From the Editor:

As you look through it, I'm sure you'll notice that this edition of the Section newsletter has a different mix of contributions. Instead of the usual collection of announcements, updates, and administrative tidbits, this edition is weighted by two main features. The first is an update on the Section's genocide task force (by Allen Grimshaw) and a response by Jack Nusan Porter. The second is a longer, substantive piece on organizational governance in peace movements by John Lofland and Joseph Fahey. Both of these features are longer, more substantive, and potentially more controversial than our usual content. Let me know your reactions to these pieces; feel free to write comments, responses, or original contributions on these or other topics. I welcome your suggestions, contributions, updates, and administrative tidbits. It's your newsletter.

-- Dana Eyre

INTERIM REPORT FROM THE TASK FORCE ON GENOCIDE, POLITICIDE AND DEMOCIDE (GPD)

By Allen Grimshaw

In the time since publication of some earlier thought about such a task force in these pages (Spring/Summer, 1994)--and since our discussions in Los Angeles--and in light of what I have learned about current and anticipated projects of other organizations, it has become clear that our Section's agenda for activity on GPD can and should be less ambitious than that I originally sketched as a possibility. An emergent interdisciplinary group, the Initiative on Preventing Genocide and Politicide (the Steering Committee of which includes three sociologists [Helen Fein, William Gamson, and Charles Tilly]) will be undertaking such responsibilities as (1) facilitation of research, (2) generating programs of interdisciplinary cooperation and creating relationships with activist organizations,

(contin’d page 2)
(3) educating our own political leaders and those of other countries about what is going on and about what they can/should do, and (4) dissemination of information on GPD to the public at large. Thus, our Task Force and our Section can focus primarily on what can be done within our own departments and institutions (and other work settings) and on what we ourselves can learn and do. In what follows I will: (1) say something about a way in which we can integrate the study of GPD in central concerns of sociology and thereby raise awareness and understanding of the phenomena, their consequences, and possible prevention and/or amelioration and (2) share information about a new organization devoted to study of genocide.

2. The section has had little or no success in persuading sociologists to teach courses on genocide/politicide; there are still only a few places where such courses or courses on war more generally are regularly taught. When courses ARE taught it is often outside of sociology. There are still only a handful of social problems texts which include sections on war or GPD as social problems. While some colleagues incorporate GPD materials in courses seen as particularly relevant (race and ethnic relations or demography might be example), treatments of war and/or GPD are essentially nonexistent in texts in other areas in sociology (or for that matter in other social sciences).

In sociology, alone (as a starter), the following "areas of interest" from among which ASA members are asked to select four, could (in some cases should) address GPD issues (and probably also issues of war and peace more generally).

- biosociology
- collective behavior/social movements
- community
- comparative sociology/macrosociology
- demography
- development
- economy and society
- environmental sociology
- human ecology
- law and society
- medical sociology
- military sociology
- political sociology
- race/ethnic/minority relations

religion;
social change;
social control;
social psychology;
socialization;
sociology of emotions;
sociology of language/social linguistics;
sociology of mental health;
sociology of world conflict (!);
stratification/mobility;
theory

Most readers will have other areas they feel should be included in this list. Methodologists, for example, might integrate examples from GPD into their courses. While the list of areas of interest is not isomorphic with that of ASA sections, the sections might be a good place to start.

I seek volunteers (initially from our own Section on Peace and War but also, as necessary and appropriate, from elsewhere in sociology or cognate disciplines) who will work with colleagues in other sections and/or areas of interest to prepare units on GPD (and, hopefully, on other war and peace concerns). Such units would include some introductory material on the general nature of GPD and on its sociological relevance and would continue with some sort of outline of topics specific to the section or area of interest. A unit on socialization, for example, would examine the consequences for children of the post traumatic stress disorder associated with extensive living in circumstances of GPD or other continuing violent conflict whether in Kampuchea or Mozambique or the West Bank or inner city Chicago (see, e.g., Garabino, Kosteln, and Dubrow, 1991). Related and quite different resources could be employed in units in courses on education, family, mental health—to mention only some more obvious examples.

It seems obvious to me that units on GPD should be included in courses on biosociology, demography, human ecology, medical sociology, and social change; what is obvious to me is clearly NOT obvious to others. Introductory demography/population texts often contain material on war and/or genocide; I have no knowledge of how foregrounded the material is in actual courses.
Our section members have a range of interests across most, if not all, of the spectrum; there are probably co-memberships with almost all ASA sections. Please contact me if you are interested in participating in this project. I will undertake at least some initial coordination. If response warrants, I will propose that a representative of the Section on Peace and War will officially approach Chairs of all possibly relevant ASA Sections and invite them to nominate a representative of their section who would be interested in working with a member(s) of our section to develop materials and bibliography which can be made available to any interested parties so that they can incorporate information, documentation, bibliography, films, etc., at appropriate juncture in courses. If we are able to generate appropriate and useful materials some subset of participants can edit the materials in a format which can then be offered to the ASA teaching program for publication and dissemination. We would also undertake to facilitate distribution of already available resources such Freedman-Apsel and Fein, "Teaching about genocide," and Chalk's, "Introducing genocide into the university curriculum."

Section members (or other interested readers) who would like to participate in this project should contact me directly at: Department of Sociology Indiana University, Bloomington IN 47405 grimsha@indiana.edu (PLEASE NOTE: no "w")

3. Helen Fein (46 Irving Street, Cambridge MA 02138; TEL (617)354-2785; FAX (617)491-8076) announces the formation of the Association of Genocide Scholars. The Association will convene regularly to "advance analysis, prediction, and prevention" of genocide. She invites members of the Section to become members and/or to participate in the group's first conference, scheduled for June 14-16, 1995, in Williamsburg, VA. For information, please contact Helen directly. It will make her life easier if you can send a stamped, self-addressed envelope if you use the US mail.

4. I will be delighted to hear from any of you with suggestions, proposals, or whatever! PEACE!

Allen D. Grimshaw

by Jack Nusan Porter

One thing is certain: we need more discussion and debate on these issues; discussion beyond this newsletter, but here are my immediate responses to the report. I should state a few of my biases. I am a sociologist, but also a child of Holocaust survivors -- my parents were active in the Soviet Army; my father was a Soviet military commander in the partisans of Western Ukraine.

I argue that genocide studies should concentrate on the Holocaust, with politicide, democide, and nuclear homicide as secondary issues. The Holocaust (of the Jews in Europe from 1933-1945) is unique in history, in its bureaucratic and technological scope. There have been mass murders (native Americans, blacks in the Middle Passage) that have far exceeded the Holocaust in sheer numbers, but none before nor since have duplicated its ferocity, lethality, and sophistication.

The Holocaust was the culmination of some of the most significant political, moral, religious, and demographic tendencies of Western Civilization in the 20th Century (see Richard Rubenstein, The Cunning of History). I do not believe that we will ever see another holocaust like "the Holocaust". Sociologists are uncomfortable with unique events. Of course, all historical events are unique, but the Holocaust was a "tremendum", one of the defining events of our civilization. Hiroshima was also unique. But because something is unique does not mean that it can not be compared to other genocides and understood in generalized terms. I do not take a strict exclusivist view of the Holocaust, unlike Steven Katz, director of the Holocaust museum in Washington, D.C. Katz feels that the only real genocide was the Holocaust because it was the only state-sponsored genocide that had as its intent the destruction of an entire group of people. In all other genocides there was never an intent to kill every single member of the targeted population. This is a provocative statement and Katz backs it up in his three volume The Holocaust in Historical Context. However, one can disagree with this position and still argue there is a problem of Holocaust denial and definitional abuse in our use of the term genocide.
Misapplying the term genocide is very common in sociology. To make everything genocide is to make nothing genocide. Massacres, "oppression", "atrocities", nuclear attack, Dresden, Hiroshima, My Lai, Maalot, slavery, abortion, the treatment of women and witches, the "suppression" of American Indians are not genocide.

To overlook the uniqueness of the Holocaust is a subtle form of Holocaust denial. To see the Holocaust as just another genocide is to deny its profound ability to be used as the key case study of our era, of universal comparability to other genocides. This is not to gainsay or to underestimate other genocides. I do not believe in "comparative suffering". Just because something is not a "genocide" does not mean it is not a heinous act. Our language should reflect this. (See my Genocide and Human Rights: A Global Anthology for further discussion.)

If access to material is facilitated, I believe we can persuade sociologists to teach courses in the sociology of genocide or to use GPD units other courses. I have developed a curriculum guide (The Sociology of Genocide and The Holocaust, available from the ASA) which addresses questions of uniqueness and universality, and includes material on several genocides.

I would not like to see Genocide Studies marginalized, but if we cannot find a home in the Peace and War Section then we may have to develop a separate section on Genocide and Holocaust Studies.

We must not lock ourselves into rigid "Stalinistic" frameworks and definitions. There must be respect for a multi-paradigmatic approach. Mine could be called the "uniqueness-comparability" approach that sees the Holocaust as unique yet comparable to others. Other scholars may have a more "inclusivist" or "exclusiveist" approach. Some will label events genocide where others would not. Some will attempt to expand the boundaries of the field by inventing new concepts such as "politicide", "democide", or nuclear omnicide. So be it. Let a hundred flowers (and typologies) bloom. Let us at least respect our differences and learn from them by listening to each other. Human beings are finding more creative ways to kill each other every day.

I can be contacted at (617) 965-8388, or at The Spencer Group, 8 Burnside Road, Newton Highlands, MA 02161. I welcome your responses.

DEcision making in Peace Groups

by John Lofland
and Joseph J. Fahey

Members of America peace groups espouse democratic values and practices, but many peace organizations are also often oligarchical and undemocratic. We are puzzled by this inconsistency between profession and practices and we seek here to develop an understanding of this paradox. Before embarking, we need to address the possible objection that concepts of governance are not relevant to discussion of peace groups. Members of peace groups, one might argue, make no claims about democracy in general or with regard to their groups in particular. Therefore, there is no paradox or contradiction to explain. We do not disagree with the argument that peace groups are much like other groups. We do think, though that any group that takes up the appellation of peace is involved in a set of expectations and standards that are rather different -- and higher -- than a great many other groups.

Peace groups are quite different associations in several ways. First and statistically, they are a tiny minority of all American group. Second, members of these groups view themselves as a distinctive minority, as standing against the prevailing and mainstream orthodoxies of power. Third, these members see themselves as in one or another way speaking truth to power and calling the nation to higher moral standard. Fourth, while the specific politics and policies they advocate vary enormously, they espouse a distinctive set of values. Charles DeBenedetti captures the values of what he calls the peace subculture:

"The peace subculture speaks of forbearance within a culture that has flowered on conquest. It speaks of reconciliation within a society that works better at distributing weapons that wealth. It speaks of supranational authority among a...nationalist people who dislike all authority. It speaks of just global order to governing officials anxious for preeminence and profit.

While DeBenedetti does not mention democracy in this passage or in the larger analysis from which we quote, we think that democracy is clearly entailed in the values that are expressed. Oligarchy in peace groups is therefore a puzzle and paradox that properly elicits inquiry.
OLIGARCHY AND DEMOCRACY

In ordinary discourse, the term oligarchy means government in the hands of a few or a group of persons, a number of whose members are served by oligarchic arrangements. Aristotle is thus reported to have classified governments in terms of the two variables of "the number of persons who ruled and the purposes served by their rule." Oligarchy was present when a few persons ruled for their own satisfaction (Jenken, 1968:281). This conception, that is, distinguishes between a public interest -- or at least the interests of multiple groupings in a polity -- and only the interests of the few who are ruling. Third, in some depictions, the narrowness of serving such interests is also thought to be irresponsible or corrupt. In this meaning, government by the few is expanded to mean government by an irresponsible and corrupt few who are serving only their own interests (Jenkin, 1986:283).

It is important to distinguish oligarchy from several forms of political organization with which it might be confused. These are authoritarianism, autocracy, dictatorship, totalitarianism. Oligarchy is neutral in meaning as regards these other forms of regime. Most often, oligarchies are probably not also one of these four. Each of these four imply rulers who are exercising high levels of zeal and comprehensive goals and plans for ruling a polity. In contrast, as a generic, the pattern of oligarchy can also be a quite mundane and limited affair carried on by laconic office-holders who have only the most modest of goals and plans for running a polity.

So conceived, we can entertain the possibility of several types or patterns of oligarchy, each of which might have its own distinctive causes and consequences. Thus, with regard to peace groups, the patterns of oligarchy studied in the classic literature may not apply without modification to the oligarchy found in these groups. The organizational entities analyzed in the classic studies of Michels (1959) and Lipset et al., (1956) were quite large, financially significant, and structurally complex. Only a handful of peace groups even remotely approach such scale of organization and significance. Instead, most are rather small, even rag-tag, affairs that are scraping by with only a dozen or so core members, if that. While the concept of oligarchy may be analytically justified in characterizing such small scale undertakings, the classic formulation of oligarchy also implies a scale that is simply not observed in peace groups. Perhaps, indeed, it might be more accurate to speak of such groups as simply clique dominated or central personality dominated. Since, however, there is a line of thought treating oligarchy but not treating clique-dominance, we retain the concept of oligarchy as a frame for analyzing the structures of peace groups. We do so, though, with the understanding that we are here addressing oligarchy in more modest and fluid organizational entities. If we are prepared to envision the possibility of types of oligarchy this should pose no problem in conceptual development and empirical inquiry.

We contrast the concept of democracy with that of oligarchy (or clique/central person domination). Unlike the rather stable history of meaning of oligarchy, democracy has undergone enormous verbal stretching and is a very loose label. Bearing that caution in mind, we start with the ordinary and abstract conception that democracy is government of, by, and for the people. This is abstract but not hopelessly so because at this level democracy contrasts with oligarchy conceived as government of, by, and for the few. Of what, more specifically, though does democracy consist? Thinking now only of what Sartori terms micro-democracy (i.e. small polities such a voluntary associations, including peace groups) and democracy that is representational rather direct, analysts have pointed to the following constituent features.

1. Written, Enforced Constitution.
2. Universal Suffrage.
3. Equal Representation.
4. Open and Fair Elections.
5. Free Dissent.
7. Open Information and Participation.
8. Full and Sober Deliberation.
9. Leaders Restrainted and Monitored.
10. Rotating Leaders.
11. Polity-Wide Legitimate Leadership.

These and other features of micro-democracy
that might be listed all aim to avoid corrupt rule by the few through establishing organizational arrangements that: (1) allow diverse views to find organized settings for their expression; (2) permit diverse views to achieve proper hearings in electoral and other places of decision; (3) restrain the actions of people in positions in power.

EXTENT & CHARACTER OF OLIGARCHY

The empirical question we want to answer is: What is the degree to which one finds democracy versus oligarchy among American peace groups? The existing scholarly literature pertinent to answering this question divides into reports of two kinds, quantitative and qualitative.

We have reviewed the literature in search of quantitative assessments of the organizational characteristics of peace groups, and have been struck by the fact that, despite an enormous and recent literature on the peace movement, almost none of it has been systematically quantitative even on the characteristics of participants, much less on the characteristics of their organizations.

Happily, however, there has been at least one quantitative study of peace organizations per se. This was a mail survey designed and conducted by Mary Anna Colwell in 1988 (Colwell, 1989). Using the Topsfield Foundation census of the 7,700 American groups existing in 1987, Colwell sent a questionnaire to each of the 497 of these groups who reported annual budgets of $30,000 or more; 274 of them returned it, a 57% response rate. She also drew a five percent sample of the 7,200 remaining groups (those with annual budgets under $30,000). Of the 330 groups in this sample, 139 returned her questionnaire, a 47% response rate. Together, Colwell assembled questionnaires on 413 peace groups.

Before examining responses a note of caution is required. The people who completed these questionnaires are not simply reporting their beliefs and attitudes. They are being asked to sum up certain kinds of objective social realities in their groups. Their responses are being treated as informant reports rather than as the subjective beliefs and perceptions of respondents. But we also know that any two people can well differ in their assessment of the exact character of objective social practices and arrangements. For this reason, multiple observers and tests of reliability are frequently employed in social research. No such checks were in operation here and we know little about how one rather than another person came to complete the questionnaire in these groups. Therefore, we have to treat these data with considerable prudence.

Peace group informants were asked: "We are interested in how peace groups operate. Please read the list of statements below. In the space to the right of each statement, please indicate if the statement is true or false for your group or organization by inserting the most appropriate number from the true/false scale." There follows a true-false scale using the numbers one through seven, where "1" is definitely true and "7" is definitely false. Four of the 23 statements in the section on "operations" bear on questions of democracy and oligarchy and these are given in Figure 1. Colwell dichotomized the seven responses between two and three and treats points one and two as "true". She was also especially interested in how larger and smaller budget groups might answer the questions differently, as is also reported in Figure 1. We are not here interested in differences between large and small budget groups, but for the sake of accuracy our summary generalizations about these data need to incorporate the contrast where appropriate:

- About half of larger groups a quarter of small ones have clearly defined structure.
- Some ten percent of larger groups and thirty percent of smaller ones have no formally designated leaders.
- A third of larger groups and a quarter of smaller groups select leaders by election.
- A strong majority of all groups use "consensus processes" rather than majority rule in making decisions.

Colwell's questionnaire also contained questions relating to the topic of "management and planning" and asked informants to indicate who participated in "deciding on the major program activities" and "who participates in developing the annual budget?". Five options: Paid staff - Committee of the leadership - General membership - Board of Directors - [and] Other -- were provided, each to be marked "no" or "yes."

In publishing answers to these questions, Colwell continued her interest in how responses differ by size of budget and added, moreover, an interest in the effects of being a pacifist or a non pacifist organization. The effects of these two dichotomized variables have on the percentage of informants answering yes to the planning and budgeting participation questions are reproduced here in Figure 2. Again, our central interest is
Figure 1:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statements</th>
<th>Percent of informants responding &quot;True&quot; (at scale points 1 and 2 on a seven point &quot;definitely true&quot; (1) to &quot;definitely false&quot; (7) scale) by size of budget.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Groups reporting annual budgets of $30,000 or more</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. &quot;There is an agreed upon, clearly defined structure that includes rules, operating procedures and a known way for participants to hold each other accountable.&quot;</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. &quot;Our organization prefers to operate without formally designated leaders.&quot;</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. &quot;Our organization chooses leaders by an election process.&quot;</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. &quot;Most of the time we use consensus processes and not majority rule to make important decisions.&quot;</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 2:
General Membership Participation in Planning and Budgeting as Reported by Informants in the Colwell Survey of American Peace Groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Questions</th>
<th>Percent of informants answering &quot;Yes&quot;, by size of budget and pacifist-nonpacifist beliefs.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Groups reporting annual budgets of $30,000 or more</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pacifist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. General membership participates &quot;in deciding on major program activities.&quot;</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. General membership &quot;participates in developing the annual budget.&quot;</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
in peace groups as a generic class rather than in the variations. Despite variation, two overall generalizations are nonetheless quite clear:

- the general membership participates in deciding on major activities in half or less of all peace groups.
- the general membership is involved in devising an annual budget in perhaps a quarter, at best, of all peace groups.

Based on informant answers to these questions, then, to what extent are American peace groups oligarchic versus democratic in the ways we have defined these terms? If one uses election of leaders and member participation in developing organizational activities as indicator, we would have to say that on the order of less than half of group representatives claim their groups are democratic in these senses. If one adds majority voting as an indicator of democracy, a very substantial majority of peace groups are not democratic. Looked at from the other side -- that of oligarchy -- the low proportion of groups in which members are involved in budgeting and the substantial minority of groups without clear structure suggests widespread oligarchic practices.

The most cautious and conservative summary estimate we can draw from these data is that no more than half of peace groups are democratic. Less cautiously and conservatively, one might conclude that a strong majority of these groups are significantly oligarchic.

QUALITATIVE REPORTS

While rather few in number, several descriptions relating to governance processes in American peace groups are available and these augment our understanding of both the extent and character of oligarchy. We find it helpful to organize discussion of these descriptions in terms of John Lofland's "organizational profile" of the peace movement. At one extreme are volunteer bureaucracies exemplified by such organizations as Beyond War, which were very hierarchically bureaucratic. At the other extreme are the quasi-commune formations of radical Christians whose lives were dedicated to communities of pacifist resistance and nonviolent acts of symbolic civil disobedience. Among such prophets, forms of charismatic leadership were the dominant tendency. Between these were several ambiguously democratic forms, including many "Mom and/or Pop Shop" that were clearly dominated by a single figure and her or his circle of supporters. Most of the [organizational] forms in the middle of the spectrum Lofland describes were de facto undemocratic in the sense that their oligarchic features were merely unremarked on and unremarkable features of their functioning.

One special variety of these was, however, explicitly and ideologically antidemocratic. We speak, of course, of the ideology of consensus process which was anti-democratic at least in the sense of being unsatisfied with majority voting and elected leaders. What movement people termed affinity groups were most committed to consensus process, but the idea of its appropriateness was much more widespread, as we see above in Figure 1, Statement 4. Lofland estimates that perhaps seven percent of peace groups were affinity groups and based on the Colwell survey we surmise that it was practiced with some frequency among the large category of (formally) democratic groups -- a category Lofland estimates to make up almost three-quarters of associations.

Because of relatively widespread use of at least weaker forms of consensus process, we think it is important to be specific regarding the sense in which this process was less than democratic and even oligarchic. Despite the enthusiasm with which one often found consensus embraced, a number of movement participants were critical of it to the point of published critiques. Among these, the reservations expressed by veteran peace activist Allen Smith and published in the War Resister's League's Nonviolent Activist are of particular note. In Smith's experience, "the implicit possibility of a block (a single person vetoing a group decision) often enforces a false unanimity and causes a group to modify plans to prevent the possible block." In such a way, groups often avoid "healthy political conflict" (Smith, 1991:13.14). In a pamphlet circulated in Northern California peace circles in the mid 1980s, affinity group participant Howard Ryan echoes such views in reporting how decisions were "watered down" or "poor quality" because consensus process "works to discourage disagreement and raising controversial issues -- Voting. (in contrast) because it does not require complete unity, makes it easier for people to disagree." (Ryan, 1983).

Consensus is sometimes justified as being "non-coercive", in contrast to democracy. But, say some people who have practiced it, the exact opposite is often actually the case because a
single person is given the power to coerce the vast majority of a group through the threat of a block. And while "consensus advocates often speak of the importance of group trust, the consensus method actually has mistrust at its foundations -- (because) it assumes that if people are not given the power to block -- others in the group are not going to listen to them, that their needs will be ignored" (Ryan, 1983). In some forms of consensus process, leaders are also eschewed and replaced by a "facilitator." But, critics suggest, this abdication of formal, democratic leadership "merely (gives) more room for informal cliques and hidden leaders to dominate groups." And groups can become so meticulous that they create a "process elite."

But what of the more common and garden variety peace group that flourished so broadly across the United States in the 1980s? Unfortunately, we have remarkably few descriptions of just how the groups made decisions -- a deficit likely a result of the fact that scholarly ethnographers are drawn more easily to exotic rather than to mundane groups. We do, though, have a few reports that suggest an at least overall picture even though it is not one focused with precision on questions of democracy and oligarchy. Lofland summarizes these reports as a picture of great differences in levels of involvement and of frequent vacillation, indecision and "buffeting" regarding courses of action.

Andrea Ayvazian’s report of her experience with these garden variety peace groups is of particular interest, for, it is based on "over one hundred days on the road conducting 'organizational' development' workshops and meeting with activists in 44 states". She reports:

"At meetings of groups I visit, it is perfectly clear to me who has been part of the group for more than two years and who has not. I know exactly who the new kids on the block are: they sit there and the nod and they get the worst jobs."

Ironically, the founders or that original core group frequently are saying:

"we want new blood (but) once new people get there -- the founders disempower them. The founders mostly talk to each other. They make plans with an interchange and a dynamic that leaves out new people -- There is often an in-group jargon and a sense of who has been there a long time. New people often feel they don’t know how to plug in."

Pertinent to the question of do peace groups formally profess democracy, Ayvazian observes that "founders disease" is a "sharp irony" because "we talk about empowering in the world, empowering our community, empowering our congregations, Senators and everyone else -- but we disempower new people who come to our meetings -- As much as we do not want to create a sense of elitism or exclusiveness, we are creating it."

Although the quantitative and qualitative data show quite robust tendencies to oligarchy in American peace groups, we certainly do not want to say that this pattern is universal. At least a significant minority of American peace groups do practice democracy in the senses of the term we give in our discussion above. Among those for which we have documentation, we want specifically to point up Frank Folsom and Connie Flederjohann's (1988) sensitive chronicle of the struggle for democratic functioning on The Great Peace March, the Lost Angeles to Washington trek of several hundred marchers in 1985.

CAUSES OF OLIGARCHY

We have reviewed quantitative and qualitative materials suggesting rather widespread oligarchical tendencies among American peace groups. We want now to ask: What factors might be involved in fostering and sustaining such oligarchic tendencies? We discuss possible causes in three areas: structural, ideological, and social psychological.

Structural: Mayhaw and Levinger (1976) have persuasively argued that the information processing limits of humans combined with the need for unified action by groups tend to create oligarchic patterns even among human associations that are quite small. Further, human associations operating in "turbulent" environments need to act rapidly and in unity and are therefore especially prone to develop oligarchic elites. Since most human associates operate in turbulent rather than munificent environments and require rapid and unitary action, oligarchy of one or another pattern is the common consequence. Only the most uncommonly situated associations can survive the delay and disunity of action that is part and parcel of democracy.

The need for rapid and unitary action in a constantly turbulent environment combines with a large number of additional features found especially in large-scale social organizations. Drawing from Michels, Lipset et al., set these forth as including bureaucratic structure per se, "control over the formal means of communication," incumbent "monopoly of
political skills," existing leaders' desires to stay in office, and member apathy. Peace groups are subject to many if not most of these pressures and structural tendencies. Therefore, peace groups tend to be oligarchical for the same structural reasons as are other groups.

Ideological: As previously mentioned, oligarchy is not a mystery among associations that profess it. They simply practice what they preach. As put by Lipset et al., "oligarchy becomes a problem only in organizations which assume as part of their public value system the absence of oligarchy, that is, democracy".

In discovering inconsistency between profession and practice regarding democracy, previous analyses of this discontinuity have tended then to move to the structural level in seeking explanations of it. We do not at all discount structural factors such as those just outlined, but we do think it is important additionally to know how the involved actors are "defining the situation" in ways that render oligarchy acceptable even as they profess democracy. Thus, for example, are oligarchic leaders, in Orwellian "Slavery is Freedom" style, claiming that "Oligarchy is Democracy?" Or, do they not think about it at all and therefore have no account of the discrepancy? Or, are they focusing on other matters altogether?

In our involvement's with peace groups we have encountered two major modes of obviating the presence of oligarchy in ostensibly democratic groups. The first of these might be "oligarchy obviousness," a lack of consciousness of or opposition to the pattern. They are part of the unnoticed and unrewarded, background of ordinary life.

Related to this, we think it is especially telling that the presence of oligarchy has not been a major theme in either quantitative or qualitative scholarly reports of peace groups, or in activist's reflections on their experiences in peace groups. Regarding scholarly reports, we take note that although a substantial number of people have been involved in analyzing the Colwell data -- and a team even reidid the original 1988 survey in 1991 -- in a period of some five years it never occurred to anyone to analyze items in the questionnaire relating to the topics. Regarding activists' reflections, the qualitative materials we review above do touch on oligarchy and democracy, but there are rather small in number. We notice, in contrast, that the major activist-composed books on the upsurge of the peace movement in the 1980s pretty much ignore issues of democracy per se, although they do make at least glancing reference to personal and political struggles within and among groups.

We want to underscore the especially puzzling character of such obliviousness. The substantive content of peace teachings places great stress on the importance of democracy in the society at large. A key -- even central -- theme of peace beliefs is that foreign, defense, and other government policies are controlled by a small "military-industrial" elite and this is a bad thing. For whatever reasons, these beliefs about the importance of democracy in the society at large were rarely perceived as relevant to the micro-organizational level of peace groups of which one was a member. It is yet another instance in which the thesis that people forge cognitive consistency in their lives is true only under very limited circumstances.

The second mode of obviating the presence of oligarchy goes beyond obviousness with a positive vision of the group's mission that makes oligarchy seem proper and not simply invisible. We term one major version of this second mode of obviating "the missionizing model." For oligarchs in such peace associations, the primary group aim is to advance peace aims as an activity and form of thought. In one peace group of our acquaintance, this mission was spoken of by one leading oligarchic as a "crusading organization" that needed to have at least one person "on duty twenty-four hours a day." Members of the governing board of this association were the agents of this purpose. The oligarchs in this group assumed that everyone accepted this model -- or should accept it. New members who did not accept it were told that they should resign. If they did not, that they were subversive. It was even suggested by some that those in disagreement with the "crusading" model or with other views of the founding oligarchs may be FBI informants sent to disrupt the organization.

In some groups we also observe a second and much stronger variation on obviating oligarchy with a positive vision, a variation we can term the "peace bund" or comradeship. Such oligarchs regard their participation as -- in the words of one -- "intensely personal." The person expressing this view thought of himself as a highly moral -- as a person who stood forthrightly against the violence and war of the modern world. He could therefore declare that his kind of people sought to "live authentic lives" and the organization was vehicle by means of
which "we model in our (organization) the kinds of persons we would like to be." In this instance of a peace bund, the staff person was viewed as a selfless and self-sacrificing leader who makes no important mistakes and who gave all he had for the organization for but meager financial return. Such sentiments expressed a thorough consensus among the oligarchs regarding goals, tasks, and responsibilities and, as such, the notions of oligarchy and democracy were irrelevant.

We find it helpful to think of the "peace bund" as a stronger and more emotionally invested form of what Andra Ayvazian has terms "Founders' Disease"; the tendency of founding organizers of a group to exhibit a comfortable, in-group consensus that resists open and democratic forms of organization. While peace bunds certainly do these and other things Ayvazian describes, they are distinguished by a stronger degrees of rationalization in lofty moral terms and claims of superior moral vision. Combined with believing that one of their number is a "leader" of exceptional capabilities and accomplishments, the deepest of commitment and self-sacrifice, peace bunds thus tend to be embryonic versions of what sociologist terms "cults" or "sects".

Social-Psychological: In addition to structural and ideological causes, we think there are some social psychological factors that need to be taken into account. Three such factors have impressed us as especially meriting scrutiny.

Oligarchy obliviousness is likely related to another theme that is striking in the social psychology of peace group people. While they are critical of the organization and behavior of remote social institutions, closer to home and in their personal files, we observe pronounced reluctance openly to be critical of others' actions. The quintessential expression of this was the popularity of the idea (if not the practice) of what was called "consensus decision-making". Fundamental to this commitment was the belief that there was a truth on which we could all eventually agree if we only worked hard enough to find it. The alternative view is, of course, that there are real, irresolvable and rational disagreements on a great many things that prevent complete consensus. In this other view, we must face up to this fact and devise means for collective decision-making and action that accepts the existence of unavoidable and unresolvable conflict. Hence, there is a need for majority vote or some other non-consensus formula. The passion for consensus, on the other hand bespeaks a conflict-averse mindset or even a passive/aggressive orientation to conflict resolution.

One implication is that even before matters of actual decision-making, conflict adverse peace group people are disposed not to "see" matters in their immediate environments that might be topics of dispute and disputation. Instead, they are disposed "see" opportunities for solidarity and celebration of how "we are all together" in some social undertaking. Therefore, even the most undemocratic practices are selectively disinterested -- which is "oligarchy obviousness."

We need further to recognize that the ordinary environments in which most members of peace groups live out the bulk of their lives are themselves quite hierarchical and formally and "legitimately" oligarchic. Indeed, subordination and lack of democracy are common experiences of the round of life of virtually every citizen, members of peace groups or not. Therefore, to expect people who are routinely subordinated suddenly to question oligarchy in a particular group is to expect the unlikely.

Our discussion of ingrained subordination versus democratic involvement treats the broad matter of long-term life experience. Separate from this, however, is variation in how much one has simply read or heard about democratic group functioning in peace groups. One can know about democratic groups without having any personal experience with them. On this dimension, too, we were impressed with the degree to which this was blank spot in the cognitive maps of peace groups people.

We are struck, moreover, with the degree to which simple incompetence and ineptitude ought not be overlooked in understanding patterns of oligarchy (or a wide variety of other patterns of behavior and organization). While the story of "The Gang That Couldn't Shoot Straight" is fictional humor, that story nonetheless contains a core of truth that we dare not ignore. Affairs of an association can drift into a functionally oligarchic mess as a consequence of simply disorganized and ineffective efforts to cope among those in positions of responsibility. Failure to make information available, autocratic decisions, lack of action, and other practices that are organizationally oligarchic can arise from sheer disarray and not only from oligarchic motivation and clique domination.

CONCLUSION

We have sought, first and by means of a review of the literature and a case study, to determine the extent and character of oligarchy
in American peace groups. We conclude that oligarchy is quite common and that it is, moreover, also not commonly defined as a problem. Second, we have explored a number of possible causes of oligarchy, drawing on the traditional literature relating to social structure and seeking further to expand our understanding by probing ideological and social psychological factors. We conclude that in addition to structural causes, the special ways in which peace group members define the oligarchies in which they are involved contribute to the genesis and maintenance of oligarchy.

Although we have highlighted the presence, acceptance, and causes of oligarchy, we want to conclude by stressing the fact that while oligarchical trends are strong, they are far from having carried the day or having completely dominated all peace groups. In addition to the quantitative data from the Colwell survey which shows a strong -- but minority -- democratic pattern, we have also shown that there is a small but pointed body of pro-democratic and critical literature and action.

This particularly the case when we place peace movement groups in comparative social movement perspective. For, taking all social movements organizations as a larger set, such organizations have not been and are not conspicuously democratic -- and a large portion of them are even vociferously anti-democratic in a way that makes even 'consensus process' seem idyllically democratic by comparison. And very much like recent scholars of peace groups, scholars of other social movement organizations have not shown much sensitivity to issues of oligarchy and democracy. We must therefore be careful not to single out peace groups and their analysts as any softer on oligarchy than participants in and analysts of movement organizations more generally.

Our premise, however, in composing this analysis is that democratic peace groups are preferable to those that are oligarchic or clique dominated. It follows from this premise that we are interested in means by which democracy can be fostered among peace groups. We want therefore to conclude with suggestions regarding how this can be done and to utilize what we have said above in formulating these suggestions.

There are many ways to foster social change, three of which are to offer intellectual analysis, to undertake educational campaigns, and to engage in political action. This report is an instance of the first of these three ways to seek change. By means of carefully bringing to the fore the historic concern with oligarchy in citizen groups and showing its pertinence to peace groups, we hope that the present effort can, in itself, play some role in the quest for change. And, we hope there will yet other scholarly analyses of this topic, the better to document and elaborate exact features of oligarchic patterns, differences in their causes and variations in their consequences. But, scholarly analyses are far from sufficient.

Educational efforts, the second mode of seeking change, are additionally necessary. Such efforts can include more explicit attention to democratic practices in the numerous organizing manuals published for the use of peace groups. Indeed, these "social change manuals" tend either to say little about decision making or to endorse consensus process. One easy step toward would be for authors of these manuals at least to raise the issue of consensus process versus democratic forms of deliberation, as well as other facets organization.

They might, in particular, use a Gandhian perspective in paying more attention to the means (now primarily consensus) which organizations use to achieve their goals. In a Gandhian perspective, the end or goal must ever be implicit in the means used to achieve that goal. Hence, if democracy is the desired end, then it must explicitly be found in the decision making process of a given group and, for the reasons stated above, we strongly question the democratic nature of consensus as a decision making process.

Third and last, and recalling the famous peace slogan "knowing is not enough/act for peace and justice." Informed peace people need to become agents of democratic change in their own groups. Part of this task is educational, but it also political, meaning that concrete proposals for change must be formulated, proposed and debated. Fears of change need to be overcome, an exceedingly delicate task in itself. Because of the various factors we have described above, democratic reform is not easy and a great deal of good humored persistence and patience is required to achieve it. So much such persistence and patience is needed, indeed, that one wonders if the supply of it is sufficient to the task. But that is a question for another inquiry.
1995 Distinguished Career Award

At its business meeting in Los Angeles, the Peace and War Section presented an inscribed pewter tray, symbol of its 1994 award for a distinguished career of scholarship, teaching and professional service, to Elise Boulding, Professor Emerita of Dartmouth College.

Professor Boulding played a central role in founding and nurturing the Peace and War Section and many other organizational vehicles for the policy-relevant study of peace building and war prevention, e.g., the Consortium on Peace Research, Education, and Development (COPRED) and the International Peace Research Association (IPRA). She has worked internationally as a scholar and activist.

The intellectual breadth of her research and commentary, appearing in over 150 publications, has enriched understanding of the contribution of socialization, women, images of the future, and international nongovernmental organizations to creating an environment of peace. A revised edition of her book on change in women's roles over four millennia, The Underside of History, was republished in 1992. Recent works, Building an Global Civic Culture and Building Peace in the Middle East, focus on transnational voluntary associations.

Boulding’s educative influence has extended well beyond the U.S. and academic settings. Her capacity to listen, her ability to develop close relationships with people all over the world, here confidence that what she and others do can have significant and helpful effects, and her faith that attention to research and theory can serve moral purposes have inspired both scholarly production and citizen action.

Newsletters:

The newsletter Nonviolent Sanctions is available by request from the Albert Einstein Institution, 50 Church Street, Cambridge, MA 02138. Donations are accepted.

Elise Boulding Student Award - 1994

The winner of the Section's 1994 Elise M. Boulding Student Paper Award is Tracy X. Karner, who has just completed here Ph.D. in sociology at the University of Kansas (Lawrence). Her paper, "Fathers, Sons, and Vietnam: Masculinity and Betrayal in the Life Narratives of Vietnam Veterans with Post Traumatic Stress Disorder" is from her dissertation. Using data from extensive interviews with Vietnam combat veterans and participant observation on a PTSD unit of a Veterans Administration hospital, Karner explores idealized social and actual father models and images in the veterans life narratives. She shows how following the outdated models of masculinity of their fathers denied the sons the attainment of male adulthood and left them suspended in a marginalized social position. Honorable mention goes to "The Impact of Family Supportive Policies and Practices on Organizational Commitment." The author is Mary Christina Bourg who has just completed her M.A. in Sociology at the University of Maryland at College Park and is now teaching in the Department of Behavioral Sciences and Leadership at West Point. She presented her paper, which is from her Master's thesis, at the Military Sociology session at the A.S.A. meeting. Members of the committee were James Hannon, Greg McLaughlan, David Rior (last year's Award winner) and Mady Wechsler Segal (chair).

Request for nominations: Elise Boulding Student Award - 1995

The Section announces the 1994-95 Elise Boulding Award for Distinguished Student Papers. The contest, whose name honors Elise Boulding and her many contributions to the study of peace, invites graduate and undergraduate students to submit papers on any topic within the realm of the sociology of peace and war.

The papers are judged by a panel of scholars from the Section. The winner receives $200 toward the cost of travel to the ASA Annual Meeting, or to help defray costs incurred while writing the paper. The winner also gets the opportunity to present her/his paper (in the usual format) at the Peace and War Section Roundtable at the 1995 Annual Meeting in Washington, D.C.. Formal presentation of the award occurs during the business meeting of the Peace and War Section during the meetings.

Papers submitted for the Award must have been written within the past two years. The must be typed, double spaced, 25 pages or less, and should adhere to standard academic format guidelines. Submit four copies of the paper by April 15 to Tom Mayer, Department of Sociology, University of Colorado, Campus Box 327, Boulder, Colorado, 80309.
Conferences:
The Peace Studies Association, seventh annual meeting, will be held March 9-12 at Tufts University in Medford, MA. The theme will be Peace As A strategy: Practice, Movement, Culture. Contact Mathew Johnson, Peace and Justice Studies, 109 Eaton Hall, Tufts University, Medford, MA 02155 for information.

The 1995 Social Sciences History Association annual meetings will be held 16-19 November, in Chicago II. Contact the Social Science History Association, Institute for Social Research, Box 1248, Ann Arbor, MI 48106-1248

Newly Published:

From the Chair:
ASA Meetings August 19-23, 1995. I am afraid deadlines for all but roundtable submissions will have passed by the time this Newsletter reaches you. Of the two sessions we have been allocated, the one on "Ethnic, Religious, and Political Factors in Civil Strife" is being organized by Martin Patchen of Purdue University; and the other, on "Peace and War in a Changing World" by Gregory McLauchlan of the University of Oregon. Papers and proposals for papers that, for one reason or another, cannot be accommodated within either of these sessions will automatically be considered for a roundtable.

There has been complete, though not exactly golden, silence to my memo, E-mail, phone call, and faxes to the ASA and to Amiati Etzioni personally, requesting a thematic session with government officials and activists involved in peacekeeping. The project is obviously moot. On the other hand, I am in the process of arranging for a group visit for 50 persons to the US Memorial Holocaust Museum for Saturday, August 19, at 10 a.m., early enough to (hopefully) sidestep the mobs that will show up throughout the day. Those interested should let me know (Lang@max.u.washington.edu) so I can decide whether I should try to reserve places for members of peace and war or open the tour to all ASA members.

Nominations. The slate for the 1995 election of section officers will be prepared over the next six weeks. Members are invited to make suggestions to the chair of the nominations committee: John MacDougall, 15 Old Lowell Rd., Westford, MA 01886.

Newsletter. To make the Newsletter more attractive and increase its relevance to all members of the section, it would be desirable to have the editorial task shared by an associate editor to work in tandem with Dana Eyre and, after he tires of it, take over as editor. Instituting such an arrangement allows us not only to share responsibility but also to ease the transition from one editor to the next.

Other plans. It may be late but all of us owe a gratitude to the preceding chair and officers of the section for ending the year with a conference to best all expectations. Its a hard act to follow and I think we should wait until someone has truly exciting idea to make the time spent in planning pay off. But let us not lose the momentum and at least begin to think about other productive themes for future conferences. Council will be highly receptive to ideas.

I also urge most strongly that we follow through on the suggestion, made at the last business meeting, that members participate in and maintain liaison with the Foreign Studies Association, the Peace Research Association, and others that share many of our interests and aims. Reports of outstanding papers at their meetings in the Newsletter would be useful.

Section awards. Nor let us forget our two sections awards, announcements of which will by now have appeared in FOOTNOTES. I have not yet been back long enough from my Fulbright in East Germany to have checked. Meanwhile, the award committee for the Distinguished Scholarship, Teaching or Service award of the Peace and War Section seeks nominations from members for the award, to be made the 1995 ASA Annual Meeting. The Award is intended to honor a career of substantial achievement in scholarship, service, teaching, or any combination of the three in the area of peace, war, or other aspects of violent group conflict. Please send nomination letters summarizing achievements and, if possible, a vita of the nominee to Kurt Lang, Department of Sociology DK-40, University of Washington, Seattle, WA 98195. Deadline is May 1, 1995.

- Kurt Lang

CONTRIBUTE to your section newsletter - preferably by email! DEye@nps.navy.mil