CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY *

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Within the generous scope of the topic of this paper, almost any subject of interest to sociologists could be discussed. We do not intend here, however, to attempt to take all sociological knowledge for our province. In fact, the very impossibility of so encompassing the accumulated knowledge in this field is a striking indirect tribute to the advances made in the science during the century since the birth of Durkheim and Simmel—all fads and foibles notwithstanding. Lest this appraisal seem overly optimistic, we may recommend the simple operational test of, first, reading the sociological works available to the world in 1858, or for that matter in 1928, and then turning to those now in our libraries. Such a test will disclose ample evidence that the discipline today knows vastly more, and knows what it knows much more exactly and systematically, than at any earlier period. This must be said clearly and simply, for our profession has on occasion shown signs of falling prey to a kind of institutionalized self-blame which is not justified by the contemporary facts of the case. The degree of intellectual control we can now command over an incomparably difficult body of complex phenomena is of an order, incomplete though it be, that needs no apology and requires little defense. Perhaps the time has come to de-emphasize the youthfulness of sociology in favor of inventorying its progress toward the responsible exercise of an adult role in the community of sciences.\(^1\)

It is from this standpoint that we wish to raise several crucial questions concerning the past development, present condition and future prospects of the field of sociology. What are the accomplishments that constitute enduring additions to human knowledge? And, what are some of the pressing challenges we confront?

ON CONTINUITY AND CHANGE

Professor Emory S. Bogardus lately reminded me that Lester F. Ward in his address as President of the American Sociological Society in its first annual meeting in Providence, Rhode Island, December 27, 1906 began with these words: “I do not propose on this occasion to enter into any defense of the claims of sociology to be called a science. I wish simply to show that its history, and the steps in its establishment, do not essentially differ from those of other

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* Presidential address read at the annual meeting of the American Sociological Society, August, 1958.

\(^1\) “Sociology ... is a science of human interaction in which the attempt is made to discover systematic evidence for determinate relations between classes of social data in order to develop generalizations that are true under specified conditions. To the extent that these generalizations or hypotheses form a logically interdependent system, sociology is a mature science.” Richard A. Schermerhorn and Alvin Boskoff, “Recent Analyses of Sociological Theory,” in H. Becker and A. Boskoff, editors, Modern Sociological Theory In Continuity and Change, New York: The Dryden Press, 1957, p. 61.
sciences.” Ward went on to argue that the then current state of sociology was comparable to that of astronomy in the seventeenth century or of chemistry “before the discovery of the true nature of combustion.” How far, if at all, have we moved since Ward delivered his paper fifty-two years ago?

It is appropriate to use the occasion of the centenary year of the two sociologists whose achievements we honor at these meetings to pause for reflection upon both the enduring and the changing features of sociological knowledge, procedures, and styles of thought. To what extent has change in sociological study been a matter merely of shifts in foci of interest and of fashions in methods and concepts, or a matter of cumulative achievement according to scientific canons? To concern ourselves with a question of this kind need not expose us to the dangers of excessive professional introspection. On the contrary, to cite a behavioral hypothesis of some plausibility, effective action requires a clarity of self-identity that is aided by confronting our past actions and the reactions of others to those acts.

There is merit in regarding the effective history of a discipline of sociology having authentically scientific aspirations as, for the most part, extending back rather less than a century. For it is only in this period that there has developed the clarity of concepts, the construction of theoretic schemes, the command of research methods, and the funding of systematically organized empirical findings which we must regard as minimum requisites of the characterization of sociology as a social science. It is entirely fitting, therefore, to reexamine the state of the discipline in order to discern important continuities, if such there be, in this vigorous and rapidly changing field of study.

Sociology has had a set of enduring concerns: with social differentiation and integration, the conditions of stability and change, the study of group structure and functioning, of institutions, of value and belief systems, and so on through a long and well-known list. After all, we can still read the works of the Fathers and understand them, and even profit from them.

In more recent times, the proliferation of numerous specialized fields, each with its many specific studies, has created pressing problems of coherence and order at both the conceptual and the substantive-empirical levels. Partly in response to this situation, we recently have witnessed renewed efforts to build theoretical schemes intended to be capable of ordering the full range of sociological knowledge, or at least a major portion thereof.

At a less comprehensive theoretic level, efforts to establish continuity in research, as well as to formulate coherent sets of empirical generalizations, have multiplied in recent years. Among many examples one may point to the secondary analyses and commentaries upon The American Soldier series and The Authoritarian Personality, the summarizing papers on “Current Problems and Prospects in Sociology” presented at the 1957 meetings of the Society, and the publication of numerous summaries and evaluations of recent research in special fields.

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3 “Yesterday’s concepts are forgotten for the sake of today’s notion. Who remembers Tardé’s laws of imitation when he writes about reference groups? Who wonders in what respects they are different answers to the same concern, or whether they tell the same story in different words? And where is there real continuity in the formulation of theories?” Paul F. Lazarsfeld and Morris Rosenberg, editors, The Language of Social Research, Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1955, p. 3.

4 “Although the development of sociological theory has not been a smooth progression, it has nevertheless been relatively free from the disturbing discontinuities that reflect intellectual chaos.” Alvin Boskoff, “From Social Thought to Sociological Theory,” in Becker and Boskoff, op. cit., p. 18.


The utility of this type of work has not been fully explored by any means, and it appears to have considerable promise.

Along with the enduring lines of continuity, there is no need to emphasize the obvious fact of fundamental changes. In the interests of brevity, the risk must be taken of giving the impression of dogmatism in summarizing a few of the more important recent changes that have left their mark on the American sociology of today. In no particular order:

1. A marked increase in the technical apparatus of the discipline and in the sophistication of its research workers concerning methodology, research procedures, and techniques.

2. The increased use of approximations to experimental design. Although these efforts are typically very far from achieving known and detailed control of all potentially relevant variables, many interesting and useful results already have been obtained from experimental and quasi-experimental research.

3. The development of more comprehensive and systematic conceptual schemes. Although many of the formulations have not yet been firmly anchored in empirical findings, and although a really tightly reasoned, comprehensive deductive system does not exist, real progress has been attained in this sector.

4. An increasingly close and effective relation between research and theory, and greatly improved clarity concerning the mutual functions involved. The live issues that still remain here are mainly practical questions of emphasis and procedure.

5. Greater specialization, keeping pace with the growing volume of research and publication. Part of the wider range of specialization has represented the emergence of partly new substantive areas such as medical sociology, industrial sociology, mental health, and intergroup relations.

6. More widespread and effective use of statistical devices and mathematical thinking. There appears no convincing evidence that would lead one to suppose that this movement will not continue. This development has had its share of abortive efforts and false panaceas, but current work on

the whole appears to have outgrown fads and to be conducted in a spirit of realism.

7. The incorporation of data, concepts, and theories from closely related fields, especially from anthropology and psychology but also from history, political science, and economics, and to a lesser extent from other disciplines, including law and the medical sciences. At the same time, sociology has contributed substantially to its neighbors among the social sciences.

8. Widespread diffusion of a relatively clear and sophisticated conception of the place of values in sociological study, as an object of research, as a factor in behavior, and as an element to be controlled in the prosecution of research. It is not surprising, of course, that substantial controversies are still with us in this area.

In general, as Znaniecki noted, the most recent period has been characterized by a striving for methodological perfection, a tendency to concentrate upon specific testable problems, and especially upon the testing of hypothetical relations among factors or variables. The predominant, although far from unanimous, professional opinion seems to be that the most pressing current need is to analyze the larger sociological "visions" into more manageable problems that can be put to empirical test in the context of a systematic theoretical orientation.

An inspection of the program of these 1958 meetings of the American Sociological Society quickly shows the alertness with which present-day sociology seizes upon current events as contexts for scientifically oriented research. We are dealing with public reactions to Salk vaccine with John Kaspar, contemporary music, the Chinese in Jamaica, the Soviet Union, panhandling, John Dewey, economic development in Turkey, the woman executive—and a variegated array of other concrete topics. At first glance, even the professional sociologist, not to mention any outside observer, may wonder whether and to what extent there is unity in sociological studies. For the most part, however, this proliferation of particular topics represents an entirely normal division of labor and specialization of skills and knowledge. To what

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extent the division of labor represents the "organic solidarity" we have a right to expect of a coherent field of study is itself a subject for sociological analysis. The present specialized interdependence will attain the impersonal unity Durkheim envisaged for society at large if, and only if, its disparate concrete concerns are approached by an accepted procedure (analogous to the "rules" that lie outside of and antedate specific contracts), if its concepts are generic conventions, and if its goals express the common values of the search for invariant, intersubjective knowledge.

With these notes on continuity and change we have reached our allotment of space with regard to the background of the present situation.

ON THE PRESENT CONDITION OF SOCIOLOGY

As we approach the present state of the field we find that many burning issues of the past have been resolved or are at least relatively dormant. We no longer argue quite so energetically, as issues in principle: qualitative versus quantitative methods, statistical techniques versus case study, experiment versus natural observation, attitudes versus actions, theory versus research, and so on. It may well be that it was necessary and fruitful to have these questions debated to the extent that they were, and there is no doubt that important questions remain for future resolution or other disposal. In the present thinking of the profession, however, one finds a certain disaffection with extreme "ideological" positions on these matters. In the case of research methods and techniques, in particular, there appears to have been a growing tendency to take a rationally pragmatic position: one uses that which "works best" as judged by the criteria of reliability, validity, elegance, power, and economy.

It is still the case that among us there are different types of scientific consciences, which, following Schellenberg, we might characterize as (1) the historical and cultural, (2) the concrete and clinical, and (3) the logico-experimental. Persons in the first grouping are concerned with broad social and cultural comparisons. Those of the second persuasion are interested in the detailed description, analysis, and diagnosis of specific situations. Those in the third category hope to use abstract concepts referring to exact observations and used to construct predictive hypotheses concerning relations among variables.

To these types of sociology correspond reference groups—the standard-setters, comparison groups, aspiration groups, audiences, judges, and gate-keepers of career lines. The collective views of these rather vague and shifting collectivities represent different kinds of consensus as to the norms and goals of sociological study, albeit a consensus marked by a high standard deviation and rather low test-retest reliability. To the extent that these norms are internalized, they may be described as variants of a common sociological conscience.

What are the main features of these professional super-egos?

To the historical and cultural conscience, it is above all important that the object of study be historically and culturally important. Such a conscience will have little to do with those social phenomena that are unlikely to receive names, dates, and the evaluation of posterity. The events of large scale, the punctuations of the flow of historical routine, the massive cycles of war, politics, migrations, religion, art, law, philosophy—such are primary objects of interest for scholars of this kind. It is understandable that a conscience of this type would insist upon intimate familiarity with a wide range of materials, and place a high value on erudition of great scope and detail. It is by the same token wholly comprehensible that sociologists of the persuasion being suggested might feel a certain lack of patience with horizons bounded by one culture and a time-span of, at most, a generation, at the least, a thirty-minute laboratory session. We may expect that they will not be overly impressed

10 Disagreements on all these topics still exist. The point here is only that the extreme positions are more and more thinly populated. Cf. the judicious appraisal by Nicholas S. Timasheff, Sociological Theory: Its Nature and Growth, New York: Random House, 1955, Chapter 22, "Mid-Twentieth Century Sociology."

11 For illuminating ideas on this topic I am indebted to my Cornell University colleague, William Lambert.

by the findings of studies of what they may deem the “formless groups” and “trivial” attitude measurements of much current research.

To the “clinical” sociologist, on the other hand, a primary virtue is detailed and sensitive fidelity to the complex, immediate situation. His anxiety-dreams are likely to be studded with horrid fancies of having “torn a fact out of context” or, perhaps worse, having “generalized beyond the data.” His conscience is clear and his disposition sunny when after a long experience of immersion in a factory work group or a boy’s gang he completes a vivid naturalistic description of complex behavior and its complex motivation. In his harsher moments, he may describe the historical or cultural sociologist as an “arm-chair theorist,” the experiment as “artificial,” and the survey as “crude” and “mechanical.”

To persons in the logico-experimental group, the ideal study is the highly controlled experiment or the sample survey, complete with scales, scores, probability samples, and possibly electronic computers. Their language is the language of “antecedent-consequent relations,” “variables,” and “controls,” “break-down analysis,” “confidence limits,” chi-squares, and “suggestions for further research.”

Although these hypothetical descriptions border on the fanciful, some germ of truth may lurk within them. And it does not seem fanciful at all to suggest that these three types of orientation have demonstrated their usefulness within the hospitable boundaries of contemporary sociological work. What has to be decided on the basis of experience is what combination of approaches is most productive for particular types of problems at given levels of knowledge and systematic formulation.

In the allocation of our quite limited resources among the tasks judged to be most advantageous for advancing knowledge, it is, by definition, an error to throw time and talent into zones that have already been won, at the expense of sectors still firmly resistant. There was a time not long past when it was necessary to demonstrate, in the face of great skepticism, the sheer fact that sociological factors do exist and that they are important causal agents in human conduct. Much energy was devoted to this task, and the effort was eminently necessary in various substantive fields at one time or another. Informed opinions will differ as to the extent to which the effort has been successful. Although the task is far from completion and will require much continued effort, it appears that the main priority is no longer that of arguing for and demonstrating the sheer importance of “the social factor.” That importance is now widely granted in circles which were largely impervious to such a conception even a few years ago. The more urgent need now appears to be that of the verification of propositions which show how and to what extent specified social factors enter into the determination of specified conditions, events, and processes. By now many governmental administrators, psychiatrists, social workers, public relations workers, educators, and business executives have come to believe as a matter of course, that “social factors” (or, “human relations”) are indubitably important. What these people now want to know is just what social factors under what conditions are likely to be followed by what consequences.

The incorporation of a portion of sociological work into the literate culture of our times has not been confined to the effects just noted. As a further example, it would be an instructive and useful enterprise to collate a sample of the quite large number of instances in which sociology and related social sciences have demonstrated that accepted “facts,” popular theories, and commonsense assumptions are clearly false. Even the most casual review will reveal striking examples. To remove the alleged factual basis for erroneous beliefs is clearly a significant social function. Perhaps equally worthy of note is the implied importance of insuring that the generalizations we do widely disseminate

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14 An obvious distinction must be drawn between recognition of the importance of social factors, on the one hand, and recognition and acceptance of the profession of sociology, on the other. Knowledge derived from sociology may be used under other professional labels, and there is no guarantee that credit automatically will be bestowed where credit is due.
have the authenticity claimed for them. Boomerang effects do occur and they are not always favorable. It is fortunate that sociology on the whole has insisted, by example rather than merely by precept, upon facing social realities squarely and upon genuine needs for clarity rather than pseudo-needs for rationalizations.

Among the possibilities for enhanced clarity at the present stage of development, special attention perhaps is due to hypothesis-formulation and to the formalization of specific theories.

In the first instance, it appears that increasingly we find that research is directed toward evidence that accredits what can be called a complex-adequate hypothesis, that is, an hypothesis which selects several weighty factors and combines them in a statement of maximum likelihood. The complex hypothesis seeks to impound a cluster of independent variables, all of which help to account for variation in X. Thus, if X is friendship formation (interpersonal liking or attraction), a "classic" hypothesis would be: the greater the frequency of interaction between any two persons, the more likely it is that there will be mutual attraction, all other things being the same. In the complex form, one might say: "within an interaction situation, friendship formation will be more likely to occur the longer the situation occurs, the more often it is repeated, the more intimate it is, the less (the) competition that is involved, the more relaxed the atmosphere, and the more need there is for mutual activity." 15

Although hypotheses of this kind still require us to remember that they are expected to hold only if the usual formula is added of "all other relevant causal factors being the same," their virtue is in a closer fit to the complex surface of the empirical world of experience. In following the approach now under examination the investigator seeks to achieve variable-saturation in order to maximize the accounting of actual variance in concrete social phenomena of very considerable complexity. In spite of what initially may appear to be crudeness, such predictive hypotheses are capable of a kind of empirical precision often lacking in the abstractly persuasive "classic" X-Y hypothesis. One must add that the selection of variables as well as the anticipatory appraisal of probable importance will be the better the more comprehensive and logically integrated are the conceptual schemes and abstract theories upon which we can draw.

The formalization of theory predictive of empirical findings is still in its earliest stages and a firm appraisal of its possibilities can not yet be made. The appeal of such an approach is very great. It has demonstrated enormous power in every field of science in which it has been extensively employed. A formalized, especially a deductive, statement has the high virtues of conciseness and economy of expression, of the detailed explicitness that encourages completeness of statement and that exposes errors of reasoning, and of the capacity to generate diverse predictions from a few axioms and theorems. As Merton has argued, a formalized theoretic scheme facilitates predictions of sufficient precision to allow decisive rejection of alternative explanations. In the past, discussions of these matters in sociological circles have drawn examples mainly from other sciences. At long last, however, islands of formalized devi-ations are beginning to be glimpsed in sociological exposition.

Let us try to explicate, by two concrete examples, the nature of certain current efforts to build limited bodies of research-based theory.

A Miniature Theory of Group Relations. In the Cornell Studies in Intergroup Rela-tions, it was found that frequency of interaction with members of an out-group was closely associated with favorable attitudes (or lack of negative prejudice) towards persons in that social category. This finding was replicated in fourteen different surveys, among adults and youths in five widely scattered American communities; it holds true for men and women, for the educated and the uneducated, for persons in high and in low socio-economic levels, and so on. It is maintained even when such socio-psychological variables as "authoritarianism" are controlled.

It may well be said that this is a correlation which tells us nothing as to what is cause and which is effect. Fortunately, it is

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possible from panel data to show that changes in attitude follow changes in interaction and that changes in interaction follow changes in attitudes. The causal sequence is reciprocal, mutual, and circular. In any case, within quite wide limits, the more we interact with a particular person, the greater the likelihood of positive attraction. Now, upon initial reflection this statistical uniformity surely must seem quite incredible. We know how easily interpersonal enmity arises, how great are the secondary gains from socially legitimated hostility, how pervasive and tenaciously held are those stereotypes which stand in the service of needs, and we are acquainted with the ubiquity of "vicious cycles" in human relations. Is it, then, totally inexplicable that, more often than not, in these studies, increased interaction leads to increased liking, even transcending those strong initial prejudices which are reinforced by and anchored in vested interests and group consensus?

At the community level, with which these studies were concerned, we find certain broad social categories—ethnic, "racial," and religious. These categories are defined by more or less definite and more or less widely shared stereotypes and affective-evaluative attitudes. Given these definitions, the social categories begin to mark off real collectivities just to the extent that collective interaction, segregated intercourse, and differentiated behavior lead to awareness of collective differences, of common fate, and to identification with an in-group and its symbols. Through these processes, what was originally a mere aggregate becomes a functioning collectivity, a diffuse but often quite powerful part of the social structure.

Now, given such structures existing side by side in the local community, we can see that intergroup relations involve several distinct sets of social processes, not just one. At the level of inter-personal relationships of individuals, one set of processes occurs in specific situations of intergroup contact, in which behavior is importantly affected by the normative expectations each of the interacting parties has concerning his own reference group's probable reactions to his conduct in the situation, and his expectations and demands concerning the behavior of the other person as such. Because of the large number and complex interaction of other factors, the interacting parties typically will find themselves modifying their initial definitions of the situation, oftimes quite markedly, in different concrete situations and in the same situation as it moves from initiation to termination.

But the community also exhibits for us, at the same time, a second distinct set of relevant processes, namely, those that occur exclusively within each of the collectivities taken separately. Here, within relationships marked by a need for relations of trust, stereotypes are reinforced, awareness of group identity and difference is sharpened, and in-group solidarity is inculcated and strengthened by example, precept, and reward. These processes are the more effective, the greater the segregation of the socially recognized collectivities, and the more intense the competition and conflict among them. Within the invisible walls of the collectivity, the expression of out-group "prejudice" provides a legitimized mode for the management of otherwise disruptive or uncomfortable intra-group aggressions, supplies a common universe of discourse, reinforces a sense of belonging, and serves as a set of credentials of membership.

All this goes on at the level of formal or informal interpersonal relations in small groups and in the episodic situations of everyday life. When, however, we turn our attention to the processes that set the larger precedents for the basic patterns of intercollectivity relations, we confront still a third aspect of intergroup relations, often neglected in research and theory building. For some of the most decisive intergroup processes are those involving contact between representatives of formally organized groups, on the one hand, and those involving decisions (whether unilateral or joint) about relations between the collectivities as such, not just among individuals who happen to be classified as members. Relations at this level have structural properties that cannot be easily or directly inferred from knowledge of interpersonal conduct at the level of the small group. Here we have the phenomena of the decisions leading to a "Little Rock," the establishment of a policy of Apartheid, the perpetuation of segregation in publicly-supported housing, the abolition of official seg-
regation in the armed services. In such crucial precedent-setting public decisions, interpersonal relations of friendship or enmity or even the private attitudes of the decision-makers often have surprisingly little to do with the outcome. These are "decisions at a distance," which by their very nature, tend to be categorical, that is, involving the familiar perceptual processes of simplification, sharpening, and levelling as well as the social imperatives of abstract generality, universal administrative applicability, and concrete definiteness of classification. Although we know far less than we need to know about the regularities of behavior at this level (as we have been reminded by Jessie Bernard, Blumer, Frazier, Lohman, and others) the recognition of the distinctive properties of such behavior is an indispensable first step toward productive work in the future.

In this context, let us return to our initial question concerning the explanation of the formation of relations of friendship across group boundaries. In this area, one can begin to discern the embryonic outlines of a miniature theory, which holds promise of integrating several important lines of sociological and psychological thinking. In his presidential address before our sister society, the American Psychological Association, Theodore M. Newcomb ably presented a theory of interpersonal attraction which may serve as our present point of departure. Newcomb derives the following central proposition: "Insofar as communication results in the perception of increased similarity of attitude toward important and relevant objects, it will also be followed by an increase in positive attraction."\(^\text{16}\)

In the appraisal of this conclusion, we may bring a combined sociological and psychological argument to bear. As an actuarial matter, the evidence shows that (other things being equal) propinquity increases the frequency of interaction. Opportunities for contact are in very important measure, determined by the elaborate compartmentalization of social structure, which marks off "acceptable" lines of communication according to sex, age, place of residence, kind of occupation, social rank, ethnic membership, and so on. Assuming that the greater the opportunity for contact the greater, on the average, will be the frequency of interaction, what processes lead to interpersonal attraction? Given a similar cultural background and a situation calling for interaction, rewards are most likely to be obtained from those with whom one interacts frequently. To the extent that the reward-punishment ratio in the interaction is actuarially positive, the mechanism of reinforcement will operate.\(^\text{17}\) To the extent that one actor develops positive feelings for the other, the likelihood increases that he will reward the alter.

The more alter is rewarded the more likely it is that he will reward ego. In this reciprocal process, then, to the extent that the interaction that has now been set in motion discloses common interests that are observable and valued by the actors, the likelihood of mutually rewarding behavior is increased. The "benign cycle" will be further facilitated to the extent that complementary interests and "symbiotic" emotional needs are found to be served by the interaction. It is through the cumulative interplay of these processes, that mutually gratifying relationships of solidarity emerge in interpersonal communication.\(^\text{18}\)

It is immediately evident that this account is consistent with several lines of development in sociological work, for example, Merton and Lazarsfeld and Williams and associates on the role of similarity of values in friendship-formation, Winch on the com-


\(^{17}\) One may even be allowed to suspect that the interpersonal relationship which supplies no rewards is a limiting theoretic case. Almost any interaction, no matter how "unpleasant" at the time, contains some gratifications, even if these be largely unconscious.

\(^{18}\) These formulations are consistent with the first of Glaser's hypotheses: "Change in an identification pattern tends to occur in one of two sequences, as follows: the first sequence which we call 'reflexive conversion,' involves first, a change of feelings aroused by contact with persons of a particular ethnic identity, then a change in association preferences, and lastly a change in ideology; the alternative sequence, which we call 'ideological conversion,' involves a change in ideology first, then a change in association preferences, and lastly, a change in feelings aroused by contact with persons of a particular identity." Daniel Glaser, "Dynamics of Ethnic Identification," *American Sociological Review*, 23 (February, 1958), p. 35.
plementarity of needs in marriage, Homans' and Bales' propositions concerning relations in small groups, and Parsons' account of the basic processes in psychiatric therapy, to mention only a few. Obviously the notions sketched here are highly incomplete and tentative, and we have said nothing of the counter-posing processes which eventuate in misunderstanding, mutual defensiveness, alienation, dislike, fear, and interpersonal conflict. But it is to be hoped that we may be permitted to deal with one thing at a time, and, that at least some of us share the opinion that the formulations we can now present represent continuity in theory and research, a not inconsiderable funded achievement of past thinking within the profession.

Of course, what has just been presented represents only a small part of our present knowledge and disciplined speculation concerning intergroup relations. We have suggestive evidence that even in discordant or "prejudiced" interaction which, for any cause, is continued over a considerable span of time, the participants mutually come to have increased concern for one another: the relationship grows in salience and importance. The data also suggest that in the course of such interaction the interpersonal perceptions and affective attitudes will become increasingly differentiated, complex, and organized, that is, cognitive, cathetic, and evaluative orientations become richer, more dense, more elaborately structured. It is presumably through such processes, resulting from the imperious confrontations of interpersonal communication and the inevitable revelations of innumerable aspects of personality, that intimate and long-continued intergroup contacts tend to modify or dissolve previously-held rigid and affectively gross stereotypes. But let us resist the temptation at this time to excavate farther in this particular vein and turn instead to one other illustrative set of substantive problems.

A Miniature Theory of Formal Organization. Another example of a small "island" of interrelated generalizations and hypotheses, derived from much empirical research, that now appears ready to be recast in coherent and partly deductive form concerns behavior in formal organizations directed toward unitary task accomplishment. Let us begin by noting an empirical tendency for larger size of such organizations to lead to greater specialization of function.\(^\text{19}\) In any case, with a more elaborate division of labor there arises increased differentiation of interests, of status-ranking, of rewards, and of control. It seems on the whole that this greater differentiation increases the likelihood of tensions and clashes of interests; yet at the same time the differentiated structure results in heightened interdependence of individuals and subunits within the organization. The high degree of interdependence, we postulate, tends in turn to lead to a recognition among the participants in the organization of the importance of preserving the existing order of relationships, in whole or in part. Then, if the importance of maintaining the organization is so valued as to outweigh the dissatisfaction generated by the processes just described, differentiation will lead to increased formality in communication, including face-to-face interaction among individuals occupying different positions.\(^\text{20}\) Thus, it is the combination of clashing interests with an effective desire to maintain the organization that is decisive: formality becomes a structural means of controlling tension, permitting the needful activities to proceed in a predictable way.

And simultaneously, formalization or conventionalization is favored by another set of conditions. The larger the size of the organization, in general, the longer its lines of communication. The greater the specialization of function, the more complex will be the communicative network. Both of these circumstances, in turn, will lead directly to formality, by definite processes we will not now stop to describe.

Now, one consequence of formality is to create difficulties of expressive-emotional

\(^{19}\) This is not an invariably necessary or sufficient condition. One can imagine that as a result of changes in technology or group objectives, an organization might actually show increased specialization with a decrease in size. However, with given technology and goals, greater size does favor specialization. This can be asserted without falling into the Durkheimian error.

\(^{20}\) It is further hypothesized that the degree and extent of formalization will be the greater, the less the shared interests and values of the members, apart from their organizational differentiation. Other factors, of course, also contribute to formality, e.g., rational considerations of reliable and accurate communication.
communication, including the “corrective feedback” of feelings which is so omnipresent in informal social relations. And the greater these difficulties in the formalized channels of interaction, the greater will be the tendencies to form informal subgroupings and off-the-record lines of communication.

The factual tendency for informal or off-the-record channels of communication to emerge arises also from the impossibility of providing for all organizational exigencies within the (necessarily) abstract and generalized formal rules. The more varied and changing are the problematic situations arising in the course of the organization’s activity, the greater will be the part played by such ad hoc, informal communication. Independently and simultaneously, informal groupings are being generated by the interaction occasioned by common activities among aggregates of like-circumstanced individuals, brought together by the organizational allocation of specialized and interdependent “functions.”

Still a third set of sequences can be discerned. Given the facts of large size, differentiation, clashing interests, extended and complex channels of interaction, and formalization, we know empirically that there will be marked tendencies toward centralization of control and the development of a hierarchy of influence and authority. This centralization then further contributes to the blockages and distortions of expressive, as contrasted with instrumental, communication already generated by formality. The same result, therefore, is reached by two routes and the two sets of processes reinforce one another.

We are assuming that patterns of affective neutrality, universalism, ascription, specificity, and collectivity-orientation are most likely to be invoked by superiors as requirements of alters in dealing with subordinates. This is another way of saying that we expect formality to be maximized at sub-boundaries within the organization, both at “breaks” in the formal status-hierarchy and in interaction across “functional” groupings. The within-boundary interaction of sub-systems will tend to be “informal.”

Given the centralized formal structure and some blockage and distortion in the expression of aspirations, fears, dissatisfactions and other affective states among the members, it would still be conceivable that the directing centers of the organization might be appraised of these states and willing to allow for them in the “official” channels of interaction and communication. Even in such an idyllic organization, however, the necessary “corrections” will take time, that is, there is “lag” in the equilibrating processes. We therefore may reason that large differentiated organizations must contain informal substructures and that such organizations must operate by a continuous, rapid oscillation between the two interlaced structures, between the formal-centralized and the informal-local emphases. The oscillations will not be random but will constitute necessary movements in the accomplishment of organizational goals.

Although these generalizations clearly do not constitute a definitive account, the present formulation is drawn directly from well-known and easily accessible research; it economically summarizes a considerable amount of knowledge; and, above all, it is vulnerable to being proved wrong at specific points by future research. In such respects, modern sociology does have the valid claim in the Theory of Action, Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1953, p. 147.

23 We are here considering specific aspects of the organizationally disruptive interests and motivations of its component actors. Cf. Parsons’ comment on organizations: “... it is reasonable to postulate an inherent centrifugal tendency reflecting pulls deriving from the personalities of the participants, from the special adaptive exigencies of their particular job situations, and possibly from other sources,” Talcott Parsons, “Some Suggestions for a Sociological Approach to the Theory of Organizations,” Administrative Science Quarterly, 1 (June, 1956), p. 79. It will be noted that the present attempt to formulate a principle relating “formality” and “informality” is consonant with Bales’ conception of a “balance” between goal-accomplishment and “... the diffuse satisfaction, which depends upon the accomplishment of expressive-integrative goals.” Parsons, Bales, and Shils, op. cit., p. 124.
that it has improved upon our discursive commonsense knowledge of the functioning of formal organizations, which loom up so importantly in the present national and international scene.

These two examples may suggest the value of immediate work on recodifications and systematic formulations of our research-based knowledge. The evidence is overwhelmingly clear that we are, in fact, finding sizable “streaks of uniformity”\(^{24}\) in social life. To systematically record our clusters of substantive theory, in addition to the conceptual development of theoretic schemes, would do much to dispel unwarranted pessimism based on a century-long rehearsing of the complexity of symbol-mediated behavior, the alleged vagueness of concepts, and the alleged interdeterminacy of social acts. If the test of the pudding is in the eating, we do not have to wait still another generation to show that sociology can supply solid fare for intellectual nourishment. Already in the literature are hundreds of empirical propositions, going beyond the purely factual description of a particular state of affairs, which rest upon repeated successful tests.\(^{25}\) A substantial further advance will be achieved as we organize these findings into logically inter-connected clusters, working toward eventual aggregation in terms of a systematic conceptual scheme.

ON CHALLENGES AND THE FUTURE

Let us turn, finally, to certain important challenges and opportunities for future development.

First, a scientific sociology, by definition, cannot be provincial. Among the opportunities for future research, a high rank accordingly is occupied by comparative or cross-cultural studies, especially those that will investigate specific hypotheses by objective operations. This opinion is no longer the pious hope it once would have been; research already accomplished shows the scientific value of transcending a sociology confined to its own national culture. One may call to mind as ready illustrations the series of investigations of child-rearing practices stimulated by the Social Science Research Council, Zelditch’s study of sex roles, Becker’s hypotheses concerning marginal trading peoples, and the rapidly growing body of cross-cultural knowledge concerning ethnic and racial relations.\(^{26}\) Inkeles and Rossi have shown important similarities in the cultural evaluations of types of occupations in the industrialized countries of the U.S.S.R., Japan, Great Britain, New Zealand, the U.S.A., and West Germany. Freeman and Winch report a unidimensional scale of social complexity, empirically derived from ratings of a sample of quite diverse societies. Advances in the comparative study of institutions and social processes of complex national systems possibly are foreshadowed by such beginnings as the comparison of social mobility in France and the United States, the nine-nation UNESCO study, and the slowly emerging macroscopic analyses of national institutional systems.\(^{27}\)

In the second place, because the task of sociology is to discover regularity in social life, it is easy to exaggerate the concrete orderliness of modern complex societies, in all their decisive political and military tumults, and this tendency is further encouraged just to the extent that research focuses on enduring groups and upon massive formal structures. The implied challenge here is only to incorporate more fully and clearly in our theory and our research the study of such matters as discontinuities in communication, of fluid and rapidly changing situations, of pro-normless collective behavior, of misunderstandings and lack of symmetry in social roles. Our world is full of crisis-conditioned, imperfectly structured relationships among

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persons and collectivities, under such conditions of rapid and massive change that we may require ideas more novel than "equilibrium" to understand them.

For social science, it might seem, the best of all possible worlds would be one in which totally integrated societies in smooth and precise movements always returned to a steady state, while all of the individuals living in such systems occupied clearly defined statuses, carrying explicit and easily describable rights and duties, and in which, therefore, every ego always acted as an alter demanded or expected and vice versa. This conception has its attractions. As other than an abstract model, however, this image also has the potentiality of leading to dysfunctions, not the least of which is that, taken too literally, it would severely limit the intellectual challenge of coping with the enormously difficult problems of specific empirical explanation of social conduct.

In all this, the great intellectual economy of our most commonly used sociological concepts is easily recognized and is of high value. As is the case with everything else, however, virtues can quite easily be transmuted into vices. We could not well do without the term "status." But its use requires us to remember that such "statuses" as "woman," "Negro," "professor," "lawyer" represent heroic abstractions from concrete social behavior; that it is the limiting case and not the usual one when expected behavior is derived from one status rather than a combination of them; that the principles or "rules" by which statuses are combined may be at least as significant as the manifest norms defining each position; that some definite statuses may not be explicitly recognized by members of the group in which these positions exist; and that quite complex "social types" typically arise as a consequence of individual and subgroup variations within a broadly-defined status or social category.28

The insidiousness of reification is well recognized in general terms, but remains a challenge in specific instances of analysis and interpretation. In studies of social stratification it is often said, or implied, that individuals "strive for status," or "are motivated to 'get ahead,'" or "struggle for prestige." Here we have to make the elementary sociological distinction between the motivation for a pattern of activity, on the one hand, and the social consequences of that activity, on the other. We may recall the need for keeping the question of purpose or intention clearly separate from the question of function or consequence. Surely it is the case that many persons who attained high prestige status by achievement were initially little, if at all, motivated to seek prestige as a goal; in particular cases, the ends-in-view of the actors were quite otherwise, and the social rewards eventually forthcoming were from their point of view fortuitous, if not unwelcome, by-products. Similarly if we were to say that the Cromwellian revolution was a revolt of the middle classes it would not do to imply without further evidence that "class" considerations were actually important in the concrete motivations of the intensely religious followers of Cromwell. Analogous pitfalls abound in other areas of inquiry. At the present time, the literature of sociology and social psychology contains many references to "conformity"—conforming to norms, "yielding to social pressure," or "adjusting to the requirements of the reference group." If the object of these references is to point to the sheer fact of correspondence and convergences of demands and expectations, no damage is done. But the implication is easily drawn that the actors in question are motivated solely in terms of the immediate positive and negative consequences of conformity or non-conformity, rather than in terms of "expressing" or "affirming" internalized values, or of being rationally persuaded on questions of fact and evaluation. The interpretative hazards in this instance, as well as some positive safeguards, have been demonstrated by such work as Asch's critique of "prestige suggestion," supported by experimental demonstration of great variability in the motives of conformity behavior.

It has sometimes been suggested that sociology together with anthropology might eventually develop into a "grammar of the social sciences." What appears to be envisaged in this suggestion is that we may be

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enabled to discover reasonably invariant principles whereby statuses are differentiated, segregated, and combined, or put in Parsonsian terms, whereby the value standards of a system of action are arranged in patterns.

For specific social systems, are there meta-norms by which norms are arranged, rules for combining rules, standards for organizing standards? It would appear logically that there must be such principles of social grammar and fragments of scattered evidence are beginning to suggest that this deduction may be confirmed. To use Everett Hughes’ expression, “dilemmas and contradictions of status,” if properly observed, may serve to bring out regularities hitherto only vaguely suspected.

Another major challenge is suggested by the observation that it is not unlikely that the anthropological and sociological thought of the past half century will appear in retrospect to have been somewhat over-impressed with the importance in group formation and social unity of shared commitment to a set of fundamental values. Possibly it is time to reexamine, in a quite critical and concrete way, the range of problems suggested by such phrases as “social cohesion,” “integration,” “antagonistic cooperation,” “interdependence,” and “conflict.” That this is not a new suggestion does not detract from its pertinence to sociology at this point in history.

Still another basic challenge lies in the study of communication. It is likely that we ordinarily underestimate, rather than over-estimate, the importance of ignorance and error in communicative efforts. Of course, in our analysis of interaction it is legitimate to construct the conceptual model of perfect communication, with full complementarity of expectations and exact mutual comprehension of meanings. But both ordinary social experience and modern research show us that communication is often not free, full, accurate, or mutual, and that failures and distortions continually occur. In fact, as we know, much communication actually consists of efforts to modify, correct, supplement, retract, reemphasize, or otherwise alter what we discover we have just communicated or have not communicated. It follows that we need more careful study of unwitting distortions, unintended deviousness, subterfuge, secrecy, defenses, and hidden intentions.

Research in sociology is beginning to give us important information on these matters, but the necessary work ahead is enormous.

On the other hand, to recognize the extreme subtlety and complexity of behavior by no means implies that only clinical feeling for the unique case can be used to gain valid knowledge. The problem of sociology, insofar as it wishes to be able to deal with the micro-sociology of interpersonal relations, rather, is to start with a precise and detailed phenomenological description which enables us to isolate the crucial variables for study. A pertinent example is provided by the problem of the differing consequences of “deprivation” versus “rejection” for the personality development of the child, a problem in which operational specification of the main factors seems feasible.

One difficulty in the relations of sociological research to other disciplines is that of differing conceptions of mensuration, precision, and phenomenological fidelity. To a team of a clinical psychologist, a physiological psychologist, and a psychiatrist studying “childhood schizophrenia,” the addition of a sociologist is expected to add firm and precise knowledge and insights concerning parent-child relations, at least a general understanding of unconscious motivation, and some researchable ideas concerning the possible effects of early affectional deprivation and of parental conflict and ambivalence. In a widely removed area, the sophisticated economist who is studying economic development in a country newly ambitious for industrialization may have a general notion of the relevance of cultural and social factors. But his questions to the sociologist have an inherently imperative character, for example, to what extent will capital furnished by outside aid be drained off in conspicuous consumption of upperclass groups, to what extent will villagers respond to higher wages, what labor turnover can be expected, under these and other conditions?

It is in such contexts that sociology requires not only a theoretic apparatus and a capacity to develop penetrating hypotheses but also a high order of research craftsmanship. It is not too much to ask that every

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holder of an advanced degree in sociology today should be capable, upon proper notice, of really designing in procedural detail a study capable of testing a vulnerable hypothesis. Were we not prepared to demand as much, we would be likely to find that sociology would be left with the cruder variables and the vaguer problems while the more productive avenues to knowledge were preempted by other disciplines. 30 One can discern in some quarters a tendency to restrict "sociological factors" to such gross categories as social class, religious affiliation, and ethnic membership, while the study of such genuinely sociological factors as the norms of husband-wife interaction, or "mothering" behavior with infants, or patterns of treatment of juvenile delinquents is held to be the province of psychiatry, clinical psychology, and social work. Simmel said that "Society does not consist merely of the objective social structures which have attained a certain independence of the individual bearers; it also consists of the thousand minor processes of socialization between individuals which contribute to the functional unity of the group." 31 To give body to this undoubtedly valid insight will require a subtlety of research technique not easy to achieve but immensely rewarding for future scientific development.

For research methods are more than gadgetry; they are the keys for unlocking the doors of opportunities for developing the substantive bodies of theory, now crystallizing out of the accumulated knowledge of the discipline. In the future perhaps even more than in the past it will be found that there is an "...intimate connection between the discovery or development of methods of research and the development of new bodies of theory." 32

Certainly there is no reason to suppose that sociology of the future will be exactly the same as that of the present, nor does it have to be fashioned according to the models of physical and biological sciences. 33 The most tenable definition of "science," in any case, is a range definition based on the history of the very diverse special sciences. Whether we approve or disapprove of it, it is a fact that sociology today contains both the scientific aspiration to derive analytical laws explaining relations among precisely indexed abstract variables, and the historical intent to communicate a part of the experiential richness of concrete human action. It may be predicted, without too much daring, that for the foreseeable future both emphases will be with us.

There will be those who would closely shave Plato's beard with the keen edge of Occam's Razor, who would choose to work with a few variables in a closed and simplified system, whose pride is the demonstration of rigorously determinate relationships, regardless of how far removed from the full historical texture. And there will be those who seek to show how the repeatable pattern is embedded in such a texture. Surely both are right to follow their respective visions, and it is not impossible that an occasional sociologist may be able to carry on a friendly affair with both Muses without losing the affections of either.

In full awareness of the dangers of prophecies, we are willing, in conclusion, to present what one may believe and hope will turn out to be a prediction of the self-fulfilling kind. The prediction is that sociology, together with the more closely related parts of the other social sciences, is now on the verge of important advances in systematic substantive theory and that within some such period.

30 For an example of skillful interweaving of cultural and personality-process data, see William Caudill and George De Vos, "Achievement, Culture and Personality: The Case of the Japanese Americans," American Anthropologist, 58 (December, 1956), pp. 1102-1126.
33 "After all, the physical sciences have constantly invented new methods to deal with new sorts of data. . . . The biochemists, for example, did not conclude because the methods used in the analysis of simple inorganic compounds would not work in dealing with complex organic substances, that therefore no adequate methods were possible, so that there could be no respectable science of the chemistry of living beings. On the contrary, they went ahead to invent new methods as well as new techniques for the understanding of organic part-whole relationships. In the same manner, those who aim to be social scientists are entitled to invent their own ways of mastering their materials, and to challenge the skeptic to doubt the reliability of their results," Larrabee, op. cit., p. 485.
as the next twenty years there will be major discoveries of lawful regularities in the functioning of groups and other social aggregates and systems. It is entirely possible that these discoveries will enable us to build at least partial deductive systems accounting for a large variety of concrete social phenomena in terms of quite simple structures. And in the meantime as well as in that hypothesized future, sociology will continue to enrich and clarify the world of experience for those who know and understand its contributions.

SOCIAL MOBILITY AND ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR *

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This paper seeks to answer the following question: What does an executive's attitude toward mobility, as distinct from the fact of mobility, have to do with his administrative performance within an organization? This question represents something of a departure from two traditions in sociological research on mobility. First, we are not concerned with mobility rates, but with the more dynamic question of what such mobility signifies for an individual's behavior. Second, we treat as a problematic variable what is commonly assumed as a given in American society—namely, the assumption that mobility motives predominate and that there is a nearly universal competitive struggle for scarce and invidious status.

Few would acknowledge, perhaps, that such a "mobility assumption" characterizes their own work; and many would agree, as a matter of course, with the proposition that mobility commitments vary considerably among individuals. Nevertheless, the evidence of such a working assumption is not difficult to find: it appears, for example, in the readiness to impute mobility motives to those who have moved upward, or to portray American society as a vast model of mobility pressures; and in the readiness to base interpretations of data upon implied striving for comparative "place." ¹

Other appraisals of the mobility motive (in the sense of striving for invidious rewards) are entertainable.² One may surely make a case for the view that intrinsic standards of achievement are more commonly held and more effective functionally than the mobility model would have us believe. But regardless of the incidence of these two types of motivation—status orientation as against intrinsic goals—they are recognizable alternatives that may dominate behavior. The explicit recognition of such alternatives highlights the need to distinguish carefully between the fact of mobility and attitude toward it. This paper presents one approach.

Warner and J. Abegglen appear to posit such a mobility model and to impute such motives; cf., Big Business Leaders in America, New York: Harper and Brothers, 1955. They write: "The principle of rank and status provides the motives for the maximal use of our energies, for the orderly functioning of institutions, and for responsible leadership hierarchies" (pp. 11-12). Elsewhere in the same volume, speaking of a chapter titled "Men in Motion," the authors remark: "It [the chapter] tells the story of the immigrant and of the country boy migrating to the city. It shows how each goes through a process of learning and unlearning and of being acculturated and assimilated as he drives ahead toward power and esteem" (Ibid., p. 7, italics mine). J. Greblum and L. I. Pearlman make invidious status-seeking a central element in their interpretation of data on mobility and prejudice in "Vertical Mobility and Prejudice," in R. Bendix and S. M. Lipset, editors, Class, Status, Power, Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1953, esp. p. 486.


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² In their study of business executives, W. L.