire for southern textile workers.

DATA

We draw our data from a number of sources. Data on radio station foundings in the South prior to 1935 were gathered from the archives of the Federal Communication Commission (FCC). These records provide the day, month, and year of each radio station founding, along with the radio station name, ownership, and the city in which it operated. Coupling FCC data with data on textile mill concentration, derived from Clark's Directory of Southern Textile Mills (1929) and Davidson's Textile Blue Book (1935), and data on strike activity drawn from various sources,[7] allows us to address the most important empirical question—was radio spatially proximate enough to textile mills to have played a part in the insurgency that occurred? This data is supplemented with historical evidence on radio ownership among mill workers.

Along with establishing the spatial link between mill concentration, radio station foundings, and strike activity is the need to specify and analyze *how radio was influential*. Here, we rely on historical data pertaining to the impact of politically oriented broadcasts, archival and interview data on ex-mill worker musicians during the period in question, and on content analyses of music lyrics. Political data are drawn from historical accounts and the archives of the New Deal Network Library and Franklin D. Roosevelt Library. We gathered information on musicians and songs dealing with southern textile mills, textile mill town life, and textile worker insurgency from 1929 to 1934 from the Archie Green Papers of the Southern Folk Life Collection at the University of North Carolina Archives and a variety of other sources.[8] The resulting collection of 35 songs represents the most comprehensive compilation of Southern textile songs of which we are aware.[9]

ANALYTIC STRATEGY AND RESULTS

We first examine radio station foundings in the South and the proximity of these stations

[6] Of course, music has been important for other labor insurgencies in the United States, back to the classical industrial ballads by Joe Hill. Unfortunately, and despite the existence of collections of songs of insurgency across a variety of industries (see Greenway 1956; Hille 1948; Lieberman 1989; Lomax 1960; Lomax, Guthrie, and Seeger 1967), the link between music, social processes, and mobilization has, with few exceptions (e.g., McLaurin and Peterson 1992), received little systematic attention among sociologists.

[7] Complete strike data for the U.S. South during the early 1930s is difficult to find, as no systematic records for the region were kept. We did, however, compile a relatively extensive list of strike activity drawing from Hall et al. (1987), Nolan and Jones (1976), Salmond (1995), Simon (1998), and Yellen (1936). While our list and the resulting map of strike activity that follow undoubtedly capture the general concentration of strike events and the largest, most pronounced strikes in the region between 1929 and 1934, we suspect that some small, less visible strikes may be missing from our data.

[8] These sources include, but are not limited to, *American Folksongs of Protest* (Greenway 1953), *The People's Song Book* (Hille 1948), *Folk Songs of North America* (Lomax 1960), *Hard Hitting Songs for Hard-Hit People* (Lomax et al. 1967), *American Industrial Ballads* (Seeger 1992), *Babies in the Mill* (Dixon 1998), and interviews undertaken by the authors.

[9] We limited our sample of songs to those emanating from the South that were recorded, sung, played, or transcribed prior to 1935. Ideally, we would also have radio "play lists" for the time period in question. Unfortunately, given the newness of radio at the time, such records were not kept. What we do know, given the historical literature and interviews we undertook with surviving mill musicians and mill workers, is that many of the musicians who wrote and sang mill-related songs traveled from radio station to radio station to play, sang some of these songs during live radio shows, and spent significant time with those residing in the mill towns (Malone 1968; Wiggins 1987). This suggests that the impact of radio on collective identity may have been direct through the playing of mill songs, or indirect through the creation of this autonomous group of

to textile mills and mill towns where the most pronounced strikes of 1929–1934 occurred. Spatial patterns are analyzed by geographical mapping. These visual representations show whether radio was a viable mechanism through which perceptions of political opportunity could have been altered and collective identity manifested. Supplementary quantitative analyses of the population of Southern mill towns (N = 542), whether a strike occurred, and whether there was a radio station within the city limits or near to the city, help us further establish the link between radio stations and actual strike events.

The analysis then focuses on transmission content, directly or indirectly via radio, and its implications for perceptions of political opportunity and collective identity. For analyses of political content, we outline a major shift in political structure and opportunity during the time period in question—that is, Roosevelt's New Deal. We then draw from archival sources to describe the role radio played in communicating this new context to southern mill workers, magnifying their perceptions of opportunity and offering legitimacy to their experiences and claims of injustice at the hands of mill owners.

Consistent with Hodson's (1999) recommendation for systematically analyzing qualitative content data and converting it into quantitative and descriptive summary statistics, we created a coding scheme for analyzing music lyrics. Both authors coded each of the 35 songs along various dimensions, reported in Tables 2, 3, and 4. Inter-coder reliability was approximately 91 percent. In cases of disagreement, we went back to the original source to rectify the difference. Our analysis of music lyrics employs a dichotomy similar to Denisoff's (1972), distinguishing between songs focusing on discontent and collective experience (N = 21) and songs dealing with protest (N = 14).[10] For songs of discontent, we report frequency breakdowns of the problems workers faced and the interpretation of causes. For songs of protest, we also use frequency breakdowns but focus on the primary intent of the song and the type of elite countermobilization described, if any. We supplement these summary statistics throughout with discussion of the musicians and illustrative lyrics.

Radio Station Foundings, Proximity to Textile Mills, and Strike Activity

Radio quickly found its way into the U.S. South in 1922, when on February 3, the first license was granted to WGH in Montgomery, Alabama. Within one month, stations were founded in Charlotte, Memphis, Atlanta, Charleston, Richmond, and Morganton. Interest in this new medium was intense, to say the least, as 43 operating licenses were granted to various stations across the South by the end of that year.

Early ownership patterns in the South mirrored those in the country as a whole, with heavy reliance on department stores, insurance companies, universities, amateurs, and major electronics manufacturers (e.g., General Electric, Westinghouse, etc.) who had links to the newly emerging recording industry (e.g., RCA/Victor) (Garafalo 1997). Our examination of FCC archival records indicates that traditional industries in the South (e.g., agriculture and textiles) played little or no role, while colleges, music companies, battery companies, and relatively new industries, such as automobile and insurance dealers, did. Take, for example, station WBT in Charlotte and station WRBU in Gastonia, North Carolina. Although located near textile mills, mill owners apparently had no involvement or control in either station. Rather, WBT was owned by C. C. Coddington, an entrepreneur and Buick dealer, while WRBU was owned by A. J. Kirby Music Company.

Two important political issues emerged during the early years of radio. The first had to do with the nature of broadcasts, and debates over public versus commercial interests. Despite considerable discussion, little federal intervention occurred until the mid to late 1930s, when the Communications Act of 1934 created the FCC. Even then, however, regulation and oversight lagged behind

musicians who drew some of their songs from workers and shared these songs across communities.

[10] Music probably serves a different function in each context. Prior to mobilization, music shapes collective experience, group-building, and interpretive understanding. Thereafter, the goal is solidarity maintenance and description of potential countermobilization in the face of active protest (Flacks 1999).



Figure 1. Number of Radio Stations in the Southern States of Alabama, Georgia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia, 1922 to 1934

Source: FCC Archives.

the new, developing technology (Bittner 1982; Garafalo 1997). Thus, stations were relatively free to broadcast what they wanted. Most stations depended on the programming of NBC and CBS, while allocating between one and three hours a day to programming and live shows that catered to the specific interests of local populations (Summers 1958). In the South, for instance, "depending on the location, one could usually begin the day or spend the noon hour listening to a program of hillbilly, Cajun, blues, or gospel music" (Malone 1979:71).

The other issue had to do with transmission range. This concern was addressed by the Radio Act of 1927, which limited the power of most stations in order to reduce interference among stations sharing the same frequency (Hogan [1930] 1971). Although initially a problem in the South, given its few stations and the inability of broadcasts to reach rural populations, this was partially remedied by the increase in foundings in the late 1920s and into the 1930s. Figure 1 displays the increase in number of stations during this time period. The increase between 1922 and 1930 was significant, and large Southern cities like Atlanta, Memphis, and Nashville boasted as many as five stations. Small stations were also established, and they found a niche in rural towns with respectable population concentrations (Hall et al. 1987). By 1931, foundings tapered off because of increased competition and market saturation.

Radio station transmissions in the large Southern cities were not strong enough to reach the high textile concentration counties of western North Carolina and northwestern South Carolina, where worker mobilization occurred between 1929 and 1934. Thus, if radio was central to information flow, and to perceptions of political opportunity and collective identity for mill workers specifically, some stations needed to have been established in areas geographically proximate to mill concentration. Map 1 overlays the concentration of textile mill manufacturing with city-specific radio station foundings prior to 1935 in an effort to assess whether this was the case.

Map 1 shows a clear "radio belt" cutting through the center of the densest textile concentration—an area where the most pronounced strike activity and the largest strikes of the late 1920s and mid 1930s occurred (Map 2). This link between radio station foundings and strike activity is further confirmed in associational analyses. Table 1 shows that strikes were significantly more likely to occur in southern mill towns that had a radio station. Because transmissions extended beyond the limits of a particular city (i.e., 25 to 40 miles, on average), we also examine the impact of having a radio station near the city—that is, not in the city,

Map 1. Textile Manufacturing Communities and Radio Station Foundings in the U.S. South Prior to 1935

Sources: *Clark's Directory of Southern Textile Mills* (1929), *Davidson's Textile Blue Book* (1935), and FCC Archives.

★ Denotes city with at least one radio station founding.



Map 2. Textile Mill Strike Activity across the U.S. South, 1929 to 1934

Sources: Hall et al. (1987), Nolan and Jones (1976), Sallmond (1995), Simon (1998), and Yellen (1936).

★ Denotes city where strike occurred.



Table 1. Association between Strike Occurrence and the Geographic Location of Radio Stations Relative to Southern Mill Towns, 1929 to 1934

Proximity of Radio Station to Town	Strike Occurred	
	No	Yes
In the Town		
No	456	50
Yes	22	14
χ^2 (d.f. = 1)	27.2***	
Near the Town[a]		
No	263	24
Yes	215	40
χ^2 (d.f. = 1)	7.0**	

Note: Number of mill towns = 542.

[a] Station not located in the town, but in the county or in an adjoining county.

**$p < .01$ ***$p < .001$ (one-tailed tests)

but in the county or in an adjoining county. This association, albeit weaker, is also significant.[11] It is clear, given these patterns, that many southern mill workers lived and worked within the concentric rings of radio transmission and that this may have shaped the insurgency that unfolded.

But did workers have access to radios? Radio ownership among mill workers was surprisingly high given their low economic status. Hampton's (1935) analysis of leisure-time activities among 122 mill workers across three mill villages during this period suggests that up to 70 percent had radios in their homes. Furthermore, when asked to rank 46 leisure-time activities, listening to music on the radio was ranked highest. "The radio is kept going all the time there ain't no static" (woman, quoted in Hampton 1935: 61). While music programs were most popular, others opted for "preaching and talks on the government" (elderly man, quoted in Hampton 1935:61).

Radio and Political Opportunity

Media may influence collective action by altering actors' perceptions of political opportunity. Pratt (1990) notes that the rapid diffusion of information to more people through media was intensified with the advent of radio. The South was no exception, particularly when it came to political information. For the first time, southern workers felt as if they had a direct line to the president, as Franklin Roosevelt took to the airwaves and entered their homes. Roosevelt used the new medium of radio to move beyond traditional means of political discourse and to "reach over and around the networks of state and local party structures and political personalities" (Kahan 1999:185). Roosevelt, in fact, created "a new political context" through radio, utilizing its directness and its potential to circumvent local power bases.

With respect to the rights and grievances of workers, Roosevelt used weekly "fireside radio chats" to signify his support. The third of these broadcasts, which was titled "On the Purposes and Foundations of the Recovery Program" and aired on July 24, 1933, dealt explicitly with the need for industrial reform and better working conditions. This left workers, including those in the South who traditionally felt isolated from national bases of power, with the impression that they could count on "the intervention of the federal government as a lever against local elites and guarantor of workers' rights" (Hall et al. 1987:292). Roosevelt also urged workers to write him—and they did, in unprecedented numbers (Sussman 1963).

Many southerners took part in the write-in campaign to the president (McElvaine 1983; Sussman 1963). Those who felt excluded from the political process, most notably women, now felt empowered to share their grievances, discussed the need and desire to organize collectively and, through their detailed letters, encouraged the powerful to consider the mill workers' plight. Many of these letters also made clear that southern workers believed there would be federal in-

[11] We also ran logistic regression models predicting the likelihood of a strike that included both radio indicators along with controls for the state and textile mill density in the city. These findings (available from the authors upon request) are consistent with the analyses reported. They suggest that a strike was greater than three times more likely to occur if the mill town had a radio station, and between one and one-half and two times more likely if there was a radio station in the county or in an adjoining county.

tervention (Hall et al. 1987). The following letter, sent to the president during the 1934 strike, describes the consequences of the walkout and includes a "personal" appeal to F.D.R. to get involved.

> Dear President Roosevelt,
>
> I hope you can spare the time for a few words from a cotton mill family, *out of work* and almost out of heart and in just a short while out of a house in which to live. You know of course that the realators are putting the people out when they cannot pay the rent promptly. and how are we to pay the rent so long as the mills refuse us work, merely because we had the nerve to ask or "demand," better working conditions.
>
> I realize *and* appreciate the aid and food which the government is giving to the poor people out of work *Thanks to you*.
>
> but is it even partly right for us to be thrown out of our homes, when we have no chance whatever of paying, so long as the big corporations refuse of work. I for one am very disheartened and disappointed guess my notice to move will come next.
>
> what are we to do. Wont you try to help us wont you appeal, "for *us* all," to the real estate people and the factories
>
> hoping you'll excuse this, but I've always thought of F.D.R. as my personal friend.
>
> C.L.F. (Columbus, Ga.)
>
> (Henry Morgenthau Jr. Collection 1934, emphasis and punctuation as in original)

The impact of Roosevelt's radio transmissions on the consciousness of southern textile workers was witnessed firsthand in 1933 by Martha Gellhorn, a reporter hired by Federal Emergency Relief Administration director Harry Hopkins to investigate social and economic conditions in the South. In her report to Hopkins on the conditions in Gaston County, North Carolina, Gellhorn describes poor health conditions along with unfair mill owner practices, while also noting:

> All during this trip I have been thinking to myself about that curious phrase "red menace," and wondering where said menace hid itself. Every house I visited—mill worker or unemployed—had a picture of the President. These ranged from newspaper clippings (in destitute homes) to large colored prints, framed in gilt cardboard. The portrait holds the place of honour over the mantel; I can only compare this to the Italian peasant's Madonna. And the feeling of these people for the president is one of the most remarkable emotional phenomena I have ever met. He is at once God and their intimate friend; he knows them all by name, knows their little town and mill, their little lives and problems. And, though everything else fails, he is there, and will not let them down. (Gellhorn 1933)

Workers also spoke directly with Gellhorn about Roosevelt, sharing their confidence that the president was on their side.

> You heard him talk over the radio, ain't you? He's the only president who ever said anything about the forgotten man. We know he's going to stand by us.
>
> He's a man of his word and he promised us; we aren't worrying as long as we got him.
>
> The president won't let these awful conditions go on.
>
> The president wanted the Code [NIRA, Section 7a, of the Textile Code]. The president knows why we struck.
>
> (Gellhorn 1933)

The initial local political autonomy of radio also enabled local organizers to gain access to the southern airwaves. At the outbreak of the massive strike of 1934, for instance, UTW vice-president Frances Gorman

> . . . took his cue from the rising generation of Millhands. He went on the radio, gaining hours of air time at no expense. He encouraged "flying squadrons" of cars and trucks to speed through the countryside—and they did, closing mills so rapidly that "tabulators almost lost check." (Hall et al. 1987:329)

Consequently, the airways became an arena in which political battles over the right of workers to collectively organize were fought when George Sloan, head of the Cotton Textile Institute, went on the airwaves to express the position of mill owners (Hall et al. 1987).

Use of the airwaves by local organizers and a progressive president intent on addressing work-related issues was important for mill worker perceptions of political opportunity.

Photograph 1. The Dixon Brothers Performing Live on the Radio in Charlotte, North Carolina

Source: John Edwards Memorial Collection, Southern Folklife Collection, University of North Carolina Archives.

The initial autonomy of radio stations, mostly a function of ownership patterns and a lack of local elite control, allowed the expression of grievances by local organizers and the use of radio as a networking resource. Roosevelt's "fireside chats" communicated a national political commitment to these workers along with an explicit recognition of their right to organize. Write-in campaigns by southern mill workers showed that they recognized a political opening and were listening. What remained unclear was the degree to which federal intervention on their behalf would actually occur.

Music, Collective Experience, and Discontent

Beyond explicitly political broadcasts, radio had a direct and indirect impact on the cultural life of mill towns by creating a niche for musicians, many of whom were ex-mill workers. These musicians knew mill life, and the songs they wrote showed they were still wedded to their mill experiences. They also made it a point to visit mill towns when traveling from radio station to radio station to perform (Malone 1968; Wiggins 1987). Ex-mill workers, like Charlie Poole and his North Carolina Ramblers, for instance, were able to play music full-time after landing a recording contract in 1925. Poole's band was extremely popular throughout the mill towns of the Southeast, playing popular tunes and songs that spoke to the lives of mill workers. In fact, the bulk of the music that mill workers listened to reflected not only mill work but the whole existence of mill life (Hall et al. 1987).

The Dixon Brothers, former mill workers, recorded "Weave Room Blues," "Weaver's Life," "Factory Girl," and "Hard Times in Here," while also performing traditional southern folk tunes and mill-related songs live on the airwaves (Photograph 1). Lesser known singers also recorded cotton-mill songs. Frank Welling and John McGee, also known as the Martin Brothers, recorded "The Marion Massacre" for Paramount, while David McCarn recorded "Cotton Mill Colic" and "Serves Them Fine" for Victor, the latter song chiding textile workers for leaving their mountain homes for the cotton mills (Malone 1968; Peterson 1992).

Record sales dropped during the Depression, and live broadcasts of music became even more important for these musicians. Sometimes, during live "barn dance" broad-

Table 2. Frequency Distribution of Textile Workers' Concerns as Expressed in Songs about the Textile Worker Experience

	Family Well-Being			Worker Well-Being		
Song Title	Family Subsistence	Children Working	Future and Children	Low Wages	Physical Well-Being	Mental Well-Being
The Big Fat Boss and the Worker				×		
Brown Lung Blues	×				×	
Cotton Mill Blues		×				
Cotton Mill Colic	×			×		
Cotton Mill Girl		×				
Cotton Mill Man			×		×	
Factory Girl					×	
Hard Times Cotton Mill Girls				×		
Hard Times in Here		×				
Hard Times in the Mill					×	
Let Them Wear Their Watches Fine			×	×		
Ma and Pa	×					
Mill Mother's Lament	×			×		
No More Shall I Work in the Factory					×	
Ol' Man Craft						
Rich Man/Poor Man				×		
Serves Then Fine				×		
Shirt Factory Blues						
Weave Room Blues	×					×
Weaver's Life					×	
Winnsboro Cotton Mill Blues						×
Total	5	3	2	7	6	2

casts, like J. W. Fincher's Crazy Waters Crystals Saturday Night Jamboree broadcast on WBT in Charlotte, these musicians and groups would play together and share mill-related songs (Green 1963a; Malone 1968). Their sharing of popular tunes and their ability to travel "paved the way for some of the first hillbilly bands to earn their livings performing at a Spartanburg high school auditorium one night, at a Gastonia mill recreation center the next evening, and on a Charlotte radio station the following morning" (Tullos 1989:2).

Woody Dewey, a radio archivist associated with the John Rivers Communications Museum at the College of Charleston, in Charleston, South Carolina, remembers hearing musicians such as Bill and Charlie Monroe, Bill Carlisle, and others sing songs of interest to mill workers. He also recalls listening to specific broadcasts in the early 1930s as a 10-year-old while visiting his uncle:

> They listened to a program each day from WIS, I think that's right, in Columbia. Anyway, they listened to a program called the Aristocratic Pigs. . . . Fisher Hendley was the head pig, I suppose [laughs]. His signature song was "Weave Room Blues," and he played the banjo, and he would play it

> [Weave Room Blues] every once in a while. He came to Lancaster with the Aristocratic Pigs . . . of course, we all had to go up and see them at the high school there in Lancaster. We all enjoyed it. Back then, ya know, there weren't no TV. . . ya didn't know what they looked like and in order to see them and get a glimpse of what they looked like, you go out when they played those personal appearances. They did that two or three times a week all around the state. (Dewey 1999)

Homer "Pappy" Sherrill, himself a legendary bluegrass fiddle player who began playing on Gastonia, North Carolina, radio station WSOC in 1929 as a 13-year-old, similarly recalls hearing the Dixon Brothers play "Weave Room Blues" and other mill-related songs over the airwaves:

> I've heard'em play it. They were on WBT [Charlotte] when we were up there. They were connected to Fisher Hendley. It was in the early thirties. [Starts singing Weave Room Blues during interview]. "Eleven cents of cotton, 40 cents of meat, how in the world can a poor man eat, I got them lonesome weave room blues. (Sherrill 1999)

Thus, radio transmission was directly influential for the cultural life of mill towns. More indirectly, radio created a network of ex-mill workers (i.e., musicians) who traveled between towns, drawing from and contributing to the cultural life and experiences of those still working in the mills. The music and the emergence of radio "put millhands across the region in touch with each other, allowing those who missed the traveling musicians' performances to hear and enjoy the same music," thus fostering a strong sense of group identity (Hall et al. 1987: 261). Mill owners, on the other hand, periodically saw the emerging music and its consciousness-altering potential as a threat. For example, in Danville, Virginia in 1930, local authorities and mill owners attempted to forbid workers from singing Dave McCarn's recently released "Cotton Mill Colic" (Rorrer 1982).

Songs pertaining to mill life often employed a collective sense of experience, using the words "we," "us," and "our," and communicated anxieties specific to the experiences of most mill workers. Table 2 (on p. 35) shows these songs (N = 21), categorized by the concerns they address, specifically family well-being and/or the worker her or himself. This table illustrates the richness of these songs, the multiplicity of concerns they touch on, and the fact that the issues addressed could vary by verse. Recognizing the overlap in themes highlights the complexity of these songs and their lyrics.

Ten of the 21 songs dealing with mill work generally relate concerns for family, while fifteen, or seventy-one percent, denote problems faced by workers. Among concerns for family well-being, children are often mentioned, something that undoubtedly evoked a broader concern and universal appeal among listeners.[12] Five of these deal with family subsistence—the ability to provide for one's family's basic needs. This concern is most obvious in some of the lyrics to a song aptly titled *Mill Mother's Lament*:

> And when we draw our money,
> Our grocery bills to pay,
> Not a cent to spend for clothing,
> Not a cent to lay away.
>
> And on that very evening
> Our little son will say:
> "I need some shoes, mother,
> And so does sister May."
>
> How it grieves the heart of a mother,
> You every one must know;
> But we can't buy for our children,
> Our wages are too low.

Another song, *Cotton Mill Man*, reflects the grieving heart of a mill worker and his fear that his son may also end up working in the mill:

[12] The following quoted lyrics for *Mill Mothers Lament, Let Them Wear Their Watches Fine, Weave Room Blues, Big Fat Boss Man and the Worker*, and *The Marion Strike* were obtained from Greenway (1953). Lyrics for *Cotton Mill Man, Winsboro Cotton Mill Blues, Union Special, Here We Rest*, and *On a Summer Eve* were gathered from Green (1963b).

I watched my woman cry when
our baby daughter died.
I couldn't make her understand
why the doctor never came,
The lack of money was to blame.
I cussed the day that I became a
cottonmill man.
Lord, don't let my son grow up
to be a sweaty cottonmill man.

While these lyrics reflect the collective experiences of mill life and their consequences for family sustenance and the well-being of children, over half of these songs (15) describe the toll mill work takes on the worker her or himself. Seven of these songs deal with the low economic return for the amount of work put in. In four verses of *Let Them Wear Their Watches Fine*, this grievance is coupled with a discussion of the social status consequences of mill work.

We work from week end to week end,
And never miss a day,
And when that awful pay day comes
We draw our little pay.

On pay day night we go back home
And set down in a chair.
The merchant knocks upon our door
He's come to get his share. . . .

Those fancy folks that dress so fine
And spend their money free,
They don't have time for a factory hand
That dresses like you and me.

As we go walking down the street
All dressed in lint and strings,
They call us fools and factory trash
And other low down things.

Many of the 21 songs dealing with the general experiences of southern mill workers in the 1920s and 1930s also specify the cause(s) of the problems they face. Table 3 shows the coding according to the cause(s) specified—the work process and/or the negative impact of human agents (i.e., bosses, managers, and/or scabs). Given our focus on the manifestation of collective identity, class consciousness, and insurgency through music, the distinction between cause and effect is important. If lyrics do not address a cause, then consciousness relating to where grievances should be aimed will remain unclear. This interpretational link between cause and effect is indeed crucial if social movement discourse and framing processes are to be effective (W. Gamson 1995; Snow and Benford 1992; Taylor and Whittier 1995). It is noteworthy that a cause is specified in more than three-quarters of these songs. Sixteen of the 21 associate discontent with the work process, while the same number specify a human culprit.

Lyrics pointing to the work process fall into three principal categories: general work conditions, the length of the work day, and the introduction of scientific management. Twelve of the 21 songs place the blame for mill worker problems on general work conditions, including the speed, cleanliness, and noise associated with mill work. One verse of *Weave Room Blues* provides a vivid image of these conditions:

Slam out, break out, makeouts
by the score,
Cloth all rolled back and
piled up on the floor.
The bats are running into strings,
they're hanging to your shoes,
I'm simply dying with them
weave room blues.

Notably, much of the worker complaint is directed specifically at employers and managers rather than being seen as a consequence of mill work. Vallas's (1987) analysis of the labor process and the social and organizational aspects of work suggests that a focus on managers and owners, rather than the labor process generally, has stronger ramifications for class consciousness (Billings 1990; Della Fave 1980). W. Gamson (1995) concurs and suggests that an injustice frame will be more effective at recruiting and mobilizing if the target is a concrete

Table 3. Frequency Distribution of Causes of Textile Workers' Concerns as Expressed in Songs about the Textile Worker Experience

	Work Process			Bosses, Managers, Scabs		
Song Title	General Work Conditions	Length of Work Day	Scientific Management	Exploitation by Owner	Managerial Control	Presence of Scabs
The Big Fat Boss and the Worker				×		
Brown Lung Blues	×					
Cotton Mill Blues	×			×		
Cotton Mill Colic	×			×		
Cotton Mill Girl	×				×	
Cotton Mill Man	×			×		
Factory Girl	×				×	
Hard Times Cotton Mill Girls	×					
Hard Times in Here	×				×	
Hard Times in the Mill		×				
Let Them Wear Their Watches Fine		×				
Ma and Pa						×
Mill Mother's Lament				×		
No More Shall I Work in the Factory	×				×	
Ol' Man Craft			×	×		
Rich Man/Poor Man				×		
Serves Then Fine				×		
Shirt Factory Blues		×			×	
Weave Room Blues	×				×	
Weaver's Life	×					
Winnsboro Cotton Mill Blues	×				×	
Total	12	3	1	8	7	1

actor, preferably a person or corporation presented as malicious, selfish, or greedy. *The Big Fat Boss and the Worker*—a song penned by Ella May Wiggins, a mill worker and local organizer who was killed in an ambush during the Gastonia uprisings—conveys such specificity and resulting polarization by straightforwardly attributing worker problems to mill owner exploitation. Two verses in particular stand out:

> The boss man hates the workers,
> the workers hates the boss.
> The boss man rides in a big fine car
> and the workers has to walk.
>
> The boss man sleeps on a big fine bed
> and dreams of his silver and gold.
> The workers sleeps in an old straw bed
> and shivers from the cold.

Some of this exploitation, as workers recognized, took the form of paternalistic practices, as related in the following two verses of *Cotton Mill Man:*

> The company taught us all the rules
> on how to work the spinning spools,
> So the boss's son could drive a
> big black sedan.

The company owned the houses and the
company owned the grammar school,
You'll never see an educated
cottonmill man.

They figure you don't need to learn
anything but how to earn
The money that you paid upon demand
To the general store they owned or else
they'd take away your home
And give it to some other homeless
cottonmill man.

Managers also are blamed for problems experienced by workers. In this verse from *Winnsboro Cotton Mill Blues*, the cause of worker duress is clearly managerial oversight and greed:

Old man Sargent sitting at the desk,
The damned old fool won't give us no rest.
He'd take the nickels off a dead man's eyes,
To buy a Coca Cola and a Eskimo pie.

Clearly, songs of mill worker experience and discontent have a general appeal—an appeal that transcends the specifics of a particular mill town and that reverberates with the day-to-day realities of mill life in the South. Not only do these songs appeal to collective understanding and concerns relating to family subsistence, the well-being and future of children, and specific problems affecting workers, but they also provide a framework through which such concerns are interpreted in a causal fashion. This is crucial if the framing aspect of social movement culture is to invoke focused collective action (W. Gamson 1995; Snow and Benford 1992; Snow et al. 1986; Taylor and Whittier 1995). Put simply, songs afforded workers a framework through which the similarity of their plight became increasingly obvious; they also shifted accountability away from the workers and toward the labor process and its beneficiaries.

Songs of Protest

Music is influential not only in its impact on collective experience and group identity but also because it serves as a unifying force during mobilization. As Morris (1984) notes in his analysis of the southern civil rights movement, this is particularly important when countermobilization is fierce (Denisoff 1972; Flacks 1999). Symbolism, ritual, and discourse through music are crucial for maintaining solidarity among participants and for shaping the consciousness of nonparticipants so that they become sympathetic to, or are actually recruited into, the movement.

In the case of southern textiles, songs that emerged out of earlier strikes became songs of unification across mill towns during later strikes (Denisoff 1971; Huber 1998; Malone 1979). The Gastonia Strike of 1929 stands out as one of the first labor conflicts in the South to create a repertoire of protest songs outlining the plight of workers as well as touching on strike issues and elite countermobilization strategies. The importance of song during an active protest is evident in Photograph 2. It shows the Four Tobacco Tags (foreground), a popular recording and radio group during the era, playing and singing at a 1934 strike near Austell, Georgia, while striking workers danced in order to block the doorways to the Clark Threadmill.

Table 4 classifies these 14 textile protest songs by their primary intent. Unlike the songs of general mill worker experience described previously, these songs are more direct in their goal and thus were easier to code. Most (9) have as their main aim solidarity maintenance and recruitment during a strike period. Like the general songs of mill life summarized previously, language is largely inclusive, referring to "we," "our," and "fellow workers." Some lyrics, such as these from *Here We Rest*, attempt to maintain solidarity in the face of strike-breaking by scabs:

We are standing on guard
Both night and day,
We are doing our best
To keep scabs away.

We are 1200 strong
And the strike still is on,
And the scabs still are standing
But they won't scab for long.

Photograph 2. Musicians Furnish Music to Dancing Strikers Blocking the Entrance of the Clark Threadmill Near Austell, Georgia, 1934

Source: Walter P. Reuther Library, Wayne State University.

Some lyrics appeal to the worker's broad sense of commitment to his/her fellow workers, as exemplified in this verse from *On a Summer Eve:*

If we love our brothers as we
all should do,
We'll join this union help fight it through.
We all know the boss don't care
if we live or die,
He'd rather see us hang on the
gallows high.

Table 4 also reports the type of countermobilization described, if any. Interestingly, 13 of the 14 songs describe some form of countermobilization, and in more than half of these, the countermobilization entails coercion of employees and employer manipulation of the legal-political system. Elite countermobilization is obvious in the lyrics to *The Marion Strike*. In this well-known song used in subsequent strikes, the performer provides the listener with a detailed account of both corporate influence over the local police and the interactive nature of the struggle that occurred:

The sheriff came down there to the factory,
And brought all of his men along,
And he says to the mill strikers,
"Now boys, you all know this is wrong."

"But sheriff, we just can't work for nothing,
For we've got a family to feed,
And they've got to pay us more money
To buy food and clothes that we need.

You've heard of the stretchout system,
A-goin through the country today,
They put us on two men's jobs,
And just give us half enough pay.

You know we helped give you your office,
And we helped to give you your pay,
And you want us to work for nothing,
That's why we are down here today."

So one word just brought on another,
And the bullets they started to flying,
And after the battle was over,
Six men lay on the ground a-dying.

Table 4. Frequency Distribution of Characteristics of Textile Workers Protest Songs

	Primary Intent			Countermobilization		
Song Title	Maintenance of Solidarity	Description of Strike Activity	Hostility toward Scabs	Employee Coercion	Incarceration of Leaders	Hiring of Scabs
All Around the Jailhouse	×				×	
Ballad of the Blue Bell Jail	×				×	
Chief Aderholt		×			×	
Come On You Scabs If You Want to Hear			×	×		
Here We Rest	×					×
Let Me Sleep In Your Tent Tonight, Beal		×				
The Marion Strike		×		×		
The Marion Massacre		×		×		
On A Summer Eve	×				×	
Roane County Strike at Harriman	×			×		
The Speakers Didn't Mind	×			×		
Song Ballet by Ella May	×				×	
Up in Old Loray Waiting for a Trial	×			×		
Union Special	×			×		
Total	9	4	1	7	5	1

Note that despite the coercion and legal-political manipulation described, these songs of protest have an optimistic underpinning throughout—that positive change will happen, albeit through struggle. The last verse of *Union Special* couples worker optimism with the recognition that powerful forces stand in their way:

The city officials are against us,
And the big men of the town.
But they will see in the future
That their playhouse will come down.

These illustrative lyrics demonstrate the complex nature and substance of these protest songs. They were an important tool in the protest repertoire, appealing to workers' sense of commitment and similarity of experience, to their own economic well-being and future, and to social justice, broadly defined. Thus, these songs offered a valuable tool with which to recruit and maintain solidarity. Further, they offered the listener, whether protest participant or not, a justification of the mobilization that was unfolding by specifying corporate abuses of economic, legal, and political power. The sharing of these themes, directly and indirectly via radio, for the first time offered southern mill workers sense of unity and solidarity that extended beyond the particulars of their specific mill town.

CONCLUSIONS

The establishment of radio stations in the South and the high concentration textile manufacturing areas of North Carolina and South Carolina was influential for the worker insurgency that unfolded in the 1920s and 1930s. Local organizers used the airwaves to express grievances and to coordinate action. Presidential "fireside chats" altered southern mill workers' perceptions of political opportunity, leading to the belief that national political power was now on their side and that the federal government would intervene to counter local elite repres-

sion. A new collective identity and movement solidarity was formed through music played on the radio and spread by local musicians traveling from mill town to mill town. Unfortunately for mill workers, little federal intervention occurred, and the strike campaigns were largely defeated through state-sponsored violence and legal-political control. Southern businessmen also helped lobby for, and eventually pushed through, the Taft-Hartley Act, which banned the closed shop, allowed states to instigate "right to work" laws, and resulted in a drastic reduction in worker petitions for union elections (Minchin 1997; Roscigno and Kimble 1995; Wood 1996).

Our explication of radio's role in this instance of mobilization extends on collective identity and political opportunity frameworks. Collective identity theory, as we have noted, is useful for establishing the importance of interpretational, identity, and solidarity processes for subordinate-group challenge, in a manner consistent with traditional emphases on class consciousness. What is often lacking, though, is elaboration on how media can play a fundamental part in these processes and, indeed, shape the collective experience and feelings of "groupness" across a geographically dispersed population. Furthermore, little systematic attention among collective identity theorists has been devoted to examining the role of music as an important element of the social movement repertoire—a role that not only provides a basis through which collective identity may be realized but also one in which an interpretational frame of cause and effect is offered to the listener. In the case of mill-related music, this consciousness-altering potential was evident during the 1920s and 1930s and persisted even into the mid-1960s when, for example, a recording of "Cotton Mill Man" was considered "too provocative" to be played on many radio stations in southern mill towns (Peterson 1992). Following previous work on culture and framing processes (W. Gamson 1995; Snow and Benford 1992; Snow et al. 1986; Taylor and Whittier 1995), we believe that music and the interpretational frame it can provide is fundamental if collective identity is to be transformed into coordinated collective action.

We do not believe that the importance of music is limited to textile workers or to one particular era of worker unrest. In fact, we found during our data collection a significant amount of material highlighting the importance of music for a number of historical struggles pertaining to class, race, and gender, and across a number of industries and geographic locations. Many movements have had a well-developed repertoire of songs, used before and during collective protest. Women's workplace issues, for instance, have received attention in songs pertaining to the coal mining industry, among others, throughout this century. Music is clearly an important part of the African American experience, from slave gospels, to blues lyrics, to jazz, to contemporary societal critiques embedded in rap music. Song also has been central to other working class movements—including striking longshoreman, lumberers, steel workers, and automobile workers—and for as long as we can tell (e.g., see Greenway 1953; Lomax, Guthrie and Seeger 1967; Pratt 1990). What is lacking, despite archival collections and some historical accounts, are systematic analyses and substantive sociological interpretations of these lyrics—*if* and *when* they are important and *how* they are tied to stratification processes and efforts to remedy inequality.[13]

Political opportunity theory has specified the importance of leverage and its historically contingent nature. However, an explication of the mechanism(s) through which potential movement participants' perceptions of opportunity may be altered is often lacking. Media, whether in an earlier historical era or the contemporary day, are important in this process (Brown 1998; Calhoun 1998; Kahan 1999). It is also the case that

[13] In general, music allows oppositional culture to exist, persist, and possibly spread, not only during pivotal moments when the political structure is ideal but also during relatively calm periods with little active or visible protest. Such oppositional culture can foster discontent and the seeds of protest, and may become more explicit and goal-directed at key historical moments (Denisoff 1972). It is also important to note that music can have a conservative influence by resigning the listener to his or her plight instead of encouraging action aimed at changing one's situation (Peterson 1992).

structural political opportunity must be disentangled from *perceptions* of opportunity, particularly when the analytic focus is on movement success and the forces that persuade or dissuade social movement participation (Kurzman 1996; McAdam 1982; Tarrow 1988). Where there is a disjuncture between the two, insurgency may result, but will probably be curtailed by countermobilization. Southern mill workers' perceptions of political opportunity were altered via radio, creating a belief that F.D.R. was on their side, that they had (federal) justification for their actions, and that the federal government would intervene when the pivotal moment came. Little intervention, however, actually occurred.

Our focus on media technology helps bridge the divide between collective identity and political opportunity perspectives by addressing the question of how processes relevant to social movement formation are manifested across space. However, the study of media and social movement dynamics must be supplemented further by theory that explicitly incorporates aspects of both identity and opportunity into a single framework (Meyer and Staggenborg 1996; Oliver and Johnston 1999). One of the most promising contemporary lines of work that undertakes this task is that dealing with social movement culture.

Social movement culture, rather than an ambiguous construct, is an influential and clearly defined component of the social movement dynamic comprising normative guidelines and practices that create and reinforce (1) a sense of group identity, (2) an alternative interpretational frame of cause and effect, and (3) a sense of political efficacy (W. Gamson 1995; Taylor and Whittier 1995). Such a conceptual frame is well-suited for analyzing the influential nature of music in the social movement repertoire, and we suspect that extending the focus to other forms of creative, linguistic, and/or performance expression conducive to consciousness-raising, group-building, and solidarity maintenance, would be worthwhile.[14] In our view, the melding of these two foci—social movement culture and the media—offers researchers the most useful set of theoretical tools for understanding the complex and dynamic character of historical, contemporary, and future movement formation across space (J. Gamson 1998; W. Gamson 1995; Gamson and Wolfsfeld 1993; Taylor 1996).

Our analyses also contribute to the growing body of research on media, communication technology, and community (Calhoun 1998; Cerulo and Ruane 1998; Purcell 1997). While much of this work focuses on the contemporary era, specifically on television and the Internet, many similar themes emerge. Do media and new communication technologies enhance social integration? Do they produce collective identity? Does such collective identity facilitate group action? What tends to be overlooked in this literature, however, is the historical context in which new information media unfold and the consequences for social groups. "We need to set our discussions of electronic media in a bit deeper historical context—not just of technology but of the spatial organization of power and movements challenging that power" (Calhoun 1998:375).

While our analyses highlight the power of radio to transform consciousness and to instigate challenges to existing structures of inequality, we also acknowledge radio's limitations. Our analyses reveal lessons that may be applicable to understanding the potential influence of television or the Internet on collective action. These newer technologies enhance collective experience through the maintenance of dispersed networks, the encouragement of "socio-spatial" enclaves, and the facilitation of group activities (Calhoun 1998; Cerulo and Ruane 1998). Like radio, however, the influence of newer media and communication technologies on these social processes may vary, depending on the level of political autonomy and the degree to which the information transmitted appeals to the unique experiences of individuals and specific social groups (W. Gamson et al. 1992).

In the case of radio, the autonomy of local stations was curbed by the FCC in the mid-

[14] Like Pattillo-McCoy (1998), who analyzes church culture and action in the black community, we find Swidler's (1986) discussion of "culture as a tool kit" from which actors can draw to be a useful way of conceiving of the cultural repertoire available to social movement participants.

to late 1930s when small owners and universities, advocating radio in the "public interest" and greater flexibility in what was aired, lost out to "commercial interests." More stringent guidelines for broadcasts that could be interpreted as "political" or "propaganda" were put in place, and radio operators who violated the new policies risked losing their operating licenses (Federal Radio Commission 1929; McChesney 1993). The success of the recording industry and its links to the big corporate broadcast networks also nationalized music played over the airwaves, leaving little room or market for music dealing with worker grievances and the concerns of local populations (Cantril and Allport [1935] 1971; Malone 1979). Thus, while the decline in local radio station autonomy and transmission specificity was in part a function of institutional bureaucratic tendencies, it was also a political process—one whose trajectory leaned toward, although was not completely determined by, corporate-political hegemony.

These issues of limited autonomy and an overly-generalized appeal apply most straightforwardly to television, suggesting a limited impact on collective experience and collective action.[15] However, the internet is a medium of multidirectional information flow—and it exists in a multinational context. Thus, it affords its users freedom from political controls and specificity of group interest, at least at the present time, and it will therefore probably have strong consequences for group-specific identities and the coordination of collective action. Like textile workers and radio in the 1920s and 1930s, however, such relations are tenuous at best, as they require "connection maintenance" (Cerulo and Ruane 1998)—something that is difficult to nurture and preserve over time and on a wide geographic and socio-political scale. Furthermore, like radio, the potential impact of the Internet may very well be curbed by regulations and political oversight, particularly if its use runs counter to dominant ideological positions and stratification structures.

[15] The impact of media is often conservative and supportive of the status quo**.** For elaboration of the conservative versus critical potential of media, see W. Gamson (1992b, 1995).

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How Movements Win: Gendered Opportunity Structures and U.S. Women's Suffrage Movements, 1866 to 1919

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State women's suffrage movements are investigated to illuminate the circumstances in which social movements bring about political change. In 29 states, suffragists were able to win significant voting rights prior to passage of the Nineteenth Amendment. In addition to resource mobilization, cultural framing, and political opportunity structures, the authors theorize that gendered opportunities also fostered the successes of the movements. An event history analysis provides evidence that gendered opportunity structures helped to bring about the political successes of the suffragists. Results suggest the need for a broader understanding of opportunity structure than one rooted simply in formal political opportunities.

In 1869 Wyoming became the first state (then a territory) to grant women suffrage. By 1920, when the Nineteenth Amendment was ratified, 15 states had granted women full suffrage, 2 southern states had given women the right to vote in primary elections, and 13 states had awarded women the right to vote for president. During these years, suffragists in all states mobilized in the struggle for voting rights. In Wyoming a handful of women were active in 1869 (Larson 1965), but in New York, which passed full suffrage in 1917, by the 1910s, a quarter of a million suffragists participated in various state suffrage organizations (McDonald 1987:150).

We examine the circumstances that led states to adopt full, primary, or presidential suffrage prior to ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment. To do this, we investigate the U.S. state suffrage movements and the contexts in which they mobilized. With few exceptions (Gamson 1975), sociologists only recently have begun to consider why some movements succeed and others fail in their attempts to bring about social change (Guigni 1998). As McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald's (1988) extensive review of the movements literature reveals, most movement studies have focused on movement emergence and development. But recently, a few policy studies have shed light on movement political outcomes (Amenta and Poulsen 1996; McCammon 1995; Quadagno 1992). Their theoretical focus, though, is on the interests of state actors and policy change, and thus these studies typically offer only pass-

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ing attention to the role of social movements, noting simply the presence or absence of movement activity and rarely noting variations in the organizational strength, strategies, and ideologies of movements. In addition, some movement researchers have turned their attention to the systematic study of movements and their outcomes, but the theoretical focus of this work has also been somewhat narrow (Amenta, Dunleavy, and Bernstein 1994; Banaszak 1996; Giugni, McAdam, and Tilly 1998). Movement researchers who examine the success of movements either focus primarily on the strategies of the movements themselves (Morris 1993) or, in examining the context of mobilization, limit their consideration to political institutions and actors, that is, to the political opportunity structure (Amenta, Carruthers, and Zylan 1992; Gelb 1987).

We argue that a model of movement success must consider not only the mobilization of the movements but the *broad context* in which those movements operate, including political *and* other social dynamics that can affect movement success. We elaborate on this below, but first we point out that a model of the political success of movements must theorize the impact of movements and their contexts *on political decision-makers*. Bringing about political or policy change—in the case of the suffragists, the expansion of voting rights—requires a willingness on the part of political decision-makers to support such change. A model of movement success, then, must specify the circumstances fostering such willingness on the part of political actors.

Sociological theories of the state and of policymaking have long recognized the need to theorize the interests and actions of state actors to understand the policymaking process (Alford and Friedland 1985). Yet, the few recent studies examining movement success fail to acknowledge this point explicitly and thus fail to draw on the diverse theories of the state to understand the full range of factors that can influence political decision-makers.

As movement researchers shift their focus away from the determinants of movement mobilization to the determinants of movement outcomes, they bring with them the concept of "political opportunity structure." Defining the political process model, McAdam (1982) states that "*any* event or broad social process that serves to undermine the calculations and assumptions on which the political establishment is structured occasions a shift in political opportunities" (p. 41, emphasis in original). But recently, political opportunity structure is typically considered to encompass only dynamics involving electoral politics and the state. For instance, Jenkins and Klandermans (1995) write that "social movements develop in a context defined by *the state and the representation system*, which afford opportunities for mobilization and set limits on the effectiveness of movement strategies" (p. 7, emphasis added; also see Skocpol 1992:41). McAdam (1996:27), surveying the recent literature, lists various "dimensions of political opportunity," all of which are characteristics of the formal political structure, its capacities, and the configuration of political elites. Others as well limit their view of the opportunity structure to the formal political landscape of party politics and the structure and action of the state (e.g., Amenta et al. 1992; Amenta et al. 1994; Banaszak 1996; Brockett 1991; Costain 1992; Kriesi 1995; Tarrow 1998).

But this narrow definition of opportunity structure represents only one view offered by state theorists of the factors that can influence policymaking. The focus on political structures and dynamics, typically excluding other contextual influences, represents a polity- or state-centered theory of policymaking (Evans, Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol 1985; Skocpol 1980). This view holds that the interests of political decision-makers, particularly those of state actors, are based on preserving or expanding their institutional authority, and their lawmaking decisions reflect this orientation (Alford and Friedland 1985; Rueschemeyer and Evans 1985). A political opportunity for movement success arises, then, when political circumstances shift such that political actors are willing to support policy change because they perceive the change will strengthen or preserve their own institutional positions. Empirical research in this area clearly demonstrates that formal political dynamics like these influence political decision-making and thus can influence the political success

of social movements (Amenta and Poulsen 1996). But the underlying assumption that political decision-making and movement success are unaffected by circumstances *beyond* these formal political dynamics is too narrow.

Society-centered approaches to political decision-making, such as feminist (Connell 1990; MacKinnon 1989), class (Block 1977; Domhoff 1998), and racial (Quadagno 1994) theories of the state, offer a starting point for broader theories of the types of opportunity structures that may influence movement outcomes. Society-centered theories assume that gender, economic class, and race relations can and do influence policymaking. We use polity- *and* society-centered theories to argue that not only did opportunities for granting suffrage to women emerge from changing dynamics in formal politics that altered the political interests of political decision-makers, but opportunities emerged in gendered ways as well.

Specifically, we posit that shifting gender relations produced a gendered opportunity for women's suffrage by altering attitudes among political decision-makers about the appropriate roles of women in society. That is, changing gender relations altered expectations about women's participation in the polity, and these changes in gendered expectations increased the willingness of political decision-makers to support suffrage.

Thus, we argue that, on the one hand, shifts in political circumstances altered the political calculus on which decision-makers based their actions, providing a *political opportunity* for suffrage. On the other hand, changing gender relations also caused political decision-makers to alter their views about the proper roles for women in society, and these changing attitudes about gender—not changing attitudes about the political viability of a particular stance on suffrage—provided a *gendered opportunity* for suffrage success. Thus, political dynamics *and* changing gender relations both influenced whether political actors voted for suffrage, but through different mechanisms: one through changing political interests; the other through changing attitudes about women's roles in society.

Gender theorists point out that gender can permeate all organizations and processes in society (Acker 1992; Lorber 1994). While we find in the history of suffrage that the opportunity structures helping the suffragists win voting rights typically took one of two forms—political or gendered—we also find that in some cases political opportunities involved gendered considerations as well. That is, formal political interests were intertwined with gendered expectations, often expectations about how women as voters would cast their ballots. Thus, consideration by social movement researchers of *only* political opportunity structures is simply too narrow an approach to understanding the full range of opportunity structures that foster movement success. Others have pointed to a need to refine our understanding of movement opportunity structures by recognizing that factors beyond formal political dynamics can influence movements and their success (Gamson and Meyer 1996; Goodwin and Jasper 1999: 53; Koopmans 1999; Rucht 1996; Taylor 1999). The opportunity structures confronted by the suffragists offer a chance to view this broader range of opportunity structures.

Our work advances theorizing of social movement success, but we also anticipate that it will add to the historical literature on suffrage success. The work of historians studying women's suffrage often parallels that of sociologists studying social movements. Historians explaining suffrage have emphasized the political circumstances necessary for winning the vote (Buenker 1971; Edwards 1997) or the movement strategies needed for success (Degler 1980; Flexner 1975). Some have pointed to changing gender relations as a contributing factor to suffrage victories (Kraditor 1965; Morgan 1972). Other historians, though, contend that the states granting suffrage had little in common and that these states gave women voting rights for idiosyncratic reasons (Beeton 1986; Larson 1971a).[1]

We have collected data from primary and secondary sources on all state suffrage movements and their contexts. These data

[1] Given that western states (and territories) were the first to pass full suffrage, much of the historical literature on suffrage success concerns suffrage in the U.S. West. For a fuller treatment of this literature see McCammon and Campbell (2001).

represent the only attempt thus far to systematize and analyze the historical knowledge on the state suffrage movements, and our analysis allows us to compare states that did and did not grant suffrage. Contrary to the argument that states granting suffrage had little in common, we identify a number of characteristics common to the suffrage states. Our comparative analysis also reveals that no single cause can explain women's suffrage success. Women did not win the vote simply because of particular political circumstances, or solely because of the strategies used by the suffragists, or simply because of changing gender relations. A combination of factors was required to broaden democracy to women.

A DEFINITION OF MOVEMENT SUCCESS

We define movement success in terms of "political or policy outcomes" (Staggenborg 1995:341), a definition that falls within Gamson's (1975) notion of "new advantages" and Kitschelt's (1986) "structural impact." Success for the suffragists was winning voting rights, a goal that, when achieved, would fundamentally redefine women's role in society by giving them "political citizenship" (T. Marshall 1950). In 29 states, women achieved full, primary, or presidential suffrage prior to passage of the Nineteenth Amendment.[2] Table 1 lists the states and the years in which each state granted women these forms of suffrage. We focus on full, primary, and presidential suffrage because they represent the state suffrage movements' most significant victories (Banaszak 1996:84). In a one-party South, winning the franchise in primary elections was tantamount to gaining full suffrage (Harper [1922] 1985:637), and winning presidential suffrage was considered a major victory by the suffragists (Buechler 1986).

Some states granted suffrage through legislative action alone. In other states, both the legislature and the electorate voted on the matter. Thus, two groups—state legisla-

[2] We include only the 48 contiguous states in our analysis because full data for Alaska and Hawaii are not available for the time period studied.

Table 1. Years in Which States and Territories Passed Full, Presidential, and Primary Suffrage for Women

	Year		
State	Full Suffrage	Presidential Suffrage	Primary Suffrage
Arizona	1912	—	—
Arkansas	—	—	1917
California	1911	—	—
Colorado	1893	—	—
Illinois	—	1913	—
Idaho	1896	—	—
Indiana	—	1919	—
Iowa	—	1919	—
Kansas	1912	—	—
Maine	—	1919	—
Michigan	1918	1917	—
Minnesota	—	1919	—
Missouri	—	1919	—
Montana	1914	—	—
Nebraska	—	1919	—
Nevada	1914	—	—
New York	1917	—	—
North Dakota	—	1917	—
Ohio	—	1919	—
Oklahoma	1918	—	—
Oregon	1912	—	—
Rhode Island	—	1917	—
South Dakota	1918	—	—
Tennessee	—	1919	—
Texas	—	—	1918
Utah	1870, 1895 [a]	—	—
Washington	1883, 1910 [a]	—	—
Wisconsin	—	1919	—
Wyoming	1869	—	—

Sources: Flexner (1975), NAWSA (1940), and numerous state-specific sources (see discussion in text on page 59).

Note: Other forms of partial suffrage were granted to women in some states prior to the passage of the Nineteenth Amendment, including school, tax and bond, and municipal suffrage, but they are not listed.

[a] Full suffrage was passed in the first year listed, was rescinded, and then was passed again in the second year listed.

tors and the electorate, both male—were implicated in the political decision-making necessary to grant women suffrage. A model of suffrage success must consider how the suffrage movements, along with the contexts in which they operated, influenced the willingness of these two male political bodies to support broadening democracy to women.[3]

A CAUSAL MODEL OF THE POLITICAL SUCCESS OF A SOCIAL MOVEMENT

Both agency and structure are likely to influence a movement's political outcomes (Amenta et al. 1992; Gamson and Meyer 1996). For the suffragists, we posit that both gendered and political opportunity structures influenced the political decision-makers that gave women the vote. But the suffrage movements themselves also were active agents in winning suffrage, and we consider the influence on movement success of movement mobilization and ideological framing.

Gendered Opportunity Structures

We argue that changing gender relations can provide a gendered opportunity for movement success. Gender relations refer to "the social organization of the relationship between the sexes" (Scott 1986:1053; also see Lorber 1992). According to Acker (1992) gender relations are a "pervasive ordering of human activities, practices, and social structures in terms of differentiations between women and men" (p. 567). This social ordering also represents a balance of power between the sexes that is maintained by socially constructed and widely held understandings of the appropriate (and different) roles for women and men in society (Connell 1987:96–97; Scott 1986). During the nineteenth century, a clear cultural demarcation between women's and men's appropriate social spheres emerged, with women's place defined as the private sphere of child-rearing and domestic work and men's place defined as the public sphere of politics and business (Welter 1966). Such beliefs excluded women from having a formal voice and thus formal power in politics. But the suffragists found gendered opportunities in changes or variations in gender relations that altered existing views about the proper roles of women. These variations occurred in a variety of contexts but, in each case, produced gendered opportunities that ultimately fostered suffrage success.

In particular, the rise of the "new woman" offered a gendered opportunity to the suffragists. Around the turn of the century, women increasingly received extensive education, worked outside the home, entered professional careers, had fewer children, divorced, and became involved in various charitable and political activities (Giele 1995; Matthews 1992). Women were moving into traditionally male domains, and the social order between the sexes began a transformation. The growing presence of this new woman in the public sphere—in factories, offices, universities, and the professions—gradually weakened the widely held nineteenth-century assumption that women's appropriate place was in the home.

Not only did such changes create a growing population of independent women who were often predisposed to suffrage arguments (DuBois 1975), but the blurring of this public/private distinction helped persuade the population more generally, including male political decision-makers in state legislatures and the electorate, of women's ability to participate in the public sphere, including politics (S. Marshall 1998; Morgan 1972). Caruso (1986), in her study of the movement in Michigan, tells us that there was a "realization that women were already playing a public role" and this "helped defuse the fear of women engaging in activities that obviously were not connected to the home" (p. 269). Ivie (1971) writes of the suffrage movement in Oklahoma that "public opinion had changed sufficiently to make possible effective suffrage work. Women were involved in civic affairs, more [women] were economically independent, and greater numbers of women were openly stating their opinions. Oklahoma was ready soil for suffrage work" (p. 68; also see

[3] In some cases, governors needed to approve new suffrage legislation. They usually agreed with legislatures, but in a few cases (e.g., in Arizona in 1903), governors vetoed suffrage legislation.

Alexander 1970:22; Fus 1972:101–102, 133; Giele 1995:162; Lerner 1981:365–66; White 1974:359). We argue that where women moved into previously male spheres of activity, gender attitudes became more egalitarian and suffrage success was more likely as lawmakers and the male electorate acted on these changing views.

Another gendered opportunity emerges from previous suffrage successes. In some states, suffragists won partial suffrage in the form of municipal, tax, or school suffrage. Also, some states bordered states in which full, primary, or presidential suffrage had been enacted. These legal changes represented a fundamental shift in gender relations in that they expanded women's political rights; such changes previously in a state or in a neighboring state also altered views about women's capacity to participate in politics. It might be argued that because such changes involved a legal change, it is a *political* opportunity. But we maintain that at its core it is a gendered opportunity (albeit with a political catalyst) because the change in law redefined gender relations by allowing women formal access to the polity and, as the historical record suggests, political decision-makers began to view gender relations differently. As the public witnessed women voting in minor elections locally or in major elections in neighboring states with competence and good results, views toward women's political participation liberalized and acceptance of suffrage rights grew (Fleming 1990:40; Jensen 1973:266; Larson 1971b:17–18; Smith 1975:26). We hypothesize that where the suffragists had gained such rights, they were more likely to succeed when pressing for full, primary, and presidential suffrage.

A third gendered opportunity exists in populations with a particular ethnic makeup. Some studies of women's suffrage suggest that certain ethnic groups strongly opposed suffrage for women, and they did so, for the most part, on the basis of traditional beliefs about the role of women in society (McDonagh and Price 1985; McDonald 1987). Irish- and Italian-Americans, whose family practices at the time tended to be more traditional and grounded in the belief that women's appropriate place was in the domestic sphere, were less receptive to arguments that women should have the vote (McDonagh and Price 1985). We hypothesize that where there were high proportions of Irish and Italian immigrants, suffragists confronted a significant hurdle to winning suffrage because legislators and electorates would be less willing to support suffrage given the prevalence of conservative gender relations and attitudes. But where these groups made up smaller percentages of the population, more liberal gender relations prevailed and an opening, or gendered opportunity, for winning the vote existed.[4]

The fourth gendered opportunity concerns the western frontier states. Many of the western states were the first to grant full suffrage to women (see Table 1). Some historians argue that the arduous life on the frontier produced unusual gender relations that compelled women and men to labor side by side to contend with the harsh and as yet untamed physical environment (Cole 1990; Turner 1972). As Cole (1990) states, "the frontier provided women with opportunity: [T]here they could be fiercely independent, capable, and durable" and they were "free from the constraints which bound their eastern sisters" (pp. 262–63). Thus, the shared and more equal circumstance of women and men in the West fostered a frontier egalitarianism. Again, because gender practices shaped gender ideologies, this increased the chances that decision-makers would support suffrage.

A fifth gendered opportunity is both gendered and political. World War I and its immediate aftermath generated an opportunity for the suffragists—it provided a circumstance that increased the number of suffrage political allies. Political opportunity theorists posit that when a movement can claim allies in the polity—political elites sympathetic to the movement's demands and willing to act on the movement's behalf—the movement is more likely to succeed (McAdam 1996; Tarrow 1998). During the

[4] We also examined the percentage of Roman Catholics as a variable because Catholics also tended to have more traditional family practices (Hackett 1995). This measure, however, overlaps with the Irish/Italian measure. The Catholic variable in a separate analysis did not significantly influence suffrage success.

war, the suffragists often set aside their suffrage work and contributed instead to the war effort. They raised funds for overseas hospitals and helped organize student nurses. And more generally, women assumed duties in the economy—in factories and on farms—previously done by men (Flexner 1975). Toward the end of the war and immediately after, politicians and male voters were more willing to support women's suffrage, acknowledging not only women's efforts during the war but the contradiction of fighting a war for democracy in Europe when half of the U.S. population was disfranchised (Sinclair 1965). To legitimate their incumbency and political office, many politicians felt pressure to make their position consistent with arguments in favor of the war.

World War I, then, was a gendered opportunity in that the war brought suffragists and women generally, as Flexner (1975) states, "out of their homes into new spheres of action" (p. 298). These new roles altered gendered relations and changed attitudes about women's fitness for the public sphere. But the opportunity was also political in that politicians understood the harm that an inconsistent position on democracy could do to their political well-being. The war thus represents both a gendered and a political opportunity, and we hypothesize that during and just after World War I, states should have been more likely to enact suffrage.

Political Opportunity Structures

There are three political opportunities for suffrage; they involve the formal political interests of political decision-makers or variations in state structures. However, the first two of these (party conflict and prohibition laws) also involve policymakers' considerations of how women might cast their ballots if given the vote. And while these opportunities do not involve changing attitudes about gender relations—and in this sense, are *not* gendered opportunities as we define them—they do include gendered expectations about women's behavior.

The first of these political opportunities concerns instabilities or conflicts among political elites, particularly among political parties. Political opportunity theorists point out that such instabilities compel parties to search for additional sources of political support, given that periods of conflict can threaten the tenure of political actors holding public office (McAdam 1996; Piven and Cloward 1977:28–29). Third-party challengers, such as the Populists, Progressives, Prohibitionists, and Socialists, sought to broaden their party's base and, in some instances, supported women's suffrage, believing that women voters, in turn, would support their parties (Berman 1987; Marilley 1996). This political dynamic was evident among the Populists in Colorado in the 1890s (Marilley 1996:124–25). We hypothesize that where third parties presented significant challenges to Democratic or Republican legislators, a political opportunity for suffrage, one rooted in political conflict, existed. But this political opportunity also contained a gendered element: Not only did third-party challengers conduct an analysis of the policy positions most likely to get them elected, they incorporated into this analysis expectations about the "women's vote," thus bringing gender to bear on their political calculations.[5]

The second of these political opportunities stems from involvement of the liquor and brewing industries in debates over suffrage. These industries opposed suffrage, fearing that female voters would favor prohibition (Catt and Shuler [1926] 1969). Prohibition, of course, would deeply hurt profit-making in these industries. These industries not only worked to persuade the public to oppose suffrage, but heavily lobbied politicians to vote against it. With passage of state prohibition laws, however, the liquor and brewing industries' opposition subsided. We theorize that the waning of economic resistance to suffrage provided "space" for political deci-

[5] A similar dynamic may be at work in competitive elections between the major parties. However, a measure of the competitiveness of gubernatorial elections between Democrats and Republicans (the only measure available) was not a significant predictor of suffrage. This measure also captures a possible influence on governors' decisions to support or veto suffrage legislation: A competitive gubernatorial election might increase a governor's willingness to support suffrage. The nonsignificant effect, however, suggests that this is not the case.

sion-makers to support suffrage. Their political calculations were no longer constrained by a monied interest opposing suffrage. The suffragists, then, encountered a political opportunity for success. But gendered expectations also factored into this political opportunity: The absence of concern about the women's vote (following prohibition) produced the political "space" in which policymakers could now favor suffrage.[6]

These last two political opportunities—third-party challenges and prohibition—are different from the gendered *and* political opportunity that World War I offered the suffragists. Third-party challenges and the passage of prohibition clearly presented political opportunities for suffrage success because the historical record indicates that the political calculus of decision-makers changed under these circumstances. But because there is no evidence of changing beliefs about gender roles, third-party challenges and prohibition did not offer gendered opportunities for suffrage, only political opportunities tempered by expectations about the women's vote.

The final political opportunity concerns the degree of access to the polity experienced by the suffragists; this opportunity does not have a gendered component. Although political opportunity theorists often use the existence of voting rights as an indicator of the openness of the polity, we must consider another indicator of political access because suffragists did not have voting rights (Amenta et al. 1994; Tarrow 1998). Even without the vote, suffragists could and did lobby state legislators to introduce a bill or resolution in the legislature that, if passed by the legislature (and in many cases the electorate as well), would grant voting rights to women. The procedural ease or difficulty of winning the passage of such legislation, then, offers an indicator of political openness. The procedure required to change voting policy was substantially less complex in some states in that fewer decision-makers were involved in the decision-making process. For instance, in territorial Wyoming only one positive legislative vote was needed to grant women suffrage. In Nevada, however, a favorable vote on a resolution for a referendum on a state constitutional amendment was required in two consecutive legislatures which met only every other year, and only then was the measure taken to the electorate.

Thus, not only is this last political opportunity not gendered, it offers a different kind of political opportunity for suffrage success in that, where it existed, fewer decision-makers were involved in granting the vote to women. The other two political opportunities offer an opportunity for political change by altering the political interests of decision-makers in ways that make them more inclined to enact policy change. One political opportunity is a quantitative shift in the number of decision-makers; the others are qualitative shifts in decision-makers' interests. We hypothesize that states with simpler procedures for changing suffrage law offered a more accessible policymaking process that heightened the chance that suffrage would be passed.[7]

Resource Mobilization and Cultural Framing Theory

We now turn our focus from the context in which movements operate to the movements themselves. Resource mobilization and fram-

[6] Admittedly, this is a weaker instance of political opportunity than the others. The *absence* of economically motivated opposition to suffrage may reduce lawmakers' resistance, but it does not explain why lawmakers voted *for* suffrage. Also, we examined the impact of other measures of liquor industry opposition to suffrage (e.g., percentage employed in brewing and liquor industries, the presence of a state brewers' association, and percentage of German immigrants). These measures were not significant factors in suffrage success.

[7] Only full suffrage required a constitutional amendment (although not in all states). Thus, the procedural ease of policy change may influence the suffragists' capacity to gain full suffrage but not presidential and primary suffrage. Also, because the territories required only one legislative vote on suffrage and no referendum, we included a dummy variable indicating the territories in our model, but it did not significantly predict suffrage. We examined the impact of another measure of the openness of the polity—the availability of the initiative and referendum—but found no significant effect on suffrage (also see Banaszak 1998).

ing perspectives offer insights into the actions of movement activists and the ways in which those actions influence political decision-makers' support for movement agendas. Contrasting these perspectives with those emphasizing opportunity structures highlights the distinction between the influences of agency (the movement itself) and structure (the movement's context). We consider both because we believe that both influence movement outcomes. We hypothesize that the ability of a movement to effect political change hinges in part on the same factors that resource mobilization theorists deem crucial to movement emergence and development—organization and key strategies (McCarthy and Zald 1977; Piven and Cloward 1977)—because successful movement mobilization aids a movement's ability to bring about political change (Gamson 1975).

Every state except Wyoming had a state suffrage association, and therefore the simple presence of such an organization is not likely to explain whether a state suffrage movement was successful.[8] The extent of organizing, however, may influence suffrage political success. The larger the movement, the more capable it should be of disseminating its message and thus of convincing legislators and the electorate to vote for suffrage. In some states, the suffrage movements organized men's or college women's suffrage leagues in addition to state suffrage associations, and some states had multiple state suffrage leagues. We use a measure of the number of organizations in a state as one indicator of the extent of organizing. Another measure of the extent of organizing is membership in state suffrage associations, which varied widely across states (National American Woman Suffrage Association [NAWSA] 1893–1917, 1919). Utah and New Hampshire had some of the largest per capita memberships, while South Carolina and Idaho had some of the smallest. We expect that the larger the per capita membership, the more successful the movement.

Until recently, little has been written on the relationship between movement strategies and movement outcomes (Banaszak 1996; Klandermans 1989; Morris 1993). The history of suffrage movements makes clear that suffragists relied almost exclusively on what R. Turner (1970) labels "persuasion strategies," or "the use of strictly symbolic manipulation without substantial rewards or punishments" (p. 149). In most cases, the suffragists relied on argument to persuade others that their goals were worthy. Rarely did they rely on disruptive tactics.[9]

Movement researchers recognize the importance of struggles over meanings and beliefs in movements. Snow et al. (1986) refer to "frame bridging" and Gamson (1988) refers to "cultural resonance" to describe a process in which movement participants, in the public rationales for their demands, use themes and ideas that tap into widely held beliefs. This resonance with popular beliefs helps to build movement strength and effectiveness by expanding support for the movement's cause (McCammon 1995; Quadagno 1992).

Suffrage movement histories suggest that a shift in the suffragists' ideological rationales for the vote occurred as the suffragists learned that they could link their arguments to existing beliefs espousing women's fitness for roles in the private or domestic sphere (Baker 1984; Buechler 1986; Marilley 1996). Kraditor (1965) writes that the suffragists began to rely less on "justice arguments" and instead began to use "expediency arguments." The earlier justice arguments used by the suffragists were based in liberal individualism—suffragists asserted that women deserved political rights equal to those of men because, like men, they were citizens. Such arguments, however, directly challenged the widely accepted boundary separating men's and women's spheres in that they attempted to redefine women's roles, particularly by defining women's participation in politics (or in the public sphere) as acceptable (Baker 1984).

[8] Because the state associations organized at different points in time, we examined the effect of the presence of a state organization on movement success but found no significant impact.

[9] Early in the movement, suffragists engaged in civil disobedience by attempting to vote illegally. Because this strategy was used primarily in the early 1870s, it is not a focus of our research. Analyses reveal, however, that illegal voting did not affect the likelihood of suffrage.

But over time, suffragists began to use expediency arguments. What we call a "separate-spheres argument" emphasized that state policies increasingly regulated the domestic sphere and that women could bring knowledge of the domestic sphere to the political arena in determining, for instance, how food, water, domestic violence, children's schooling, and even alcohol abuse should be regulated. Marilley (1996) makes a similar point when she focuses on the emergence of "home protection" arguments among the suffragists. The strategy of espousing separate-spheres arguments, we expect, should have produced success for the suffragists because, unlike justice arguments, separate-spheres arguments did not overtly challenge the traditional roles of women and men. Such arguments simply pointed to the advantage of allowing women to help regulate the private sphere. Thus, political decision-makers should find these arguments more convincing than those based on justice.

A second hypothesis about successful strategies used by the suffragists concerns two types of tactics used by the suffragists—insider and outsider strategies (Ornstein and Elder 1978). Both of these strategies, where used, should help the suffragists win the vote. Insider strategies are the political activities that the suffragists engaged in to influence political "insiders," that is, state legislators. Suffragists lobbied lawmakers to introduce suffrage bills and resolutions into the legislature or to cast a favorable vote on suffrage, worked to elect sympathetic legislators, and routinely appealed to state political parties, particularly the Democrats and Republicans, to endorse suffrage. Banaszak (1996:139) argues that such political strategies were key for suffragist success. We also argue that they were important because convincing the legislature to approve suffrage was necessary for winning the vote in every state.

Outsider strategies, on the other hand, are tactics aimed at persuading the general public of the movement's goals, and they target citizens or "outsiders" to the polity. Such strategies included formal and informal public speeches—the latter involving "street speaking" (soapbox speeches on street corners) and "autotours" (statewide speaking tours in which speeches were given from automobiles)—parades, booths at fairs, storefront advertising, and pamphleting. While outsider strategies could influence legislators, their impact may be most discernible in states in which a public referendum on the suffrage question was required and thus in which public opinion was crucial to the outcome. This was the case in most states voting on full suffrage for women.

To close this discussion of suffragist strategies, we consider the impact of fundraising on political success. Fundraising does not fit neatly into either the insider or outsider classification. Successful fundraising could support both insider and outsider work, for instance, by affording the suffragists trips to the state capitol or party conventions to lobby politicians or allowing the suffragists to purchase space to advertise in newspapers or literature to distribute. But also, because increased funding can translate into many different types of activities—whatever was deemed critical by suffrage leaders—fundraising becomes an important strategy that should foster movement success. In effect, it gave the suffragists flexibility because they could target insiders or outsiders for their persuasion tactics, whoever was deemed more important. The histories of suffrage are replete with instances of fundraising activities, and the national suffrage organization (NAWSA) was adamant in its communications to state suffrage associations that they engage in a variety of fundraising activities. We expect that fundraising heightened suffragists' chances of political success.

Finally, we briefly consider another "agent" that may have influenced the success of the suffragists. Anti-suffrage organizations mobilized in many states to oppose voting rights for women. Members of this countermovement argued that suffrage posed a threat to the "sanctity of the home" and that involvement in politics would overburden women, cause discord between husband and wife, and violate the natural and biological differences between women and men (Camhi 1994). Where this resistance to suffrage existed, political decision-makers may have been persuaded by its arguments and may have voted against giving women the vote. Thus, where the anti-suffrage organizations were most active should be where the suffragists were least successful.

DATA AND METHODS

We use discrete-time methods in event history analysis to examine the factors leading to suffragists' political success between 1866 and 1919 (when Congress passed the Nineteenth Amendment). All data are annual (i.e., calendar year), state-level data. Our dependent variable indicates years in which states granted full, primary, or presidential suffrage, the suffragists' most significant political successes. The variable is coded as 0 for years prior to the enactment of suffrage and 1 for the year in which suffrage was granted. Sources used in the construction of the dependent variable include: Flexner (1975), NAWSA (1940), and numerous state-specific sources.[10]

We collected a large portion of our data on the state suffrage movements and their contexts from an extensive search of secondary materials on each of the state movements (over 650 sources in all). We also relied on volumes 3, 4, and 6 of *The History of Woman Suffrage* (Stanton, Anthony, and Gage , vol. 3, [1886] 1985; Anthony and Harper, vol. 4, [1902] 1985; Harper, vol. 6, [1922] 1985), which were written by movement participants and contain lengthy descriptions of the state suffrage movements. In addition, we examined *The Hand Book of the National American Woman Suffrage Association and Proceedings of the Annual Convention* from 1893 to 1919, the years of its publication for our period. For six states (Arizona, Delaware, Maine, New Hampshire, New Mexico, and North Dakota), few secondary materials exist, and we conducted archival research in the states to supplement secondary accounts. For these states, we also examined the *Woman's Journal* from 1870 to 1919, a suffrage newspaper published by NAWSA and its predecessors that routinely reported state suffrage events. Unless other sources are noted, the reader can assume that the source of data for a variable came from this extensive collection process.

We used content analysis to code the information in each article, book, dissertation, or archival source that we read. Three coders collected data, and Krippendorff's (1980) alpha ranged from .91 to .95 on selected sources for which we assessed interrater reliability.

The *rise of the new woman* is indicated with an index that combines three measures: (1) the proportion of college and university students who are female (U.S. Department of Commerce various years; U.S. Office of Education various years), (2) the proportion of lawyers and doctors who are female (U.S. Bureau of the Census various years; U.S. Department of Commerce various years),[11] and (3) the number of prominent women's organizations active in a state (viz., the Consumers' League [Nathan 1926], the General Federation of Women's Clubs [Skocpol 1992:330], the National Congress of Mothers [Mason 1928:295], the National Women's Trade Union League [Dye 1980; National Women's Trade Union League (NWTUL) various years], and the Woman's Christian Temperance Union [WCTU]). We combined these three measures by summing their standardized values (α = .64).[12]

[10] Even though states passing presidential or primary suffrage are still "at risk" of enacting the other forms of suffrage, to avoid bias in the estimated standard errors that can result if events are not independent (as may be the case when suffrage is enacted more than once in a state), we analyze the possibility of only one event per state (Allison 1984:54). This affects the coding of the dependent variable for 3 of the 29 states that passed suffrage. Michigan passed presidential suffrage in 1917 and full suffrage in 1918. We chose to analyze the passage of full suffrage in Michigan because of its wider impact. Utah and Washington both passed full suffrage and then rescinded it. Both later passed full suffrage again and did not later rescind it. For these states, we analyze the passage of permanent suffrage.

[11] For two variables (proportion of lawyers and doctors who are female and percentage of Irish or Italian immigrants), only decennial data are available. For these variables we linearly interpolated data for the intervening years.

[12] We acknowledge that, from a resource mobilization perspective, these measures of the new woman may also be measures of potential leaders for the suffrage movements. However, given that we include more direct measures of movement organizational strength and strategies in the analysis (i.e., the likely consequences of good leadership), the contributions of measures of the new woman to effective leadership (and thus to movement success) have been controlled in the analysis. Also, it could be argued that our mea-

Legal changes expanding women rights are indicated by (1) the earlier passage in a state of municipal, tax, or school suffrage (coded as a simple count of the number of forms of partial suffrage in existence; same sources as full, presidential, and primary) and (2) the proportion of neighboring states that enacted full, primary, or presidential suffrage.[13] Each of the legal variables is lagged one year because we assume that there will be a brief delay in the effects of a change in law.

The *presence of Irish and Italian immigrants* is measured by the number of Irish- and Italian-born immigrants living in a state per 1,000 in the population (U.S. Bureau of the Census various years).

We use a dichotomous measure to indicate the *western frontier states* (defined on the basis of census categories). The measure is coded 1 if the state is in the West and 0 otherwise. The western states are: Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho, Kansas, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming.

World War I is a dichotomous variable coded 1 in 1917 and 1918, the years of U.S. involvement in the war, and 0 otherwise. The term is lagged one year because of our expectation that the effects of World War I on suffrage success will be experienced later in the war and in its immediate aftermath.

Third-party legislative challenges are indicated by the percentage of seats in the state legislature held by third parties. This variable is lagged one year. Although the measure is not a direct indicator of third-party challenges during elections, it reflects the outcome of elections. We lag the variable to approximate the influence of a third-party challenge during an election in the previous year.[14]

The *passage of a state prohibition law* is coded 1 for years following the passage of a prohibition law and 0 otherwise (Cashman 1981).

The *accessibility of the polity* measures the procedural difficulty of winning suffrage. It is indicated with a variable coded 1 through 5, with 1 representing the simplest procedures and 5 the most difficult (a fuller description of this variable is available on request from the authors).

We measure *the extent of suffrage organizing* in a state by: (1) the number of suffrage organizations in existence in a given year (including state associations, college women's suffrage leagues, and men's suffrage leagues), and (2) members (per 100,000 in the population) in the NAWSA-affiliated state suffrage associations (NAWSA 1893–1917, 1919). Membership is estimated from dues paid by state associations to NAWSA (Banazak 1996:231–33).

The *suffragists' use of separate-spheres arguments* is coded 1 if a separate-spheres argument was made (in a public speech or public document) in a given year, and 0 otherwise.[15]

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sure of women's organizations measures a nonsuffrage organizational resource for the suffrage movement because some of the these organizations, especially the WCTU, campaigned for suffrage. We excluded these measures (first the women's organization measure and then just the WCTU measure) from our index, and each of the revised indices remained significant and positive.

[13] Including a measure of the passage of suffrage in contiguous states provides a crude measure of a spatial diffusion process whereby events in one state spread to neighboring states. If such a process exists in our data, however, without a more sophisticated control, our estimates could be biased (Doreian 1981). Thus, we included in analyses not shown a spatial effects term constructed by multiplying a normalized weight matrix for our states (coded 1 for contiguous states and 0 for noncontiguous states) by the predicted value for suffrage success (Deane, Beck, and Tolnay 1998). Inclusion of this term rather than the simple measure did not alter our findings in any meaningful way. Thus, in the results presented here we use only the simpler measure.

[14] Most legislatures during this period met every other year. In a few states, elections and sessions occurred in the same year. A nonlagged measure of third-party electoral success, however, did not significantly predict the passage of suffrage. Because legislatures cannot enact law in nonsession years, we included an indicator for years in which legislatures were in session. The measure was not significant, suggesting that our other variables better explain when states were likely to grant suffrage.

[15] We examined the impact of justice arguments on suffrage success as well (not shown), but the variable did not significantly influence the passage of suffrage.

Insider strategies used by the suffragists include lobbying state legislators, writing them letters, giving speeches in the legislature, presenting petitions to the legislature, campaigning for pro-suffrage candidates, and seeking endorsements from political parties at state party conventions. *Outsider strategies* include holding formal public meetings (usually with an admission fee and lecturers), giving informal public speeches (such as street speaking and autotours), participating in parades, setting up booths at fairs, and distributing leaflets door to door or on public streets. The insider and outsider strategy variables are counts of the different types of strategies used in a given year.

Fundraising activity on the part of the suffragists is indicated by any activity that was designed to raise money for the movement, such as selling tickets to suffrage lectures and plays, soliciting donations, and holding various types of sales to raise money. If the suffragists engaged in any such activities in a given year the measure is coded 1 and 0 otherwise.

The *presence of anti-suffrage activity* is coded 0 when no activity occurred, 1 when out-of-state anti-suffrage groups were active, 2 when a few state anti-suffragists were active, and 3 when a state anti-suffrage organization existed.

We also include in our models dichotomous variables indicating the various decades in our period of analysis (the decade of the 1910s is the reference category). Many states passed suffrage in the last decade of our analysis (see Table 1). Including the decade measures allows us to determine whether, after controlling for other factors, any period effects remain.

RESULTS

Table 2 presents results from our event history analyses of the circumstances leading to suffrage success. Models 1 and 2 include all variables discussed above. Model 1 contains a measure of the number of suffrage organizations in a state, while Model 2 contains a measure of suffrage association membership.[16] Model 3, our final model, includes only the significant variables from Models 1 and 2.[17] Models 4 through 6 are variations on Model 3.

The impact of gendered opportunity structures on movement success is shown in the first two panels (labeled "Gendered Opportunity Structures" and "Gendered and Political Opportunity Structure") for Models 1 through 3. Although not all gendered opportunity variables are significant, there is substantial evidence that gendered opportunities for suffrage success existed. The presence of the new woman—educated, professional, and politically and civically active women—significantly enhanced the likelihood that the suffragists would win the vote. Furthermore, Model 4 shows that all three of the individual measures used to construct our new-woman index are significant predictors of suffrage success. These results suggest that the presence of such women demonstrated to the larger population that women were fit for a significant political role in the public sphere and convinced legislators and the electorate to support women's suffrage. The presence of the new woman thus played an important role in helping the suffragists win the vote.

Moreover, the passage of full, presidential, and primary suffrage in one or more neighboring states significantly encouraged the passage of these types of suffrage in a particular state. This suggests another gendered opportunity rooted in the legal climate. Laws granting women broader citizenship rights helped to redefine appropriate gender roles. The redefinition of legal gender roles in one state appeared to alter thinking about gender roles by political actors in neighboring states, resulting in the passage of suffrage there as well. Interestingly, the passage of various forms of partial suffrage (school, tax, and municipal suffrage) in a state did not increase the likelihood of suffrage success in that state. This suggests that for a gendered opportunity of

[16] We do not include these two measures in the same model because they measure the same concept and data on membership are only available beginning in 1892.

[17] Comparing the log-likelihoods for Models 1 and 3 shows that Model 3 is a significant improvement over Model 1 (likelihood-ratio chi-square equals 26.3, which is significant at $p \leq .001$).

Table 2. Maximum-Likelihood Coefficients from an Event History Analysis of Factors Influencing the Passage of Women's Suffrage in U.S. States, 1866 to 1919

Independent Variable	Model 1[a]	Model 2[b]	Model 3[c]	Model 4[c]	Model 5[c,d]	Model 6
Gendered Opportunity Structures						
New-woman index	1.234* (.327)	1.096* (.272)	1.002* (.230)	—	.977* (.224)	—
Proportion female college students	—	—	—	.105* (.030)	—	—
Proportion female lawyers and doctors	—	—	—	.027* (.011)	—	—
Number of women's organizations	—	—	—	.596* (.309)	—	.446* (.267)
Proportion of neighboring states with full, presidential, or primary suffrage (lagged)	5.100* (1.822)	4.353* (1.971)	4.736* (1.081)	3.824* (1.180)	4.175* (1.010)	5.650* (1.086)
Number of school, municipal, and tax suffrage laws (lagged)	.254 (.348)	.291 (.357)	—	—	—	—
Irish and Italian immigrants per 1,000 population	.008 (.015)	–.001 (.015)	—	—	—	—
Western state	–.043 (.963)	.104 (.973)	—	—	—	—
Gendered and Political Opportunity Structure						
World War I years (lagged)	1.723* (.899)	1.964* (.874)	2.037* (.654)	2.171* (.698)	2.312* (.693)	1.821* (.638)
Political Opportunity Structures						
Percent third-party seats in legislature (lagged)	.020 (.035)	.013 (.035)	—	—	—	—
State prohibition law	2.783* (.975)	2.439* (.887)	2.279* (.661)	1.869* (.704)	1.978* (.631)	1.361* (.558)
Accessibility of the polity	–.746* (.315)	–.689* (.307)	–.528* (.242)	–.620* (.250)	.323 (4.861)	–.433* (.225)
Resource Mobilization and Cultural Framing						
Number of suffrage organizations	–.376 (.430)	—	—	—	—	—
Suffrage association membership per 100,000 population	—	.011 (.024)	—	—	—	—
Number of insider strategies	.113 (.369)	.150 (.366)	—	—	—	—
Number of outsider strategies	.373 (.340)	.262 (.321)	—	—	.845 (2.349)	—
Outsider strategies used in a referendum state	—	—	—	—	–.631 (2.351)	—
Fundraising activity	1.856* (.788)	1.740* (.783)	1.938* (.633)	1.910* (.635)	1.831* (.666)	1.987* (.551)
Separate-spheres arguments used by suffragists	2.153* (.769)	1.955* (.742)	1.719* (.600)	1.688* (.630)	1.659* (.583)	1.424* (.528)
Anti-suffrage activity	–.244 (.249)	–.242 (.248)	—	—	—	—

(Table 2 continued on next page)

(Table 2 continued from previous page)

Independent Variable	Model 1[a]	Model 2[b]	Model 3[c]	Model 4[c]	Model 5[c,d]	Model 6
Decade						
1860s	—	—	—	—	—	1.559 (1.461)
1870s	–3.901 (57.714)	—	–3.598 (33.607)	–4.471 (54.522)	–2.986 (34.092)	–6.750 (32.598)
1880s	–5.678 (50.268)	—	–4.986 (30.165)	–6.819 (44.746)	–4.742 (29.837)	–7.089 (32.432)
1890s	–1.381 (1.727)	–.747 (1.658)	.057 (.769)	–.336 (.902)	.408 (.781)	–.076 (.817)
1900s	–10.177 (46.366)	–8.933 (27.837)	–8.893 (28.561)	–9.963 (47.142)	–8.549 (29.076)	–8.598 (31.552)
Constant	–8.343* (1.608)	–8.256* (1.572)	–7.738* (1.275)	–11.682* (2.142)	–9.733* (4.994)	–6.513* (1.303)
Number of cases	1,921	1,161	2,078	2,078	2,078	2,358
Year beginning period of analysis	1872	1892	1872	1872	1872	1866
Likelihood-ratio chi square	168.1*	142.4*	178.3*	182.2*	174.1*	158.0*

Sources: See text on pages 59 to 61.

Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.

[a] Analysis begins in 1872 because female college student data begin in 1872. Also, professional women data begin in 1870, and immigrant and third-party data are unavailable for some territories.

[b] Analysis begins in 1892 because suffrage association membership data begin in 1892. Also, female college student data begin in 1872, professional women data begin in 1870, and immigrant and third-party data are unavailable for some territories.

[c] Analysis begins in 1872 because female college student data begin in 1872. Also, professional women data begin in 1870.

[d] In Model 5 only, the accessibility of the polity variable is an interaction term indicating the use of outsider strategies in states in which the referendum was required to change a constitutional amendment.

*$p \leq .05$ (one-tailed tests)

this nature to occur, the enactment of suffrage must have been of the same caliber, that is, full, presidential, or primary. Minor forms of suffrage apparently did not transform attitudes about women's political rights and clearly did not lead to the passage of major forms of suffrage.

The presence of Irish and Italian immigrants had no significant negative effect on winning the vote for women. Thus, the absence of these groups did not provide a gendered opportunity for suffrage success. Several other studies (e.g., Lerner 1981; Mahoney 1969) also provide evidence that immigrants were no less likely to support suffrage than were native-born residents. Although we do not have a direct measure of immigrant attitudes, our results generally are in line with these findings. Also, the western frontier did not provide a gendered opportunity for the passage of suffrage. It may be that the new-woman measures better explain suffrage success in the West: Educated and professional women were often more prevalent in the West than in other regions (U.S. Bureau of the Census various years; U.S. Department of Commerce various years; U.S. Office of Education various years).[18]

[18] Even though full suffrage was more likely to be enacted by western states compared with states in other regions, in analyses not shown, we found that the "western" variable did not significantly influence the passage of full suffrage (excluding presidential and primary suffrage from the dependent variable) once other factors had been taken into account.

States were significantly more likely to enact suffrage toward the end of or just after World War I (see panel labeled "Gendered and Political Opportunity Structure"). Although this effect indicates a political opportunity for suffrage, it also adds to the evidence that gendered opportunities were instrumental in bringing about women's suffrage.

The fact that the new-woman variable and the measures of suffrage in neighboring states and World War I are the significant gendered opportunity indicators suggests that gendered opportunities for suffrage stemmed particularly from women's growing presence in the public sphere. These measures, unlike most of the other gendered opportunity measures (e.g.,, the measures of immigrants and western states) are clear indicators of women's movement into the public sphere.

Among the measures of political opportunity structures, the passage of state prohibition laws and the accessibility of the policy-making process significantly influenced whether the suffragists won citizenship rights (third panel, Models 1 through 3). These results, combined with those for the World War I variable, indicate that political opportunities also helped suffragists gain the vote. Increased political support for the suffragists during the war, reduced liquor industry opposition after the passage of state prohibition laws, and simpler enfranchisement procedures all worked favorably for the suffragists.

Third-party representation in the legislature did not provide a significant political opportunity for the enactment of suffrage. Perhaps during periods of third-party conflict, some political actors supported suffrage, hoping to appeal to future women voters, while others opposed suffrage, fearing harm to (re-)election chances.

The results for the resource mobilization and ideological framing measures suggest that larger suffrage movements were no more successful in winning the vote than smaller movements (fourth panel, Models 1 through 3). Neither measure of the extent of organization—the number of suffrage organizations (Model 1) or the size of membership (Model 2)—is significant. This finding is not surprising for two reasons: Gamson (1975:51) found a similar pattern in his early work, and some suffragists recognized the importance of small, quiet movements. For instance, Abigail Scott Duniway, an activist in the northwest, saw the merit of what she called the "still hunt"—quiet persuasion on many fronts so as not to arouse the opposition (Moynihan 1983; also see Trout 1920). These results, along with Gamson's, suggest that movement researchers need to rethink the role of large movements in winning political gains.

Also, the use of insider or outsider strategies does not significantly predict suffrage success.[19] The nonsignificant results for insider strategies run counter to Banaszak's (1996) claim that the lobbying efforts of the suffragists were key to their success. Model 5 includes a term indicating the use of outsider strategies in states where a public referendum was required to amend the state constitution.[20] Where the procedure for changing voting rights entails a vote by the electorate, outsider strategies—designed to sway public opinion—may be more effective in bringing about suffrage success. But the results show that the use of such strategies in referendum states did not significantly increase the suffragists' likelihood of winning voting rights.

Two strategies, however, when employed by the suffragists, did help them achieve their goals—fundraising and the use of separate-spheres arguments (fourth panel, Models 1 through 3). The significant result for fundraising suggests that this activity was key because it afforded the suffragists many ways of influencing the actions of political decision-makers. The significant result for the separate-spheres measure suggests that when suffragists framed rationales for suffrage along the lines that women would use the vote to protect their children and their

[19] We disaggregated the insider and outsider strategy measures into their constituent parts and included these more specific measures in analyses. None of the individual measures was significant.

[20] The interaction term is constructed by multiplying the outsider strategy variable by a dichotomous variable coded 1 for states requiring a referendum and 0 otherwise. The interaction replaces the accessibility of the polity variable in the analysis.

homes, they were effective because such arguments were consistent with established gender beliefs.

Two of the significant measures in these models have missing data: women's representation among college students and among professionals. Both measures have missing data at the beginning of our time period.[21] Because missing data in event history analysis can introduce censoring, which can then produce sample selection bias and thus biased estimates (Yamaguchi 1991:3–9), Model 6 excludes these two variables from the analysis to ascertain whether censoring affects our findings. However, the results are substantively unchanged once the earlier years are included in the analysis.[22]

Finally, the results for the decade measures (the fifth panel of Table 2) suggest that our substantive variables explain period differences in the pace of suffrage reform over time. None of the decade measures is significant, indicating that once other factors have been taken into account, the 1910s are no different from the other decades. The flurry of suffrage successes in the 1910s probably results from a combination of many of the factors shown here to be significant—the emergence of the new woman, the increasing number of states having already passed suffrage, World War I, state prohibition laws, and greater fundraising and separate-spheres framing on the part of the suffragists. (Our indicators show that both of these last measures were increasing over time.)[23]

[21] Data for the proportion of professional women begin in 1870 and data for the proportion of female college students begin in 1872.

[22] One event is left-censored because of these missing data (passage of full suffrage in Wyoming in 1869). Although censoring occurs in the analyses in other models as well, we found no evidence of bias.

[23] Analyses including interaction terms between movement mobilization and opportunity structure variables revealed no significant interaction effects. Recursive regressions showed no meaningful instability in our significant coefficients. Also, multicollinearity does not affect the results: For any substantially correlated pairs of predictors, excluding one of the variables from the analysis did not affect the results of the remaining variable.

CONCLUSION

Susan B. Anthony declared, in her last public address in Washington, D.C. in 1906, that "failure is impossible" (Harper 1908:1409). She was right: In 1920, with ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment, women won the right to vote in all elections across the United States. But for five decades, suffragists in the state movements had battled for the vote with varying degrees of success. Our goal has been to uncover the circumstances that produced political success for some of the state movements. The histories of the state suffrage movements provide a rare opportunity to compare, systematically, multiple movements working toward the same general goal. Our findings reveal that several circumstances were necessary for suffrage success.

Not only did resource mobilization, cultural framing, and political opportunity structures help to produce movement success, but gendered opportunity structures were important as well. In the case of the suffragists, changing gender relations fostered movement success by altering beliefs among political decision-makers about the proper role of women in society. These changed beliefs, we argue, made legislators and the electorate more willing to vote for suffrage. Some of the political opportunities that benefited the suffragists also had gendered elements. In fact, the political opportunity provided by World War I was so intertwined with a gendered opportunity that we could not analyze them separately. Clearly, gender theorists are correct when they state that gender "is integral to many societal processes" (Acker 1992:565).

Our most important theoretical conclusion is that social movement scholars must recognize that other types of opportunity structures, beyond those stemming from formal political dynamics and the formal political interests that they generate, can also influence movement success. Our findings that gendered opportunities fostered suffrage success and that political opportunities were gendered in various ways demonstrate that more than simply formal politics matter for movement success.

Opportunity structures can take a variety of forms. In the context of suffrage, we

found evidence of political and gendered opportunities and even a combined gendered and political opportunity. Researchers studying other movements may find different types of opportunity structures. Among movements working to redefine broad cultural definitions of women's and men's roles in society, gendered opportunities—opportunities emerging from changing gender relations and altered views about gender—are likely to be crucial to movement success. However, a social movement struggling to redefine the position of a racial group in society, such as the civil rights movement's attempt to achieve political inclusion for African Americans, is likely to find opportunity structures in changing race relations that alter people's thinking about the appropriate relations between races. Similarly, changing economic relations between employers and workers may provide an opportunity structure for working-class political success.

Thus, rather than using the narrower "political opportunity structure" to refer to the contextual factors that influence movement success, researchers would do well to use the broader and simpler term, "opportunity structure." Then, to determine the precise nature of the opportunities—be they gendered, racial, ethnic, class or combinations of these—researchers must carefully examine the evidence in the particular context for their movement(s) and scrutinize the dynamics shaping the willingness of key political decision-makers to support policy change. We draw once again on McAdam (1982:41, italics in original), but with an important revision: "*[A]ny* event or broad social process that serves to undermine the calculations and assumptions" of key political decision-makers presents the possibility of *an opportunity structure* for movement success.

Our findings about the role of gendered opportunities in producing suffrage success, along with the way in which the suffragists framed their rationales for expanded political rights, reveal a paradox in the circumstances leading to suffrage success. Competing logics appear to have been at work. On the one hand, the suffragists were more successful when they used an ideological rationale that resonated with widely accepted but highly traditional beliefs about women's appropriate roles in society. The suffragists' use of separate-spheres arguments, which held that women should be allowed to vote because they could protect and help regulate the domestic sphere, significantly aided the suffragists in their bid for the vote.

On the other hand, the presence of the new woman (an independent, civically active, and educated woman), along with expanded political rights in neighboring states and women's contributions during the war, helped the suffragists win voting rights. These circumstances successfully chipped away at the traditional belief that women's only appropriate place in society was in the domestic sphere. Here, more egalitarian gender relations created an opportunity for suffrage success, unlike the separate-spheres arguments that tapped into support for traditional gender relations. That both dynamics, one rooted in traditional beliefs about gender roles and the other rooted in the emergence of more egalitarian relations, could be operative during these years is not surprising when one considers the fundamental changes that women's lives were undergoing (Flexner 1975). In such a period of transition, competing logics were simultaneously at work.

Finally, our findings show that not only did opportunity structures help the suffragists win the vote, but the actions of the suffragists themselves were important. The suffragists were clearly agents in the redefinition of democracy that occurred during these years. They were active in all states, and the degree to which they mobilized financial resources and the manner in which they framed rationales for the vote significantly influenced whether they were successful in winning the vote. But the outcome was not entirely within their control. Gendered and political dynamics transpiring in the broader context also mattered. In the end, then, we argue, as have others, that both agency and structure determine a movement's political success.

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Social Movements and Policy Implementation: The Mississippi Civil Rights Movement and the War on Poverty, 1965 to 1971

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This study of the Mississippi civil rights movement and the War on Poverty examines the relationship between social movements and policy implementation. A "movement infrastructure" model is developed that focuses on organizational structure, resources, and leadership to account for the impact of social movements on policy implementation. A two-tiered research design is employed that includes (1) a quantitative analysis of poverty programs in Mississippi counties from 1965 to 1971, and (2) case studies that show the complex interaction between the civil rights movement, resistance by whites, local powerholders, and federal agencies. The quantitative analysis shows that counties with strong movement infrastructures generated greater funding for Community Action Programs. The case studies show that movements were excluded from the initial formation of these programs as local whites attempted to preempt civil rights activists. However, in counties with strong movement infrastructures, activists were able to gain access to decision-making bodies and shape the content of poverty programs.

Social movement scholars agree that the question of a social movement's impact on political change is important and understudied. Over the past four decades, leading scholars have reviewed the relevant literature on social movements and have noted the limited amount of systematic research on outcomes (Diani 1997; Eckstein 1965; Giugni 1998; Marx and Woods 1975; McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1988; Tarrow 1998). Burstein, Einwohner, and Hollander (1995) observe that, "the field of social movements grew tremendously in the 1970s and 1980s, but the study of movement outcomes did not. . . . [The result is] that we still know very little about the impact of social movements on social change" (p. 276). Furthermore, the question of movement impact addresses one of the most important concerns of movement participants—the efficacy of social movements.

I have two major objectives in this paper. First, I provide a conceptual framework for analyzing movement outcomes. Most discussions focus on the analytic problems of establishing whether movements create change, but how movements generate political change must also be examined. I identify and compare the major theoretical models used to explain the relationship between movements and political change. I argue that our understanding of the influence of social movements will be greatly improved by delineating models that specify how movements generate institutional change (McAdam and Snow 1997). I propose a "movement infrastructure" model that fo-

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cuses on the organizational structure, resources, and leadership of a movement to explain its impact on the political process. Second, I present an extensive analysis of the effects of the civil rights movement in Mississippi on the implementation of poverty programs at the local level. I investigate whether local movements directly and indirectly shaped the implementation of federal policy in Mississippi. First, a quantitative analysis of poverty program funding examines the impact of movement organization, white countermobilization, social, political, and economic factors on funding from 1965 to 1971. Two case studies follow that assess the impact of local civil rights movements on the form and content of poverty programs in their communities.

CONCEPTUALIZING MOVEMENT OUTCOMES

Outcomes as Changes in Political Institutions

I focus on outcomes rather than success. Recent research has identified methodological and theoretical problems with studying success (Amenta and Young 1999; Giugni 1998). Success implies the attainment of specific, widely shared goals, but the goals of most social movements are contested by participants and observers. Goals also change over the course of a movement. Studying outcomes avoids these problems and allows scholars to focus on unintended and negative consequences as well as successes.

The analysis here pertains to *political* movements and *institutional* outcomes in the political arena. Political movements involve a sustained challenge to existing power relations, and they employ disruptive, nonroutine tactics that publicly challenge the distribution and uses of power in the broader society (Gamson 1990; McAdam 1982; Schwartz 1976; Tilly 1978). This focus excludes movements focused on changes internal to a group and its members. Because political movements also directly or indirectly make claims on the state, I focus on institutional outcomes. Typically, political movements attempt to build organizations and change the culture and consciousness of their members or the broader public. In fact, a movement's impact on institutions often depends on its ability to build organizations and shape collective identities (Mueller 1987). These movements, however, seek change in political institutions, and those changes may take a variety of forms such as: (1) gaining access to the decision-making process, (2) altering an institution's goals and priorities, (3) securing favorable policies, (4) insuring that those policies are implemented, or (5) shifting the distribution of institutional resources to benefit the movement's constituents (Burstein et al. 1995; Gamson 1990; Kreisi et al. 1995; Schumaker 1975).[1] Overall, a focus on institutional outcomes makes sense because it encompasses the long-term goals of many social movements. In addition, a focus on institutional outcomes has a methodological advantage because in many cases these outcomes are more easily measured than cultural, attitudinal, and psychological outcomes. Political outcomes provide an important indicator of "the results of [the civil rights] movement in the lives of black southerners" (Button 1989:4).

Opportunity Structures, Institutional Arenas, and Key Actors

Political process theories note that the emergence of social movements is patterned by broad changes in the "political opportunity structure" (McAdam 1982). This observation points to one of the methodological challenges for research on movement outcomes: If changes in the opportunity structure facilitate the emergence of a social movement, then those same changes may account for the apparent impact of a movement (Amenta, Dunleavy, and Bernstein 1994). The importance of opportunity structures has been established, but few scholars would argue that they have a singular and deterministic effect on social movements (Goldstone 1980; Kitschelt 1986). Rather, the emergence and maintenance of a social movement is in part attributable to the internal dynamics of the

[1] Movements can also influence "reactive" outcomes such as preventing a policy that would damage the movement or its constituents (Kriesi et al. 1995).

movement itself. In addition, some scholars argue that the impacts of movements on opportunity structures should be studied. For example, McAdam (1996) notes that "our collective failure to undertake any serious accounting of the effect of past movements on . . . political opportunities is as puzzling as it is lamentable" (p. 36).

Any analysis of movement outcomes must examine the structure and strategies of the relevant exogenous political actors and institutions. Movements make claims that directly or indirectly impinge on other groups. Thus, movements have complex and sometimes unexpected relationships with other groups that become allies or opponents. They also mobilize within institutional settings that structure conflict and possible outcomes. For example, federal agencies are constrained by their relationship to Congress and public opinion (Burstein 1999). These rules and resources shape the possible responses of state actors to social movements.

Measuring Outcomes Over Time

For methodological and conceptual reasons, I need to measure multiple outcomes and to measure outcomes over time (Andrews 1997; Banaszak 1996; Button 1989; Snyder and Kelly 1979). Movement outcomes over time must be measured because movements change their tactics and goals. For example, Katzenstein (1990) finds that feminist activists in 1973 organized around the issue of ordination, but by 1983 the movement had broadened its analysis and goals to include "running shelters for homeless women; doing prison work; organizing in the sanctuary movement; joining in protests against US intervention in Central America; running empowerment workshops, lesbian retreats, and conferences to build bridges between women religious and laywomen" (p. 41; also see Katzenstein 1998). Another reason for measuring outcomes over time is that the form and degree of influence may vary over time (Andrews 1997). By focusing on a movement's immediate impact the movement's influence could be over- or underestimated.

In sum, analyzing movement outcomes involves: (1) examining different forms of political change (e.g., access, policy enactment, implementation), (2) analyzing opportunity structures, institutional arenas and key actors that shape movement dynamics, (3) incorporating temporal processes by measuring outcomes over time.

FOUR DIVERGENT VIEWS ON MOVEMENTS AND OUTCOMES

Studies of the impact of social movements have typically focused on the question of whether movements exert influence. In those cases for which one can identify the influence of movements on institutional change independent of other nonmovement factors, a second set of questions must be answered. First, the causal argument must be specified. What characteristics of a movement or movement activity account for the impact? Second, the mechanisms of influence must be revealed. What is the process or mechanism by which a movement influences a political institution? There are several prominent answers to these questions.

Analyses of movement outcomes will be improved by systematically comparing and elaborating these contending models. In my view, no single model can account for the ways movements generate change. This view stems from the variety of cases and political contexts that have been studied as "social movements." Nevertheless, there is a relatively limited set of possibilities, and our understanding of movement impacts will be improved by specifying those models as "ideal types." Scholars often operate with an implicit model that remains undertheorized. Elaborating these models allows researchers to ask how particular cases diverge from the theoretical models. Most important, comparing different models can direct scholarship toward broader questions about variation across movements and political contexts.[2]

I delineate four major approaches to the relationship between movements and outcomes.[3] Each model singles out key ele-

[2] For example, Piven and Cloward's (1977) explicit focus on "poor people's movements" suggests that class composition is a key variable (also see Ragin 1989).

[3] I focus on theories that explicitly examine the movement/outcome relationship. Other than my

ments that account for a movement's impact, and each implies different mechanisms through which movements can exert influence. These distinct ways of thinking about movement impact are rarely made explicit or contrasted with one another in sociological research. By explicating each, I aim to clarify the lines of debate in the field and place my research within that debate.

Action-Reaction Models: Disruption or Persuasion

In the first two models, which I call "action-reaction" models, mobilization has the momentary potential to leverage change through its impact on political elites, electoral coalitions, or public opinion. Within the action-reaction approach, theorists describe two possible routes whereby movements are influential.

In one route, movements are dramatic, disruptive and threatening to elites, which prompts a rapid response—typically either concessions and/or repression. Piven and Cloward (1977) have been the primary proponents of this view arguing that "the most useful way to think about the effectiveness of protest is to examine the disruptive effects on institutions of different forms of mass defiance, and then to examine the political reverberations of those disruptions" (p. 24). For Piven and Cloward (1977), it is not clear that protest has an independent impact because it "wells up in response to momentous changes in the institutional order. It is not created by organizers and leaders" (p. 36). Protest is one link in a sequence, and once the sequence is initiated protesters have little control over the policy response. The authors conclude that "whatever influence lower-class groups occasionally exert in American politics does not result from organization, but from mass protest and the disruptive consequences of protest" (Piven and Cloward 1977:36).

Organizations, particularly mass-based membership organizations, are doomed to failure because powerless groups can never mobilize as effectively as dominant groups in a society. As a result, organization can only lessen the disruptive capacity and efficacy of protest (Piven and Cloward 1984, 1992; also see Gamson and Schmeidler 1984; Morris 1984). Elite reaction is ultimately focused in a self-interested way on ending protest. Analyzing urban policy changes in the 1960s, Katznelson (1981) argues that "the targets of these public policies were not objects of compassion, but of fear born of uncertainty" (p. 3). Policymakers caught off guard by protest, attempt to quickly assemble a strategy of repression, concessions, or a combination of the two that will end the protest wave (Tarrow 1993). Disruption models focus on the limitations of protest on policymaking beyond the agenda-setting stage.

In the second version of the action-reaction model, movements are dramatic and generate support from sympathetic third parties that take up the cause of the movement. The intervening role of "third parties," "bystander publics," or "conscience constituents" is critical. In a classic essay, Lipsky (1968) argues that "the 'problem of the powerless' in protest activity is to activate 'third parties' to enter the implicit or explicit bargaining arena in ways favorable to protesters" (p. 1145). Lipsky claims that "if protest tactics are not considered significant by the media . . . protest organizations will not succeed. Like the tree falling unheard in the forest, there is no protest unless protest is perceived and projected" (p. 1151; also see Benford and Hunt 1992). [4]

Garrow (1978) argues that civil rights campaigns, especially in Selma, Alabama, generated momentum for the 1965 Voting Rights Act. For some theorists, repression is an intervening link. For example, Garrow

brief discussion of political opportunity structure, I do not focus on theories of political-institutional change including (1) pluralist or interest group theories, (2) state-centric theories, or (3) elite theories. Some scholars have contrasted these theories with "movement theories" of political change (Amenta, Caruthers, and Zylan 1992; Quadagno 1992).

[4] These models of movement influence are connected to methodological strategies. For example, Rucht and Neidhardt (1998) argue that media reported protest is a meaningful barometer of all protest: "Insofar as we are interested in those protests which are an input for the political system, media reported protests have a higher validity than the whole range of actual protests" (p. 76).

argues that attacks by southern officials on civil rights activists further solidified the support of bystanders. Burstein (1985) shows that the movement did not reverse the direction of public opinion arguing that movements are probably unable to have such a substantial impact on opinion. Rather, protest increased the salience of the civil rights issue, and political representatives were able to act on those louder and clearer signals (Burstein 1999). In this view protest is a form of communication, and persuasion is the major way that movements influence policy (Mansbridge 1994).

These two versions of the action-reaction model differ: The first emphasizes disruptive and often violent action forcing a response from political elites; the second proposes that protest can mobilize sympathetic third parties that advance the movement's agenda by exerting influence on political elites. But both versions of the action-reaction model share the assumption that (1) large-scale dramatic events shape the process of change by, (2) mobilizing more powerful actors to advance the movement's cause, and (3) that (implicitly) movements have little or no direct influence beyond this initial point. In both versions, the primary focus is on public protest events rather than on organizations.

Access-Influence Model: Routinization of Protest

The third major approach argues that the determinant of movement efficacy is the acquisition of routine access to the polity through institutionalized tactics. This approach typically describes a drift toward less disruptive tactics such as electoral politics, coalitions, lobbying and litigation. Organization and leadership figure prominently in this model. Organizational changes parallel the tactical shift including increasing centralization and bureaucratization of movement organizations. In short, social movement organizations evolve into interest groups. In the "access-influence" model, the organizational and tactical shifts are accompanied by an increase in influence over relevant policy arenas. In contrast, the action-reaction model would predict that movement influence declines as tactics become routinized and organizations become incorporated. Most important, the access-influence model argues that disruptive tactics have little independent impact on institutional change. In their study of the impacts of black and Hispanic political mobilization on a variety of policy outcomes, Browning, Marshall, and Tabb (1984) argue that protest and electoral strategies were used together effectively, but "demand-protest strategies by themselves produced limited results in most cities" (p. 246).

Access-influence models also assert that securing insider status is more consequential than pursuing a single, specific policy objective. Rochon and Mazmanian (1993) argue that the antinuclear movement, by advocating a single piece of legislation, was unsuccessful. In contrast, the environmental movement, especially antitoxic groups, attempted to become a legitimate participant in the regulatory process. By gaining access, the movement has been able to have a substantial, long-term impact on policy (also see Costain 1981; Sabatier 1975).

The access-influence model has fewer proponents within the movement literature than the action-reaction models. However, the notion that "routine" tactics are most efficacious is consistent with pluralist theories of democracy that view the political system as relatively open to citizen influence. In this model, organization-building (especially professionalization, bureaucratization, and centralization) provides movements with the necessary tools to operate in the interest group system where bargaining is the key mechanism of influence.

The Movement Infrastructure Model

Finally, I propose a "movement infrastructure" model. Three components of a movement's infrastructure must be examined to explain its influence on the policy process: leadership, organizational structure, and resources. Infrastructures that allow the movement to employ multiple mechanisms of influence (including disruption, persuasion, and bargaining) will have the greatest impact on policy implementation. At a general level, the autonomy and continuity of the infrastructure are key factors explaining the long-

term viability and impact of the movement, sustaining a movement through shifts in the broader political environment (Andrews 1997; Rupp and Taylor 1990). A strong movement infrastructure can spur political elites to initiate policy concessions in response to the perceived threat of the movement. That threat rests on the belief that a movement has the capacity to institute more substantial change through parallel, autonomous institutions.

Leaders and organizations must be embedded in indigenous, informal networks. Such links make leaders more responsive to their constituency and less easily co-opted (Morris 1984). Robnett (1996) distinguishes between formal leaders (e.g., ministers) and an intermediate layer of "bridge leaders," who stand at nodal points within the informal networks of a community. This type of leadership structure can generate ongoing tension within a movement. However, it also can provide advantages, such as innovation (Stepan-Norris and Zeitlin 1995). A differentiated leadership structure allows for communication to various audiences including participants, potential recruits, opponents, and state actors (Klandermans 1997). A leadership structure with a diversity of skills and experiences will be better able to use mass-based tactics as well as routine negotiation with outside groups (Ganz 2000; Gerlach and Hine 1970).

The critical role of preexisting organization and resources has been established in the emergence of social movements. To persist over time, movements must forge new organizational forms and establish independent resource flows (McAdam 1982; Schwartz 1976). In the mobilization process, the informal structure of relationships among activists and organizations must be expansive across communities and subgroups. In the policymaking process, formal organizations become a necessary vehicle for advancing a group's claims. Organizational structures can alter the routine operation of the political process when they are perceived as legitimate and/or threatening by established political actors (Clemens 1997; Gamson 1990).

Movements that rely primarily on the "mobilization of people" rather than on financial resources are more likely to continue using protest tactics (Schwartz and Paul 1992). As a result, their strategic and tactical options are broader (Ganz 2000). Ultimately, movements require substantial contributions of volunteer labor to maintain organizations and launch protest campaigns. This is seen most clearly at the local level where movement organizations are less likely to maintain a paid, professional staff.

In the movement infrastructure model, strategy and tactics depend on a movement's leadership, organization, and resources. This contrasts with the action-reaction model that either views protest and organization in conflict with one another or pays little attention to organization. Strategy and tactics are conceptualized broadly in the infrastructure model and range from protest to the building of counter-institutions.

In sum, strong movement infrastructures have diverse leaders and a complex leadership structure, multiple organizations, informal ties that cross geographic and social boundaries, and a resource base that draws substantially on contributions from their members for both labor and money. These characteristics provide movements with greater flexibility that allows them to influence the policy process through multiple mechanisms.

COMPARING THE MODELS

The movement infrastructure model builds on the insights of the prior three models. First, it assumes, like the action-reaction models, that there are key moments when movements can be especially efficacious. Further, it assumes that disruptive tactics are important for movements to have an impact, especially when disruptive tactics are creatively injected into routine political processes. The movement infrastructure model differs from the others because it emphasizes the building and sustaining of movement infrastructures as an important determinant of the long-term impact of these movements (in contrast to short-term impacts, like agenda-setting). Furthermore, unlike the access-influence model, these organizations have the greatest impact when they maintain their ability to use both "outsider" and "insider" tactics. Litigation, lobbying, and electoral politics can be effectively employed by social movements. However, movements lose

key opportunities for leverage in the political process when they quickly adopt the tactics of "interest groups" and abandon "insurgent" tactics.

Movements must be able to create leverage through multiple mechanisms. The prior three models focus on a single mechanism as the primary means by which movements create change (e.g., disruption, persuasion, or negotiation). The movement infrastructure model accounts for the ability of movements to impact political change through multiple mechanisms, and this change can occur when a movement's leadership and organization allow for strategic flexibility.

The pattern of outcomes for a movement may depend on processes described by each of these models. For example, both action-reaction models focus on agenda-setting as the primary outcome that movements can influence. In contrast, access-influence and movement infrastructure models examine later stages in the policymaking process. Ultimately, researchers should use these models to compare across different types of social movements and political contexts. The analysis I present here demonstrates the utility of the movement infrastructure model as applied to the Mississippi case.

RESEARCH DESIGN

The War on Poverty as an Outcome

The War on Poverty created a new set of opportunities and constraints for the civil rights movement. These programs brought substantial resources into impoverished communities, providing opportunities for blacks to influence the shape and direction of policy. At first glance, it is surprising how thoroughly local movements became involved in the War on Poverty. After all, the publicly stated goal of the movement in the early 1960s was gaining access to electoral politics. However, an underlying objective of the movement in Mississippi was building local movements that could define and pursue their own goals (Payne 1995). The early movement organizations were not directly involved in the War on Poverty. Nevertheless, local movements continued to operate in the post-1965 period and attempted to shape the local implementation of poverty programs. Many local activists defined economic empowerment as a natural outgrowth of the political empowerment pursued through voter registration. In fact, many believed that political power would be meaningless unless black communities could generate viable economic programs (Dorsey 1977).

There were several obstacles to movement influence. First, the objectives of federal agencies constrained the ability of local movements to direct the War on Poverty. The "professionalization of reform" could reduce the participation and influence of the poor to a primarily symbolic role (Helfgot 1974; also see Friedland 1976). In addition, the administration of poverty programs required negotiations with many community groups, some of which were potential allies or opponents of civil rights activists. While movement mobilization shaped the distribution and development of antipoverty programs in Mississippi, these programs also shaped the direction of local movements.[5] Once the War on Poverty was initiated, local movements in Mississippi and across the country attempted to secure resources and shape programs (Patterson 1994:146). Quadagno (1994) notes that a "crucial linkage . . . unquestionably did develop between the civil rights movement and the War on Poverty" (p. 28).

The poverty programs in Mississippi can be examined as an outcome of the civil rights movement for four main reasons: (1) the poverty programs and the civil rights movement both targeted an overlapping arena of activity, (2) there was substantial and ongoing interactions between civil rights activists and the Office of Economic Opportunity, (3) the programs provided benefits to the movement's primary constituency (blacks in the South), and (4) there is significant variation across states and counties in local actors' influence on the programs.

Study Design: Quantitative and Qualitative Analyses

Mississippi is an important case for examining the long-term impacts of the civil rights

[5] I do not analyze the impacts of poverty programs on the civil rights movement, e.g., whether the programs co-opted the movement (see Eisinger 1979).

movement. The state is widely known for its institutionalization of the "tripartite system of domination"—a term Morris (1984) has used to describe the political, economic, and personal bases of racial inequality in the U.S. South. On one hand, Mississippi can be viewed as a test case where the movement met its most intense resistance. At the same time, there is substantial variation within the state across key variables: movement mobilization, countermovement, structural characteristics, and the implementation of poverty programs.

Follow Amenta's (1991) suggestion of analyzing subunits, I use counties as the unit of analysis to strengthen the theoretical value of the study. This focus has substantive merit because the Mississippi movement targeted counties as areas within which to organize. In addition, counties are the most important local political unit in the South (Krane and Shaffer 1992). Finally, poverty programs were instituted in Mississippi across counties rather than across municipalities.

The research here combines two complementary strategies: (1) a quantitative analysis of Mississippi counties that allows for precise estimates of the distribution of programs and funding, and (2) qualitative evidence from case studies using interview and archival data. Most previous research on the War on Poverty has focused on urban areas, riots, and the distribution of poverty programs (Button 1978; Fording 1997). Beyond single case studies, few scholars have examined the impacts of social movement processes on poverty programs. In my quantitative analysis, I ask whether movements had an impact on poverty programs independent of other relevant factors.[6] After establishing that movements did have an impact on poverty program funding, I use case studies to examine the *processes and form* of conflict at the local level (i.e., the mechanisms through which local movement organizations shaped the development of poverty programs).

The primary sources are the records of movement organizations and information from the Office of Economic Opportunity. These sources provide data on the key actors, their activities, and their analyses of the political landscape. For the case studies, written records are supplemented with participant interviews from published and unpublished collections.

THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT AND THE WAR ON POVERTY: NATIONAL AND STATE CONTEXTS

The National Context of the War on Poverty[7]

On August 20, 1964, President Lyndon Johnson signed the Economic Opportunity Act, a key component of his Great Society agenda. The initiation of the War on Poverty coincided with a set of national policy initiatives of the early 1960s, including the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the 1965 Voting Rights Act—legislation that altered the political context of the civil rights movement. The War on Poverty included a cluster of programs administered primarily through the newly formed Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO). (Table 1 provides a list of acronyms used throughout this paper.) The War on Poverty lacked a unified approach conceptually and administratively. For example, the 1964 legislation included plans for Neighborhood Youth Corps, Community Action Programs, Head Start, Volunteers in Service to America (VISTA), and the college work-study program (Patterson 1994). Through the 1960s, OEO administered the majority of these programs, allowing them to bypass old-line agencies like the Department of Labor and local or state agencies. Over time, however, the major poverty programs were phased out or shifted over to the

[6] The data set is drawn from a larger study that includes measures of the civil rights movement, local countermobilization, contextual variables, federal intervention, and other outcomes. This data set includes all Mississippi counties except Hinds County, which includes Jackson, the capitol of Mississippi. The large size of Hinds County makes it an outlier in some analyses. In addition, Jackson served as the organizational center for state-level activities. My interest is in the local forms of mobilization, and in Hinds County these cannot be distinguished from state-level mobilization.

[7] For overviews see Friedman (1977), Patterson (1994), Piven and Cloward (1993), and Quadagno (1994).

more conservative agencies, and in 1973 OEO was eliminated (Quadagno 1994).

Among the various poverty programs, the Community Action Program (CAP) received the greatest attention and became almost synonymous with the War on Poverty. Policymakers pushing "community action hoped to stimulate better coordination among the melange of public and private agencies delivering social services" (Peterson and Greenstone 1977:241). This objective, however, was abandoned in favor of "citizen participation." OEO and local CAPs had little impact on the established agencies providing services to poor communities. As a result, CAPs administered many of the new antipoverty programs. CAPs were coordinated at the local level through a CAP Board that served as the overarching administrative body and provided a point of potential access for local movements. This opening paved the way for intense conflicts between local groups attempting to gain access to CAP boards in order to influence the flow of OEO funds.

The Mississippi Civil Rights Movement

In Mississippi, the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) began developing community projects in the early 1960s around voter registration (Carson 1981; Dittmer 1994; Payne 1995). These early projects linked the small network of indigenous NAACP leaders and an emerging group of grassroots leaders exemplified by Annie Devine, Fannie Lou Hamer, and Victoria Gray (Payne 1995). Civil rights projects met intense repression across the state from local law enforcement and local whites. SNCC's early efforts were expanded during the 1964 Freedom Summer project that brought college students from across the country into the local movements. Two features of this early period stand out: (1) the intensity of white resistance and (2) the focus on building local community organizations and leaders.

Following Freedom Summer, the newly formed Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party (MFDP) challenged the all-white Mississippi delegation to the Democratic National Convention in Atlantic City. This is often portrayed as the final chapter of the Mississippi movement as national attention shifted away from the southern movement following passage of the 1965 Voting Rights Act. However, key struggles took place at the state and local levels concerning the implementation of voting rights and social policies. Both the NAACP and MFDP continued to pursue a civil rights agenda after 1965 in Mississippi. The period following the Atlantic City convention was marked by increasing conflict between the two dominant organizations. In the electoral arena, both organizations supported candidates in local and state elections. Local branches of both organizations pursued school desegregation, organized boycotts and demonstrations, and pushed for expanded poverty programs in their communities (McLemore 1971; Parker 1990).

Table 1. List of Acronyms and Organizations

Acronym	Organization
ACBC	Associated Communities of Bolivar County
CAP	Community Action Program
CDGM	Child Development Group of Mississippi
CMI	Central Mississippi, Inc.
COFO	Council of Federated Organizations
CORE	Congress of Racial Equality
MFDP	Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party
NAACP	National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
OEO	Office of Economic Opportunity
SNCC	Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee

The Child Development Group of Mississippi: Early Involvement in the War on Poverty

From their origins, poverty programs in Mississippi were closely tied to the dynamics of the civil rights movement. One of the earliest and most celebrated programs, the Child Development Group of Mississippi (CDGM), administered Head Start centers across the

state building directly on the movement's base of Freedom Schools and community centers. CDGM provided an entry point for activists into the War on Poverty (Greenberg 1969).

CDGM was formed by a small group of policymakers and psychologists with loose connections to the Mississippi movement. For example, Tom Levin, the first director of the program, had participated in Freedom Summer through the Medical Committee for Human Rights, a group providing medical assistance to local projects. Despite these ties, when proposals for CDGM were circulated in early 1965, the response from SNCC and MFDP's state-level leadership was one of skepticism and opposition (Payne 1995). Many movement leaders were suspicious of the federal government and the initiatives of white liberals following the challenge at Atlantic City (Dittmer 1994). Thus, the state-level civil rights organizations made little effort to support CDGM.

Nevertheless, CDGM quickly diffused through the local movement infrastructure. In April 1965, CDGM held its first statewide meeting to begin developing the organization for the upcoming summer. At the first meeting, representatives from 20 communities attended. By the second meeting in the middle of April, that number had increased to 64 (Greenberg 1969:18, 22). For the first summer, Payne (1995) reports that "on opening day of the eight-week session, eighty-four centers opened across the state, serving fifty-six hundred children" (p. 329). Greenberg (1969), the OEO staff person responsible for CDGM, claims that "CDGM stood on the shoulders of COFO and its companion projects which were active the preceding summer" (p. 28).

Holmes County illustrates the relationship that developed between the civil rights movement and CDGM at the local level. An inspection during the second year of the program found that 102 of the 108 staff members in Holmes County were active members of MFDP. Reflecting the strength of the local movement, the investigation found that "many of the Negroes in the communities around the centers have donated money and time to build buildings for the centers and work with the programs" (NA, RG 381, Box 108, July 30, 1966).[8] Bernice Johnson, who worked with CDGM in Holmes County, recalled that community centers were used in the daytime for Head Start and at night for the MFDP (Bernice Johnson, interviewed by author, June 20, 1996). The same core groups of activists participated in both activities. Investigations across the state showed that CDGM staff were affiliated with COFO, SNCC, CORE, NAACP, the Urban League, the Delta Ministry, and MFDP (NA, RG 381, Box 108, July 5, 1966).

The strong relationship between local movements and CDGM made the Head Start program a target of opposition, including violence. The primary resistance came from influential Mississippi politicians, including Senator James Eastland, who chaired the Judiciary Committee, and Senator John Stennis, who chaired the Appropriations Committee. The opposition to CDGM resonated with growing fear from around the country that the War on Poverty was funding black insurgency (Quadagno 1994).

CDGM acquired its second grant for the 1966 summer after a massive mobilization including a demonstration in which "forty-eight black children and their teachers turned the hearing room of the House Education and Labor Committee into a kindergarten" (Dittmer 1994:375). After this, CDGM was funded at 5.6 million dollars. In response,

> Governor Johnson and his allies came to see that by setting up CAP agencies in Mississippi communities, local whites could prevent the flow of federal dollars into programs like CDGM. Under continuing attack from segregationists, OEO was eager to recognize any CAP agency in Mississippi, regardless of its composition. (Dittmer 1994: 375)

This tactical shift is remarkable—that Mississippi politicians opposed to federal antipoverty programs would come to embrace them must be attributed to the threat posed by the Mississippi civil rights movement.[9]

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[8] Complete citations for archival material are listed in the bibliography under Archival Sources. "NA" indicates the National Archives and Records Administration, and "RG indicates the Record Group.

[9] This opposition to federal intervention was specific to programs that would benefit black

OEO undermined the viability of CDGM by stipulating that in counties with a CAP, Head Start must be administered through the local CAP agency rather than a specialized, statewide program like CDGM. Turning Head Start over to CAPs gave local agencies a high profile in the community. The policy also undermined the movement's control of Head Start in Mississippi. OEO realized that this would shift the attention of movement activists toward local CAPs. In November 1966, OEO's southeast regional director wrote to OEO director Sargent Shriver explaining that "CDGM . . . had a large number of local poor people involved or hired. These same people can be expected to become involved in local CA[P] activities as their concern or experience warrants" (NA, RG 381, Box 2, November 8, 1966). This became the main battleground as activists attempted to shape Community Action Programs in Mississippi.

MEASURES AND MODELS: THE FORMATION AND FUNDING OF CAPS

Community Action Programs became the central component of the War on Poverty. Did local movements in Mississippi shape the formation and funding of CAPs? If so, in what ways did they influence CAPs? I analyze the funding of Community Action Programs during two phases, the initial development phase from 1965 to 1968 and the later phase of declining resources from 1969 to 1971.[10] The *dependent variable is the amount of CAP funding* for each period. The independent variables include measures of the civil rights movement (*black mobilization*), white resistance to the movement (*countermobilization*), and local characteristics of the county (*political and socioeconomic variables*). (See Appendix Table A for a list of variables, descriptions, means and standard deviations.)

Black mobilization is measured by three variables. MFDP staff in 1965 and NAACP membership in 1963 distinguishes between the effects of the militant (MFDP) and moderate (NAACP) wings of the Mississippi civil rights movement. I measure black electoral mobilization by the number of black candidates running for office in 1967. Few black candidates won in these initial elections following the Voting Rights Act. However, the variable indicates the early consolidation of organizations and networks focused on electoral politics.

Countermobilization by whites is measured by three variables: incidents of violent resistance during Freedom Summer, the presence of a Citizens' Council organization, and the presence of a Ku Klux Klan organization in the county.[11] The formation of a Community Action Program required some support and participation from local whites, typically from the County Board of Supervisors. Hence, the areas that had most strongly resisted the civil rights movement should be the least likely to seek out or support federal programs. In some counties, for example, local whites became targets of repression if they met with civil rights groups (Dittmer 1994; Harris 1982).

Political characteristics of the county are examined in terms of the political orientation of the electorate and the organizational capacity of the local government. The partisan loyalty of a county's electorate is measured by the percentage of votes cast for Lyndon Johnson in 1964. Higher levels of Democratic loyalty may have been rewarded

Mississippians. Cobb (1990) notes that "Delta planters were skilled in the pursuit and manipulation of federal assistance long before the New Deal," including flood control programs and crop-reduction subsidies (p. 914).

[10] The two dependent variables are the total CAP grants for 1965–1968 and 1969–1971 (NA, RG 381, Box 14, n.d.). There were 18 CAPs in Mississippi from 1965 to 1971 of which 8 were multicounty agencies. I used two different strategies for estimating county-level expenditures for multicounty agencies. First, I divided the budget evenly among the counties covered by the CAP. For the second estimation, I divided the budget among the counties proportional to the number of households in each county with an income below $3,000 per year. The two estimates produced similar results; I report the analysis using the "proportional" estimates. Because participation in programs was based on economic eligibility, this strategy is a better, if not perfect, approximation of the distribution.

[11] These three variables are not highly correlated, and thus I treat them as distinct modalities of resistance.

with higher levels of funding. In addition, I examine the possible influence of local political institutions on program implementation by including the proportion of the labor force employed in local government in 1964. I expect that counties with large political institutions will be more likely to seek out poverty program funding because of their greater organizational capacity (Mazmanian and Sabatier 1983).

Socioeconomic characteristics that might influence the formation and funding of CAPs include the local class structure, the level of poverty, and the population size. I examine the local class structure using three different indicators: (1) the proportion of the labor force employed in manufacturing, (2) the proportion of the labor force employed as professionals, and (3) landowner concentration for commercial farms. Measures of class structure are often used in studies of the policy process. James (1988) finds that manufacturing is a key component of the southern class structure that influences the level of racial inequality in political participation. Hence, I expect manufacturing to have a negative impact on poverty program funding. Professionals were potential supporters of poverty programs, so I expect the proportion employed as professionals to have a positive impact on CAP funding. The measure of landholding concentration estimates the predominance of the traditional plantation economy. Roscigno and Tomaskovic-Devey (1994) find that a similar indicator is an important determinant of local political outcomes in North Carolina. The expected direction of the relationship with this variable is unclear: While southern planters historically had opposed extensions of the welfare state system into the local economy, the mechanization of farming coincided with the rise of the civil rights movement and the initiation of the War on Poverty. This left many farm laborers unemployed, and poverty programs could have been viewed as a viable strategy for addressing the social and economic consequences of technological change (Cobb 1990).

To measure poverty, I use the proportion of households with incomes below $3,000 per year. In these models, using households or individuals produces similar results because they are highly correlated (r = .994). I also include a variable measuring the total number of households. To measure poverty and the number of households, I use data from the 1960 census (rather than 1970) because OEO would have used these data at the time. (Analyses using the 1970 data provide similar results.)[12]

The initial models were estimated using OLS regression. However, in the final models I conduct an additional test using a "spatial error" model, which tests for spatial dependence in the model that can result from the geographic proximity of the units of analysis (see Amenta et al. 1994; Gould 1991). The presence of spatial dependence can lead to inflated significance tests (Anselin 1992; Doreian 1980). The autocorrelation term in both models is statistically significant. However, the profile of results for the remaining independent variables is similar to that in the OLS models.[13]

RESULTS

Black Mobilization and Community Action Programs

Table 2 shows that the measures of black mobilization play an important role in the funding of Community Action Programs during both periods: The MFDP has a statis-

[12] Similarly, I tested several measures of poverty, such as the number of households with income below $2,000 and $1,000 in these models. Each indicator produced comparable results. The chosen indicator, households earning less than $3,000, is the closest approximation of the federal poverty line. CAP grant applications required that applicants list the percentage of households earning below $3,000. When OEO investigated the composition of CAP boards or program employees to determine whether there was sufficient representation of "the poor," this was the indicator they used. The indicator became so widely used that the movement employed it, and in 1966, MFDP sent out a call for a statewide meeting of all persons earning below $3,000. Studies by political scientists and sociologists measuring poverty with 1960 data have also employed this same indicator (e.g., Colby 1985; Cowart 1969; Friedland 1976).

[13] The independent variables that were significant in the OLS models remain significant, with the exception of the presence of Ku Klux Klan organizations.

Table 2. Unstandaradized Coefficients from the Maximum-Likelihood Regression of Community Action Program Funding (in $100,000s) on Selected Independent Variables: Mississippi Counties, 1965–1968 and 1969–1971

Independent Variables	CAP Grants 1965–1968	(S.E.)	CAP Grants 1969–1971	(S.E.)
Black Mobilization				
MFDP membership, 1965	1.942***	(.506)	1.109***	(.243)
NAACP membership, 1963 (logged)	1.646**	(.715)	.451	(.350)
Number of black candidates, 1967	—		.566**	(.211)
Countermobilization				
Violent resistance during Freedom Summer	–1.96***	(.577)	–1.240***	(.283)
Citizens' Council organization in county, 1956	–1.657	(2.401)	–.657	(1.105)
Ku Klux Klan organization in county, 1964	–2.622	(2.324)	–1.707	(1.116)
Political Characteristics				
Percentage voting for Lyndon Johnson, 1964	–.011	(.199)	—	
Proportion employed in local government, 1964	690.229*	(327.970)	415.988**	(156.610)
Socioeconomic Characteristics				
Proportion employed in manufacturing	–.025	(.205)	–.090	(.093)
Proportion professionals	.431	(.374)	.131	(.176)
Landowner concentration	5.251	(7.432)	.107	(3.357)
Poverty, 1959 (proportion of households earning less than $3,000)	43.769*	(25.408)	11.447	(12.129)
Total number of households, 1960 (in 1,000s)	.907*	(.424)	.760***	(.206)
Spatial autocorrelation (λ)	.551***	(.114)	.383**	(.136)
Constant	–53.083*	(26.425)	–18.618	(12.416)
Fit	.422		.562	
Maximized log-likelihood (LIK)	–1,226.3		–1,165.3	
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC)	2,478.6		2,356.6	

Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. "Fit" measures the squared correlation between the predicted and observed values (Anselin 1992). Number of counties = 81.

*$p < .05$ **$p < .01$ ***$p < .001$ (one-tailed tests [except landowner concentration; see text])

tically significant effect in both periods, the NAACP variable is significant for 1965–1968 but not for 1969–1971, and the measure of black electoral organization is positive and statistically significant for 1969–1971.[14]

The models underscore the influence at the local level of the more militant organizations. Quadagno (1994) argues that "OEO promoted black moderates at the expense of more militant civil rights activists" (p. 43). Certainly, OEO attempted to do this. But these analyses show that local movements, especially militant groups, promoted the expansion of OEO programs.

Next I discuss the remaining variables in the CAP models. Then I provide an extended discussion of movement influence. I argue that we must look further to determine whether movement activists, moderate or militant, played a direct role in the administration of CAPs. I draw on two case studies of Mississippi counties to examine *how* movements shaped poverty program formation and funding.

[14] The black candidate variable does not account for the declining importance of NAACP membership. Models omitting the black candidate variable show a similar profile of coefficients, and the NAACP variable remains nonsignificant.

Countermobilization: Repression and Poverty Programs

The negative coefficients for violent resistance during Freedom Summer are statistically significant in both models. Less CAP funding went to those locales that had been sites of the most militant resistance to the civil rights movement. One white leader in Coahoma County articulated the common view that "if the white leaders did not become involved then the alternative was more Federal intervention with the county's antipoverty program being turned over to the Negroes" (Mosley and Williams 1967:8). Most counties had some white leaders who shared this view, but they did not prevail in counties that had high levels of violent repression. Local white moderates were the targets of white violence in some counties, but in counties that were relatively less repressive, moderate white leaders stepped forward to form poverty programs.

This interpretation is supported by evidence from the case studies and broader historical material on the civil rights movement (see Cunnigen 1987; Jacoway and Colburn 1982). In those cases in which local whites supported the civil rights movement, they were often singled out for repression. For example, during Freedom Summer, the Heffners, a white couple, met with civil rights activists in their home in McComb. After this meeting, the Heffners were intimidated until they left the state (Dittmer 1994; Harris 1982). This type of repression was not limited to Freedom Summer. In 1966, for example, a white Head Start teacher in Panola County "received threatening phone calls. On July 16, a letter was distributed around the city of Batesville. It was signed KKK, listed some of the white teachers and aides working in the program and said they would be given just one more opportunity to get out on their own. . . . As a result of the threat, four white aides left the Head Start program" (NA, RG 381, Box 110, July 17, 1966). OEO field reports and CDGM records document similar efforts to limit white support for the movement and the poverty programs.

Movement scholars often argue that repression has a negative impact on a movement's ability to achieve its objectives (Gamson 1990).[15] This can occur when repression undermines the organizational capacity of the movement, but in this case, I argue that a different process is operating—repression diminished CAP funding by suppressing the mobilization of other groups.[16]

The Local Context: Political Variables and Poverty

The pattern reported in Table 2 indicates that poverty was significantly associated with high levels of CAP funding during the first period only. County size (measured by the number of households) also has a positive effect in both models. The proportion employed in local government has a positive and statistically significant relationship to poverty program funding in both periods. Partisanship and social class measures do not show statistically significant effects on poverty program funding.

Most CAPs were initiated in the early years following the 1964 legislation. As budget cuts were made through the late 1960s, the funding of new grants was minimal. OEO's broad guideline was to make reductions of "approximately equal percentage" while allowing room for administrative discretion (NA, RG 381, Box 2, October 14, 1966). However, Table 2 reveals some important shifts, including the declining role of poverty and the increasing role of county size (measured by number of households). Overall, the results reported in Table 2 indicate that there was some continuity in the funding of CAPs.

Local Movements and Community Action Programs

The key finding from the regression models, then, is the significant positive impact of

[15] The relationship between repression and protest has received considerable attention in recent years and has been strongly influenced by Tilly's (1978) early analysis (Koopmans 1997; Lichbach 1987; Rasler 1996). In contrast, little is known about the impact of repression on outcomes.

[16] I conducted a third case study that sheds light on this process. In Madison County, violent repression endured longer than it did in most of Mississippi. Only one effort was made to estab-

black mobilization on the funding of CAPs. However, this finding is consistent with different interpretations. One possibility is that local movements were directly involved in the formation of CAPs. However, another possibility is that movements posed a threat that mobilized other groups in the county to develop poverty programs. These scenarios correspond to Gamson's (1990) concepts of success and preemption: Success occurs when movements gain access to the policymaking process and generate substantive gains; movements are preempted when substantive gains are achieved without access to the policymaking process.[17]

The regression equations do not indicate which of the two interpretations apply in Mississippi. The case studies show that the pattern was more complex. Initially movements were preempted, and this was followed by long struggles with varying degrees of success to achieve access to the policymaking process. Movements gained influence by employing multiple strategies such as disruptive protest, negotiation with OEO officials, and administering independent poverty programs. In short, the movement infrastructure in the community shaped the extent and form of influence that was ultimately achieved.

In 1965 and 1966, Community Action Programs were formed without substantial participation from movement activists. Black participation often involved traditional leaders not affiliated with the civil rights movements (neither the moderate NAACP nor the more militant MFDP representatives), such as ministers and teachers. OEO was, in fact, aware of what it called the "Tom" problem. In early 1966, the southeast regional manager of CAP reported that in Mississippi

> . . . the most frequent problem and the one which requires the most time in its solution is representation. Boards on original submission are almost always hand picked and packed in favor of the Governor. Negro representation is always 'Tom.' . . . Protests almost always follow the selection of such initial Boards and resolution generally takes from 3 to 4 months. (NA, RG 381, Box 2, February 24, 1966)[18]

Even though they were aware of the problem, OEO's grant administrators often did not have detailed information about the local situation and lacked "the technical competence necessary to help with Board problems" (NA, RG 381, Box 2, February 24, 1966). This problem was particularly acute in the early years. During this period, OEO depended on local movements to act as "whistle-blowers."

THE CASE STUDIES

The Community Action Programs in Holmes and Bolivar Counties were formed with little direct involvement from activists. However, this changed as each movement attempted to influence local CAPs. The cases differ with regard to the specific strategies deployed by local movements and the way that local elites responded to those efforts. In Holmes County, activists were able to secure positions and influence within the CAP administration and staff. In Bolivar County, activists used a variety of tactics to establish an independent poverty program that operated alongside the local CAP.

Holmes County

In the early 1960s, Holmes County developed one of the most successful local civil rights movements in Mississippi (MacLeod 1991; Payne 1995). The movement developed an infrastructure with broad leadership, multiple organizations, indigenous resources, and strategic flexibility. A core group of activists emerged in the small community of Mileston. Bernice Johnson, one of the first activists from the eastern part of the

lish a CAP, and it was unsuccessful (*Madison County Herald*, "CAP Meeting Saturday," April 27, 1967, p. 1).

[17] There were some rare cases in which NAACP leaders and liberal whites formed coalitions at the local level—this occurred, for example, in Coahoma County. However, these coalitions were stronger in state-level organizations like the Loyalist Democrats (Dittmer 1994; Simpson 1982).

[18] Governors could veto poverty programs unless they were administered through a college or university. Some programs, such as CDGM, were administered through historically black colleges to avoid the veto. Other programs were sponsored by universities outside the South, such as the Tufts Delta Health Center in Bolivar County.

county, remembers the diffusion process as follows:

> Well, they were constantly trying to get new members. I remember when I first started going to Mileston, I encouraged the people in the community where I lived (which was Sunny Mount) to start having a meeting. . . . We were constantly going from community to community, from church to church, asking people to allow us to come into your church. . . . "Set up a community meeting. Elect you some officers—a president, a secretary, a treasurer or what have you—designate a certain time for your community meeting." (Rural Organizing and Cultural Center 1991, p. 70)

By 1964, most of the small communities in the county had held meetings sponsored by the MFDP that culminated in a monthly countywide meeting (Mississippi Department of Archives and History, MFDP Records, Reel 3, n.d.). Sue Lorenzi, a community organizer, reported weekly meetings in 15 different communities in 1966 (State Historical Society of Wisconsin [SHSW], Alvin Oderman Papers, August 27, 1966).

The movement infrastructure included multiple venues for leadership development. Salamon (1971:440), who conducted field research in Holmes County in 1969, estimated that there were approximately 800 formal leadership positions in movement organizations held by 600 different individuals.[19]

Financial resources were modest. However, they were derived from local activities including collections at monthly meetings, plate dinners, and set donations from churches of, for example, $100 a year. The FDP office was sustained by local collections—in 1966, "over $500 was raised . . . for its phone, rent, lights, some supplies" (SHSW, Alvin Oderman Papers, August 27, 1966). While the vast majority of resources were generated internally in the form of labor, the movement periodically employed outside help from sources like legal aid organizations or national civil rights organizations.

Ed Brown, one of the early SNCC workers in Holmes County, described the local movement

> . . . as opposed to placing the emphasis on confrontational politics we had placed the emphasis on organizing so that in the instances where there were confrontations there was sufficient organizational strength behind it to make the whites think, you know, twice before doing anything. (Tougaloo College, Tom Dent Collection, July 2, 1979)

The Holmes County movement was a loosely coordinated confederation of movements across the county that expanded the repertoire of skills at the local level and brought local activists into contact with state and national politics.

Initial efforts to form a CAP in Holmes County bypassed the strong movement infrastructure. In the fall of 1965, a committee appointed by the Board of Supervisors began plans to join Central Mississippi, Inc. (CMI), a multicounty CAP. OEO's Southeast Regional Office was skeptical of CMI's initial proposal. Bob Westgate, an OEO staff member, noted that

> . . . although there are three Negroes on each of the [five], seven member county boards, I have my doubts of their real value to their people, whether they were really "elected" by their people, and suggest that they should be checked by someone from this office. At least eight of the 15 Negro members are dependent upon the white power structure for their jobs or welfare pension payments (five principals or teachers, two on welfare and one maid). (NA, RG 381, Box 5, December 11, 1965)

Westgate sought information through CORE and NAACP contacts, but neither organization could provide contacts because they did not have organizations in the counties. Originally, CMI had submitted a proposal reporting that 25 percent of the population was black, but OEO required an increase in the number of "minority representatives" when it discovered that the population in the six counties was actually 58 percent black (NA, RG 381, Box 5, December 11, 1965).

OEO was also concerned that "eight of the 20 white board members are 'Johnson colonels'—men who contributed funds and support during Governor Johnson's campaign" (NA, RG 381, Box 5, December 11, 1965). The governor exercised considerable power

[19] The 1960 census reports 19,488 black persons (71.9 percent of the total population) living in Holmes County (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1963).

over CAPs because he had to sign off on grants and the organization's charter. With CMI, Johnson "allegedly held up the signing of the charter until these eight [supporters] were appointed on the board." The president and vice president of the CMI board were Johnson loyalists, and they had strong ties to the local political structure. For example, Ringold, the president, was the attorney for the Board of Supervisors (the most powerful local political body in Mississippi) in Montgomery County (NA, RG 381, Box 5, December 11, 1965).

Because the formation of CMI occurred outside the public arena, it could not be contested by local activists. Daisy Lewis, director of the Holmes County Community Center, observed that "CAP came into Holmes County unexpected before the poor Negro and poor white had the chance to take part in it or decide if it would help our county or not. . ." (Tougaloo College, Ed King Papers, Box 11, 1966). A group of approximately 40 white leaders held a planning meeting in February 1966 to coordinate efforts. The *Lexington Advertiser* reported that "leaders were told that they have a choice of the county conducting it's own anti-poverty program and 'taking the Negroes along with us' or not acting and have the 'Negroes and civil rights workers' take over" ("Anti-Poverty Program Discussed," February 24, 1966, p. 1). Despite being caught off guard, the movement quickly mobilized to participate in the program. On March 7, a public meeting was held with approximately 500 blacks and 30 whites in attendance (*Lexington Advertiser*, "Holmes CAP Advisory Group," March 10, 1966, p. 1). Activists brought a series of demands including the dissolution of the existing board. A compromise was reached in which six additional members were elected to a temporary advisory committee. Other changes were made, including the election of a 31-member permanent advisory committee that would elect a six-member Board of Directors. In addition, each Head Start center would elect a separate advisory committee. Because the small communities throughout the county were already organized, the movement could elect a majority to the advisory committee and influence key policy decisions of the Community Action Program (Salamon 1971).

The Holmes County movement thus restructured the organization of poverty programs during the course of a single meeting. These policies ensured a high level of movement participation in future program implementation. By securing access to the administration of CAP, the civil rights movement was able to maintain control of Head Start centers through an independent, delegate agency. In addition, CAP initiated several projects that went beyond job training to address rural poverty in Holmes County. While the poverty programs provided services, they also provided jobs—the programs constituted the single largest employer in Holmes County (Salamon 1971).

Bolivar County

In the mid-1960s, the Bolivar County movement was weaker than that in Holmes County. Community organizers had begun campaigns in some towns (e.g., Shaw), but several communities had no movement activity. The movement was held together by a loose network of activists, but it did not have the regular meetings, diverse organizations, or comprehensive presence that Holmes County did. Nevertheless, civil rights activists mobilized a successful, widespread campaign to secure an independent, parallel program. This campaign became a major vehicle for building a movement infrastructure in Bolivar County.

As in Holmes County, the initial plans for a CAP occurred without movement participation. The Bolivar County Community Action Committee was formed in 1965 with key support from local elites including the Board of Supervisors and the Chamber of Commerce. As editor of the *Bolivar-Commercial* and President of the Chamber of Commerce, Cliff Langford provided considerable support for the program. From its beginning, local activists criticized the program for excluding movement participation and appointing conservative blacks to the CAP board. As was the case in many CDGM counties, mobilization crystallized in early 1966 when local leaders in Bolivar County learned that Head Start could no longer be administered through CDGM. Consistent with its new policy, OEO recommended that the Head Start program be shifted to the lo-

cal CAP. The CDGM group formed a local organization called the Associated Communities of Bolivar County (ACBC). A campaign was launched that simultaneously attacked the local CAP for excluding movement activists and demanded the continuation of Head Start through the established CDGM program. A similar strategy was used in Sunflower County (Mills 1993). Black members of the CAP board were singled out as "Toms" appointed by the "power structure." The CDGM group was outraged that one of the black ministers appointed to the CAP board had denied CDGM access to several churches in 1965 (SHSW, Amzie Moore Papers, Box 2, n.d.b and Box 3, n.d.).

The primary leader of the challenge was Amzie Moore, one of the early NAACP leaders in Mississippi. However, the leadership included a large number of local ministers (from churches in which Head Start centers operated) and the staff from Head Start programs throughout the county. These efforts also received support from the Delta Ministry and MFDP. The challenge could quickly mobilize throughout the organizational infrastructure that had been used to operate Head Start. The local movement, calling itself the "Committee of the Poor in Bolivar County," held mass meetings, circulated a petition, and operated the CDGM centers for approximately 1,200 children on a volunteer basis through the spring of 1966 (NA, RG 381, Box 40, March 17, 1966; SHSW, Amzie Moore Papers, Box 2, January 19, 1966). The volunteer programs demonstrated the commitment of the local movement and posed an ongoing challenge to the legitimacy of the funded project in the county. One OEO investigator noted that the petition "is a forceful and dramatic expression of the feelings of these people of Bolivar County. It does show that there is a good deal of organization at the grass roots level" (NA, RG 381, Box 40, March 3, 1966). In addition to the local activities, leaders went to Washington, D.C. to lobby OEO to maintain the CDGM-based program in Bolivar County.[20]

The Bolivar County CAP tried to respond to charges that its board was unrepresentative by holding open meetings at the local level to discuss program objectives and consolidate support. These meetings provided an opportunity for representatives of the CDGM-based group to publicly criticize the CAP board and build support for their challenge (SHSW, Amzie Moore Papers, Box 2, n.d.a; SHSW, Amzie Moore Papers, Box 2, March 13, 1966). These events culminated in a meeting between CAP and the CDGM group in March at which the Bolivar CAP voted down a proposal to transfer funds to the CDGM group and allow it to administer an independent program. This forced OEO to make a decision regarding the two groups (SHSW, Amzie Moore Papers, Box 2, 1966; SHSW, Amzie Moore Papers, Box 2, March 22, 1966).

OEO was initially opposed to having parallel organizations and favored a reorganization of the existing CAP board. Summarizing an extensive investigation, an OEO report emphasized that "it is *crucially* important that the Bolivar County Community Action Committee be given every consideration for funding" (NA, RG 381, Box 40, 1965). Despite initial support of the local CAP, Bill Seward concluded his investigation for OEO that

> . . . although representing less than a third of the Negro population, [the CDGM group] is a potent and vocal force that must be recognized and included in any further OEO programs. . . . [F]urther postponement [of funding] will raise the level of emotional discontent of the Negro/poor from one of frustration, channeled into constructive effort, to one of frustration resulting in overt demonstration. In other words, there had better be a Head Start and quick *before* the lid blows. (NA, RG 381, Box 40, March 17, 1966)

This analysis led Seward to recommend dividing the funds evenly between CDGM and the local CAP (NA, RG 381, Box 40, March 31, 1966; U.S. Senate 1967). In April, this was the compromise that OEO reached in Bolivar County—two separate Head Start

[20] Although there is no precise estimate of the movement's size, the "Outline of Important Events" cited above reports "approximately 7,000 signatures" on the petition (SHSW, Amzie Moore Papers, Box 2, n.d.b; for a copy of the petition see SHSW, Amzie Moore Papers, Box 2, n.d.c).

programs with separate staffs and administrations were funded (SHSW, Amzie Moore Papers, Box 3, April 14, 1966).

Despite initial opposition, support within OEO increased for the movement-based program which had applied for funding as the Associated Communities of Bolivar County (ACBC). A 1967 report noted that "preliminary evaluations indicate that the ACBC programs are probably better than the CA[P]'s." Even though the Bolivar County CAP was making efforts to subsume ACBC within its program, OEO representatives in Mississippi stated that "our position will be to support and maintain ACBC as a separate entity" (NA, RG 381, Box 5, January 13, 1967). The Bolivar County movement leveraged a response from OEO because of its sustained mobilization using conventional and disruptive tactics. In the 1966 year-end report, the southeast regional director singled out Bolivar County because of the "lessening of over-all community tensions" (NA, RG 381, Box 2, December 30, 1966).

The Bolivar County movement was able to use sustained protest to secure an autonomous poverty program. Despite initial opposition, OEO officials came to see the duplication of administrative staff and costs as preferable to an ongoing challenge to their legitimacy in Bolivar County. The movement's challenge depended on an expansive network of activists that could run Head Start centers, coordinate mass meetings, and negotiate the grant-writing process with OEO.

Movements in Holmes County and Bolivar County were successful at maintaining movement-controlled Head Start centers. In addition, both movements posed a credible threat that compelled local political elites to establish well-funded Community Action Programs. However, the counties differed in important respects. In Holmes County, activists achieved greater impact on the structure of CAP by capitalizing on a strong movement infrastructure. In Bolivar County, activists protected movement-affiliated Head Start programs but ceded control to the broader CAP program. This outcome resulted from the relatively greater opposition and the less developed infrastructure in Bolivar County compared with Holmes County.

CONCLUSION

A striking finding of this study is the extent to which movements shaped the implementation of local poverty programs. While this influence was certainly less than local activists would have desired, it was nonetheless considerable. The quantitative analysis shows that local movements had a positive impact on the amount of CAP funding in Mississippi counties. The case studies support my interpretation of the quantitative evidence and show how movements influenced the formation of Community Action Programs by carving out areas of administrative control.

I propose that researchers specify more precisely *how* movements shape social policy. Even in this small case study, I demonstrate several ways that local movements influenced policy implementation in Mississippi, including the disruption of program operations, negotiation with agency officials, and symbolic and persuasive protest activities. The greatest influence may have occurred indirectly when movements prompted local white politicians to actively pursue grants for poverty programs.

In terms of the movement-outcome models, the evidence indicates that the impacts of the movement were cumulative, rather than momentary as suggested by the action-reaction models. The movement posed a threat, but the threat was based on the ability of the movement to distribute federal programs independent of local agencies. Local movements used a variety of conventional tactics, but they did not abandon the politics of protest—marches and boycotts were organized in local communities throughout the late 1960s. Rather, movements were most influential when they built local organizations that allowed for an oscillation between mass-based tactics and routine negotiation with agency officials.

The action-reaction models cannot account for the sustained interactions between local movements and OEO officials during the implementation of poverty programs. During much of this period, local activists and program officials collaborated to establish poverty programs. The access-influence model would suggest a drift toward greater professionalization of the movement and the aban-

donment of protest tactics, but this did not occur as the Bolivar County case illustrates.

The movement infrastructure model shows how movements exert influence through multiple causal mechanisms. The three most crucial mechanisms observed in this study are (1) direct implementation of poverty programs, (2) indirect influence by challenging the political authority of local elites, and (3) disruptive and persuasive protest that compelled OEO to act on behalf of the movement. These forms of influence all derive from the organizational capacity of local movements. Direct program implementation required an extensive leadership cadre that could maintain ongoing ties to OEO officials, other programs throughout the state, and community members. In Bolivar County, activists secured independent programs over the initial opposition of OEO administrators and the local CAP. The movement-affiliated centers (formerly CDGM) continued to operate Head Start programs in 1966 without funding, illustrating the underlying strength of the local organization. The second form of influence flowed from the first. Because local movements were capable of operating poverty programs independently, they undermined the authority of local officials who had historically administered social programs. Finally, local movements used protest, including disruptive protest in Bolivar County, to bring additional pressure to bear on OEO and to mobilize national support. OEO officials came to see this as an inevitable part of the implementation process in Mississippi with civil rights groups acting as whistle-blowers.

As an analytic strategy, I have addressed the long-standing problems of studying movement outcomes, opening questions about the variation in movement infrastructures and the ability of movements to influence policy. The strategy employed is less generalizable than studies based on a representative sample of social movement organizations or campaigns (e.g., Gamson 1990), yet it avoids some of the problems inherent in studies analyzing multiple movements, such as limited measures of movement impact. While the Mississippi movement is exceptional in some respects, the movement employed organizational forms and strategies that are comparable to those of many other social movements, including labor movements (Fantasia 1989; Ganz 2000), the environmental justice movement (Bullard 1990), and many women's movements (Ferree and Martin 1995; Whittier 1995).

One might reasonably ask whether there were distinctive aspects of the War on Poverty in Mississippi that make this instance of policy implementation and the findings presented here unique? First, the high degree of public participation required by the poverty programs facilitated the movement's access to the programs while bringing the movement's opponents into the implementation process. Second, the high level of local autonomy permitted in the formation and management of projects allowed the movement to pursue local efforts to influence poverty programs rather than pursue a national struggle in which the movement would have had to target federal actors, especially Congress and the Presidency. Local variation in policy implementation is common for social policies in the United States (Amenta et al. 1994; Banaszak 1996; Clemens 1997), but the model might require modification to accommodate variation in political context (Amenta, Halfmann, and Young 1999). Third, the central role of racial politics in the development of the War on Poverty is seen, for example, in the ongoing efforts of OEO to showcase racial integration in its programs (Quadagno 1994). However, this conflict reveals dynamics of a more general nature in that the long-term goals of program administrators and movement activists often conflict. To address these concerns in a more meaningful way requires similar analyses of other social movements across a variety of policy arenas.

The growing body of research on movement outcomes calls for more explicit development of the causal arguments concerning movement impact. I provide a preliminary map of these arguments that allows for more systematic, comparative research: Future studies of outcomes can address these issues by (1) using quantitative analysis of outcomes across time and policy arenas, (2) giving greater attention to the process and mechanisms of impact through case studies, and (3) synthesizing across specific findings to explain variation across movements and political contexts.

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Appendix Table A. Descriptions and Means and Standard Deviations of Variables Used in Analysis

Variable Name	Variable Description	Source	Mean	S.D.
Black Mobilization				
MFDP membership, 1965	Number of MFDP staff/ contact persons in county.	Tougaloo College, Ed King Papers, Box 11, August 23, 1965.	1.81	2.55
NAACP membership, 1963 (logged)	Number of members in NAACP 1963, (logged).	Library of Congress, NAACP Papers, Box 75, 1963.	1.06	1.89
Number of black candidates, 1967	Black candidates running for office in 1967 county and state elections.	Mississippi Department of Archives and History, MFDP Records, Reel 2, n.d.; Tougaloo College, Rims Barber Papers, Box 1, August 4, 1967.	1.38	2.73
Countermobilization				
Violent resistance during Freedom Summer	Number of incidents of physical attack on civil rights workers, June–August 1964.	McAdam (1988:257–82); Holt (1965:207–52); summary of incidents also included in SNCC and CORE papers.	1.00	2.31
Citizens' Council organization in county	Presence of organization in county, January, 1956.	Citizens' Council of America (1956).	.69	.46
Ku Klux Klan organization in county	Presence of organization in county, c. 1964.	U.S. House of Representatives (1965).	.48	.50
Political Variables				
Percentage voting for Lyndon Johnson, 1964	Percentage of votes cast for Johnson in 1964.	U.S. Bureau of the Census (1967).	11.61	8.61
Proportion employed in local government, 1964	Proportion of labor force employed by local government in 1964.	U.S. Bureau of the Census (1967).	.021	.004
County Socioeconomic Variables				
Proportion employed in manuafacturing	Proportion of labor force employed in manufacturing.	U.S. Bureau of the Census (1963).	20.42	8.98
Proportion professionals	Proportion of labor force employed as professionals.	U.S. Bureau of the Census (1963).	24.27	6.3
Landowner concentration	Proportion of all commercial farm land owned by owners of 500 acres or more, 1964.	U.S. Bureau of the Census (1969).	.42	.22
Poverty, 1959	Proportion of households earning less than $3,000 in 1959.	U.S. Bureau of the Census (1963).	.59	.11
Total number of households (in 1,000s)	Number of households in county in 1960.	U.S. Bureau of the Census (1963).	5.64	4.17
Dependent Variables				
CAP grants 1965–1968 (in $100,000s)	Total CAP grants for 1965–1968.	NA, RG 381, Box 14, n.d. multiple files by organization name.	5.28	13.05
CAP grants 1969–1971 (in $100,000s)	Total CAP Grants for 1969–1971.	NA, RG 381, Box 14, n.d. multiple files by organization name.	3.30	6.74

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Studying Status: An Integrated Framework

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This paper reports development of an integrated framework for studying status. The framework provides models and methods for addressing long-standing, unresolved issues, such as (1) the emergence of status, (2) distinguishing between the status of individuals and the status of characteristics, and (3) measuring and understanding the status gap between subgroups (between men and women, or between races). The framework, which covers both small groups and large societies, and both task and nontask groups, utilizes ideas and insights from several literatures to identify three types of status, linked in precise ways to two kinds of personal characteristics (quantitative and qualitative). The three types of status are mathematically specified, and initial theoretical development is presented for all three, including, for each, formulation of measures, derivation of testable implications, and analysis of how to change status and the status structure. Testable implications cover such phenomena as status differences between group members, status gaps between subgroups, overall status inequality, and status gains and losses from discrimination – all under varying conditions, including the number and intercorrelation of status-conferring personal characteristics and the proportions in the subgroups. The new status theory also identifies two mechanisms involved in the phenomenon of "internalized oppression." The framework thus opens many avenues for future work, both theoretical work, deriving more and sharper implications, and empirical work, testing the implications and using the new measures for the status of persons and the status of characteristics to assess key status phenomena in surveys and experiments.

Status processes are central to the social life, and understanding status is a central task for sociology. Status processes play a part in the development of powerful inequalities, which shape the structure of groups and societies as well as, directly and indirectly, the opportunities of individuals (Berger, Rosenholtz, and Zelditch 1980). Moreover, recent conjectures and preliminary evidence suggesting that status may directly affect physical health (Marmot 2000; Sapolsky 1993; Smith 1999; Wilkenson 1996) provide new urgency for obtaining sharper, more precise, and more reliable knowledge about the operation of status.

Although much has been learned, many basic questions about status remain unanswered; and the insights that could be marshaled for sustained inquiry reside in separate literatures. In this paper I develop an integrated framework for studying status.[1] The framework provides models and methods for addressing long-standing, unresolved issues. These issues include: (1) the emergence of status; (2) how to distinguish between, and measure, the status of persons and the status

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[1] Status, as used in this paper, refers to evaluations of the worth of individuals and characteristics; synonyms include "honor, esteem, respect, and prestige" (Zelditch 1968:250, 253).

of characteristics; (3) whether quantitative and qualitative characteristics operate differently; (4) how to measure status gaps between subgroups of a group or society; (5) how to assess the effects of the proportions in different subgroups; (6) how to incorporate multiple bases for status; (7) how status processes differ in small groups and large societies; (8) how status processes differ in task groups and other kinds of groups; and (9) how status is shaped by the degree of correlation among valued personal characteristics.

The proposed framework has three key features. First, it distinguishes between two kinds of characteristics (quantitative and qualitative) and between three types of status which are linked in precise ways to the two kinds of characteristics. Second, it builds carefully on previous work, incorporating seminal ideas and insights into a consistent, coherent whole; chief among these ideas and insights are (1) the mathematical specification for the production of status from quantitative characteristics (owed to Goode [1978] and Sørensen [1979]), (2) the link between the status conferred on individuals by quantitative characteristics and the status acquired by qualitative characteristics (owed to Ridgeway [1991, 1997b], Ridgeway and Balkwell [1997], and Webster and Hysom [1998]), and (3) the multidimensional specification of the status of individuals (analyzed by Barber [1968], Goode [1978], Rossi [1979], and Turner [1984, 1995]). Third, the framework is fully mathematized, leading to precise predictions about the magnitude of status conferred on individuals and the magnitude of status obtained by qualitative characteristics, and about the conditions conducive to greater or lesser status and larger or smaller status gaps, and providing as well a set of measures ready for use in empirical work.

For example, it is universally believed that in almost all societies, men have higher status than women. But the status gap between the sexes is also known to vary greatly, and there has not been a theory-based way to measure it. The status-gap continuum extends from societies in which women are not permitted to vote or to own property to societies in which women and men work in teams (on earth and in space, in war and in peace), vote their conscience, and face no legal bars to income and wealth. The new framework provides a coherent set of models and tools, based on the status, prestige, and stratification literatures, which enable both measurement of the status gap and analysis of why and how the status gap varies in magnitude.

The new framework not only enables examination of all the unresolved issues but also yields unexpected results. It shows that key ideas and insights from the several status literatures, when combined together, produce unexpected synergies, providing new testable implications and opening new avenues for status research. The initial set of testable implications includes implications for the effects on status and status structure of (1) the number and intercorrelation of personal characteristics, (2) the availability of information about personal characteristics, and (3) the proportions of a group in each category of a qualitative characteristic. Status processes have a long reach, and the new status theory identifies two mechanisms that may be involved in the phenomenon of "internalized oppression" (Bourdieu 1997; Ridgeway 1997a:222; Stanton-Salazar 1997), provides a new way to understand gains and losses from discrimination, and yields ceteris paribus implications for a wide range of behavioral and social phenomena including coalition formation, defection, identity and reference-group processes, response rates and missing data in surveys, veiling customs, relative size and skill of political parties, and the tension between individualism and collectivism.

Of course, the new framework for status analysis is preliminary, and further theoretical and empirical inquiry will no doubt lead to modifications. To make the framework as useful as possible, I take a threefold approach: First, I lay the foundation carefully, formalizing the three basic status functions (corresponding to the three kinds of status identified by the framework), which become the three basic assumptions of the new status theory. Second, I provide a sampling of the kinds of theoretical development enabled by the framework, deriving implications for several special cases, including both small groups and large societies under a variety of conditions. Third, I take a brief look at how

to change status and the status structure, including speculation linking measures and mechanisms identified by the framework to potential empirical applications across a broad spectrum of social contexts. This threefold approach invites further work on the content of the functions and assumptions, on additional special cases for deriving implications, and on empirical applications, including surveys and experiments.

The next section provides an overview of the framework. It is followed by three sections, focusing, respectively, on the three kinds of status.

OVERVIEW OF THE FRAMEWORK FOR STATUS ANALYSIS

The objective is to develop a general framework for the study of status—a framework that will cover status phenomena and status processes in all settings (e.g., task groups as well as nontask groups) and at both micro and macro levels (e.g., in both small groups and large societies), that distinguishes clearly between the status of individuals and the status of characteristics and between status and its determinants and its consequences, and that enables both measurement and analysis. The framework should contain the basic building blocks which provide the starting assumptions from which a variety of testable implications can be derived and which provide measures ready for use empirically. Future work can then proceed on three fronts—expanding and refining the framework, building theories and deriving more and sharper implications, and testing the implications and accumulating information on magnitudes and correlates of key status phenomena.

The framework draws insights and reasonings from the many pertinent literatures, including literatures on social organization, social stratification, status organizing processes, and inequality.[2] The emphasis throughout is on developing a foundation for coherent and fruitful synthesis. Of course, not all status topics are covered, but future work can draw them in, expanding and refining the framework as needed, as well as establishing links to other frameworks.

This section discusses the two basic ingredients in the framework: (1) a distinction between two kinds of personal characteristics; and (2) a distinction between three types of status.[3]

Two Types of Characteristics: Quantitative and Qualitative

The new framework distinguishes between *quantitative* and *qualitative* characteristics. Quantitative characteristics are characteristics of which individuals can have "more" or "less"; qualitative characteristics, in contrast, describe features of individuals that have no inherent ordering but which can be used to classify them into groups or categories. Quantitative characteristics may be cardinal (like wealth) or ordinal (like beauty). Qualitative characteristics may be binary (like gender) or polytomous (like race and ethnicity).

Until a decade ago, status research did not distinguish between quantitative and qualitative characteristics; any possible distinctiveness in status processes had not been noticed. For example, Berger et al. (1980) observed:

> The key concept in the study of status organizing processes is the *status characteristic*, any characteristic of actors around which evaluations of and beliefs about them come to be organized. Examples include age, sex,

[2] Valuable contributions to these literatures include Barber (1968); Berger et al. (1977); Berger et al. (1980); Fararo (1989); Goode (1978); Homans (1967); Lipset (1968); Merton ([1949, 1957] 1968); Parsons [1949] 1964; Ridgeway (1991, 1997b); Ridgeway and Balkwell (1997); Rossi (1979); Sørensen (1979); Skvoretz and Fararo (1996); Stinchcombe (1968); Turner (1984, 1995); Veblen [1899] 1953; Wagner and Berger (1993); Weber [1922] 1978; Webster and Hysom (1998); and Zelditch (1968).

[3] For simplicity, the framework is presented in terms of persons, personal characteristics, and the status of persons and of personal characteristics. Status processes, however, also operate at other levels of analysis, such as that of social entities. Orchestras differ in status, as do countries. The framework is, with minor modifications, applicable to status processes at all levels of analysis. For example, replacing the word "person" with the word "actor" extends the framework to corporate actors.

> race, ethnicity, education, occupation, physical attractiveness, intelligence quotients, reading ability. . . . (P. 479)

Ridgeway (1991) was the first to pose the question of how *qualitative* characteristics acquire status value, and pioneered development of a theory of status construction in which cardinal characteristics produce status for qualitative characteristics (Ridgeway 1991, 1997b; Ridgeway and Balkwell 1997). Webster and Hysom (1998) extended the theory so that ordinal as well as cardinal—that is, all quantitative characteristics—can be used to produce status for qualitative characteristics.

Quantitative characteristics: Goods and bads. Within the set of quantitative personal characteristics, most status research has focused on characteristics which have the property that "more" is preferred to "less"; for convenience, these will be called "goods." For simplicity, this analysis is couched in terms of goods, but, of course, "bads" (less is preferred to more) may also operate in status processes and their handling is straightforward.

Quantitative characteristics: Cardinal versus ordinal goods, and rank versus amount of cardinal goods. Two related questions arise: whether to distinguish between cardinal and ordinal goods; and whether, among cardinal goods, amounts play a part in status processes or only ranks. Note that the operation of cardinal and ordinal goods can only be distinguished by incorporating amounts of cardinal goods; and, conversely, if only rank matters in cardinal goods, then there is no distinction between cardinal and ordinal goods.

As discussed below, the process of choosing a functional form for first-order status led to the rank-based function that Sørensen (1979) proposed in his work on the status of occupations; and thus the status of individuals is modeled as a function of rank only. A shortcoming is that the distribution of a quantitative characteristic such as wealth is treated as flat, rather than, say, as a peaked distribution with most individuals located in some region of the distribution. This shortcoming is mitigated somewhat, however, by two things: First, the status function, as will be seen, is not flat, being a nonlinear function of rank; and, second, ranks are flexible in that situations with most people in some region can be modeled by the use of tied ranks.

Nonetheless, this element of the framework merits further research. Such research should proceed along two lines. One is mathematical—searching for functional forms capable of incorporating cardinal and ordinal goods. The other is substantive—assessing the extent to which status processes are responsive to rank rather than to amounts of cardinal goods.

Three Types of Status: S1, S2, and S3 Status

The framework distinguishes between three types of status. First-order status, denoted S1, is a property of individuals and is based on quantitative personal characteristics. Second-order status, denoted S2, is a property of qualitative characteristics. Third-order status, denoted S3, is a property of individuals; it arises as a way to impute status to individuals when S1 cannot be generated because there is no information on quantitative characteristics, but may linger after information is obtained, combining both S1 and S2 types of status. Each of the three types of status operates in distinctive ways—each arises and is maintained or altered via distinctive processes, as elucidated below.

The work on S1— the first kind of status, which is a property of individuals and which is based on quantitative characteristics—besides building in a general way on the status-relevant literatures, builds in a specific way on two seminal contributions to the mathematical specification of status, Goode (1978) and Sørensen (1979). Similarly, the work on S2—the second kind of status, which is a property of qualitative characteristics—builds directly on Ridgeway (1991, 1997b), Ridgeway and Balkwell (1997), and Webster and Hysom (1998). The work on S3—the third kind of status which is a property of persons and which arises when S1 cannot be generated—builds on the multidimensionality aspect of status and prestige (Barber 1968; Goode 1978; Rossi 1979; Turner 1984, 1995).

Modeling S1 status requires a function which yields a clear status metric and em-

Table 1. Summary of the Three Types of Status in the Framework for Status Analysis

	Three Types of Status		
Characterization	S1	S2	S3
Property of	Person	Qualitative characteristic	Person
Produced by	Quantitative characteristic	S1	S2, and possibly S1
Information required	Rank on quantitative characteristic	Correlation between quantitative characteristic and qualitative characteristic	S2
Formula	$\sum_{g=1}^{G} w_g \ln\left(\frac{1}{1-r_g}\right)$	$S2_c = \left[M(S1)\right]_c$	$\boldsymbol{w}\mathbf{S1} + \boldsymbol{w}\mathbf{S2}$

Note: Quantitative characteristics are orderable characteristics; they may be cardinal (like wealth) or ordinal (like attractiveness). Quantitative characteristics of which more is preferred to less are called "goods"; quantitative characteristics of which less is preferred to more are called "bads." Qualitative characteristics are unorderable characteristics (e.g., race and sex).

In the formulas above, g denotes a good (indexed from 1 to G), w denotes the weight, r denotes rank on a quantitative characteristic, c denotes a category of a qualitative characteristic, $M(\cdot)$ denotes the average (mean, median, etc.), and bold characters denote vectors.

bodies the properties discussed in the status literatures. Chief among these properties is the property analyzed by Goode (1978) that, as rank increases, status increases at an increasing rate, rising steeply at higher ranks. The search for a function satisfying properties desirable in an S1 function led to the function proposed by Sørensen (1979) to measure the status of occupations. The simplicity, elegance, and tractability of this function made it an appealing choice.

Personal characteristics and types of status. Quantitative characteristics play a special role in the framework, as they form the basis for first-order status (S1). In this framework, building on Ridgeway's fundamental insight, qualitative characteristics cannot confer first-order status, but rather they must first acquire second-order status. Accordingly, qualitative characteristics are used to form subgroups; the subgroups are characterized by a summary measure of the members' first-order status, and this summary measure in turn attaches to each category of a qualitative characteristic, becoming its measure of second-order status (S2).

Summary measure of S1 within the categories of a qualitative characteristic. The summary measure of S1, which becomes a category's measure of S2, can be any measure of location, such as the arithmetic mean, the geometric mean, or the median. For simplicity and concreteness, in the theoretical development below, we use the arithmetic mean. As will be seen, choice of summary measure affects some results but not others. Future research might investigate both preference for, availability of, and effects of alternative measures.

Information and types of status. Information is of two kinds: (1) information about the quantitative characteristics of particular individuals, and (2) information about the summary measure of first-order status in the subgroups formed by qualitative characteristics. Information about individuals' ranks on quantitative characteristics is used to produce first-order status (S1). Information about the average first-order status of the subgroups formed by qualitative characteristics is used to generate second-order status (S2) in the qualitative characteristics. In the absence of information about the quantitative characteristics of particular individuals (i.e., when first-order status cannot be generated), second-order status is used to produce an imputed individual status, the third-order status (S3). But S3 may not disappear when information about the quantitative characteristics of particular individuals is obtained; the process by which

Table 2. Self-Other S1 Status Matrix

$$\begin{bmatrix} S1_{11} & S1_{12} & S1_{13} & \dots & S1_{1J} \\ S1_{21} & S1_{22} & S1_{23} & \dots & S1_{2J} \\ S1_{31} & S1_{32} & S1_{33} & \dots & S1_{3J} \\ \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ S1_{N1} & S1_{N2} & S1_{N3} & \dots & S1_{NJ} \end{bmatrix}$$

Note: Each individual (i = 1 to N) accords S1 status to each individual (j = 1 to J). Each row represents the S1 status accorded by one individual (to Self and to Others), and each column represents the S1 status received by one individual. Thus, each row represents the S1 status structure in the mind of one person. In the special case of consensus, the matrix collapses to a vector.

S3 combines both S1 and S2, with S2 lingering even in the face of S1—a form of discrimination—is analyzed below.

Summary table of three types of status. Table 1 provides a summary of the three types of status, including the formulas to be presented below. The table may be helpful not only as an outline of the exposition but also as a guide to further theoretical work (e.g., assessing alternative functional forms for S1) and empirical work (e.g., formulating information conditions in experiments).

Status Matrices

Corresponding to each type of status is a matrix containing each actor's evaluations of the status of persons (S1 and S3) and the status of characteristics (S2). To illustrate, consider S1 status in a collectivity of N persons. Each individual (called "Self") accords S1 status (or makes prestige payments, in Goode's [1978] evocative phrase) to every individual (to "Others" and also to "Self"). Group members may differ in the first-order status they accord to any given Other. Different individuals may value different quantitative personal characteristics; for example, one individual may value wealth, while another may value beauty, and a third may value both. Moreover, different goods may be weighted differently; for example, one individual may weight wealth two-thirds and beauty one-third, while a second may do the opposite. Thus, the S1 status order is represented by a matrix (Table 2).

The S1 and S3 matrices are square, each member of the collectivity represented by both a row and a column. In the S2 matrix, each person occupies a row and each characteristic is represented by a set of columns, one column for each category of the characteristic.

If all the rows of a matrix are identical, the matrix collapses to a vector. An important area of research focuses on the processes by which individuals agree, or not, on status matters, for example, how individuals choose the quantitative characteristics they use in the S1 function, how individuals shape the societal S1 function and societies in turn shape individuals' S1 functions.[4]

The initial theoretical development below follows a twofold approach. First, as in most status research, we characterize groups by a single status function, asking, for example, what status processes look like if all group members share the same S1 function (i.e., use the same quantitative characteristics as bases of evaluation and weight them the same way). Second, we consider strategies for changing status structures, some of which involve parallel status structures. For example, individuals make, and expect, prestige payments (in Goode's words) based on the S1 structure in their heads; conversely, they receive prestige payments based on the S1 structures in others' heads. Important and interesting phenomena accompany such interindividual differences in S1 structure.

FIRST-ORDER STATUS (S1)

S1 Assumption and Function

We begin with the general S1 function, written to accommodate multiple goods, denoted g, and differential weights, denoted w (with bold characters denoting vectors). Formally:

Assumption 1a (General First-Order Status Function): First-order status (S1) is a weighted function of goods,

$$S1 = S1(\boldsymbol{wg}). \quad (1)$$

[4] For insightful analysis of diffusion and consensus processes, see Berger et al. (1998), Blau (1977), Friedkin (1998), Ridgeway and Balkwell (1997), and Skvoretz and Fararo (1996).

The weights, which may take zero or positive values, must sum to one; if zero, the associated good does not produce status, and if one, the associated good is the only good that confers first-order status.

Following Goode (1978), we assume that first-order status is a special kind of function: it is not only an increasing function of the quantitative personal characteristics but also it increases at an increasing rate. As Goode (1978:142) observes, "prestige payments rise steeply." As discussed above, we adopt the function proposed by Sørensen (1979), which has the upwardly-concave property as well as other appealing properties. Accordingly, we specify S1 status as a function of rank on a valued characteristic:

$$S1 = \ln\left(\frac{1}{1-r}\right), \quad (2)$$

where r denotes the relative rank (between zero and one) on the valued quantitative characteristic.[5] For convenience, we will refer to this function as the "log-rank function." The log-rank function ranges from zero to infinity, approaching but never reaching the value zero. When working with small groups, the rank r is approximated by $i/(N+1)$, where i denotes the raw rank (the sequence of integers from 1 to the group size N, with 1 assigned to the lowest-ranking person).[6] The formula for the small-group case is:

$$S1 = \ln\left(\frac{N+1}{N+1-i}\right). \quad (3)$$

Extending Sørensen's (1979) function to the multiple-good case and making explicit the assumption about the specific form of the S1 function:

Assumption 1b (Specific First-Order Status Function): First-order status is the weighted sum of good-specific S1 components, where each component is the log-rank function of a good:

$$S1 = \sum_{g=1}^{G} w_g \ln\left(\frac{1}{1-r_g}\right). \quad (4)$$

[5] Formally, the first-order status function has positive first and second derivatives.

[6] The formula can incorporate tied ranks. Both the sequence of integers and the set of ranks incorporating tied ranks sum to the same quantity, $N(N+1)/2$.

S1 Initial Theoretical Development

In this initial theoretical development, we analyze the operation of first-order status in several settings, varying the number of goods and their association and modeling S1 in both small groups and large societies. The theoretical results are empirically testable implications. Of course, many more results can be obtained, and the framework can be applied to many new arenas.

S1 in the special case of one-good small groups. To examine how first-order status operates, we begin with the simplest one-good case in small groups of size ranging from 2 to 12, with no tied ranks. Table 3 presents the magnitudes of S1 for each member of such groups; the valued characteristic can be any quantitative personal characteristic (e.g., wealth or beauty or athletic skill).[7] The figures immediately reveal three important implications of the S1 function in the one-good case. First, the status of the lowest-ranking person (Member 1) declines as group size increases. Second, the status of the highest-ranking person (the last member in each column) increases as group size increases. Third, average status increases as group size increases. Thus, the status difference between the lowest- and highest-ranking members of the group increases steeply with group size, from .7 S1 units in the dyad and 1.1 in the triad to almost 2.5 in the 12-member case.[8]

Many of the status phenomena in small groups involve interactions within subsets of the members. The status difference in each of the possible pairs of members of a group is thus an important feature of groups. The number of pairs rises steeply from one in the two-member group to 66 in the 12-member group. To investigate dyadic status difference in small groups, Table 4 presents the complete S1-difference structure for the possible pairs in three groups, those of sizes 4, 5, and 6. Although the full

[7] The figures in Table 3 are obtained by applying the S1 formula to the one-good case; see equations 2, 3, and 4 and the notes to Table 3.

[8] Formally, the range of S1 is equal to $\ln(N)$. The average of S1 can also be expressed as a function of group size, as shown in the note to Table 3.

Table 3. S1 Status in One-Good Small Groups: By Group Member and Group Size

	Group Size										
Member	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
1	.405	.288	.223	.182	.154	.134	.118	.105	.095	.087	.080
2	1.099	.693	.511	.405	.336	.288	.251	.223	.201	.182	.167
3	—	1.386	.916	.693	.560	.470	.405	.357	.318	.288	.262
4	—	—	1.609	1.099	.847	.693	.588	.511	.452	.405	.368
5	—	—	—	1.792	1.253	.981	.811	.693	.606	.539	.486
6	—	—	—	—	1.946	1.386	1.099	.916	.788	.693	.619
7	—	—	—	—	—	2.079	1.504	1.204	1.012	.875	.773
8	—	—	—	—	—	—	2.197	1.609	1.299	1.099	.956
9	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2.303	1.705	1.386	1.179
10	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2.398	1.792	1.466
11	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2.485	1.872
12	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2.565
Mean	.752	.789	.815	.834	.849	.862	.872	.880	.887	.894	.899

Note: S1 status is a function of one valued quantitative characteristic. Group members are ordered from lowest ranking to highest ranking on the valued characteristic. S1 status is given by the formula, $\ln[1/(1-r)]$, where r denotes the relative rank and is approximated by $[i/(N+1)]$, where i, in turn, denotes the raw rank and N denotes the group size. The equivalent formula expressed directly in terms of the raw rank i and group size N is: $\ln[(N+1)/(N+1-i)]$. The formula for the arithmetic mean of S1 is: $E(\mathrm{S1}) = \ln \frac{N+1}{\sqrt[N]{N!}}$.

structure could be reported in the triangle above the diagonal, Table 4 presents completely filled-out matrices; these have the advantage that they directly show not only the set of S1 differences for the group but also the set of S1 differences for each individual.

As expected from Table 3, the magnitude of the smallest status distance decreases with group size, and the magnitude of the largest status distance increases with group size. Additionally, there are three main results in Table 4. First, the magnitude of the S1 difference increases for successive ranks; Member 1 in the 4-member group is not only farther away from Member 4 than from Member 3 and farther away from Member 3 than from Member 2 but also the increment in the status distance increases for each successive rank (from .288 to .405 to .683). Second, a group member is always closer to the individual below than to the individual above. For example, in the 6-member group, Member 3 is closer to Member 2 than to Member 4, but Member 2 is closer to Member 1 than to Member 3. Thus, dyadic relations are not symmetric. Third, a few (very few) group members are equally distant from two group members, one below and the other above, with the one below being not immediately below and the one above being immediately above. In Table 4 there are three such persons, one in each group: Member 3 in the 4-member group, Member 4 in the 5-member group, and Member 5 in the 6-member group. These individuals may play pivotal parts in group dynamics, being uniquely situated to bridge status distance in two directions.

There is evidence from previous empirical research that observable behaviors produced by status follow the predicted S1 patterns. For example, Bales (1999) documented the acts initiated by each member of a group, in groups of size 3 to 8, coding both acts directed at the group and acts directed at another member. The number of acts initiated increases at an increasing rate with rank, and who-to-whom matrices of acts initiated indicate that each member is closer in status to the lower neighbor than to the higher neighbor, as predicted here.

S1 IN THE SPECIAL CASE OF TWO-GOOD SMALL GROUPS. Consider now the case in

Table 4. S1 Status Differences among Members of One-Good Groups: By Member Pairs in Groups of Three Different Sizes

Group Size and Member	Member 1	Member 2	Member 3	Member 4	Member 5	Member 6
N = 4: Six Pairs						
Member 1	—	.288	.693	1.386	NA	NA
Member 2	.288	—	.405	1.099	NA	NA
Member 3	.693	.405	—	.693	NA	NA
Member 4	1.386	1.099	.693	—	NA	NA
N = 5: Ten Pairs						
Member 1	—	.223	.511	.916	1.609	NA
Member 2	.223	—	.288	.693	1.386	NA
Member 3	.511	.288	—	.405	1.099	NA
Member 4	.916	.693	.405	—	.693	NA
Member 5	1.609	1.386	1.099	.693	—	NA
N = 6: Fifteen Pairs						
Member 1	—	.182	.405	.693	1.099	1.792
Member 2	.182	—	.223	.511	.916	1.609
Member 3	.405	.223	—	.288	.693	1.386
Member 4	.693	.511	.288	—	.405	1.099
Member 5	1.099	.916	.693	.405	—	.693
Member 6	1.792	1.609	1.386	1.099	.693	—

Note: Group members are ordered from lowest ranking to highest ranking on the valued quantitative characteristic; each person's S1 status appears in Table 3 (see the previous page). Each row and/or column provides the set of pairwise S1 status differences involving each member of the group. The full set of pairwise S1 status differences for the entire group occupies the triangle above the diagonal (and is duplicated in the triangle below the diagonal).

which the members of a small group use two quantitative characteristics as bases of evaluation; as in the previous special case, there are no tied ranks. If the two goods are perfectly positively associated—that is, each member's rank is the same on both characteristics—then the S1 structure remains the same as in the one-good case. However, if the two goods are independent or negatively associated or imperfectly positively associated, then S1 structure changes. Here we investigate the case in which two equally weighted goods are perfectly negatively associated. Other special cases can be similarly studied.

Table 5 reports the status structure in the case of two goods negatively associated and equally weighted, for groups of size 4, 5, and 6. For each group member, the table reports S1 derived from each of the two goods, denoted $s1_1$ and $s1_2$. Member number denotes the rank on the first good. Thus, for example, Member 1 in the 4-member group ranks lowest on the first good and highest on the second good; Member 1 has a magnitude of .223 on $s1_1$ (the lowest status) and a magnitude of 1.609 on $s1_2$ (the highest status). The two-good S1 status is the unweighted average of $s1_1$ and $s1_2$, namely, .916.

Table 5 shows that the status structure is dramatically compressed, although the average status in each group remains the same (compare with Table 3). First, S1 no longer approaches zero, but now has a floor of ln(2), or approximately .693.[9] Second, the status of the top person—who is always the person who ranks highest and lowest on the two characteristics—is reduced by the amount $\ln\sqrt{N}$; for example, S1 for Member 1 in the 5-member group is reduced from 1.792 (as in Table 3, as well as for the second good's status $s1_2$ in Table 5) to .987. Third, the range of S1 is substantially reduced, for example, from 1.792 (1.946 –

[9] The lowest value of S1 is always ln(2) in odd-sized groups and approaches it in even-sized groups.

Table 5. S1 Status in Small Groups with Two Negatively Associated, Equally Weighted Goods: By Group Member and Group Size

	Group Size								
	4			5			6		
Member	$s1_1$	$s1_2$	S1	$s1_1$	$s1_2$	S1	$s1_1$	$s1_2$	S1
1	.223	1.609	.916	.182	1.792	.987	.154	1.946	1.050
2	.511	.916	.714	.405	1.099	.752	.336	1.253	.795
3	.916	.511	.714	.693	.693	.693	.560	.847	.703
4	1.609	.223	.916	1.099	.405	.752	.847	.560	.703
5	—	—	—	1.792	.182	.987	1.253	.336	.795
6	—	—	—	—	—	—	1.946	.154	1.050
Mean	.815	.815	.815	.834	.834	.834	.849	.849	.849

Note: The status components $s1_1$ and $s1_2$ are each functions of a single valued quantitative characteristic (as in Table 3). Member number refers to rank on the first valued characteristic, corresponding to the status component $s1_1$. The two characteristics are perfectly negatively associated. In this example, the two characteristics are weighted equally, and thus S1 is the unweighted average of $s1_1$ and $s1_2$. A direct formula for S1 in this case is given by: $-\ln\sqrt{r-r^2}$, where r denotes the relative rank on the first characteristic and is approximated by $[i/(N+1)]$, where i, in turn, denotes the raw rank, and N denotes the group size. The equivalent formula expressed directly in terms of the raw rank i and the group size N is: $\ln\left[(N+1)/\sqrt{i(N+1-i)}\right]$.

.154) to .347 (1.050 – .703) for the 6-member group. Fourth, all the groups are symmetric, such that the S1 scores are symmetric about the midrange. Thus, except for odd-sized groups, each member has a fellow group member of identical status; for example, in the 4-member group, Members 1 and 4 have identical status, and Members 2 and 3 have identical status.

To the extent that a group's status structure defines its character, the groups in Table 5 are dramatically different from their one-good counterparts in Table 3—they have less inequality, less status distance, and more dyadic symmetry.

To more carefully assess these two-goods/equally-weighted/negatively-associated small groups, Table 6 presents the status-distance matrices for the groups portrayed in Table 5. The results are striking. First, whereas the one-good status-distance matrices of Table 5 had large status distances—for example, ranging from .288 to 1.386 in the 4-member group—the corresponding status distances in these two-good matrices are small—for example, ranging from 0 to .203 in the 4-member group. Second, the status-distance matrices retain the property that the largest status distance increases with group size, but the smallest status distance is now independent of group size, being zero for every group size. Third, all group members have several identical status distances from other members, in contradistinction to the one-good groups in which very few group members were in this situation; for example, in the 4-member group, every member has identical status distances from two other members.

Figure 1 illustrates the contrast between the one-good and the two-goods/negatively-associated small groups, displaying the full set of S1 differences for the 4-member and 5-member groups (i.e., with 6 and 10 status differences, respectively). It is clear from Figure 1 that the one-good group has considerably more status inequality.

S1 IN THE SPECIAL CASE OF LARGE SOCIETIES. Status phenomena and processes occur in groups and societies of all sizes, and thus it is important to investigate the operation of first-order status (S1) in large societies as well as in small groups. To do so, we use techniques from the study of probability distributions (Stuart and Ord 1987).[10] Sub-

[10] Formally, many of the formulas and results for large societies may be thought of as the limit, as N increases to infinity, of the formulas and results for small groups.

Table 6. S1 Status Differences among Members of Small Groups with Two Negatively Associated, Equally Weighted Goods: By Member Pairs in Groups of Three Different Sizes

Group Size and Member	Member 1	Member 2	Member 3	Member 4	Member 5	Member 6
N = 4: Six Pairs						
Member 1	—	.203	.203	0	NA	NA
Member 2	.203	—	0	.203	NA	NA
Member 3	.203	0	—	.203	NA	NA
Member 4	0	.203	.203	—	NA	NA
N = 5: Ten Pairs						
Member 1	—	.235	.294	.235	0	NA
Member 2	.235	—	.059	0	.235	NA
Member 3	.294	.059	—	.059	.294	NA
Member 4	.235	0	.059	—	.235	NA
Member 5	0	.235	.294	.235	—	NA
N = 6: Fifteen Pairs						
Member 1	—	.255	.347	.347	.255	0
Member 2	.255	—	.091	.091	0	.255
Member 3	.347	.091	—	0	.091	.347
Member 4	.347	.091	0	—	.091	.347
Member 5	.255	0	.091	.091	—	.255
Member 6	0	.255	.347	.347	.255	—

Note: Group members are ordered from lowest ranking to highest ranking on the first valued characteristic, as in Table 5; each person's S1 status appears in Table 5. Each row and/or column provides the set of pairwise S1 status differences involving each member of the group. The full set of pairwise S1 status differences for the entire group occupies the triangle above the diagonal (and is duplicated in the triangle below the diagonal).

stantively, the model is set up as before. S1 is a function of valued quantitative personal characteristics; the function is the log-rank function given in equations 2 and 4. Because, as seen, the case in which S1 arises from one good is identical to the case in which S1 arises from two perfectly positively associated goods, we present an integrated theoretical development in which two goods are used as bases of evaluation. As before, let the two goods be weighted equally in the S1 function. Also as before, we distinguish between perfectly positively associated goods and perfectly negatively associated goods; we also introduce a new case, which arises naturally in the study of probability distributions—namely, the case in which the two goods are independent.

At the outset it is known that the distribution associated with S1 in the positively associated case is the exponential and that its mean equals 1. Because the mean of the average of two identical variates is equal to the original mean, it is also known that the mean of S1 in the negatively associated and independent cases equals 1.

The formula for S1 in the two-goods/negatively-associated case is straightforward to obtain. The two formulas for both the positively and negatively associated cases, with equally weighted goods, may be expressed:

$$S1 = \begin{cases} \ln\left(\dfrac{1}{1-r}\right), & \text{positively associated goods} \\ \ln\left(\dfrac{2}{\sqrt{1-r^2}}\right), & \text{negatively associated goods.} \end{cases} \quad (5)$$

As before, r denotes the relative rank; in the negatively associated goods case, r is the relative rank on one of the two goods.[11]

When the two goods are independent, it is not possible to obtain an algebraic formula for S1. However, S1 can be numerically approximated by interpolating from the cumu-

[11] In probability-distribution terms, the formulas for S1 in equation 5 are quantile functions.



Figure 1. S1 Status Differences in Small Groups

Note: In the two-good case, the goods are equally weighted and negatively associated. In the four-member group there are 6 pairs, and in the five-member group there are 10 pairs. In each of the two-good groups, there are two pairs with S1 status differences equal to zero.

lative distribution function of the Erlang variate.[12]

Table 7 reports the first-order status (S1) for individuals at selected relative ranks (from 0 to 1, in increments of .05), for the three cases—positively associated goods, negatively associated goods, and independent goods. As expected from the work with small groups, the positively and negatively associated cases differ both with respect to the lower extreme value of S1 and to the compression of S1. In the independent-goods case, S1 retains the lower extreme value of zero but, with respect to compression, occupies an intermediate place between the positively and negatively associated cases. In all three cases, the majority of the population have S1 magnitudes below the mean of 1—59.4 percent in the independent case, 63.2 percent in the positively associated case, and 67.7 percent in the negatively associated case.

A different way to gauge the three types of S1 structures is to examine their probability density functions (pdf). Figure 2 presents graphs of the three pdf's. The graphs indicate several important features: First, there are individuals of very high status in all three types of S1 structure. Second, there are individuals of very low status (approaching zero) only in the positively associated and independent cases; as already known, in the negatively associated case, S1 has a floor of approximately .7. Third, in the positively and negatively associated cases, the mode occurs at the lower extreme value and in the independent case it occurs at .5; that is, there is a concentration of low-status persons. These graphs provide vivid depiction of the sociological insight that high status is relatively scarce and the philosophical insight that societies differ dramatically according to whether valued characteristics are positively or negatively associated.

How to Change S1 and the S1 Structure

Individuals are accorded status because they possess quantitative characteristics which

[12] The sum of two independently and identically distributed exponential variates is distributed as an Erlang variate; the unweighted average of two *iid* exponentials is also an Erlang. The Erlang is a member of the larger gamma family.

Table 7. S1 Status in Three Kinds of Two-Good Large Societies, by Member's Relative Rank

Member's Relative Rank	Two Characteristics, Positively Associated	Two Characteristics, Negatively Associated	Two Characteristics, Independent
0	0	.693	0
.10	.105	.698	.266
.15	.162	.704	.342
.20	.223	.714	.413
.25	.288	.725	.481
.30	.357	.740	.549
.35	.431	.758	.618
.40	.511	.780	.689
.45	.598	.806	.762
.50	.693	.837	.840
.55	.798	.873	.922
.60	.916	.916	1.012
.65	1.050	.968	1.110
.70	1.204	1.030	1.220
.75	1.386	1.106	1.347
.80	1.609	1.204	1.498
.85	1.897	1.334	1.687
.90	2.303	1.524	1.945
.95	2.996	1.857	2.372
1	∞	∞	∞

Note: Member's relative rank is the relative rank corresponding to (a) both characteristics in the positively associated case, (b) one characteristic in the negatively associated case, and (c) the composite rank in the independent case. The formulas for S1 status are: (a) in the positively associated case, $S1 = \ln[1/(1-r)]$; and (b) in the negatively associated case, $S1 = \ln\left[2/\sqrt{1-r^2}\right]$. In the independent case, S1 is approximated numerically from the cumulative distribution function of the S1 distribution (see Appendix Table A).

individuals and groups reward and use as a status-conferring device. If individuals lose the valued characteristics, they lose their status, holding constant the goods in the S1 function. Conversely, if individuals change their minds about what they find admirable and desirable, then receipt of S1 is altered. For example, suppose that Smith is the best swimmer in the world. As long as some individuals (swimming enthusiasts, say) value swimming skill and Smith retains the skill, Smith will be accorded the highest status on the S1 swimming component (by swimming enthusiasts). However, if Smith loses the skill or if swimming enthusiasts disappear, Smith will lose status. Similarly, the strategy for the film character who says, "I don't get no respect," is to promote admiration for, or desirability of, some characteristic on which he or she ranks high.

Note that the strategy of changing the quantitative characteristics used to confer status appears in two versions. In the first version, an individual attempts to change others' valued goods, for example, by persuading them that wealth is meaningless and should not be used as a status-conferring device or that writing poetry is the most admirable and desirable skill. In the second version, an individual changes his or her own valued goods, effectively ceasing to make prestige payments, in Goode's (1978) evocative phrase, and thus putting an end to this micro form of "internalized oppression."

To illustrate, consider two college roommates in a fraternity house: One is wealthy and an athlete of no particular distinction; the other comes from a poor family and is a



Figure 2. S1 Status in Two-Good Large Societies

Note: Formulas for the probability density function are reported in Appendix Table A.

gifted athlete.[13] If both roommates value wealth only and use it to confer status, then the rich roommate will be accorded higher status than the other roommate—by both of them. The athlete roommate can change this S1 structure by two methods: (1) S/he can persuade him/herself and the rich roommate that athletic skill is highly desirable and should also be used to confer status; or (2) s/he can relinquish his/her love of riches and value only athletic skill. Under the first method, if successful (and athletic skill and wealth are weighted equally), the S1 structure would be transformed into one of perfect equality—the two goods are perfectly negatively associated, hence both roommates would receive equal magnitudes of S1. Under the second method, if successful, the athlete roommate would no longer accord higher status to the rich roommate. Of course, if the rich roommate still uses wealth as a basis of evaluation, there would be a new tension arising from their having discrepant S1 functions.

As shown, the kind of statistical association between two or more valued goods—whether they are positively associated, negatively associated, or independent—powerfully affects first-order status. The association between any pair of goods is less open to alteration than the choice of valued goods, although it can be changed by changing the population, through recruitment or expulsion of members.

SECOND-ORDER STATUS (S2)

S2 Assumption and Function

First-order status is a property of persons—individuals obtain first-order status from their quantitative characteristics. Individuals also have qualitative characteristics and, by processes of status generalization (Berger et al. 1977; Ridgeway 1991, 1997b; Ridgeway and Balkwell 1997; Webster and Hysom 1998), if in a group or society there is an association between the valued quantitative characteristics (the goods) and a qualitative characteristic, the qualitative characteristic acquires status by that association. This status acquired by qualitative characteristics we call second-order status (S2).[14]

[13] This example was suggested by an anonymous reviewer.

[14] In the analysis of second-order status, a new kind of association figures prominently. Whereas in the analysis of first-order status the focal as-

Thus, as discussed earlier, we assume that qualitative characteristics cannot produce status; they can only derive it from some already produced status. Formally, letting c denote a category of the qualitative characteristic and $M(\cdot)$ denote the average (mean, median, etc.):

Assumption 2a (Second-Order Status): Second-order status is obtained by a qualitative characteristic if and only if the average first-order status differs across its categories. In such case, the second-order status attached to each category is equal to the average first-order status in the category:

$$\mathrm{S2}_c = \left[M(\mathrm{S1})\right]_c. \quad (6)$$

The second-order status gap follows immediately. Letting c_A and c_B denote two categories of the qualitative characteristic and *gap* denote the gap in second-order status between them:

Assumption 2b (Second-Order Status Gap): The S2 status gap is the difference in S2 between the categories of a qualitative characteristic:

$$\mathrm{S2}_{gap} = \left[M(\mathrm{S1})\right]_{c_\mathrm{A}} - \left[M(\mathrm{S1})\right]_{c_\mathrm{B}}. \quad (7)$$

The second-order status gap ranges from zero to high positive values. For a given qualitative characteristic, there is a set of second-order status gaps defined as the set of gaps for all pairs of categories. For example, while gender has only one pair of categories and hence only one possible second-order status gap, ethnicity could have 3, 6, 10, 15 pairs of categories, and so on, and hence could have that many second-order status gaps. If all gaps are equal to zero, then the qualitative characteristic has not acquired second-order status.

Note that the process of generating S2 status may operate simultaneously for many qualitative characteristics, each acquiring S2 status (or not) depending on the average S1 status in its categories. For example, gender, race, ethnicity, and religion all potentially can acquire S2 status simultaneously.

S2 Initial Theoretical Development

We focus here on two outcomes—second-order status (S2) and the gap in second-order status between the categories of a qualitative characteristic ($\mathrm{S2}_{gap}$)—and on determinants of these outcomes. We examine the effects of (1) the number of valued goods in the S1 function and the goods' association, (2) the association between the valued good(s) and the qualitative characteristic, and (3) the relative sizes of the categories of the qualitative characteristic. The summary measure of S1 is specified as the arithmetic mean.

Sufficient conditions for second-order status. To begin, look back at the layout of first-order status in one-good small groups presented in Table 3. If there is a perfect association between the good (i.e., the quantitative characteristic used to confer first-order status) and a binary qualitative characteristic, then the qualitative characteristic will acquire second-order status. For example, in the group of size 4, if Member 1 is female and Members 2 through 4 are male, or if Members 1 and 2 are female and Members 3 and 4 male, or if Members 1 through 3 are female and Member 4 male, then gender will acquire second-order status, such that the category "male" will have a higher magnitude of S2 than the category "female." And conversely, if the association goes in the opposite direction. Thus, the combination of (1) a one-good S1 function with (2) a perfect association between the good and a qualitative characteristic is sufficient to induce second-order status for the qualitative characteristic. Moreover, because the S1 structure of a one-good society is identical to that in a society with several perfectly positively associated goods, the combination of (1) perfectly positively associated goods in the S1 function with (2) a perfect association between the goods and a

sociation is between quantitative characteristics (as between wealth and beauty), in the analysis of second-order status the focal association is between one quantitative characteristic and one qualitative characteristic. Put differently, given that the term "goods" is used for quantitative characteristics of which more is preferred to less and given that here we are not working with "bads," the focal association in the analysis of S1 is between two goods, whereas the focal association in the analysis of S2 is between a good and a qualitative characteristic.

qualitative characteristic is also a sufficient condition for second-order status to arise.

Consider now a somewhat more complicated case, that of societies with negatively associated goods. Look at Table 5. If there is a perfect association between one of the two goods and the qualitative characteristic and if group members are assigned in equal numbers to categories of a binary qualitative characteristic (e.g., let Members 1 and 2 of the four-member group be men and Members 3 and 4 be women), then the average S1 among men equals the average S1 among women. In this situation, gender does not acquire status. On the other hand, suppose that Members 1 and 4 are women and Members 2 and 3 are men—that is, eliminate the perfect association between the valued goods and the qualitative characteristic—then average S1 status differs across the two sexes and gender acquires second-order status.[15]

Combining the results obtained from inspection of Tables 3 and 5 leads to statement of sufficient conditions for the emergence of S2 status: Given a perfect association between one quantitative good and the qualitative characteristic, singly sufficient conditions for the qualitative characteristic to acquire second-order status are: (1) S1 is based on one good; (2) S1 is based on several perfectly positively associated goods; (3) S1 is based on two perfectly negatively associated goods, and the group size is odd; (4) S1 is based on two perfectly negatively associated goods, and the subgroup split is not fifty-fifty.[16]

Note again that even in this case of perfect association between one quantitative good and the qualitative characteristic, there are situations in which S2 will not arise, including the situation, obvious from Table 5, in which S1 is based on two perfectly negatively associated goods and the subgroup split is fifty-fifty.[17]

S2 IN THE SPECIAL CASE OF ONE-GOOD SMALL GROUPS. Consider a group of size 12 (as in Table 3). First-order status (S1) is based on either one good or several positively associated goods, there are no tied ranks, and the qualitative characteristic is binary. Next, suppose that there is a perfect association between the good(s) and the qualitative characteristic. The subgroup with the lowest-ranking individuals on the quantitative characteristic is called the bottom subgroup, and the subgroup with the highest-ranking individuals is called the top subgroup. Now imagine all possible subgroup splits, ranging from the case in which the bottom subgroup has 1 member and the top subgroup has 11 members to the opposite case in which the bottom subgroup has 11 individuals and the top subgroup has only 1.

Table 8 reports the average first-order status in each subgroup formed by the 11 possible subgroup splits (with each split represented by a row). As shown, average S1 differs for the two subgroups in each row; for example, in the case of a fifty-fifty split, average S1 is .33 in the bottom subgroup and 1.47 in the top subgroup. Thus, this situation unambiguously produces second-order status. If, in the example just given, the qualitative characteristic is gender, then gender acquires second-order status, and if women are the top subgroup and men are the bottom subgroup, then the magnitudes of S2 are .33 for the category "men" and 1.47 for the category "women."

Table 8 also reports the S2 gap between the two categories of the qualitative characteristic. As shown, the second-order status

[15] The case of imperfect correlation between the quantitative and qualitative characteristics is an important one to analyze. Although space constraints prevent such an analysis here, two things are worth noting: First, a priori it is obvious from equation 7 that the status gap will be smaller if the correlation is weaker; the bottom subgroup will include higher scorers, so to speak, and the top subgroup will include lower scorers, thus attenuating the status gap. Second, attenuation of the status gap, especially in situations of multiple qualitative characteristics acquiring S2, may lead to competition among alternative views for structuring status relations.

[16] Work is underway to analyze the case of two independent goods.

[17] This is a highly suggestive case for gender phenomena. For example, if heroism (or, say, wealth or hunting skill) is perfectly negatively associated with beauty and concomitantly perfectly associated with sex and if the sex split is fifty-fifty, then the average S1 status will be the same among both sexes and gender will not acquire S2 status. The new framework enables fresh interpretation of many situations in history and literature, including the rise of veiling customs and their link to gender inequality.

Table 8. S2 Status (Average S1 Status) in Two Subgroups of Group of Size 12

Bottom Subgroup		Top Subgroup		S2 Status
Size	S2 = *E*(S1)	Size	S2 = *E*(S1)	Gap
1	.080	11	.974	.894
2	.124	10	1.054	.931
3	.170	9	1.142	.973
4	.219	8	1.239	1.020
5	.272	7	1.347	1.074
6	.330	6	1.468	1.138
7	.394	5	1.607	1.214
8	.464	4	1.770	1.307
10	.636	2	2.218	1.583
11	.748	1	2.565	1.817

Note: Each group member's S1 status is reported in Table 3. Direct formulas for calculating S2 status (average S1 status) in the two subgroups and the S2 gap (letting N denote the group size and n denote the size of the bottom subgroup) are:

S2 in bottom subgroup: $S2_{bot} = \ln(N+1) - \ln \sqrt[n]{\frac{N!}{(N-n)!}}$;

S2 in upper subgroup: $S2_{top} = \ln(N+1) - \ln \sqrt[N-n]{(N-n)!}$;

S2 gap: $S2_{gap} = \left[\frac{-N}{n(N-n)}\right]\{\ln[(N-n)!]\} + \frac{1}{n}\ln(N!)$.

gap increases as the relative size of the bottom subgroup increases. To illustrate, if women are wealthier than men, such that the poorest woman is richer than the richest man, then the S2 gap between men and women is lowest when there is only one man and there are 11 women (a gap of .89 S1 units) and it is highest when there are 11 men and one woman (a gap of 1.82 S1 units).

S2 acquisition is a general process, and this analysis applies to any qualitative characteristic. For example, consider the status of academic disciplines. Suppose that a given interdisciplinary course enrolls first-year graduate students from discipline A and third-year graduate students from discipline B. If competence is valued and if it increases with years of study, then S2 status arises, favoring discipline B. Moreover, if the disciplines differ in sex ratio and racial or ethnic composition, then a train of further status inequalities is set in motion.

S2 IN THE SPECIAL CASE OF ONE-GOOD LARGE SOCIETIES. Consider now S2 in large societies in which a binary qualitative characteristic is perfectly associated with the good(s). As in the analysis of S1 in large societies, techniques from the study of probability distributions make it possible to obtain many a priori results. Table 9 presents, as in Table 8, the S2 acquired by the two categories of the qualitative characteristic and the S2 gap. As shown, and consistent with the previous results, in both categories, second-order status increases with the relative size of the bottom subgroup. More important, the second-order status gap also increases with the relative size of the bottom subgroup. This means, for example, that given a racially divided society in which two races are, respectively, advantaged and disadvantaged on the good, the status gap will be substantially larger if the disadvantaged race constitutes 90 percent of the population and the advantaged race constitutes 10 percent of the population than if the disadvantaged race constitutes 10 percent of the population and the advantaged race constitutes 90 percent of the population.

To more fully appreciate the results, it is useful to graph S1 and S2 (average S1) for each subgroup split of interest. Figure 3 reports the graphs of S1 and S2 for the case in which the population is evenly split between the two categories of the binary qualitative characteristic. As expected, S1 increases at

Table 9. S2 Status (Average S1 Status) in Two Subgroups of Large Society

Bottom Subgroup		Top Subgroup		S2 Status
Relative Size	S2 = *E*(S1)	Relative Size	S2 = *E*(S1)	Gap
.05	.025	.95	1.051	1.026
.10	.052	.90	1.105	1.054
.15	.079	.85	1.162	1.083
.20	.107	.80	1.223	1.116
.25	.137	.75	1.288	1.151
.30	.168	.70	1.357	1.189
.35	.200	.65	1.431	1.231
.40	.234	.60	1.511	1.277
.45	.269	.55	1.598	1.328
.50	.307	.50	1.693	1.386
.55	.347	.45	1.798	1.452
.60	.389	.40	1.916	1.527
.65	.435	.35	2.050	1.615
.70	.484	.30	2.204	1.720
.75	.538	.25	2.386	1.848
.80	.598	.20	2.609	2.012
.85	.665	.15	2.897	2.232
.90	.744	.10	3.303	2.558
.95	.842	.05	3.996	3.153

Note: Subgroup S2 status (average S1 status) is based on S1 arising from a single valued characteristic or several perfectly positively associated characteristics. S1 status for representative persons in this population is reported in the second column of Table 7. Formulas for calculating the S2 status (average S1 status) in the two subgroups and the S2 status gap in this large-population case (letting p denote the relative size of the bottom subgroup) are:

S2 in bottom subgroup: $S2_{bot} = 1 - \left(\frac{1-p}{p}\right)\ln\left(\frac{1}{1-p}\right)$;

S2 in upper subgroup: $S2_{top} = 1 + \ln\left(\frac{1}{1-p}\right)$;

S2 gap: $S2_{gap} = \frac{1}{p}\ln\left(\frac{1}{1-p}\right)$.

an increasing rate as relative rank increases. A vertical dashed line divides the population into the two equal-sized subgroups. Average first-order status is represented by horizontal lines; the two short lines are for S2 in each of the two subgroups, and the long line is for average S1 over the entire population.

In this equal-split case, the two categories' magnitudes of second-order status are equidistant from the overall average S1 of 1; and the S2 gap between the two categories is 2ln(2). (There are precise relations between each subgroup split and the S2 gap.)

This kind of analysis, carried out more elaborately and examining the effects of all the elements in play (e.g., the number of goods and their intercorrelations and weights, the correlation between good(s) and qualitative characteristics, and population subgroup splits) may prove useful in understanding gender relations as well as intergroup relations across a wide variety of settings, including, for example, empires, colonial societies, and multiracial societies.

How to Change S2

We have described the process by which qualitative characteristics acquire status. The question arises, how second-order sta-



Figure 3. S1 Status and S2 Status in a One-Good Society with Two Equal-Sized Subgroups

Note: Subgroup S2 status equals average S1 status in each subgroup. The vertical dashed line denotes the division of the society into two equal-sized subgroups. Horizontal lines denote average S1 status in each subgroup and in the population as a whole. S1 values are reported in Table 7 (see page 108) and S2 values in Table 9 (see page 113).

tus changes, is maintained, or is discarded. According to the framework, S2 is totally dependent on S1 and on the configuration of goods, their weights, their association with each other and with the qualitative characteristic. Thus, S2 cannot be directly affected; rather it is altered by altering the determinants of S1 and the association between the goods and the qualitative characteristic.

To illustrate with an example based on the work of Ridgeway (1991, 1997b), Ridgeway and Balkwell (1997), and Webster and Hysom (1998): Suppose that wealth is the valued good and that wealth is perfectly associated with gender, such that men are richer than women. Wealth produces first-order status, and first-order status generates second-order status—the category "male" has greater S2 than the category "female." Strategies to make gender shed its second-order status include: (1) change the S1 function (e.g., by eliminating wealth or by introducing a second good negatively associated with wealth); and (2) change the association between wealth and gender (e.g., by recruiting wealthy women and/or destitute men into the society).

These strategies illuminate the underlying dynamics, pointing to a mechanism that may play a part in the phenomenon of "internalized oppression" (Bourdieu 1997; Stanton-Salazar 1997). If women did not value wealth, gender would not have acquired S2. The members of the bottom subgroup are always in collusion, so to speak, with the members of the top subgroup. By agreeing that wealth is desirable, members of the bottom subgroup let wealth confer first-order status, and once wealth confers first-order status, given the association between wealth and gender, gender acquires second-order status. Hence, a radical way to remove S2 from gender is to renounce wealth. The literature on utopian communities provides trenchant insights into this process for removing S2 from qualitative characteristics. Note, however, that if women renounce wealth but men still value it, then there will be two parallel status structures, with men making prestige payments on the basis of wealth (to both men and women) and women making prestige payments on the basis of something else (to both men and women). The ensuing windfalls and shortfalls in status constitute a

new avenue for research, with many new special cases to be analyzed, together with the mechanisms for achieving a new consensus.

The second strategy is less drastic. One can continue to value wealth and enjoy its use, but one has to search for anomalous individuals and import them into the society, thus reducing or eliminating the association between wealth and gender.

THIRD-ORDER STATUS (S3)

S3 Assumption and Function

We have described the processes for producing first-order status—which is a property of individuals and arises from individuals' quantitative characteristics, together with information about their ranks—and for producing second-order status—which is a property of qualitative characteristics and arises from first-order status. Now consider the case in which first-order status cannot be produced because there is no information about an individual's ranks on quantitative characteristics. Suppose that wealth is the basis of evaluation, but there is no information about an individual's wealth rank. In this case, if the individual can be categorized with respect to a qualitative characteristic (e.g., can be classified as male or female) and if there is information about the average S1 status in that category of the qualitative characteristic, then third-order status is produced and imputed to the individual. Formally:

Assumption 3a (Third-Order Status): If information about an individual's ranks on quantitative characteristics (goods in the S1 function) is not available so that first-order status cannot be produced, and if there is information about the average S1 in the category of a qualitative characteristic corresponding to the individual, then third-order status (S3) is imputed to the individual. S3 for the *j*th person in the *c*th category of a qualitative characteristic is equal to the second-order status of the category:

$$S3_{jc} = S2_c. \tag{8}$$

The S3 formula may be generalized in a number of ways. First, there may be information about average S1 status for subsets formed by more than one qualitative characteristic (e.g., "black women," "white men," etc.). Second, if S1 is produced by more than one quantitative characteristic, there may be separate information about average S1 status derived from one good in one qualitative characteristic and average S1 status derived from another good in another qualitative characteristic (e.g., average S1 status due to wealth in each category of gender and average S1 status due to beauty in each category of race).

There is another important process. S2, once produced, acquires a life of its own, so to speak. Even if information about the pertinent quantitative characteristic(s) becomes available, there may be a reluctance to relinquish the S2 component of S3, leading to a generalized version of S3, denoted $S3^*$. Formally:

Assumption 3b (Generalized Third-Order Status): Given that third-order status has been produced, a generalized version of S3, $S3^*$, is generated; this is a weighted sum of S1 and S2:

$$S3^* = \boldsymbol{w}\mathbf{S1} + \boldsymbol{w}\mathbf{S2}. \tag{9}$$

(As before, bold characters indicate vectors and the weights must sum to one.)

This process of combining S1 and S2 is related, in part, to the empirical tradition pioneered by Rossi (1979) in which the prestige of an individual is linked to a large set of the individual's quantitative and qualitative characteristics. Thus, consistent with the theoretical framework developed here, if S1 is generated by schooling and earnings and S2 is acquired by race and gender, then S3 may respond to all four characteristics. A primary research objective would be to ascertain whether, given information about schooling and earnings, race and gender have no effect or whether, alternatively, S2, once generated, is long-lived.

S3 Initial Theoretical Development

Why would use of S2 survive introduction of the information required to produce S1? Look again at Figure 3. Notice that the sub-

group S2 lines intersect the S1 curve. To the left of the intersection in each subgroup, S2 status (average S1 status) is greater than the individual's first-order status (S1), and to the right, S2 status (average S1 status) is smaller than the individual's S1. This indicates that there are status gains and losses from the use of S2: Individuals whose S1 is lower than their subgroup's S2 gain status from the use of S2, while individuals whose S1 is higher than their subgroup's S2 lose status from the use of S2.[18]

Use of S2 is a form of discrimination—individuals are not assessed on their individual S1-pertinent quantitative characteristics but rather are treated as part of a subgroup and their subgroup's characteristics are imputed to them. Thus, there are status gains and losses from discrimination, and they may not be what one expects. That is, it would be reassuring to find that all members of the bottom subgroup suffer from discrimination and that all members of the top subgroup gain from discrimination. But the reality is more complex, with some individuals in the bottom subgroup gaining status from discrimination and some individuals in the top subgroup losing status from discrimination.[19]

S3 IN THE SPECIAL CASE OF ONE-GOOD SMALL GROUPS. To analyze S3 in small groups, we return to the case of a 12-member group which values one good and in which that good is perfectly associated with a binary qualitative characteristic. The members' S1 was presented in Table 3, and the subgroups' S2 was presented in Table 8. Table 10 reports the status gains and losses from discrimination in each subgroup and the total gain and loss, for all possible subgroup splits from 1–11 to 11–1. For each subgroup, Table 10 reports the Member ID numbers of those who gain and those who lose, and the percentage of the subgroup who gain and lose. For example, in the 3-9 subgroup split, the two lowest-ranking members (Member IDs 1 and 2) gain from discrimination and the third member of the bottom subgroup (Member ID 3) loses from discrimination—within the subgroup, then, 67 percent gain from discrimination and 33 percent lose from discrimination. Meanwhile, in the top subgroup, the bottom five members gain from discrimination and the top four lose from discrimination; thus, within the top subgroup, 56 percent gain from discrimination and 44 percent lose. Looking at the group as a whole, seven members gain and five members lose, for total percentages of 58 percent who gain from discrimination and 42 percent who lose. Of course, when the subgroup has only one person, as in the bottom subgroup of the 1–11 split and the top subgroup of the 11–1 split, the person neither gains nor loses from discrimination; in those cases, the total gain and loss do not sum to 100.

Table 10 shows that the majority gain from discrimination in all subgroup splits except the 8–4 (a tie) and the 11–1 (which has a plurality gaining from discrimination). If individuals care about their status, then in most situations the majority will want to retain S3 even if information becomes available to generate S1.

If affinities arise from similarity in interests and if individuals care about their status, then there is a natural affinity between those members of the bottom subgroup who gain from discrimination and those members of the top subgroup who also gain from discrimination. Similarly, there is a natural affinity between those members of the bottom subgroup who lose from discrimination and those members of the top subgroup who also lose. Accordingly, the stage is set for coalitions to form. These coalitions have the interesting property that proponents of discrimination are drawn from among the least advantaged of each subgroup, while opponents of discrimination are drawn from among the most advantaged of each subgroup (regardless of the summary measure of S1 underlying S2). Thus, if the quantitative characteristic which confers S1 status is correlated with political skill, then opponents of discrimination—although almost always outnumbered—may by cunning win the day.

[18] Note that this result continues to hold even if S2 is measured by the median of S1, or by any other location measure, rather than by the mean of S1. In contrast, the proportions who gain and lose from discrimination depend on the summary measure of S1.

[19] Note the importance of distinguishing between use of S2 when S1 cannot be generated and use of S2 when S1 is available. Note also that similar reasonings may be used to analyze identity and reference-group processes.

Table 10. Status Gains and Losses from Discrimination in a Group of Size 12

Bottom Subgroup					Top Subgroup					Total	
	Gain $S1_i < E(S1)$		Loss $S1_i > E(S1)$			Gain $S1_i < E(S1)$		Loss $S1_i > E(S1)$			
	Member		Member			Member		Member		Gain	Loss
Size	ID	Percent	ID	Percent	Size	ID	Percent	ID	Percent	Percent	Percent
1	—	—	—	—	11	2–8	63.6	9–12	36.4	58.3	33.3
2	1	50.0	2	50.0	10	3–8	60.0	9–12	40.0	58.3	41.7
3	1–2	66.7	3	33.3	9	4–8	55.6	9–12	44.4	58.3	41.7
4	1–2	50.0	3–4	50.0	8	5–9	62.5	10–12	37.5	58.3	41.7
5	1–3	60.0	4–5	40.0	7	6–9	57.1	10–12	42.9	58.3	41.7
6	1–3	50.0	4–6	50.0	6	7–10	66.7	11–12	33.3	58.3	41.7
7	1–4	57.1	5–7	42.9	5	8–10	60.0	11–12	40.0	58.3	41.7
8	1–4	50.0	5–8	50.0	4	9–10	50.0	11–12	50.0	50.0	50.0
9	1–5	55.6	6–9	44.4	3	10–11	66.7	12	33.3	58.3	41.7
10	1–6	60.0	7–10	40.0	2	11	50.0	12	50.0	58.3	41.7
11	1–6	54.5	7–11	45.5	1	—	—	—	—	50.0	41.7

Note: The entries in this table are obtained by comparing each person's S1 status from the rightmost column of Table 3 (see page 103) with the subgroups' S2 status (average S1 status) from Table 8 (see page 112). When a subgroup has only one member, that member's S1 equals the average, and hence he or she neither gains nor loses status from discrimination. In those cases (the top and bottom rows of the table), the percentages of the entire group with status gains and losses from discrimination do not sum to 100; the residual may be thought of as unaffected by discrimination.

***S3* IN THE SPECIAL CASE OF LARGE SOCIETIES.** Next we analyze the status gains and losses from discrimination in large societies which value one good or several positively associated goods. S1 in such societies was reported in Table 7, and S2 in Table 9. Table 11 indicates that, for every subgroup split, majorities of both the bottom and top subgroups gain from discrimination. The sizes of these majorities differ between bottom and top subgroups and across the subgroup split. While in the top subgroup, the percentages who gain and lose are constant across all subgroup splits—63 percent always gain and 37 percent always lose—in the bottom subgroup, the percentage who gain increases with the relative size of the bottom subgroup, and the percentage who lose decreases.[20]

To flesh out Table 11, suppose that the bottom subgroup (or its leadership) decides to fight against discrimination and the top subgroup (or its leadership) decides to fight for discrimination. Both the bottom and top subgroups are vulnerable to defections; that is, members may disagree with the leadership and refuse to participate in the fight or even sabotage it. The figures in Table 11 quantify the danger of defection. In the bottom subgroup, those who gain from discrimination are at risk of defecting; and in the top subgroup, those who lose from discrimination are at risk of defecting. Accordingly, while the top subgroup has a constant risk of defecting of approximately 37 percent of the membership, the bottom subgroup has a larger subset at risk of defecting—the lowest subset at risk of defecting is over half (50.2 percent in the .05 subgroup split)—and the subset at risk increases with the subgroup's relative size.

Thus, the bottom subgroup is more difficult to discipline (to prevent defections) than is the top subgroup. And the difficulty increases as the bottom subgroup increases in relative size.

[20] Analysis of the formulas underlying the quantities in Table 11 (Appendix Table B) indicates that in the bottom subgroup, as the subgroup split approaches zero, the proportion who gain from discrimination approaches its lower limit of .5 and the proportion who lose from discrimination approaches its upper limit of .5.

Table 11. Status Gains and Losses from Discrimination in Large Societies

Bottom Subgroup					Top Subgroup					Total	
	Gain $S1_i < E(S1)$		Loss $S1_i > E(S1)$			Gain $S1_i < E(S1)$		Loss $S1_i > E(S1)$			
Relative Size	Rank	Percent	Rank	Percent	Relative Size	Rank	Percent	Rank	Percent	Gain Percent	Loss Percent
.05	0–2.5	50.2	2.5–5	49.8	.95	5–65	63.2	65–100	36.8	62.6	37.4
.10	0–5	50.4	5–10	49.6	.90	10–67	63.2	67–100	36.8	61.9	38.1
.15	0–8	50.7	8–15	49.3	.85	15–69	63.2	69–100	36.8	61.3	38.7
.20	0–10	50.9	10–20	49.1	.80	20–71	63.2	71–100	36.8	60.8	39.2
.25	0–13	51.2	13–25	48.8	.75	25–72	63.2	72–100	36.8	60.2	39.8
.30	0–15	51.5	15–30	48.5	.70	30–74	63.2	74–100	36.8	59.7	40.3
.35	0–18	51.8	18–35	48.2	.65	35–76	63.2	76–100	36.8	59.2	40.8
.40	0–21	52.1	21–40	47.9	.60	40–78	63.2	78–100	36.8	58.8	41.2
.45	0–24	52.5	24–45	47.5	.55	45–80	63.2	80–100	36.8	58.4	41.6
.50	0–26	52.8	26–50	47.2	.50	50–82	63.2	82–100	36.8	58.0	42.0
.55	0–29	53.3	29–55	46.7	.45	55–83	63.2	83–100	36.8	57.7	42.3
.60	0–32	53.7	32–60	46.3	.40	60–85	63.2	85–100	36.8	57.5	42.5
.65	0–35	54.2	35–65	45.8	.35	65–87	63.2	87–100	36.8	57.4	42.6
.70	0–38	54.8	38–70	45.2	.30	70–89	63.2	89–100	36.8	57.3	42.7
.75	0–42	55.5	42–75	44.5	.25	75–91	63.2	91–100	36.8	57.4	42.6
.80	0–45	56.2	45–80	43.8	.20	80–93	63.2	93–100	36.8	57.6	42.4
.85	0–49	57.2	49–85	42.8	.15	85–94	63.2	94–100	36.8	58.1	41.9
.90	0–52	58.3	52–90	41.7	.10	90–96	63.2	96–100	36.8	58.8	41.2
.95	0–57	60.0	57–95	40.0	.05	95–98	63.2	98–100	36.8	60.1	39.9

Note: The entries in this table are obtained by applying the mathematical formulas in Appendix Table B, which compare each person's S1 status, as in the second column of Table 7 (see page 108), with the subgroups' S2 status (average S1 status), as in Table 9 (see page 113).

Although the subgroup-specific patterns are monotonic (or constant, as in the top subgroup), they combine to form totals which are nonmonotonic. As shown in Table 11, the overall percentage who gain first decreases as the relative size of the bottom subgroup increases, then when the bottom subgroup contains approximately 70 percent of the population, the overall percentage who gain begins to increase. Meanwhile, the overall percentage who lose first increases, then, when the bottom subgroup contains approximately 70 percent of the population—mirroring the pattern among the percentage who gain—the percentage who lose begins to decrease. However, although the percentages who gain and lose vary, a majority always gains. Thus, in a contest adjudicated by majority rule, and in which everyone voted and everyone voted for the platform under which their own status would be highest, discrimination would win.

However, as noted above, the proponents of discrimination are drawn from the bottom ranks of each subgroup, while the opponents of discrimination are drawn from the top ranks of each subgroup. Thus, if the status-conferring quantitative characteristic is correlated with political skill, then opponents of discrimination—though always outnumbered—may be able to snatch victory.

A different way to approach these results is to assess the sources of support for and opposition to discrimination. Table 12 presents, separately for the subset who gain status from discrimination and presumably support it and the subset who lose status from discrimination and presumably oppose it, the percentage drawn from the bottom subgroup and the percentage drawn from the top sub-

Table 12. Sources of Support for and Opposition to Discrimination, by Population Subgroup Split

Percentage in Bottom Subgroup	Support for Discrimination		Opposition to Discrimination	
	Percentage from Bottom Subgroup	Percentage from Top Subgroup	Percentage from Bottom Subgroup	Percentage from Top Subgroup
5	4.0	96.0	6.7	93.4
10	8.1	91.9	13.0	87.0
15	12.4	87.6	19.1	80.9
20	16.8	83.2	25.0	75.0
25	21.3	78.7	30.7	69.3
30	25.9	74.1	36.1	63.9
35	30.6	69.4	41.4	58.6
40	35.5	64.5	46.5	53.5
45	40.4	59.6	51.4	48.6
50	45.5	54.5	56.2	43.8
55	50.7	49.3	60.8	39.2
60	56.0	44.0	65.4	34.6
65	61.4	38.6	69.8	30.2
70	66.9	33.1	74.1	25.9
75	72.5	27.5	78.4	21.6
80	78.1	21.9	82.6	17.4
85	83.7	16.3	86.8	13.2
90	89.2	10.7	91.1	8.9
95	94.7	5.3	95.4	4.6

Note: The population subgroup split is represented by the percentage in the bottom subgroup in the leftmost column. The sources of support for discrimination sum to 100 percent, as do the sources of opposition to discrimination. Thus, for example, in a society split into two equal-sized subgroups, the majority of supporters for discrimination are drawn from the top subgroup (54.5 percent), and the majority of opposers to discrimination are drawn from the bottom subgroup (56.2 percent). The entries in this table are obtained by applying the formulas in Appendix Table B.

group. The percentages from the bottom and top subgroups sum to one. For example, in the case where 25 percent of the population is in the bottom subgroup (the fifth row), support for discrimination relies heavily on the top subgroup, which constitutes 78.7 of its base; concomitantly, opposition to discrimination also relies heavily on the top subgroup, which provides 69.3 percent of its constituency.

The sources of support and opposition to discrimination operate monotonically. As the percentage in the bottom subgroup increases, the percentages of both the support and opposition constituencies drawn from the bottom subgroup increase, and the percentages drawn from the top subgroup decrease.

A final way to examine the status gains and losses from discrimination is to graph the proportions of the entire population who are in each of the four subsets (those who gain and are in the bottom subgroup, those who lose and are in the bottom subgroup, those who gain and are in the top subgroup, and those who lose and are in the top subgroup) as a function of the relative size of the bottom subgroup. Figure 4 presents these plots. As shown, the two subsets from the top subgroup decrease linearly, the gain subset from the bottom subgroup increases nonlinearly, and the loss subset from the bottom subgroup increases throughout most of the range but then shifts direction (at a subgroup split of approximately .955).



Figure 4. Status Gains and Losses from Discrimination

Note: For a given population subgroup split (represented by the relative size of the bottom subgroup), the proportions in the four subsets sum to one. Formulas are reported in Appendix Table B; related values are reported in Table 11 (see page 118).

Because the proportions in the four subsets sum to one, Figure 4 enables assessment of which sets dominate, by population split. For example, in societies in which the proportion in the bottom subgroup is less than a little over half, the largest subset in the society is the one composed of top-subgroup members who gain from discrimination. Similarly, at the point where the top-gain and bottom-gain subsets intersect (i.e., when the proportion in the bottom subgroup is a little over half), the two subsets (top-gain and bottom-gain) are of equal size.

It is especially interesting to examine Figure 4 at the points corresponding to an equal population split. As shown, the smallest subset consists of individuals from the top subgroup who lose from discrimination (18 percent), and the largest subset consists of individuals from the top subgroup who gain from discrimination (32 percent); the two subsets from the bottom subgroup occupy intermediate places (26 percent in the bottom-gain subset and 24 percent in the bottom-lose subset). Given that the gender split is approximately fifty-fifty, it would be useful to reexamine data generated by experiments on gender and status in light of these results.

How to Change (or Keep) S3

Third-order status arises because of the lack of information on quantitative personal characteristics; but provision of such information does not guarantee its elimination. Nonetheless, provision of the information may be useful in eliminating S3—for those who wish to eliminate it. Perhaps the most intriguing result is that some members of the disadvantaged subgroup gain from discrimination, suggesting another mechanism producing and maintaining "internalized oppression" (Bourdieu 1997; Ridgeway 1997a: 222; Stanton-Salazar 1997). Thus, devising strategies to change S3 entails devising strategies for all actors.

Those who gain status from discrimination have as their objective to maintain S3 as a function exclusively of S2; introducing S1, even mildly weighted, diminishes their status. Accordingly, a useful strategy for them is to, first, prevent the free flow of information, second, discount the information or dispute its accuracy, and, third, make arguments for ignoring individual characteristics and focusing instead on subgroup membership or other communal considerations. Because

there are people in both subgroups who gain from discrimination, they will form partnerships; these partnerships can then be used to underscore the amicable relations that obtain between the two subgroups.

The strategy for those who lose status from discrimination is exactly the opposite—except that they will still form partnerships with their natural allies in the other subgroup. For these individuals, the goal is to increase information, make it widely available, express confidence in it, extol individualism.

Finally, a little insight for political activists and organizers, who often must go into unfamiliar situations: In both subgroups, the lowest-ranking individuals (on the quantitative characteristic that confers S1 status) are likely to support discrimination, and the highest-ranking individuals are likely to oppose discrimination. Thus, lobbyists for discrimination should seek out low-ranking persons, and lobbyists against discrimination should seek out high-ranking persons.

Further Implications

S3 status provides fertile ground for substantial further theorizing. One avenue involves the effects of status processes on identity phenomena. Suppose that activation of a subgroup identity produces status gains and losses, exactly as in the analysis of discrimination. Then, among other things, two ceteris paribus implications follow: First, in self-report surveys, the higher-ranking in each subgroup formed by a qualitative characteristic (such as race or ethnicity) will be less likely to answer subgroup-identification questions; thus, average schooling, skills, and income will be underestimated in all subgroups. Second, in face-to-face interviews, if interviewer characteristics or behavior activate subgroup identity, there will be a tendency for higher-ranking prospective respondents to decline to participate in the survey; thus, nonresponse will be disproportionately greater among persons with higher schooling, skill, and income.

Finally, suppose that the cross-subgroup coalitions discussed above lead to formation of political parties—an "individualistic" party comprising those who lose from discrimination (or from subgroup identification) and a "collectivistic" party comprising those who gain from discrimination (or from subgroup identification). Then the individualistic party is predicted to be smaller but higher-skilled.[21]

CONCLUDING NOTE

This paper presented an integrated framework for studying status. The framework combines ideas and insights from several literatures in order to address long-standing, unresolved issues in status research, such as: (1) the emergence of status; (2) how to distinguish between, and measure, the status of individuals and the status of characteristics; (3) how to measure and understand the status gap between subgroups (e.g., between men and women, or between races); and (4) how to distinguish the operation of quantitative and qualitative characteristics in the production of status.

By identifying three distinct types of status and linking them in distinctive ways to quantitative and qualitative characteristics, the framework makes it possible to analyze a wide variety of status phenomena in a broad range of groups and societies.

The new status theory yields many testable implications and, based on the work to date, appears capable of yielding many more implications beyond the ones presented here. The initial set includes implications for the effects of (1) the number and intercorrelation of personal characteristics, (2) the availability of information about personal characteristics, and (3) the proportions of a group in each category of a qualitative characteristic. The derived implications cover such phenomena as status differences between group members, status gaps between subgroups, and overall inequality in the status structure, all under varying conditions. For example, the analyses suggest that under certain given conditions: (1) status inequality is lower if the valued goods are negatively correlated; (2) in a two-subgroup society, the least advantaged from both subgroups gain status from discrimination, and the most advantaged

[21] The "Florida phase" of the 2000 U.S. presidential election may provide a case in point (see Nagourney and Barstow 2000).

from both subgroups lose status from discrimination, leading to cross-subgroup coalitions; (3) the status gap between two subgroups increases with the relative size of the disadvantaged subgroup; (4) when two subgroups are fighting for and against discrimination, it is more difficult to prevent defections in the bottom subgroup than in the top subgroup; and (5) opponents of discrimination are outnumbered.

The new framework for status analysis opens many avenues for future work—refining the basic status functions, building theories and deriving more and sharper implications, and testing the implications and using the new measures for the status of persons and the status of characteristics to assess key status phenomena and their correlates in surveys and experiments.

Ahead, a further integration looms on the horizon. The status analyzed here refers to evaluations of the worth of individuals and characteristics (footnote 1). This kind of status is related to the other major kind of status of interest in social science—the "status" in status attainment (Sewell and Hauser 1972, 1992)—in that the status in status attainment consists of the characteristics which confer the evaluation kind of status. Ultimately, this evaluation status cannot be fully understood without understanding how individuals come to have the characteristics they bring to the social arena—and, importantly, the two processes may be dynamically linked. Thus, a more complete framework than the one developed in this paper would integrate the two kinds of status, providing fertile ground for new substantive and methodological synergies.

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Appendix Table A. Principal Functions and Parameters of the S1 Status Distribution, in Four Special Cases

Case	Variate Family	$f(x)$	$F(x)$	$Q(\alpha)$	$Q(0)$	$E(X)$	$Q(1)$
One Characteristic	Exponential	e^{-x}	$1-e^{-x}$	$\ln\left(\frac{1}{1-\alpha}\right)$	0	1	∞
Two Characteristics:							
Positively associated	Exponential	e^{-x}	$1-e^{-x}$	$\ln\left(\frac{1}{1-\alpha}\right)$	0	1	∞
Negatively associated	Unnamed	$\frac{4e^{-x}}{\sqrt{e^{2x}-4}}$	$\sqrt{1-\frac{4}{e^{2x}}}$	$\ln\left(\frac{2}{\sqrt{1-\alpha^2}}\right)$	ln2	1	∞
Independent	Erlang	$4xe^{-2x}$	$1-\left[e^{-2x}(2x+1)\right]$	—	0	1	∞

Note: This appendix table presents principal functions (probability density function $f(x)$, cumulative distribution function $F(x)$, and quantile function $Q(\alpha)$) and parameters of the S1 status distribution arising in four special cases defined by the configuration of valued personal characteristics. In the three two-good cases, the two goods are equally weighted.

Appendix Table B. Formulas for Calculating Gains and Losses from Discrimination

Quantity	Bottom Subgroup	Top Subgroup
(1) Relative rank at which S1 = E(S1)	$1-\left(\frac{1}{e}\right)\left(\frac{1}{1-p}\right)^{\frac{1-p}{p}}$	$1-\frac{1-p}{e}$
(2) Those who gain status from discrimination, as a proportion of the population	$1-\left(\frac{1}{e}\right)\left(\frac{1}{1-p}\right)^{\frac{1-p}{p}}$	$(1-p)\left(1-\frac{1}{e}\right)$
(3) Those who lose status from discrimination, as a proportion of the population	$p-1+\left(\frac{1}{e}\right)\left(\frac{1}{1-p}\right)^{\frac{1-p}{p}}$	$\frac{1-p}{e}$
(4) Those who gain status from discrimination, as a proportion of the subgroup	$\frac{1-\left(\frac{1}{e}\right)\left(\frac{1}{1-p}\right)^{\frac{1-p}{p}}}{p}$	$1-\frac{1}{e}$
(5) Those who lose status from discrimination, as a proportion of the subgroup	$\frac{p-1+\left(\frac{1}{e}\right)\left(\frac{1}{1-p}\right)^{\frac{1-p}{p}}}{p}$	$\frac{1}{e}$

Note: In the formulas, p denotes the relative size of the bottom subgroup. The four proportions given in rows 2 and 3—representing those who gain and lose status from discrimination, in both subgroups. as proportions of the population—sum to one. In each subgroup, the two proportions in rows 4 and 5—representing those who gain and lose status from discrimination, as a proportion of the subgroup—sum to one.

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Justice Processes: Specifying the Mediating Role of Perceptions of Distributive Justice

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Extant theories suggest that individuals' perceptions of the fairness of their pay causally intervene between the salary/wages they receive and their emotional responses (e.g., satisfaction) to that level of pay. In addition, it has been argued that the impact of an event evaluated by an individual as unfair depends on the importance of fairness to that individual—an unfair event has a greater effect for those who place greater importance on distributive justice. Despite the centrality of these arguments in the justice literature, current research has not adequately tested them. In this article, the authors propose a general theoretical model based on these arguments. A structural equation model is then estimated using data from a national sample of Protestant clergy. The findings support both the mediating role of ministers' perceptions of distributive justice and the moderating role of the importance of justice in explaining their level of pay satisfaction.

Justice is a rather murky concept in social psychology, perhaps because of its various uses in common discourse. In general, the term *distributive justice* refers to the fairness of the outcomes or rewards that an individual or group receives. This can be contrasted to procedural justice (i.e., the fairness of the process by which outcomes are determined) and interactional justice (i.e., the fairness of interpersonal treatment). Although the focus of research has recently shifted somewhat toward the latter two forms of justice, our understanding of distributive justice processes is by no means complete. A critical question that remains unanswered is the extent to which an individual's perception that a reward is unfair causally mediates the effect that reward has on cognitive, behavioral, and emotional responses.

We model the causal relationships between the reward conditions an individual faces (especially relative to what he or she believes is fair), the importance the individual places on justice, the individual's perception of the degree of injustice present in the situation, and the individual's emotional response to the situation.[1] Although our

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[1] Although most theories claim that justice perceptions can lead to cognitive, behavioral, and emotional responses (Jasso 1986, 1993; Mark and Folger 1984), we focus here on emotional responses, and in particular on individuals' expressions of (dis)satisfaction regarding their rewards. An individual's emotional response (e.g., satisfaction, anger) is distinct from the affective component of justice evaluations, often referred to as the "sense of injustice" or "injustice experience" (Jasso 1993). It is also important to distinguish the perceptual components of justice evaluations (e.g., justice perceptions) from the emotional consequences of such evaluations (e.g., reward satisfaction)—an individual's assessment

theoretical model is based on the arguments contained in extant theoretical perspectives, the pivotal concept in our model—"justice perceptions"—is seldom explicitly defined, and its causal position within the justice evaluation process is usually only loosely, if at all, specified. Our work adds to the theoretical literature by more explicitly defining and specifying the causal position of this critical construct.

The looseness in how the concept of justice perceptions is often used is rarely challenged by justice theorists because there have been few attempts to empirically assess whether justice perceptions actually serve the mediating role suggested in the theoretical literature. In response to this oversight, we estimate a structural equation model that relates workplace rewards (including their comparison with the rewards believed to be fair) to pay satisfaction through individuals' perceptions of distributive injustice. We use survey data collected from a national sample of Protestant ministers.

JUSTICE PERCEPTIONS

For social psychologists, the notion that perceptions mediate the effects of concrete social conditions on individuals' responses is by no means novel—it is one of the cornerstones of the field. The symbolic interactionist tradition has long held such a conception of social reality, represented by such constructs as the "Thomas theorem" (Thomas and Thomas 1928) and the "looking-glass self" (Cooley 1902). Each of these abstract concepts shares the general notion that social behavior is based on the actor's interpretation, or "definition," of the situation, and thus behavior cannot be directly predicted from the characteristics of the objective stimuli an actor faces (also see Goffman 1959).

Although the mediating role of perceptions has long been accepted as an orienting principle in sociological social psychology, its relevance for understanding distributive justice processes has not been fully exploited theoretically, nor has it been empirically demonstrated. The majority of social psychological theories employing the distributive justice concept recognize (at least implicitly) that individuals' perceptions of injustice in a particular situation intervene between the reward conditions they face and the cognitive, behavioral, and emotional outcomes of interest. However, as Hegtvedt and Markovsky (1995:272) argue, the perceptual component of justice evaluations has received inadequate theoretical attention. Since the classical equity (Adams 1965; Homans 1974; Walster, Walster, and Berschied 1978) and relative deprivation perspectives (Crosby 1976; Folger 1986) began dominating the justice literature more than 30 years ago, primary attention has been paid to specifying (1) the comparison processes that are assumed to lead to perceptions of injustice (i.e., justice perceptions as a dependent variable, or "ends"), and (2) the cognitive, behavioral, and emotional consequences of injustice (i.e., justice perceptions as an independent variable, or "means"). Both "ends" and "means" conceptions of justice contain, at their heart, the assumption that it is an individual's *perception* of the degree of injustice existing in a situation that drives his or her emotional response to reward conditions—if an individual does not perceive a situation as unfair, he or she will not express negative emotions regarding that situation (Hegtvedt and Markovsky 1995; Törnblom 1992).

Extant research supports the importance of justice perceptions as both a dependent and an independent variable.[2] Unfortunately,

of the fairness of rewards is conceptually and empirically distinct from his or her expressed satisfaction with them.

[2] Most empirical investigations of distributive justice processes also tend to follow *either* the "ends" or the "means" conceptions of justice. Research using justice perceptions as ends often involves experiments in which researchers manipulate the rewards individuals receive and those received by a social referent or implied by normative standards; subjects are then asked to report their perceptions of the degree of injustice in the situation (Anderson 1976; Jasso 1978; Mellers 1982). Studies treating justice perceptions as means often use surveys in which measures of justice perceptions predict individuals' reward satisfaction and their organizational commitment (McFarlin and Sweeney 1992; Mueller and Wallace 1996; Sweeney and McFarlin 1993).



Figure 1. Causal Model of Justice Evaluations

Note: All exogenous variables are allowed to correlate. Disturbances for pay and global distributive justice perceptions are allowed to correlate.

however, there is a lack of empirical evidence directly demonstrating that justice perceptions act as a mediator in justice evaluation processes. Given the significance of this issue and the absence of demonstrative data, we believe it is important to empirically test the assumed mediating role of justice perceptions that has been at the root of distributive justice theories since their inception.

Specifying a Causal Model of Justice Evaluation Processes

We have developed a general theoretical model (see Figure 1) in which justice perceptions explicitly mediate the effects of reward conditions on individuals' emotional responses to these conditions. At the center of our model are four distinct constructs that make up the justice evaluation process—the justice evaluation, justice perceptions, justice importance, and the emotional response to perceived injustice. Below, we explicitly define these concepts and specify their causal position within the model. As shown in Figure 1, we assume that the reward conditions individuals face relative to the rewards that are believed to be fair (i.e., the justice evaluation) directly affect individuals' perceptions of distributive injustice in the situation. However, we also assume that the importance of justice to the individual moderates the effect of unfair rewards on justice perceptions, such that the more important justice is, the greater the effect of injustice on the individual. Finally, we assume that justice perceptions directly affect the individual's emotional response to the situation and mediate the effects of justice evaluations.

Reward Conditions and Justice Evaluations

In our model, *reward conditions* refer to the absolute magnitude of the rewards (e.g., pay, benefits) existing in a given situation. According to a basic "self-interest model," the reward conditions faced by an actor have an important *direct* impact on his or her expressed emotions—the more rewards an individual receives, the more "positive" the emotional reaction. For instance, Randall and Mueller (1995) found partial empirical support for a parsimonious self-interest model relating the absolute magnitude of workplace rewards and privileges to employees' job satisfaction and organizational commitment.

Contrary to the self-interest model, our "justice model" emphasizes a comparison process, suggesting that it is the magnitude of rewards *relative to some standard of fairness* that generates subjective states of injustice and determines the resulting reactions.[3] This view of the "relativity" of rewards is exemplified by classical equity theories (Adams 1965; Homans 1974; Walster et al. 1978) and relative deprivation formulations (Crosby 1976). More recent sociological perspectives have expanded the scope of possible referents, allowing comparisons to other individuals, groups, prior experiences, imagined alternatives, and normative standards (Folger 1986; Jasso 1986; Markovsky 1991). We follow Markovsky (1985) in assuming, as a scope condition, that individuals evaluating the fairness of rewards already possess a principle of fairness with which to assess outcomes. Therefore, the relevant questions are: Given an activated standard of distributive justice, how do particular levels of over- or underreward (relative to that standard) translate into specific degrees of perceived distributive injustice? And, how are specific degrees of perceived injustice translated into measurable emotional reactions in specific situations (Jasso and Wegener 1997:394)?

Jasso (1980) has labeled the comparison of actual rewards to just rewards the *justice evaluation*; we adopt this term to represent the rewards individuals' receive relative to their activated justice standard. Specifically, Jasso (1980) proposes that an individual's sense of injustice can be expressed by the following justice evaluation (*JE*) equation:[4]

$$JE = \ln\left(\frac{actual\ share}{just\ share}\right), \qquad (1)$$

where ln is the natural logarithm, "actual share" is the amount of reward received in the situation, and "just share" is the amount of reward believed to be fair by the individual (for a more detailed discussion of the determination of the just share, see Jasso and Wegener 1997:399).

Distributive injustice is assumed to be distressing (Adams 1965; Homans 1974; Markovsky 1988; Törnblom 1992) and is expected to lead to cognitive, behavioral, and emotional responses (Jasso 1986; Mark and Folger 1984). Focusing on emotional responses, we can specify an alternative to the self-interest model—the greater the discrepancy between the actual and just shares, the more "negative" the individual's emotional response to those rewards (Jasso 1993). Consistent with this argument, justice researchers have empirically demonstrated that the greater the discrepancy between the pay/benefits received and those felt to be deserved, the more likely an individual is to make a formal complaint (Markovsky 1985), the lower his or her satisfaction with those rewards (Randall and Mueller 1995), and the greater the resentment he or she will direct at the perceived perpetrator (Folger et al. 1983). With reference to the theoretical model presented in Figure 1, we assume that an individual's justice evaluation has a *total* causal effect on his or her emotional response to the situation, net of the absolute level of rewards received.

The Mediating Role of Justice Perceptions

We use the term *justice perceptions* to refer to an individual's assessment of the magni-

[3] We recognize that an individual may base the outcome he or she feels is fair (i.e., the just share) on a principle of "self-interest," such that the individual feels he or she deserves the majority of rewards (Leventhal, Karuza, and Fry 1980; Messick and Sentis 1979). Although this allows a relationship between self-interest and notions of fairness, the distinction between the justice and self-interest *models* remains. The justice model treats self-interest as one of the possible principles for determining the just share against which actual outcomes are compared, and this comparison is assumed to lead to perceptions of fairness and subsequently to observable reactions. On the other hand, the self-interest model treats the absolute magnitude of rewards as a *direct* determinant of individuals' responses.

[4] Several specific functional forms have been suggested to represent the properties of justice evaluations (Anderson 1976; Jasso 1980; Markovsky 1985, 1991; Mellers 1982). We adopt Jasso's (1980) specification because of its general acceptance in the sociological literature and its mathematical properties (for refinements of this mathematical model, also see Jasso and Wegener 1997).

tude of distributive injustice in a particular situation.[5] Our primary contribution here is our assessment of the argument that justice perceptions mediate the impact of reward conditions and distributive justice evaluations on individuals' reactions to injustice. Three basic assumptions are embodied in the argument that a variable (*Y*) mediates the effects of another variable (*X*) on a given response variable (*Z*): (1) *X* is assumed to have a direct causal effect on *Y*, (2) *Y* is assumed to have a direct causal effect on *Z*, and (3) the effect of *X* on *Z* is assumed to be *indirect*, working through *X*'s effect on *Y*.

The first assumption suggests that justice evaluations directly impact an individual's perceptions of injustice in the situation. Although equity researchers have focused primarily on the link between "objective" inequities and behavioral reactions, Adams (1965) stressed that perceptions play an important role in linking the two. As Törnblom (1992) has noted, "*perceived* discrepancies between the perceived actual and perceived ideal (expected) match between inputs and outputs [are] assumed to result in subjective experiences of inequity" (p. 181, italics added).

Contemporary theories of distributive justice make even finer distinctions between the concrete, evaluative, subjectively perceived, and responsive components of the justice evaluation process. Jasso (1980) explicitly states, with respect to her justice evaluation function, that the ratio of actual share to just share (in parentheses in equation 1) is "an exclusively cognitive magnitude, completely devoid of any emotional content" (p. 6), thus categorically distinguishing between distributive justice evaluations and their subjective impact on the individual. Similarly, Markovsky (1985, 1991) treats the following as distinct elements of the justice evaluation process: (1) the actual reward and the reward standard activated in a situation, (2) the cognitive assessment of their fit, (3) the subjective feeling of justice or injustice resulting from this comparison, and (4) the overt behavioral responses of the actor.

Although these perspectives differ somewhat in how justice evaluations, justice perceptions, and reactions to injustice are conceptualized, each perspective acknowledges (at least implicitly) that perceptions of injustice are a crucial part of the process that leads individuals to react to injustice. In the majority of perspectives, however, the definition and causal position of the justice perception construct is somewhat ambiguous. Our conceptualization remedies this, as illustrated in Figure 1: Discrepancies between the rewards an individual receives and those he or she believes are fair (i.e., the value of the justice evaluation) directly affect the individual's perception of the degree of injustice in the situation.

The direct causal link between justice evaluations and justice perceptions is supported by an impressive body of experimental research that has shown that manipulated discrepancies in rewards have a substantial impact on individuals' perceptions of the fairness of those rewards (Anderson 1976; Greenberg 1993; Hegtvedt, Thompson, and Cook 1993; Mellers 1982). Likewise, experiments in which measures of justice perceptions are treated as a "manipulation check" (i.e., a means of validating the general efficacy of the manipulated experimental factors) are based on the logic that individuals must perceive reward conditions as unfair in order to react as theoretically expected. In such cases, a "successful" manipulation supports the justice evaluation → justice perception relationship (Hegtvedt 1990; Markovsky 1985, 1988). Finally, empirical support for the specific justice evaluation function in equation 1 is provided by data reported by Jasso (1980), Markovsky (1985), and Randall and Mueller (1995).

The foregoing theoretical arguments and research findings lead to our first hypothesis, represented in Figure 1 by the causal path leading directly from pay justice evaluations to justice perceptions.

[5] We recognize that perceptual processes may also come into play at two other points in the justice evaluation process: (1) an individual's perceptions of the amount of rewards received may differ from those actually received, and (2) an individual's determination of the rewards that are deserved in the situation (i.e., the "just reward") may differ from "objectively" determined standards of fairness, such as the rewards received by comparison others, received in the past, or implied by existing normative standards (Jasso and Wegener 1997:407–408).

Hypothesis 1: The greater the degree of injustice in a distributive justice evaluation, the lower the perceived distributive justice.

Theoretical interest in perceptual processes in the distributive justice literature is also reflected in the emergence of several "individual-difference" constructs. For instance, theorists have suggested that individuals differ in terms of "justice importance" (Markovsky 1985), "equity sensitivity" (Huseman, Hatfield, and Miles 1987), and "expressiveness" (Jasso and Wegener 1997). Although these concepts differ according to the particular individual and situational characteristics they consider important and in the manner in which they are expected to impact the justice evaluation process, each provides further support for the basic contention that "justice is in the eye of the beholder" (Markovsky 1985:822)—what the individual perceives in terms of fairness governs his or her response to the situation. Determining how such individual-level factors affect the justice evaluation process (e.g., through additive or interaction effects) is critical for correctly specifying and estimating empirical models of distributive justice processes.

We begin to address this issue by incorporating into our model Markovsky's (1985) concept of "justice importance," which he defines as the degree to which an individual values fairness in the given situation and for the particular actor on whose behalf the justice evaluation is being made. Markovsky suggests that justice importance *moderates* the effect of reward discrepancies (captured by the justice evaluation) on the amount of injustice perceived—the more the evaluator cares about justice, the greater the impact an injustice will have.[6] Markovsky (1985) has provided experimental evidence that increasing the degree to which an individual identifies with his or her workgroup (and thus presumably, the more important it is that the group be fairly rewarded) increases the impact of a given pay discrepancy on the number of complaints the individual makes on behalf of the workgroup. Similarly, Gartrell and Paille (1997) found that employees who felt responsible for wage-cut decisions (and thus who were presumably more indifferent to the fairness of wage cuts) perceived actual wage cuts as more fair than employees who were not responsible.

These are the only two studies we have found, however, that empirically investigate the potential moderating effects of justice importance for justice evaluations, and neither study employed direct measures of justice importance. This means not only that a significant theoretical insight remains supported by only a few empirical studies, but, just as important, that statistical models that do not control for the interactive effects of justice importance are potentially misspecified. Thus, we include the moderating impact of justice importance in our model of justice processes, represented in Figure 1 by the direct causal path leading from the interaction term (pay justice evaluation × justice importance) to justice perceptions. This leads to our second hypothesis.

Hypothesis 2: The greater the importance of justice, the greater the effect of a given degree of injustice on perceptions of distributive justice.

The second assumption regarding the mediating role of justice perceptions suggests that an individual's perception of injustice in a situation directly affects his or her emotional reaction to that situation. We represent this assumption in Figure 1 by including a direct causal path leading from justice perceptions to the emotional response. This causal link is supported by a vast body of survey research in which measures of justice perceptions have been used to predict a variety of emotional responses, including job

[6] Formally, Markovsky (1985) defines the base of the logarithmic function (equation 1) as the evaluator's indifference to injustice (i.e., the inverse of justice importance) for the specific comparison being made. As such, the greater the importance of justice to the evaluator, the smaller the base of the logarithmic function and the steeper the slope of the relationship between reward discrepancies and the amount of injustice felt by the evaluator (Markovsky 1985:828). Discursively, this translates into the assumption that justice importance interacts with the value of the justice evaluation to predict perceptions of injustice (Markovsky 1985:838).

and reward satisfaction, organizational commitment, anger, and resentment (Folger and Konovsky 1989; McFarlin and Sweeney 1992; Mueller and Wallace 1996; Sweeney and McFarlin 1993). This causal path leads to our third hypothesis.

Hypothesis 3: The lower the perceived distributive justice, the more negative an individual's emotional response.

The final assumption regarding the mediating role of justice perceptions suggests that the effects of justice evaluations are indirect, working through perceptions of injustice. We represent this assumption in Figure 1 by excluding direct paths from pay justice evaluations to emotional reactions, leading to our fourth hypothesis.

Hypothesis 4: Perceptions of distributive justice mediate the effect of the justice evaluation on an individual's emotional response.

Because the proposed interaction between justice importance and justice evaluations is assumed to directly affect justice perceptions, our causal model also implies that the interaction effect should be mediated by justice perceptions. We represent this assumption in Figure 1 by excluding direct paths from the interaction term (pay justice evaluations × justice importance) to the emotional response, leading to our final hypothesis.

Hypothesis 5: Perceptions of distributive justice mediate the effect of the pay justice evaluation × justice importance interaction on an individual's emotional response.

Despite the seemingly "obvious" nature of these mediating propositions and the substantial empirical evidence supporting each of the direct causal paths in our model (represented in Hypotheses 1 through 3), there are few, if any, examples of experimental or survey research that directly test the mediating role of justice perceptions we propose in Hypotheses 4 and 5. To test their role requires that researchers *simultaneously* consider the reward conditions faced by individuals, their justice evaluations, how important justice is to them, and their perceptions of the fairness of those conditions in predicting individuals' emotional reactions; this has yet to be done.

It is important to note, however, that we do not mean to criticize or refute the myriad empirical investigations of justice processes. To the contrary, these studies provide important empirical justification for the individual assumptions of our model. Rather, we suggest simply that previous research has focused on aspects of the justice evaluation process other than the mediating role of justice perceptions, such that there is a general lack of evidence directly assessing the mediating role of justice perceptions in the study of distributive justice. Below, we report results from a national survey of Protestant clergy that bear on the mediating role of justice perceptions and the moderating role of justice importance in explaining ministers' reported pay satisfaction.

DATA AND METHODS

The data analyzed here come from a 1996 national survey of parish ministers in the United Church of Christ (UCC) and Christian Church (Disciples of Christ) (DOC). Both are Protestant denominations in the moderate to liberal range with respect to religious conservatism. Details of the survey instrument and sample are provided by McDuff and Mueller (1999, 2000). Of the 4,500 ministers who were mailed the questionnaire, a total of 2,780 (62 percent) returned them, a reasonable response rate for a national-level mailed survey (Dillman 1991). To ensure sufficient cases for analyzing subgroups (not at issue in the current paper), all female ministers were sampled, while a 50-percent random sample of male ministers was taken. Because females were "double over-sampled," weights have been introduced so that coefficients estimated from the entire sample are not biased by female over-representation. Also, we restricted our analyses to the subset of ministers who reported that they are *not* in interim positions. After applying the sampling weights and eliminating cases listwise for missing data, the effective sample size is 2,350 (1,953 males and 397 females). In general, a comparison of characteristics of the sample with those of the population of parish ministers in UCC and DOC churches indicates that there are

few differences, suggesting that this sample is representative of the population (see McDuff and Mueller 1999, 2000).

Logic of Analysis

The hypotheses presented above are assessed by estimating a structural equation model (Jöreskog and Sörbom 1996) based on the theoretical model presented in Figure 1, as specified with the measures we describe below. LISREL with maximum-likelihood estimation produces reliability-corrected estimates of direct and indirect effects and the relevant asymptotic standard errors. As described below, some of the constructs are captured with multiple-item measures, although most are based on single indicators. Finally, several of the indicators are measured as ordinal scales and, thus, violate the assumption of interval scales when Pearson correlations and MLE are used. We conducted several sensitivity checks of the results using a smaller model, a polychoric correlation matrix, and weighted-least-squares estimation. These checks suggest that our results are robust to the violation of this assumption.[7]

Variables and Measures

Full details of each of the measures used in the analyses are provided in Appendix A, and descriptive statistics for all of the variables included in the analysis are presented in Table 1. The variables are introduced below by tracing the causal model in Figure 1 from left to right, that is, from the exogenous to the endogenous variables.

Controls. The estimated model includes three sets of exogenous control variables. The first set includes characteristics of the work setting—church budget, church size, and denomination. The first two variables are common in models of work satisfaction and are potentially important sources of symbolic rewards, as large and well-funded churches tend to represent high-status positions in the ministerial occupational labor market (McDuff and Mueller 2000). Also, there are qualitative differences between denominations that might influence justice processes, such as the status of ministers in the congregation.

The second set of controls includes various characteristics of the respondents as employees and as individuals—gender, marital status, full-time employment status, being the primary wage-earner for their household, occupational tenure, and organizational tenure. Again, these are common controls for models of work satisfaction that partial out potentially confounding effects. In general, ministers in this sample are more likely than not to be married, to be employed full-time, and to be the primary wage-earner; they tend to have been in the profession for around 18 years and in their present position for around 7 years.

The third set of controls focuses on the degree of autonomy allowed ministers on the job, an aspect of workplace conditions (other than the rewards considered below) that may affect respondents' overall feelings of fairness and satisfaction. As suggested by recent research and theory, interactional and procedural aspects of the workplace, although conceptually distinct from distributive justice, may exert an independent effect on per-

[7] When variables in such models are ordinally scaled, Bollen (1989) and Jöreskog and Sörbom (1996) recommend using polychoric correlations to estimate an asymptotic covariance matrix and weighted-least-squares to estimate the structural equation model. However, without very large sample sizes the asymptotic covariance matrix is often poorly estimated and/or the solution will not converge, even after a large number of iterations. Jöreskog and Sörbom (1996) argue that maximum-likelihood estimation (MLE) is the better alternative in such cases, and Bollen (1989) concludes (based on Monte Carlo simulations) that assuming interval-level data and using Pearson correlations (with MLE) does not substantially alter the results when there are more than four categories for the variables. Facing the problem we have just described, Matsueda (1992) and Heimer and Matsueda (1994) estimate their full model with MLE, but then assess the robustness of their results by estimating smaller parts of that model using polychoric correlations and weighted-least-squares. We followed this strategy because our attempt to estimate the full model with weighted-least-squares failed to converge after over 2,000 iterations. The results obtained by this strategy (available on request from the authors) were consistent with those reported in Table 3 based on the MLE strategy.

ceptions of distributive fairness (Brockner and Wiesenfeld 1996; Randall and Mueller 1995; van den Bos, Vermunt, and Wilke 1997). By including autonomy as an exogenous variable in the model, we control for the potentially confounding effects of intrinsic characteristics of the work, as well as procedural and interactional factors of the workplace, on distributive justice perceptions and pay satisfaction. Ministers in the sample report, on average, that they have a relatively high degree of autonomy, with a mean score of 4.29 (S.D. = .52) on our five-point autonomy scale (which ranges from low to high autonomy). Assuming that ministers prefer more autonomy in their work, we expect autonomy to positively affect justice perceptions and pay satisfaction in our model.

REWARD CONDITIONS. Because we focus on respondents' evaluations and perceptions of *distributive* (as opposed to procedural or interactional) fairness, and the effects of those evaluations and perceptions on respondents' pay satisfaction, we include several variables as indicators of the concrete rewards received by respondents in their jobs. Perhaps the most obvious workplace reward is pay—ministers in this sample earned an average of about $33,713 per year in 1996 (S.D. = $14,242). To tap into workplace rewards other than pay that may impact respondents' perceptions of distributive injustice and thus indirectly affect their pay satisfaction, we also include the number of both formal and informal benefits. Ministers in this sample reported receiving an average of 7.84 out of 13 possible formal benefits (S.D. = 2.76) and an average of 3.5 out of 9 possible informal benefits (S.D. = 1.84), weighted by their frequency.

JUSTICE EVALUATIONS. The first variable of interest in the distributive justice process is the distributive justice evaluation. This construct is measured as a pay justice evaluation, by taking the natural log of the ratio of the income reported by the respondent (i.e., the actual share) to the income the respondent says he or she deserves (i.e., the just share).[8] This operationalization of the

Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for Variables in the Analysis: Protestant Ministers, 1996

Variable	Mean	S.D.
Emotional Response		
Pay satisfaction	3.21	1.13
Work Setting		
Church budget	2.28	.76
Church size	2.15	.73
Denomination	.69	.46
Worker Characteristics		
Female	.17	.38
Married	.87	.34
Employed full time	.86	.35
Primary wage-earner	.69	.46
Years in ministry	18.65	9.91
Tenure	7.07	6.00
Working Conditions		
Autonomy [a]	4.29	.52
Workplace Rewards		
Pay (in 1996 dollars)	$33,713.08	$14,242.03
Formal benefits	7.84	2.76
Informal benefits	3.50	1.84
Distributive Justice		
Pay justice evaluation ($\times 10^{-03}$) [b]	1.31	.30
Justice importance ($\times 10^{-03}$) [b]	2.51	.73
Pay justice evaluation × Justice importance ($\times 10^{-03}$) [b]	1.32	.26
Distributive justice perceptions:		
Pay	2.38	.72
Global [a]	3.25	1.02

Note: Sample size is for the weighted sample after listwise deletion of cases with missing data; N = 2,350.

[a] Statistics are based on the simple sum of the items divided by the total number of items.

[b] Statistics are calculated on the centered variable.

[8] Although we do not have data pertaining to the specific referent used by respondents in our sample, this measure of the just reward eliminates the need for such information by asking respondents to report the level of pay they deserve given their own experience, effort, education, and training. This allows the specific referent to vary across respondents without biasing the measure of just rewards. Again, this strategy for measuring the just reward is justified by adopting

justice evaluation function proposed by Jasso (1980) is based on the statistical models employed by Markovsky (1985) and Randall and Mueller (1995). As coded here, the pay justice evaluation variable becomes more negative as an individual's salary moves farther below the deserved salary (i.e., the greater the degree of underreward), and it becomes more positive as an individual's salary moves farther above the deserved salary (i.e., the greater the degree of overreward). As suggested by Jasso (1980), the justice evaluation will equal 0 for an individual who receives the salary he or she says is deserved. For our sample, the uncentered mean pay justice evaluation is –.28 (S.D. = .30), indicating that, on average, ministers in our sample are slightly underrewarded.

As Randall and Mueller (1995) have demonstrated, the characteristics of the rewards being evaluated must be carefully considered within the context in which they are evaluated. Specifically, several justice researchers have suggested that, under particular conditions, slight degrees of overreward may not lead to negative emotional reactions (Hegtvedt 1990; Hegtvedt et al. 1993; Jasso 1986; Markovsky 1988). There are several reasons that we do not expect overrewarded ministers to perceive injustice in their pay or to express dissatisfaction with it. First, because most ministers receive low pay relative to other professionals, it is unlikely that many respondents in our sample will be overrewarded. In fact, 85 percent of ministers in the sample were underrewarded, slightly more than 12 percent were justly rewarded, and only about 2 percent were overrewarded, indicating a general state of underreward.[9] Second, because most ministers are not in *direct* competition with others for the salary and other benefits they receive, and because they are not directly responsible for determining their own pay, it is likely that those who are overrewarded would be able to justify this fact through external attributions (Hegtvedt et al. 1993).

Based on this reasoning, the results reported by Randall and Mueller (1995), and the coding of the variable, we expect pay justice evaluations to have a positive, monotonic effect on justice perceptions, such that increasingly negative justice evaluations should be associated with lower perceived justice (Hypothesis 1).

Justice importance. As conceptualized, Markovsky's (1985) concept of justice importance can be directly operationalized via attitudinal survey items. We measure this construct on a five-point scale indicating the importance to the respondent of being fairly rewarded given the work done (ranging from "not at all important" to "of great importance"). The uncentered mean justice importance for respondents in this sample is 3.89 (S.D. = .73).

Pay justice evaluation x Justice importance interaction. We operationalize the pay justice evaluation × justice importance interaction effect proposed in Hypothesis 2 by creating a variable computed as the product of the justice evaluation and justice importance variables. This is consistent with Bollen's (1989:128) recommendation for including single-indicator interaction terms in LISREL models. Also, because of high collinearity between the interaction term and the two variables composing it, we have centered the pay justice evaluation and justice importance variables at their means prior to computing values for the interaction term, as recommended by Neter et al. (1996).

Distributive justice perceptions. We include two indicators of distributive justice perceptions, one specific to pay and

Markovsky's (1985) scope condition that individuals already possess a standard of fairness with which to evaluate the rewards they receive, and because we are interested in the effects of the justice evaluation *given* such a standard, without concern for the source of that standard.

[9] This frequency distribution is strikingly similar to that reported by Randall and Mueller (1995:186) for a sample of registered nurses. Across a variety of qualitative, nontransferable rewards, an average of 2.9 percent of the respondents in their sample reported being overrewarded (the percentage who reported being overrewarded for each type of reward ranges from 0 percent to 11.1 percent). This adds to our confidence that the results reported here have implications for justice evaluations in other samples and that there will be a monotonic relationship between pay justice evaluations and each of the endogenous variables we consider.

one a more global distributive justice measure (which includes pay plus other benefits of being a minister). The pay-specific measure taps the degree to which respondents perceive that they have been under- or overrewarded in terms of pay and benefits; the midpoint (2.5) represents perfect justice. The mean of 2.38 (S.D. = .72) indicates that respondents generally perceive themselves to be slightly underrewarded. Global distributive justice perceptions are measured by three items from the Price-Mueller index that tap the degree to which respondents perceive themselves to be fairly rewarded given their effort, experience, and responsibilities (Price and Mueller 1986). Table 1 indicates that ministers generally agree that they are fairly rewarded, with a mean of 3.25 on a five-point Likert scale. However, there is substantial variation in these perceptions (S.D. = 1.02), and this variation is more important to our analysis than the overall means. Because we do not make any assumptions about the causal effect of one perception on the other, but we do expect them to be empirically related, we allow the disturbances for these two justice perceptions to be correlated in the estimated structural equation model.

Emotional response. We investigate the effect of justice evaluations and perceptions on respondents' pay satisfaction, our indicator of an emotional response to injustice. Pay satisfaction exemplifies what Jasso (1986) has called a "responsive" consequence of experienced injustice (as opposed to purposive behaviors designed to reduce injustice), and it includes both cognitive and affective elements (Mark and Folger 1984; Randall and Mueller 1995). We chose this specific facet of job satisfaction (rather than overall job satisfaction) because (1) it provides a cleaner test of the theoretical model (focusing attention on distributive rather than other forms of justice) and (2) following neoclassical economic theory, pay is perhaps the most universally (positively) valued workplace reward. This is important, because, as Jasso and Wegener (1997) convincingly argue, whether an individual frames a particular outcome as a positively or negatively valued object has direct implications for the form and magnitude of the sense of injustice that may result. In the analyses to follow, we assume that respondents frame pay as a positively valued goal-object.[10]

Our measure of pay satisfaction ranges from 1 to 5, with lower values representing lower pay satisfaction (i.e., a more "negative" emotional response) and higher values representing higher pay satisfaction (i.e., a more "positive" emotional response). As indicated in Table 1, on average, ministers in this sample were relatively satisfied with their pay (mean = 3.21), although there is substantial variation (S.D. = 1.13).

RESULTS

Table 2 gives the LISREL-estimated correlation coefficients (corrected for unreliability) and Table 3 presents the LISREL-estimated path coefficients for the model proposed in Figure 1. Our main concerns are to (1) demonstrate the general efficacy of the causal model proposed, (2) determine whether justice importance interacts with justice evaluations as proposed by Markovsky (1985), and (3) determine whether (and to what extent) justice perceptions mediate the effects of the exogenous variables.

In assessing the general efficacy of the causal model, it is important to first consider whether the expected relationships between the exogenous and intervening variables are found (see Table 3). Focusing on workplace rewards, both pay and informal benefits have the expected positive effects on pay and global justice perceptions. Unexpectedly, however, formal benefits have a negative effect on both pay and global justice perceptions, a finding we discuss below. Autonomy, our indicator of working conditions other than pay, has the expected positive effect on both pay and global justice perceptions. Moreover, attesting to the general efficacy of the model, about 71 percent of the variance in pay satisfaction is accounted for by all causally antecedent variables, and

[10] The survey instrument we used contained a question asking respondents to indicate the importance they place on receiving "good pay." Our assumption that pay is positively valued by respondents is supported by the fact that the mean value for the pay importance variable is 3.80 (S.D. = .75), nearly one and two-thirds standard deviations above the scale midpoint.

Table 2. Correlation Coefficients between Variables in the Analyses: Protestant Ministers, 1996

Variables	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)	(19)
(1) Pay satisfaction	1.00	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
(2) Church budget	.18	1.00	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
(3) Church size	.15	.73	1.00	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
(4) Denomination	.01	–.02	.06	1.00	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
(5) Female	–.08	–.21	–.19	.02	1.00	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
(6) Married	.09	.20	.19	–.03	–.31	1.00	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
(7) Employed full time	.01	.49	.45	.01	–.15	.07	1.00	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
(8) Primary wage earner	.05	.29	.29	.02	–.14	–.09	.40	1.00	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
(9) Years in ministry	.09	.23	.22	.00	–.39	.18	.11	.11	1.00	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
(10) Tenure	.07	.16	.15	.05	–.17	.09	.08	.02	.45	1.00	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
(11) Autonomy	.27	.08	.05	.01	.01	.04	–.03	.01	.05	.14	1.00	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
(12) Pay	.25	.71	.63	.06	–.22	.18	.51	.34	.28	.18	.11	1.00	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
(13) Formal benefits	.09	.50	.46	.27	–.04	.09	.48	.32	.12	.06	.06	.50	1.00	—	—	—	—	—	—
(14) Informal benefits	.20	.05	.09	.01	.04	–.07	.08	.09	–.05	–.03	.19	.09	.16	1.00	—	—	—	—	—
(15) Pay justice evaluation	.39	.37	.34	.05	–.07	.07	.34	.28	.04	.03	.06	.49	.35	.10	1.00	—	—	—	—
(16) Justice importance	–.13	.12	.13	.01	–.01	–.01	.09	.07	.08	.00	.06	.14	.13	.00	.01	1.00	—	—	—
(17) Pay justice evaluation × Justice importance	.09	–.02	–.04	.01	.01	–.02	–.06	–.03	.01	.01	.06	–.02	–.06	.00	–.13	–.15	1.00	—	—
(18) Global distributive justice	.83	.18	.16	–.02	–.11	.10	.05	.06	.10	.07	.30	.28	.11	.26	.41	–.06	.08	1.00	—
(19) Pay distributive justice	.65	.14	.12	–.03	–.01	.08	.02	.06	.06	.03	.15	.22	.05	.16	.44	–.10	.05	.67	1.00

Note: Correlations are computed on the weighted sample, for the centered variables, and corrected for unreliability (as generated by the LISREL estimation software); N = 2,350.

Table 3. Unstandardized LISREL Coefficients for the Justice Model Illustrated in Figure 1: Protestant Ministers, 1996

Variables	Mediating Variables: Pay Distributive Justice Perception	Mediating Variables: Global Distributive Justice Perception	Pay Satisfaction
Work Setting			
Church budget	.011	–.010	.074*
	(.029)	(.039)	(.030)
Church size	–.014	–.009	.006
	(.027)	(.036)	(.028)
Denomination	–.046	–.069	.081**
	(.029)	(.040)	(.030)
Worker Characteristics			
Female	–.109**	–.153**	.081*
	(.039)	(.053)	(.041)
Married	.064	.116*	.008
	(.041)	(.056)	(.043)
Employed full time	–.287***	–.323***	–.165***
	(.047)	(.064)	(.049)
Primary wage-earner	–.038	–.102*	.011
	(.031)	(.043)	(.033)
Years in ministry	.003	.005*	.001
	(.002)	(.002)	(.002)
Tenure	–.002	–.002	.001
	(.002)	(.003)	(.003)
Working Conditions			
Autonomy	.127***	.404***	.062*
	(.028)	(.038)	(.030)
Workplace Rewards			
Pay (in $1,000)	.004**	.009***	.001
	(.001)	(.002)	(.002)
Formal benefits	–.022**	–.017*	–.004
	(.006)	(.008)	(.006)
Informal benefits	.047***	.099***	–.004
	(.007)	(.010)	(.008)
Distributive Justice			
Pay justice evaluation	1.124***	1.271***	.127*
	(.051)	(.070)	(.059)
Justice importance	–.080***	–.068**	–.124***
	(.018)	(.024)	(.019)
Pay justice evaluation × Justice importance	.226***	.395***	.026
	(.051)	(.069)	(.053)
Distributive Justice Perceptions:			
Pay	—	—	.216***
			(.027)
Global	—	—	.827***
			(.023)
R^2	.326	.271	.714

Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. Model fit information: $L^2 = 482.412$; d.f. = 98; standardized Root Mean Square Residual = .0195; Goodness-of-Fit Index = .983; Adjusted Goodness-of-Fit Index = .949; Normed Fit Index = .980.

*$p < .05$ **$p < .01$ ***$p < .001$ (two-tailed tests)

Table 4. Direct, Indirect, and Total Causal Effects of Selected Variables on Pay Satisfaction: Protestant Ministers, 1996

Variables	Standardized LISREL Coefficients		
	Direct Effect	Indirect Effect	Total Causal Effect [a]
Pay	.007	.107***	.114**
Formal benefits	–.010	–.046*	–.056**
Informal benefits	–.006	.150***	.144***
Autonomy	.029*	.169***	.198***
Pay justice evaluation	.033*	.342***	.375***
Justice importance	–.080***	–.047***	–.128***
Pay justice evaluation × Justice importance	.006	.086***	.091***

[a] Coefficients in column 3 represent the total *causal* effect rather than the total effect of the variable. The total causal effect does not include the covariation between the variable and pay satisfaction that is due to the variable's correlation with other exogenous variables that also influence pay satisfaction. The total effect of the variable is the zero-order correlation with pay satisfaction and can be found in column 1 of Table 2.

*$p < .05$ **$p < .01$ ***$p < .001$ (two-tailed tests)

each of the goodness-of-fit indices (see note to Table 3) indicates a respectable correspondence between the model and the data.

Hypotheses 1 and 2 refer to the first set of causal paths directly linking justice evaluations and the justice evaluation × justice importance interaction to justice perceptions. Supporting Hypothesis 1, our measure of pay justice evaluations has a significant positive effect on both types of justice perceptions and, in support of Hypothesis 2, our indicator for the pay justice evaluation × justice importance interaction significantly influences both pay and global justice perceptions. As suggested by Markovsky (1985), the positive sign for this interaction term means that justice evaluations impact justice perceptions more strongly when justice is more important to the person (a graph of this interaction is available on request from the authors). Unexpectedly, however, justice importance has a significant negative main effect on both types of justice perceptions (we discuss possible reasons for this below). Most important, these findings support the first assumption required for justice perceptions to serve a mediating role as proposed—respondents' justice evaluations directly affect their perceptions of distributive justice.

Recall that the second assumption regarding the mediating role of justice perceptions requires a direct effect of justice perceptions on pay satisfaction (Hypothesis 3). Turning to the estimates for the pay satisfaction equation in Table 3, both pay and global justice perceptions significantly and dramatically increase satisfaction with one's pay, supporting Hypothesis 3. With respect to the other exogenous variables in our model, we find that the pay justice evaluation has a significant positive direct effect, justice importance again has an unexpected significant negative main effect, and the direct effect of the interaction term is not significant. The causal importance of justice perceptions is highlighted in that their standardized coefficients ($\beta = .137$ and $\beta = .705$ for pay and global justice perceptions, respectively) are substantially larger than those for any of the other variables used to predict pay satisfaction.

The third assumption regarding the mediating role of justice perceptions requires that the effects of the pay justice evaluation and the pay justice evaluation × justice importance interaction be *indirect*, affecting pay satisfaction primarily through their impact on justice perceptions. In Table 4, we decompose the total causal effects of the key exogenous and intervening variables in our model into direct and indirect effects. As reported above, autonomy, pay justice evaluations, and justice importance have significant direct effects on pay satisfaction. The indirect effects of these variables (through justice perceptions), however, are 85 per-

cent, 91 percent, and 38 percent of the total causal effects, respectively, supporting Hypothesis 4. We discuss possible reasons for the substantial unmediated (direct) effect of justice importance below. Also supportive of the proposition that justice perceptions is the mediator, the effects of pay, formal benefits, informal benefits, and the pay justice evaluation × justice importance interaction are entirely indirect, working through the two justice perceptions. The fact that the effect of the interaction term is entirely mediated by justice perceptions offers strong support for Hypothesis 5.

DISCUSSION

These results provide substantial support for the theoretical model presented in Figure 1 and the five hypotheses we have drawn from it. While the absolute level of pay and informal benefits have significant and positive total effects on pay satisfaction, these effects are entirely indirect through the individual's perceptions of distributive justice. These findings are especially relevant for pay (94 percent of its total causal effect is indirect), given the inability of previous researchers to distinguish between the relative efficacy of self-interest and justice models of work satisfaction (Randall and Mueller 1995). Consistent with the justice model, we find that the absolute level of rewards received by individuals does not exhibit a direct effect on pay satisfaction net of justice evaluations and perceptions. Randall and Mueller's (1995) failure to include justice perceptions in their statistical models may account for their inability to adjudicate between the self-interest and distributive justice explanations. At a minimum, our findings suggest that future investigations of justice evaluation processes should include measures of the crucial mediating variable—justice perceptions—to avoid reaching faulty substantive conclusions.

We find an unexpected significant negative direct effect of formal job benefits on both pay and global justice perception measures, and a similar negative total causal effect (but no direct effect) on pay satisfaction. The fact that respondents who receive greater formal benefits perceive being underrewarded, and express lower pay satisfaction as a result, suggests an interesting paradox. It may be that receiving substantial formal benefits (e.g., insurance, vacation) leads ministers in this sample to believe that they could, and, in fact, *should*, receive greater pay from their parish. Obviously, this interpretation is speculative, but it is supported by the positive correlation ($r = .385$, $p < .001$) between formal benefits and the amount of pay respondents believe is just (the denominator of the pay justice evaluation). Future research investigating distributive justice in work settings should include a wide variety of workplace rewards, and should attempt to disentangle the interrelationships between the rewards respondents receive and those they believe they deserve (also see Jasso and Wegener 1997).

Also supporting the model presented in Figure 1, we find that pay justice evaluations have a positive total causal effect on pay satisfaction, primarily through their effects on justice perceptions and, consistent with Markovsky's (1985) argument, this effect is moderated by the importance placed on justice by the respondent. That is, for ministers in this sample, the more importance they place on being fairly rewarded, the greater the effect of discrepancies between their actual and deserved pay on their perceptions of distributive justice and, indirectly, on their pay satisfaction.

The main anomaly found in this study is the direct negative main effect of justice importance on pay satisfaction—net of all other variables, ministers who place a high value on being fairly rewarded tend to perceive themselves as being underrewarded and to express lower pay satisfaction. Although justice importance has significant negative effects on both pay and global justice perception measures, its effect on pay satisfaction is predominantly direct (62.5 percent of the total effect is unmediated). Our measure of justice importance asks respondents about the importance of being fairly rewarded *in general* (not restricted to pay or job benefits). Conceptually, it is possible that the importance one places on distributive justice affects not only the translation of reward discrepancies into perceived injustice in concrete situations (i.e., the interaction effect proposed here), but also

may serve as a more general schema that sensitizes individuals to issues of distributive fairness beyond their pay and job benefits.[11] Thus, individuals who place a high value on distributive justice may also be more likely to attend to a wider range of justice evaluations (e.g., intangible rewards, workplace procedures, interactions with supervisors) and justice referents. In our sample, ministers who place a high value on fair pay may be more sensitive to the fact that their pay is quite low when compared with pay in other professions (the ministers' average salary for 1996 was less than $34,000 per year). Future research should investigate both the moderating effects of justice importance for justice evaluations in specific situations, and the broader implications of this overarching value for justice perceptions and for individuals' emotional responses. Because this is one of only a handful of studies that empirically considers this intriguing concept, much remains to be learned about the role of justice importance in the justice evaluation process.

CONCLUSION

We have argued that justice perceptions—the degree of injustice that an individual perceives to exist in a situation—mediate the impact of rewards (both absolute and relative to those the individual believes are fair) on individuals' emotional responses to injustice. Although this argument is basic to almost all theories of distributive justice, it appears to be a "taken-for-granted" assumption, as most theories leave the definition and causal role of justice perceptions implicit. To counter this, we have presented a theoretical model of the justice evaluation process that (1) more explicitly defines and specifies the causal position of justice perceptions, (2) explicitly incorporates the moderating effects of justice importance suggested by Markovsky (1985), and (3) demonstrates the relevance of perceptions as intervening mechanisms in the justice evaluation process.

Most important for our purposes, past research has not directly demonstrated that justice perceptions do, in fact, act as a mediator in the justice evaluation process. Extant empirical studies focus on the effects of absolute rewards, justice evaluations, *or* justice perceptions on individuals' reactions, but rarely on all three simultaneously. We have filled this empirical void by analyzing data from a national sample of Protestant ministers that contains measures of all of these theoretical constructs. Based on estimates from a structural equation model, we have found considerable support for the proposed justice evaluation model. The effects of (1) the absolute level of workplace rewards (e.g., pay, informal benefits), (2) justice evaluations (i.e., discrepancies between actual and deserved pay), and (3) the pay justice evaluation × justice importance interaction on pay satisfaction are all primarily indirect, mediated by perceptions of pay-specific and global distributive justice. Support for our distributive justice model also provides support for the more general notion within social psychology that individuals' perceptions (e.g., definitions of the situation) play an important mediating role in determining their resultant behaviors and emotions.

Our findings also have practical implications for understanding justice processes. Many professionals rely on their ability to satisfy others' sense of fairness to maintain relatively harmonious interpersonal interactions. Understanding the crucial mediating role of justice perceptions means that this task becomes more complex—not only must one consider the level of rewards offered relative to available normative standards and social referents (e.g., coworkers), but also individuals' perceptions of the fairness of those rewards and the individual-level factors (e.g., justice importance) that impact reactions to specific reward discrepancies. For instance, Mueller and Wallace (1996) argue that the "paradox of the contented female worker" (Phelan 1994), in which women whose work conditions and rewards are objectively below those of male counterparts often feel just as satisfied as (or even more satisfied than) men, is partly due to the fact that women do not perceive the differences as unfair. Also, the ability to manipulate factors such as responsibility (Gartrell and Paille 1997) and social identi-

[11] We thank an anonymous *ASR* reviewer for suggesting this interpretation.

fication (Markovsky 1985), which have been associated with the importance individuals place on distributive fairness, may prove particularly effective for managers and other professionals facing potentially "explosive" situations (e.g., pay raises/cuts, layoffs).

While our empirical model was estimated based on data from a relatively restrictive population of professionals (i.e., ministers from two Protestant denominations), there is reason to be guardedly confident that the general model would also apply to other groups of professionals and nonprofessionals. Justice researchers have generated an impressive body of research illustrating the importance of distributive justice perceptions for individuals' attitudes, behaviors, and emotions in a vast array of work organizations. This includes evidence that the rewards employees receive affect perceptions of fairness in a wide variety of settings, including workers at a plywood cooperative facing pay-cuts (Gartrell and Paille 1997), public university employees facing pay-raise decisions (Dulebohn and Martocchio 1998), and teachers in the United States and South Korea (Mueller, Iverson, and Jo 1999). There is also evidence that justice perceptions have substantial effects on job and/or pay satisfaction for a broad range of occupations, including first-line manufacturing employees (Folger and Konovsky 1989), engineers in a public utility company (Sweeney and McFarlin 1993), bank employees (McFarlin and Sweeney 1992), supervisors in Chinese joint-venture hotels (Leung et al. 1996), and Canadian lawyers (Mueller and Wallace 1996). Finally, Randall and Mueller (1995) provide evidence of the total effect of justice evaluations on job satisfaction, organizational commitment, intent to stay with an employer, and turnover for a sample of registered nurses. The sampling universe covered by these studies is impressive, ranging from salaried professionals to hourly manufacturing workers. The fact that the evidence in each case supports a portion of our model gives us reason to be confident that our entire model should apply to other samples. Because ours is the first study to consider each of these relationships simultaneously, however, such generalizability is speculative and awaits further corroboration and theoretical refinement.

A final word of caution regarding our results is warranted. The data we use to test the theoretical model are cross-sectional, and therefore we cannot make unambiguous causal inferences despite our estimation of a structural equation model. In fact, some theorists have questioned the presumed causal role of justice perceptions, suggesting instead that individuals first experience a negative affective response, then "search" for the cause of this negative affect in the situation, leading them to perceive that their rewards are "unfair" (Scher and Heisse 1993). In our case, this argument implies that workplace rewards lead to pay satisfaction, and only then to evaluations of pay justice and to perceptions of distributive injustice. Future research, grounded in carefully controlled experiments, may assist in disentangling the causal order of the cognitive and affective elements of justice evaluations. However, such fine-grained analysis is far beyond the aims of the current paper and the data used in this study. Instead, we provide an explicit and general theoretical model, based on the predominant theoretical position and prior empirical evidence, that stresses the mediating role of justice perceptions in translating reward conditions into emotional responses, and find substantial support for the assumptions represented by this model.

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*(*Social Psychology Quarterly, *1996, pp. 338–49;* Social Justice Research, *2000, pp. 1–24), factors differentially affecting organizational and professional commitment (*Work and Occupations, *2000, pp. 89–116;* Social Psychology Quarterly, *1999, pp. 325–46), and temporary labor markets for clergy (*Research in the Sociology of Work, *2000, pp. 211–30).*

Appendix A. Variable Names and Definitions

Unless otherwise noted, all variables were measured on five-point Likert scales (1= strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree). Reverse coded items are denoted [R]. Coefficient alpha and factor loadings [ ] are reported for multi-item scales.

EXOGENOUS CONTROL VARIABLES

Work Setting

Church budget. "What is the budget of your congregation?" (1) Under $50,000, (2) $50,000 to $100,000, (3) Over $100,000.

Church size. "What is the size of your present congregation?" (1) 0 to 100, (2) 101 to 300, (3) more than 300.

Denomination. A dummy variable, with UCC coded 1 and DOC coded 0.

Worker Characteristics

Female. A dummy variable, coded 1 if respondent is a female, 0 if respondent is a male.

Married. A dummy variable, coded 1 if respondent indicated that he or she was currently married, 0 if single, divorced, separated, or widowed.

Full-time. A dummy variable, coded 1 if current position is 40 or more hours per week, 0 if less.

Primary wage-earner. A dummy variable, coded 1 if the respondent indicated he or she earned 51 percent or more of the household income, 0 otherwise.

Years in the ministry. Total years as a minister.

Tenure. Years serving in present congregation.

Workplace Rewards

Pay. A variable constructed from a single item, which asked each respondent to indicate their current yearly income from parish ministry before taxes: (1) less than $10,000, (2) $10,000 to $15,999, (3) $16,000 to $20,000, (4) $21,000 to $25,999, (5) $26,000 to $30,999, (6) $31,000 to $35,999, (7) $36,000 to $40,999, (8) $41,000 to $50,999, (9) more than $60,000. We then computed each respondent's pay as the midpoint of the salary range they indicated, except in the case of category (9), in which a Pareto estimate was assigned (see Parker and Fenwick 1983 for details on this procedure).

Formal benefits. The total *number* (ranging from 0 to 13) of the following benefits the respondent receives based on written contract with the congregation: (a) health insurance, (b) dental insurance, (c) medical co-payment plan, (d) vacation, (e) maternity/paternity leave, (f) life insurance, (g) disability insurance, (h) sabbaticals, (i) pension/annuity, (j) travel expenses, (k) continuing education, (l) allowable reimbursement policy, (m) malpractice insurance.

Informal benefits. The total *number* of the following benefits the respondent receives, weighted by their *frequency* (0 = never, 1 = sometimes, 2 = often), that are dependent on the good will of the congregation and not in a written contract: (a) parsonage furnishings, (b) gifts of food, (c) dinner invitations by parishioners, (d) special occasion gifts, (e) use of a parishioner's vacation home, (f) use of a car, (g) reduced insurance rates, (h) reduced mortgage rates, (i) country club and/or other club memberships.

Working Conditions

Autonomy. The mean of four items: (a) "I have a considerable amount of freedom to do my job" [.82], (b) "I influence the things that affect me on the job" [.78], (c) "I have input deciding what tasks or what parts of tasks I will do" [.71], and (d) "I control the scheduling of my own work" [.67]. The composite scale has a reliability α = .83, and ranges from 1 to 5 with higher values representing greater autonomy.

DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE VARIABLES

Pay justice evaluation. A variable constructed by taking the natural log of the ratio of the respondent's value for *pay* (see above) and for *just pay*. The latter was constructed from the respondent's response to the question, "Thinking in terms of your current position, what annual salary from your job (base salary plus housing or fair rental value of parsonage) do you feel you deserve, one that would be fair and just given your education, training, experience, position and input into your work?" (1) $10,000 to $15,999, (2) $16,000 to $20,999, (3) $21,000 to $25,999, (4) $26,000 to $30,999, (5) $31,000 to $35,999, (6) $36,000 to $40,999, (7) $41,000 to $50,999, (8) $51,000 to $60,999, (9) $61,000 to $70,999, (10) $71,000 or more. We then assigned each respondent the mid-

(Appendix A continued on next page)

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point of the category they selected, except for category (10), in which a Pareto estimate of the median value ($104,802 for females and $88,792 for males) was assigned (see Parker and Fenwick 1983 for details on this procedure).

Justice importance. Measured by a single item that asks respondents to rate the importance of being fairly rewarded for the job they do: (1) "Not important at all," (2) "Of little importance," (3) "Of some importance," (4) "Quite important," (5) "Of great importance."

Pay justice evaluation × justice importance. An interaction term created by multiplying the values of the pay justice evaluation and justice importance variables.

Pay distributive justice perception. Measured by a single item that asks respondents to choose the statement that best describes their beliefs about their current pay and benefits? (1) "I receive much less than I deserve," (2) "I receive less than I deserve," (3) "I receive exactly what I deserve," (4) "I receive more than I deserve," and (5) "I receive much more than I deserve."

Global distributive justice perception. The mean of three items: (a) "I am fairly rewarded for the amount of work I put in" [.90], (b) "I am fairly rewarded considering the responsibilities I have" [.94], and (c) "I am fairly rewarded in view of my experience" [.86]. The composite scale ranges from 1 to 5, with higher values representing greater perceived fairness (α = .93).

EMOTIONAL RESPONSE VARIABLE

Pay satisfaction. Measured by a single item: "I am satisfied with my pay."

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Comment and Reply

Comment on Greeley and Hout, ASR, *December 1999*

True Facts, True Stories, and True Differences

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Greeley and Hout (1999, henceforward G&H) make extended arguments about the religions and religious beliefs of Jews and Catholics. They present hypotheses about trends in those beliefs, which they claim to support with analyses of the 1973–1998 General Social Survey (GSS) and with examination of the traditional teachings of Judaism and Catholicism. Their arguments are crippled by critical errors in their statistical analyses and in their exposition of Jewish religious doctrine.[1] In particular: (1) In their comparisons of Orthodox, Conservative, and Reform Jews, G&H claim to find "no significant differences" in beliefs in life after death. They do not mention that the GSS includes data on only 12 Orthodox Jewish respondents. (2) G&H draw key substantive conclusions from statistically nonsignificant parameter estimates. They report neither statistical significance tests nor the small numbers of cases for these estimates. (3) G&H misrepresent traditional Jewish doctrine about life after death. Their assertions are inconsistent with well-known primary and secondary sources, including the traditional Jewish prayer book. (4) G&H claim to estimate cohort and age effects (differences) on beliefs. They use statistical models that are mathematically incapable of producing such estimates. (5) G&H ignore gender differences in trends in belief in life after death. In fact, results for men contradict G&H's conclusions.

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[1] I discuss only those problems that undermine G&H's core conclusions. One might object also to the accuracy, documentation, and appropriateness of the "true story" with which G&H begin their article, which concerns a conversation between a rabbi and a priest at a Chicago funeral (p. 813).

Criticisms

Differences "Not Significant" with 12 Cases

G&H are correctly concerned about differences in belief among Jewish denominations. Before 1990, the GSS did not ask Jews their denomination. G&H assert, "Differences among Orthodox, Conservative, and Reform Jews are not significant" (G&H, p. 831). However, their reported "not significant" differences for the Orthodox are misleading, because it is based on only 12 Orthodox Jewish respondents in the cumulative GSS. For example, in a sample of only 12 respondents, sample estimates of the population proportion who believe in the afterlife would not be significantly different from 43 percent ($p \leq .05$, two-tailed test) if 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, or 9 respondents were to report that they believe in the afterlife (based on binomial exact confidence intervals estimated with Stata 6.0). G&H do not report the number of respondents who are Orthodox Jews.

Erroneous Statements about Jewish Religious Doctrine

G&H write, "Belief in life after death is not a question of orthodoxy (*sic*.) for Jews as it is for Christians. As belief in the afterlife increases for Jews, they are innovating at least as much as they are conforming" (p. 828). G&H offer no support for this assertion. In contrast, consider the following statements from the *Oxford Dictionary of the Jewish Religion* (also see Asheri 1978:195–97; Gillman 1997):

> By the time of the Talmud [approximately the year 200 of the common era], the concept of an afterlife had become highly developed and had a number of components.

> Souls continued after death and received either reward or punishment based on the person's conduct during life (divine retribution). The righteous were assigned to the garden of Eden to receive their reward, and the wicked were assigned to Geihinnom to receive their punishment, which was generally not supposed to last more than twelve months. The Pharisees developed the doctrine of bodily resurrection, which was one of the major doctrinal disputes between the Pharisees and Sadducees. . . . In the Middle Ages, Maimonides included resurrection and divine reward and punishment in his Thirteen Principles of Faith. (Werblowsky and Wigoder 1997:193)

> Maimonides' [1135–1204] Thirteen Principles of Faith found their way into the prayer book in two versions: a prose version in which each principle is introduced with "I believe with perfect faith" (*ani ma'amin*), and a rhymed version known as *Yigdal*. (Werblowsky and Wigoder 1997:692)

The traditional prayer book offers a direct view of Jewish orthodoxy. The afterlife is mentioned prominently and explicitly in Orthodox and Conservative prayer services.[2] In addition to *Yigdal* (Harlow 1985:326; Scherman 1984:12–13) and other prayers, the Eighteen Benedictions (*Amidah*) asserts belief in the afterlife. Consider a popular translation for Conservative Jews: "Thou . . . callest the departed to everlasting life. . . . Faithful art Thou, O Lord, who callest the dead to life everlasting" (Silverman [1946, 1973] 1984:96). A translation meant for Orthodox Jews reads, "He . . . resuscitates the dead with abundant mercy . . . causes death and restores life" (Scherman 1984:269). For centuries, the *Amidah* has been recited once or more in each Sabbath, holiday, and daily prayer service for the morning, afternoon, and evening (Elbogen [1913,1972] 1993; Harlow 1985; Scherman 1984). Contrary to G&H's assertion (p. 814), the afterlife *of the individual* is explicit in Jewish orthodoxy. For example, in memory of the dead (*El Maleh Rachamim*), Orthodox Jews ask, "May his/her resting place be in the Garden of Eden" (Scherman 1984:455). And, prior to Christianity, "The *Book of Daniel* (12.2) mentions the resurrection of the righteous" (Werblowsky and Wigoder 1997:193).

[2] My statements about Jewish orthodoxy do not apply to theological positions taken by Reform Judaism, which rejects key tenets of traditional Judaism and, by its very name, is neither "traditional and established," nor "Orthodox."

Table 1. Numbers and Percentages of Jewish Respondents Believing in Life after Death: GSS, 1973 to 1998

GSS Survey Year	Number of Respondents: Don't Believe	Number of Respondents: Believe	Percentage Believing
1973–1975	46	11	19
1976–1980	52	19	27
1982–1985	39	20	34
1986–1990	68	37	35
1991–1994	32	34	52
1996–1998	34	44	56
All years	271	165	38

Trends Not Significant

G&H's Table 1 (p. 816) gives the percentage of persons believing in life after death, by survey year and religion from 1973 to 1998. G&H write that Table 1 shows, "Belief increased monotonically among Jews since the early 1970s, reinforcing the impression of significant change garnered from comparing the end points" (p. 816). G&H report neither number of cases nor significance tests here. My Table 1 (above) presents the number of cases for Jews from the GSS data. To test for association between time period and afterlife belief in the 1970s and 1980s, I compute chi-square tests on the counts in the first four rows (i.e., the 4×2 tabulation of beliefs in 1973–1975, 1976–1980, 1982–1985, and 1986–1990). The Pearson χ^2 is 5.28, the likelihood χ^2 is 5.49; neither is significant at $p \leq .05$ or even $p \leq .10$. *Thus, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the proportion of Jews who believe in the afterlife remained stable throughout the 1970s and the 1980s.*

For the 1990s, the story is the same: The proportion who believe in 1991–1994 is not significantly different from the proportion who believe in 1996–1998 ($p \leq .10$). Nor can we reject the hypothesis that the proportion

Table 2. Recalculation, by Gender, of G&H's Table 2: Logistic Regression Coefficients with *Z*-Statistics and Wald Test Results [a]

	Males			Females		
Tests/Cohorts	Protestant	Catholic	Jewish	Protestant	Catholic	Jewish
Test of the Null Hypothesis [b]						
P-value	.093	.232	.348	.244	.001	.001
Number of cases	5,831	2,445	196	8,411	3,285	219
χ^2	12.25	9.29	7.83	9.13	24.76	24.24
d.f.	7	7	7	7	7	6
Birth Cohorts						
1900–1909	–.603 (–.493)	–.451 (–1.245)	–.419 (–1.913)	–3.200* (–2.274)	–.602 (–1.877)	.229 (1.064)
1900–1909	–.419 (–1.913)	–.451 (–1.245)	–.603 (–.493)	.229 (1.064)	–.602 (–1.877)	–3.200* (–2.274)
1910–1919	–.370* (–2.136)	–.323 (–1.254)	–.370 (–.432)	.104 (.619)	–.531* (–2.184)	–1.101 (–1.258)
1920–1929	–.208 (–1.473)	–.093 (–.449)	–.347 (–.493)	–.048 (–.357)	–.519* (–2.761)	–1.651 (–1.859)
1940–1949	.214 (1.622)	.242 (1.234)	.329 (.570)	–.118 (–.951)	.419* (2.430)	2.427* (2.940)
1950–1959	.166 (1.120)	.297 (1.361)	1.266* (1.967)	.091 (.632)	.606* (3.186)	3.263* (3.601)
1960–1969	.325 (1.802)	.575* (2.289)	1.681 (1.902)	.100 (.605)	.554* (2.558)	3.868* (3.790)
1970–1978	.427 (1.548)	.643 (1.900)	2.381* (2.274)	.372 (1.592)	.666* (2.202)	NA
Constant	1.545* (13.688)	1.221* (7.204)	–1.149* (–1.981)	1.921* (17.747)	1.331* (8.915)	–2.104* (–2.753)
Log-likelihood	–2,757.000	–1,304.083	–12.878	–3,498.209	–1,666.300	–119.540

Note: Standard errors can be obtained by dividing the coefficients by the *z*-scores. Calculations are unweighted; weighted calculations lead to identical significance test results and nearly identical coefficients. G&H's Table 2 appears on page 818 of their December 1999 article. The number of cases in this table differ slightly from those in G&H's table; see text. Two small coding errors are corrected (see footnote 3).

[a] For the Wald tests, coefficients for age dummies are not shown.

[b] Tests for the null hypothesis that the cohort coefficients equal 0.

*$p \leq .05$ (two-tailed tests)

believing never declined from one interval to the next. So G&H's Table 1 does not support their claim of monotonic increases in afterlife beliefs among Jews throughout the 1970s and 1980s, or after 1990. Indeed, the data are more consistent with the hypothesis that these percentages remained approximately stable from the early 1970s through the 1980s, increased substantially about 1990, when the wording of GSS questions about Jewish identity changed, and then remained steady.

Ignoring Gender Differences in Effects

Previous research shows strong gender differentiation in religious beliefs and practices (de Vaus and McAllister 1987; Mueller and Johnson 1975). G&H neither consider nor calculate gender differences in independent variable effects. To assess the consequences of ignoring these gender differences, my Table 2 recomputes G&H's analyses (from their Table 2, p. 818) separately for men and

women.[3] For example, to reassess G&H's assertion that their Table 2 logit analyses "show substantial increases [in belief in the afterlife] from earlier to more recent cohorts for Catholics and Jews" (p. 819), I use these gender-specific analyses to test the null hypotheses that all year-of-birth (cohort) variables have coefficients equal to 0. Cohort variables are not significant for Jewish and Catholic males, but *are* significant for Jewish and Catholic females. *These results are not caused by small sample sizes*: For Catholic males, the sample size is large (2,445), and results are not significant, even at $p \leq .20$. For Jewish females, the number of cases is small (219), and the significance level of the test is very stringent ($p \leq .0005$). Tests for specific cohort variables show the same thing. For Catholic males, only the dummy variable for the 1960–1969 birth cohort has a statistically significant coefficient ($p \leq .05$). For Jewish males, only coefficients for only the 1950–1959 and 1970–1978 cohorts are significant. This absence of year-of-birth effects for Catholic and Jewish men is entirely inconsistent with G&H's arguments.

[3] I also correct some coding errors. G&H indicate that their Table 2 describes analyses based on respondents who report their religion as Protestant, Catholic, or Jewish (p. 817); who were born in or after 1900 (per their Table 2); who were at least 18 years old when surveyed (per their Table 2); and who have no missing data on age, birth year, and response to the GSS question about belief in the afterlife. G&H report on 20,715 respondents—14,489 Protestants, 5,794 Catholics, and 432 Jews. Applying those same criteria to the GSS data, I obtain 322 fewer respondents (14,242 Protestants, 5,730 Catholics, and 421 Jews). I am able to replicate G&H's numbers exactly (i.e., 432 Jews) if I include respondents who were born before 1900, and if I exclude respondents to the 1998 GSS who reported their age as 18 years. Thus, I speculate that G&H did not actually exclude those born before 1900 from these analyses, and that in manipulating the 1998 data, they included only those whose age was greater than (not greater than *or equal to*) 18 years. Respondents born before 1900 would be grouped with those who were born in 1930–1939, which is the omitted (or reference) category in G&H's dummy variable representation of the distribution of birth years.

Confounding Age, Period, and Cohort

In their Tables 2, 5, and 7, G&H claim to estimate cohort differences and to distinguish them from age differences in afterlife beliefs (henceforward "cohort effects" and "age effects"). For example, in their Table 2 analyses, G&H seek to "completely purge the effects of age from the data" (p. 817) and thereby "dismiss the conjecture that the increases across cohorts in belief in life after death among Catholics and Jews are an artifact of the increased religiousness associated with age" (p. 819). Unfortunately, G&H confound cohort, age, and period (survey year) effects.

The root cause of G&H's confounded age, period, and cohort effects is the well-known multicollinearity of age, period, and cohort. If any two of these quantities are known, then the third is known also, as follows:

$$YOB = Period - Age;$$

$$Period = YOB + Age;$$

$$Age = Period - YOB;$$

where *YOB* represents year-of-birth (or cohort), *Period* is the survey year of the GSS, and *Age* is the respondent's years of age at the time of the survey.

G&H solve their collinearity problems by simply ignoring period effects; ignoring period effects does not make them go away (Blalock 1967; Mason et al. 1973:243). That is, absent some defensible assumptions to *identify* age, period, and cohort effects, it is mathematically impossible to know if G&H have found age and cohort effects, age and period effects, period and cohort effects, or a combination of all three. G&H could present ancillary evidence to support an assumption that period or cohort effects are absent. Or they could include age, period, and cohort variables but constrain sets of cohorts, periods, or ages to have equal effects. For example, in response to a critic's complaint of a previous underidentified age–period–cohort analysis, Knoke and Hout (1976) use the second strategy to support a claim of "constant cohort effects" (p. 905). But G&H simply ignore period effects. (G&H's two-knot linear spline transforma-

tion of COHORT is no solution: In each of the three *YOB* intervals defined by the knots the model is linear and additive.)

To see the consequences of these interdependencies for G&H's analyses, consider logit models 1 and 2 below, which are estimated here for Jewish females in the GSS. Equation 1 is a continuous-variable, linear specification of G&H's analyses from their Table 2 (p. 818). If additional independent variables are added, equation 1 is also the same model that G&H estimate in their Tables 5 and 7 (except for the continuous and linear parameterizations of *YOB* and *Age*). Y = 1 if the respondent believes in the afterlife; Y = 0 indicates otherwise. *Z*-statistics are presented in parentheses below the coefficients. The asterisks indicate statistical significance at $p \leq .05$.

$$\begin{aligned}\text{Logit}\,(Y=1) = {} & -107.043 \;+\; .054\ \mathit{YOB} \\ & (-2.556^{*}) \quad (2.569^{*}) \\ & +\; .028\ \mathit{Age}; \\ & \quad (1.303)\end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}\text{Log-likelihood} &= -1224.174; \\ N &= 195. \end{aligned} \qquad (1)$$

Equation 1 appears to do what G&H claim to do with a dummy variable specification of the same model: It produces a significant positive net association between cohort and probability of afterlife belief, and it finds an nonsignificant net association between age and probability of afterlife belief ($z = 1.303$; $p \leq .05$).

But the absence of age effects in equation 1 is illusory. *YOB* incorporates age (because *YOB = Period – Age*), so equation 1 merely divides the effect (or association) of age between *Age* and *YOB*. The part of that effect that is not absorbed into the effect of *YOB* is positive, not much bigger than its standard error ($z = 1.303$), and not statistically significant. The remaining effects of *Age* are hidden, but not absent, from equation 1.

To see the full, negative, and significant presence of the *Age* variable in equation 1, consider equation 2.

$$\begin{aligned}\text{Logit}(Y=1) = {} & -107.043 \;+\; .054\ \mathit{Period} \\ & (-2.556^{*}) \quad (2.569^{*}) \\ & -\; .026\ \mathit{Age}; \\ & \quad (-2.799^{*})\end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}\text{Log-likelihood} &= -1224.174; \\ N &= 195 \end{aligned} \qquad (2)$$

In equation 2, independent variables are *Period* and *Age* only; the coefficient of *Age* is negative and significant ($z = 2.799$). If I show that equation 1 can be derived completely and exactly from equation 2, then I also show that equation 1 incorporates the statistically significant negative effects of age, in contradiction of G&H. The algebraic manipulations below accomplish the necessary derivation:

$$\begin{aligned}\text{Logit}(Y=1) &= -107.043 + .054\ \mathit{Period} \\ &\quad - .026\ \mathit{Age}, \\ &= -107.043 + .054\ \mathit{Period} \\ &\quad - .026\ \mathit{Age} \\ &\quad + (.054\ \mathit{Age} - .054\ \mathit{Age}), \\ &= -107.043 \\ &\quad + .054\ (\mathit{Period} - \mathit{Age}) \\ &\quad - .026\ \mathit{Age} + .054\ \mathit{Age}, \\ &= -107.043 + .054\ \mathit{YOB} \\ &\quad + .028\ \mathit{Age};\end{aligned}$$

which is the right hand side of equation 1. *So equation 1 equals equation 2.* The two equations are simply different ways to write exactly the same model.

Thus, it is no surprise that equations 1 and 2 have identical log-likelihood statistics and identical constant terms with identical standard errors and identical *z*-statistics. The coefficient, *z*-statistic, and standard error of *YOB* in equation 1 are identical to the coefficient, *z*-statistic, and standard error for *Period* in equation 2. If these two equations are simply different ways to write the same model, then it cannot be true that equation 2 *does* show an effect of age, while equation 1 *does not* show an effect of age. The same effect or association is revealed in equation 2 and is disguised in equation 1.

The chain rule for partial derivatives provides an elegant and general method for revealing disguised effects of this type in any differentiable equation. Applying the chain rule for partial derivatives to equation 1 produces the following result: Where β_{Age} is the coefficient for *Age* in equation 1 and β_{YOB} is the coefficient for *YOB*, then

$$\partial[\text{Logit}(Y=1)]/\partial Age =$$
$$\{\partial[\text{Logit}(Y=1)]/\partial YOB\}(\partial YOB/\partial Age) + \beta_{Age},$$
$$= -\beta_{YOB} + \beta_{Age},$$
$$= (.054)(-1) + .028,$$
$$= -.026.$$

This partial derivative shows that equation 1 can be used to calculate the effect of *Age*, and that effect is identical to the effect obtained from inspection of equation 2.

Thus, G&H have confounded age, period, and cohort. Their measures of cohort differences are therefore confounded with the very effects they claim to have purged from their analyses. Ironically, the confounding of age, period, and cohort in their analyses means that their statistical results provide as much support for a theory of age and period effects as for the theory of age and cohort effects that they espouse.

CONCLUSIONS

The shortcomings of G&H's paper range from the specific to the general, and from factual to theoretical to technical. Some of these problems invalidate important parts of G&H's argument, while others cast doubt on virtually all of their conclusions. Starting with the specific, the shortcomings of G&H's paper are most severe in its treatment of Jews: G&H tell us that there are no significant differences among Orthodox, Conservative, and Reform Jews in afterlife beliefs, but their significance test lacks power and is misleading because it is made on a data set with only 12 Orthodox Jewish respondents. If the Orthodox sample size problem is ignored and possible differences among Jewish denominations are overlooked, then we must face the failure of the GSS to support G&H's claim, that "Belief [in the afterlife] increased monotonically among Jews since the early 1970s" (p. 816). If we accept as true G&H's incorrect claim of monotonic trends for Jews, and if we overlook the virtually powerless test of differences among Jewish denominations, then we face the inaccurate statement of traditional Jewish religious doctrine—at odds even with the traditional Jewish prayer book—that misinforms G&H's thinking about changes in Jewish beliefs in the afterlife. If we ignore all the problems specific to their analyses of Jews, G&H's analyses of both Catholics and Jews still suffer from confounding of age, period, and cohort effects. And, finally, even if age–period–cohort confounding and all other problems are ignored, there remains the problem of gender effects. Although G&H's models do not permit analysis of gender differences in trends, the GSS data do not support their claims for either Catholic men, for whom samples are large, or for Jewish men. These problems—and perhaps others as well—would seem to overwhelm G&H's claims to have described trends in afterlife beliefs of Jews, or to have explained trends in the afterlife beliefs of Catholics and Jews.

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Reply to Stolzenberg

Getting to the Truths That Matter

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Our article (Greeley and Hout 1999, henceforward G&H) had two main points: (1) Between 1973 and 1998, belief in life after death increased for Catholic and Jewish adults, and (2) these trends reflect dynamics internal to the Catholic and Jewish religions, not diffusion of beliefs from Protestants to them. Nothing in Stolzenberg's comment warrants revising these conclusions.

Stolzenberg (2001, henceforward Stolzenberg) tenders five objections: (1) He notes that the GSS provides only sparse data on Jewish denominations (only 12 respondents are Orthodox Jews). A larger sample and a significant result would only have further supported our argument. (2) He says we misrepresented traditional Jewish doctrine, but our passage that he quotes refers to Jewish respondents in the GSS, not to doctrine. This criticism is moot. (3) He asserts that the increase in belief in life after death is "not significant" for Jews, but the data as he presents them show a statistically significant increase. New calculations show even more evidence of change. (4) He says we ignore gender differences. That is simply wrong; our multivariate models included all the statistically significant effects of gender. He calculates separate tests for men's and women's cohort differences and finds that the cohort differences are not significant among men. The separate tests unnecessarily reduce the sample size for each test. Cohort patterns are nearly identical for men and women so we were correct in considering them together. (5) Stolzenberg manipulates the well-known equation:

$$Cohort = Year - Age,$$

to show that the data could be mathematically explained as a function of year and age (we used cohort and age). But his alternative formulation implies that people lose faith as they age. This makes little substantive sense in the sociology of religion; our formulation is more sensible. None of his objections stand up to scrutiny, and our conclusions need no revision.

RESPONSE

Now we respond to each of Stolzenberg's criticisms:

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Differences "Not Significant" with 12 Cases

Evidence of differences among Orthodox, Conservative, and Reform Jews would support our conclusion that increasing belief in life after death among Jews reflects an internal dynamic, not diffusion from Protestants. The data are sparse (we agree), and we cannot reject the null hypothesis. But our argument does not depend on that test. We presented two other pieces of evidence rejecting diffusion and supporting our conclusion that change reflects dynamics internal to the Jewish community: (1) Jews married to Protestants are no more likely to believe in life after death than are Jews with Jewish spouses, and (2) belief increases significantly as synagogue attendance increases. These two tests are sufficient to make our case, so a question of the statistical power of the third test is a trivial issue.

False Statements about Jewish Religious Doctrine

The quoted passage is not a false statement about Jewish religious doctrine. It does not refer to religious doctrine; it refers to the GSS respondents. Elsewhere in our article (p. 814), we draw attention to the antiquity of Jewish teaching on life everlasting. In going over the data we did have in mind the way that many teachers and writers in the Reform and Reconstructionist traditions share the GSS respondents' skepticism (Ellenson 1998:72, 76–78),[1] but we had no intention of raising a theological question. Our aim—stated in a transitional paragraph—was to move the reader along, with a modicum of context, from the data on Catholics' beliefs to the data on Jews' beliefs. A full review of the complexities of these debates would have been beyond the scope of our article (and arguably beyond the scope of the *American Sociological Review*). Stolzenberg avers that we "offer no support for this assertion" (p. 146). The GSS data are our support. The observation that a majority of Jewish GSS respondents interviewed prior to 1990 did not believe in life after death establishes that this belief is not "customary or conventional"—the meaning of orthodoxy we intended.[2] Similarly, the increase from 19 percent believers to 38 percent over time and from 15 to 68 percent across cohorts justifies our reference to innovation among American Jews in the twentieth century.

Findings Not Significant

Stolzenberg breaks the 1973–1998 time series into two periods: 1973–1990 and 1991–1998. He presents an incomplete partition of the overall association between time and belief among Jews; his tests account for 4 of the 5 degrees of freedom in the original table (Stolzenberg, pp. 147–48). To complete the partition, he should test the hypothesis of no change between the 1973–1990 period and the 1991–1998 period (Goodman 1981). Chi-square statistics reject this null hypothesis ($L^2 = 24.30$; $\chi^2 = 24.56$; d.f. = 1; $p < .001$). This test is strong evidence that Jews' beliefs increased significantly from the first to the second period (as Stolzenberg has chosen to divide the data). Had he finished the partition and presented this test, he could not have claimed that increasing belief is "not significant."

Table 1 presents a full accounting of the association between time and belief among Jews in the GSS. The full GSS time series

[1] Ellenson (1998:77) notes, for example, that *Gates of Power*, a Reform prayer book, replaces "*m'chayei hametim*" ("giving life to the dead") in the second blessing in the *Amidah* with "*m'chayeh hakol*" ("giving life to everything"). The Reconstructionist prayer book *Kol Haneshamah* inserts "*m'chayeh kol chai*" ("nurturing the life of every thing"). Stolzenberg addresses the beliefs of the Orthodox and Conservative Jewish traditions, but except for a mention in his footnote 2, he does not address the beliefs of Reform Jews. Yet Reform beliefs are relevant to our analysis: Of the 152 Jews for whom we know both denomination and belief in life after death, 51 percent are Reform, 41 percent are Conservative, and 8 percent are Orthodox.

[2] The *Random House Dictionary of the English Language* (1987) offers seven definitions of "orthodox." Definitions 1 and 2 refer to denominations. Definition 3 is "customary or conventional." As sociologists we feel we are on solid footing when judging whether opinions are "customary or conventional," but we would not attempt to discern what is "sound or correct" (the fourth definition of "orthodox") for respondents.

Table 1. Partitioning the Likelihood Ratio Statistic for the Association between Survey Year and Belief in Life after Death: GSS, Jewish Adults in the United States, 1973 to 1998

Comparisons	L^2	d.f.	*p*-Value	Percentage of Baseline
Total: All 17 years	33.62	16	.006	—
Partition 1: Six Periods				
Between	29.99	5	<.001	89
Within	3.63	11	.979	11
Partition 2: Two Periods				
Between	24.30	1	<.001	81
Within	5.69	4	.224	19
Partition 3: Three Periods				
Between	28.22	2	<.001	94
Within	1.77	3	.622	6
Partition 4: Change between 1987 and 1988				
Split 1973–1990 into 1973–1987 and 1988–1990	.92	1	.338	—
Split 1986–1990 into 1986–1987 and 1988–1990	.0049	1	.944	—
Partition 5: Uniform Association				
Linear increase in log-odds	28.27	1	<.001	94
Residual	1.72	4	.788	6

Note: N = 440; cases of "no opinion" are excluded.

[a] The 17 survey years include 1973, 1975, 1976, 1978, 1980, 1983, 1984, 1986, 1987, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1993, 1994, 1996, and 1998.

[b] The six periods are 1973–1975, 1976–1980, 1982–1985, 1986–1990, 1991–1994, and 1996–1998.

[c] The two periods are 1973–1990 and 1991–1998.

[d] The three periods are 1973–1975, 1976–1990, and 1991–1998.

contains 17 data points.[3] Change over time in this "total" table is statistically significant (L^2 = 33.62; d.f. = 16; p = .006), as shown in the top row.[4] Our original analysis was based on six periods (1973–1975, 1976–1980, 1982–1985, 1986–1990, 1991–1994, 1996–1998). The six-period cross-classification also shows evidence of statistically significant change (p < .001). The ratio of the six-period L^2 to the total L^2 shows that our six-period aggregation preserves 89 percent of the total association.

Partition 2 shows the result regarding the change between 1973–1990 and 1991–1998; belief is significantly higher in 1991–1998 than in 1973–1990 (p < .001) as previously noted. The within-period L^2 (5.69) is the sum of the 3 degree-of-freedom and 1 degree-of-freedom tests that Stolzenberg (pp. 147–48) reports. Because the within-period component is larger than 3.64 (the critical value of chi-square with one degree of freedom), there might be additional evidence of significant change if the right 1 degree-of-freedom contrast is examined. Indeed, our first period—1973–1975—differs significantly from the rest of Stolzenberg's first period—1976–1990 (L^2 =3.92; d.f. = 1; p = .048). This rather small refinement is important because Stolzenberg suggests that the significant increases in positive responses to the GSS question on life after death were induced by a change in the questionnaire (p. 148).[5] Evidence that beliefs increased sig-

[3] There was no GSS in 1979, 1981, 1992, 1995, or 1997, and the life after death question was not asked in 1974, 1977, 1982, and 1985.

[4] The Pearson chi-square test also rejects the null hypothesis. We use the likelihood ratio test (L^2) because it is additive across most of the partitions in Table 1.

[5] Questions about current Jewish denomination and denomination of origin were added to the GSS in 1988.



Figure 1. Observed Percentage Believing in Life after Death, by GSS Survey Year, 1973 to 1998

nificantly 12 years before the questionnaire changed weakens his claim.

The definitive test of whether the observed change in belief is an artifact of the 1988 questionnaire change, though, is to break the time series right at 1988. This test can be done by splitting the full 1973–1990 segment into two parts or by splitting 1986–1990 into two parts. The result is the same both ways: No significant difference between 1973–1987 and 1988–1990 ($p = .338$) nor between 1986–1987 and 1988–1990 ($p = .944$). Thus, the observed changes in Jews' statements about life after death cannot be attributed to a change in the questionnaire.

The first four tests in Table 1 ignore the time sequence of the surveys. Our original conclusions, though, refer to a *monotonic* increase in belief. A general test of monotonic change can be tedious because monotonicity can take many functional forms. A very simple model—uniform association—is available to test for linear change in the log-odds of belief. A good fit for uniform association is not *necessary*, but it is *sufficient* to establish a case for a monotonic trend.[6] Partition 5 in Table 1 shows the result. The uniform association model fits extraordinarily well as the small residual L^2 (1.72) and a plot of observed and expected percentages show (see Figure 1).[7] The trend parameter is positive and significant ($p < .001$). The good fit of uniform association and the 37-point increase between the first period and the last are strong evidence in favor of our conclusion that Jews' belief in life after death increased monotonically over the period covered by the GSS.

Ignoring Gender

We did not ignore gender; Stolzenberg is mistaken on this point. Models 2 to 6 of our multivariate analysis of Catholics' beliefs include it (see G&H, Table 5, pp. 824–25) as does our first multivariate model for Jews (Model 2 in G&H, Table 7, p. 829). We dropped gender from Models 3 to 7 for Jews because the data provided no evidence that gender differences among Jews were significant.[8]

Stolzenberg splits the GSS into separate male and female samples before testing for cohort differences. The only justification for this practice would be a test that shows significant differences between men's and women's cohort effects. Stolzenberg presents no such test. There are two ways to do the test, and both indicate that the differences are not significant. Adding the gender × cohort interaction terms that define the difference between his model and ours results in likelihood ratios of 10.26 for Catholics (d.f. = 7, $p = .17$) and 10.48 for Jews (d.f. = 6, $p = .11$).[9]

[6] A linear trend in log-odds is one form of monotonic trend but there are many others.

[7] The line in Figure 1 is curved because the uniform association model is linear in log-odds but not in probablities.

[8] The gender coefficient in Model 2 is only one-fourth as large as its standard error.

[9] All Jewish women in the most recent cohort say they believe in life after death—forcing perfect prediction and reducing the d.f. by 1.



Figure 2. Cohort Coefficients for Men, Women, and All Adults, by Religion

Note: The Horizontal bars around the men's and women's coeficients indicate the 95-percent confidence intervals for these coefficient.

Wald tests yield nearly identical results for Catholics (W = 10.27, d.f. = 7, p = .17) and a more definitive conclusion for Jews (W = 6.24, d.f. = 6, p = .40).[10] Lacking evidence of significant gender differences in cohort effects, Stolzenberg reduced the power of his tests of cohort differences against the null hypothesis and got specious null results.

Figure 2 helps interpret how Stolzenberg's findings and ours could come from the same data. He splits men and women while we combine them; Figure 2 plots all of the coefficients by cohort and religion. All of the coefficients (men, women, and total) follow the pattern of increasing belief across cohorts that we noted in discussing our original Table 2. As Stolzenberg notes, the 95-percent confidence intervals for several of the men's coefficients overlap zero leading him to conclude that they are not significant. However, those same confidence intervals also overlap the corresponding coefficients for the total sample and the 95-percent confidence intervals for the corresponding women's coefficients; that means that the gender differences are not significant. Most important, all but three of the gender-specific coefficients are closer to the corresponding total coefficient than to zero (further indicating that men and women should be combined). Cohort differences in the combined model are significant at the $p <$ .001 level (the Wald tests are 26.45 for Catholics and 35.75 for Jews with d.f. = 7 for each).

Confounding Age, Period, and Cohort

Stolzenberg presents several ways of looking at the well-known equation

Cohort = Year – Age,

but none of them constitutes evidence that our age–cohort model is wrong in any way. Our model is both internally consistent and consistent with the sociology of religion literature; the alternative models—though formally equivalent to ours—entail implausible

[10] In producing Table 2 in G&H, we erroneously included persons born prior to 1900 and coded them as if they were born 1930–1939; the calculations in this paragraph correct this error.



Figure 3. Percentage Believing in Life after Death Expected under Model 7 of Greeley and Hout: Three Views

Source: Greeley and Hout (1999:829–31).

Note: Symbols indicate data points that are in the same cohort.

counteracting effects and have no basis in the literature.

The age–period–cohort problem is not as complicated as the proofs and derivatives in Stolzenberg make it seem. The "identification problem" is simply the choice of how to connect the symbols in Figure 3a. A researcher can connect the symbols that represent people born in the same year (the age–cohort model) or connect the symbols that represent people interviewed in the same year (the age–period model).[11] Figure 3b shows the age–cohort perspective; Figure 3c shows the age–period perspective. From either perspective, the younger people are clearly more likely to believe in life after death than the older people are. At issue is how that pattern developed. Perhaps people tend to be more believing as they grow older and more recent cohorts started out with a higher propensity to believe; that is the age–cohort perspective. The alternative is that the younger people are temporary believers who tend to lose faith as they age, but the times are so religious that they override this tendency; that is the age–period perspective.

The two perspectives account for the GSS data equally well. Choosing between them is a matter of citing other evidence and deciding which of the arguments is more internally consistent. The sociology of religion literature supports the age–cohort perspective; cross-sectional and panel studies (e.g., Stolzenberg, Blair-Loy, and Waite 1995) indicate that other facets of religiosity increase with age. The age–cohort perspective also is simpler; it can be summarized in two complementary statements. The age–period alternative relies on an implausible combination of negative age effects and countervailing period effects strong enough to override them. In this it gets no support from the literature; no religious scholar we know of has argued that people lose faith as they age, and many have argued in favor of *negative* period effects. Our age–cohort perspective plainly works better as a sociological model, even though the age–period per-

[11] The symbols in Figure 3a display the percentages believing in life after death expected under our Model 1 in Table 7 of G&H (p. 829), but the points we raise here are general ones that apply to any age–period–cohort analysis.

spective results in the same expected probabilities.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

We have countered all five criticisms raised by Stolzenberg. His criticism that we use a low-power test of denominational differences is moot because we have other, stronger evidence for our argument. Our use of the lowercase "orthodox" in a transitional paragraph was not an erroneous statement about Orthodox Judaism, just a reference to the observed variance in the beliefs of all Jews in the GSS. The change over time in beliefs among Jews is statistically significant over the whole time series and between the periods that Stolzenberg contrasts; further analysis supports our conclusion that Jews' beliefs in a life after death increased monotonically between 1973 and 1998. We did not ignore gender; we included its statistically significant effects in our multivariate analyses. We did not test for cohort effects for men and women separately because tests indicate that the cohort effect is the same for men and women (the main cohort effect is statistically significant). Stolzenberg's manipulation of the age–period–cohort identities leaves him with an implausible model that implies that unspecified recent events have counteracted peoples' tendency to lose faith as they age. Our age–cohort model provides a substantive explanation that is free of overriding effects and accords well with the sociological literature on aging and religion.

We made no "critical errors." There is no reason to change the findings or conclusions of our original paper in light of this comment.

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