The Intellectual Structure of Peace Studies: Questions and Social Roles in the Recent Period

John Loftland, University of California, Davis

This paper was presented at the fourth annual meeting of the Peace Studies Association, Boulder, Colorado, February 28, 1992.

I am a relative newcomer to the field of peace studies—having seriously attended to the discipline slightly less than one decade of my almost three decades of earning a living as a scholar. Like most newcomers to a social world, I have experienced wide-eyed, “gee whiz” astonishment. Matters that old hands take for granted have, for me, puzzles and problems. Like other marginal people looking in on a novel and bustling scene, I have been preoccupied with the question, “What are these people doing?”—and I have tried to find some plausible order in what I have experienced as confusion and disorder—as a panoply of people striding off in myriad, slightly related directions.

I am aware that many peace studies people have definite ideas about what peace studies “actually” is or should be. That is, bold intellectuals have set forth what they conceive to be the main tasks of peace studies and have elaborated broad agendas of work. We may think of this as a logical or deductive approach to the question of “What are these people doing?” While such efforts are indispensable, they are prescriptive rather than descriptive. They are answering the question “What should these people be doing?” rather than the question “What are these people doing?”

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Civil-Military Relations in Eastern and Central European Republics

David R. Segal, University of Maryland

On February 3, 1992, I had the privilege of participating in a colloquium on “The Role of the Military in Democratic Societies” at Le Chateau Montebello, in Quebec. The colloquium, sponsored by the Canadian Ministry of External Affairs and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, was intended to help government officials and military officers from recently independent Eastern and Southern European republics move their nations toward associate membership in NATO (a membership category that doesn’t yet exist) by defining roles for their military forces that are

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Studying Principled Nonviolent Action (PNVA)

John T. Crist, Syracuse University and Catholic University of America

It was the dramatic confrontation between the British Raj and Indian Nationalists during the years surrounding the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM) in India, 1929-1934, which first piqued the interest of sociologists in principled nonviolent action (PNVA) as a subject for study and analysis. Though recently some scholars have focused on the cultural meanings associated with PNVA (Epstein 1991; MacQueen 1992), from its beginnings sociological writing on PNVA has been concerned with explaining and evaluating the strategic utility of the tactic.

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We encourage our members to submit articles on any subject that you feel is pertinent to Section members.
Deadline for submission to the next edition of the Newsletter is September 1, 1992.
ASA Council Declines to Endorse the Sociological Statement on War and Violence

In the summer of 1990, the Peace and War Section voted to endorse the Seville Statement on Violence and to submit it to the A.S.A. Council for its official endorsement. The Council subsequently endorsed the Statement in January of 1991. In addition, because the Council felt that “the major propositions (of the Seville Statement) were largely psychological or anthropological,” it requested the Section on Peace and War “to develop a statement summarizing the sociological evidence bearing on the Seville Statement.”

Louis Kriesberg, past Chair of the Section, spearheaded this effort with the help of several Section members. This Sociological Statement on War and Violence was discussed at the Section’s 1991 business meeting and was printed in the Section’s 1991 Fall Newsletter, along with a request for any recommendations and/or changes. Kriesberg and his committee edited the Sociological Statement accordingly and presented it to the ASA Council in January of this year.

In response, James Coleman, President of ASA, wrote Kriesberg the following letter:

I’m writing subsequent to the ASA Council meeting of January 30, concerning the Sociological Statement on War and Violence prepared by the Section on the Sociology of Peace and War. We want to thank you personally and the Section very much for all the effort you put into preparation of the commentary. The Council has decided against making any further statement on violence or on the Seville Statement. A subcommittee of Council is now considering the general question of ASA’s making statements which express a public policy position on matters not directly affecting sociologists. For that reason, we do not want at this point to say more concerning the Seville statement or concerning violence.

I’m sorry that this may mean that the Section’s work was in vain. The Section is free, of course, to use the statement as it wishes, as a Section statement, so long as it’s clear that it is a statement of the Section and not the ASA. I should say that some Council members went so far as to say that it could well be seen to confirm the view which sees sociology as nothing more than painful documentation of the obvious. I believe it is extraordinarily difficult to make statements of this sort which are neither merely restating the obvious nor making assertions that can’t be defended. My own judgment is that the Seville Statement is that it errs on the latter side, while the Section’s statement errs on the former side.

Thanks again for responding so fully to the Council’s request.

Signed, James Coleman, President, 1991-92

The Section’s Sociological Statement on War and Violence will be discussed at the Section’s business meeting in August.

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Member News


Attend Section Activities in Pittsburgh, PA, on Sunday, Aug. 23

Meetings

The Consortium on Peace Research, Education and Development (COPRED) will hold its 21st Annual Conference on August 13-16, 1992, at San Francisco State University. The theme is “Healing the Wounds: Prospects for Peace and Justice in the next 500 years.” For more information contact: COPRED, George Mason University, Fairfax, VA 22030-4444, (703)993-3639.


The Community Board Program is the leading national training organization for school conflict manager programs and classroom curricula. A pioneer of student mediation systems, the Community Board Program began a pilot Conflict Manager program in the San Francisco schools in 1982. In 1984, the program received special commendation from both Bill Honig, California’s Superintendent of Public Instruction, and the California State Legislature for its “exemplary curricula and student-to-student conflict resolution process.”

The following are Conflict Manager Institutes to be held in 1992:

- May 12-15, Washington D.C.
- July 21-24, San Francisco
- August 18-21, San Francisco
- Nov. 10-13, San Francisco

Advanced Institute
- October 7-9, San Francisco

If you would like more information on the Community Board Program or have any questions, please call (415) 552-1250.
Funding Opportunities

The Social Science Research Council announces dissertation and postdoctoral fellowships for training and research on peace and security in a changing world, under the direction of the Committee on International Peace and Security. This program is funded by the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation. The Council expects to award approximately eight dissertation and eight postdoctoral fellowships to support innovative and multi-disciplinary research on the security implications of worldwide cultural, military, social, economic, environmental, and political changes. The Committee welcomes applications which engage the relationship between these changes and issues of international peace and security from the perspectives of social and natural sciences and the humanities. Applications are especially solicited from area studies scholars.

For further information and application materials, write to:

Social Science Research Council
Program on International Peace and Security
605 Third Avenue
New York, NY 10158
United States of America

Application deadline: December 1, 1992
Announcement of awards: April, 1993

New Peace Studies Program

The Center for Education Abroad is pleased to announce two new programs in Peace Studies to be offered during the fall semester 1992. These programs will be held at the European University Center for Peace Studies in Burg Schlamming, Austria. The Program in Peace and Culture is designed for students with little or no background in peace studies but who are interested in exploring the issues involved in peace and conflict resolution. The Advanced International Program in Peace Studies is intended for students with a substantial background in peace studies.

In addition to the course offerings in peace studies, basic German language courses will be available. Questions about the peace studies program should be referred to Helene C. Cohan, at (800) 767-0029.

Call For Papers

Papers in the area of “Environmental Politics” are being solicited for a special issue of the Journal of Political and Military Sociology, co-edited by Penelope Canan and Marvin E. Olsen. The issue will be published in late 1992 or early 1993. Papers dealing with any aspect of the politics of the environment (or the role of the military in such issues) are welcome. Please send two copies of your manuscript to Penelope Canan, Department of Sociology, University of Denver, Denver, Colorado 80208-0209 by September 1, 1992. The Journal charges a $10 processing fee payable to JPMS. If enough papers of high quality are received, the collection will subsequently be published as a book.

Civil-Military Relations (Continued From Page 1)

“appropriate” for democratic states. Half of the seventy participants were from North American and Western European NATO members (with Germany conspicuously absent) and from NATO headquarters. The other half were from a range of East and Central European nations: Albania, Bulgaria, the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, the Commonwealth of Independent States, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, and Romania.

The NATO agenda was fairly clear, and the participants from Eastern and Central Europe were obviously interested in discussing issues that we tend to take for granted in civil-military relations: whether the Minister of Defense must be a civilian; whether all other personnel in the Defense Ministry can be military; whether the parliament must see the defense budget; how much of the defense budget must be reviewed; whether parliament can reject or change the defense budget; under what conditions it would be appropriate for the armed forces to seize the government. I was tempted to point out that commissioned officers in the U.S. armed forces are sworn to protect and defend the Constitution; not necessarily to support a sitting president. But I held my tongue. Especially problematic to the representatives from the ex-Warsaw Treaty states was where a nation finds civilians sufficiently expert in military affairs to staff a defense ministry and parliamentary defense committees.

The would-be NATO members also came with their own agendas: to reassure NATO that they were not a threat to the West; to try to assure Russia that they did not perceive a threat from the East; to assure each other that they accept their current borders as the price of peace and stability; to sensitize the West and each other to the persisting ethnic and nationalistic cleavages that came to the fore with the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union (and the important role that they attach to the armed forces as an integrating institution in the face of such cleavage); to plead for economic assistance that they see as necessary for the stability they require as a foundation for political democracy.

Equally interesting was the range of opinion reflected by the current NATO members. While the backplot of the meeting was a message to the new republics that to achieve a formal linkage with the Atlantic alliance they would have to become democratic like the current members, it was clear that some of the smaller southern NATO nations felt that too much democracy might be a bad thing, particularly where the armed forces are concerned.

While many North Americans (including many North American social scientists) seem to expect to see the Americanization of civil-military relations in East and Central Europe, I fear that the Latin Americanization of these relations is perhaps a more likely outcome. The Cold War may be over, but peace and stability in Europe have not been achieved, and it is not clear to me that either political democracy or market economics will ultimately triumph there.
6. war systems taken as a general class in all human societies who have ever developed them.
7. direct group violence as a human phenomenon, encompassing the above referents but also including all forms of collective intergroup violence.
8. all direct violence, expanding to include interpersonal violence.
9. indirect or structural violence, expanding to include all acts and arrangements that thwart full human development (as proposed by Galtung).
10. all severe human conflict, expanding to include forms of human strife that are severe but less than structural violence.
11. all human conflict, expanding to include the milder of human antagonisms.

In the recent period much intellectual endeavor has been organized in terms of all eleven—or almost all eleven—of these central "dependent variables" or units of attention. It is my (undocumented) impression that either explicitly or implicitly most attention has been focused on levels four and five, with some attention to level six. In the midst of the mass fears of nuclear war of the early and middle eighties there was, of course, a great deal of attention to level two—the possibility of superpower nuclear war. I think, though, that the actual discussions of such a possibility moved rather quickly to levels four and five. It is of special note that the single most ambitious and elaborate effort to explicate the field in the recent period—providing it its first true textbook—is organized primarily around levels five and six (Barash 1991).

QUESTIONS

Work at this cluster of levels four, five, and six has seemed to me to address ten questions that are themselves applications and adaptations of generic questions one would ask about any social phenomenon. I state each question abstractly and then provide several examples of each question's formulation into specific inquiries.

1. Scale, Structure, Changes?
   What is the sheer scale and structure of the war system of the United States, the "former Soviet Union," and the globe, and how is its scale and structure changing over time in response to what other kinds of changes?
   • E.g. What is global military spending?
   • E.g. How is its spending distributed by Congressional districts? Since it has been shown to be carefully spread through a large portion of such districts, why have war system people so acted?
   • E.g. What is the character of the discourse employed by war system people, especially, nuclear weapons elites? Is there something called "nukespeak"?

2. Processes?
   What are the processes of the U.S. and other war systems?
   What, precisely, is going on within them; how do they work?
   • E.g. What is the process by which new policies move through elites to implementation?
   • E.g. What are the dynamics of the arms race?
   • E.g. How is war system spending expanding or contracting and in what ways?
   • E.g. Does a war system inherently operate in a wasteful and corrupt fashion regarding contracting and procurement?
   • E.g. What are its covert operations? What new strategies—such
as low-intensity conflict or weapons systems—is it developing and fielding?

3. Causes?
   What are the causes of the U.S. and other war systems?
   Why is there a war system in the United States, in other contemporary societies, in societies of human history? What are its historical, economic, political, psychological, and other underpinnings? Is it driven by psychologically pathological forces?
   • E.g. Is there a deep and underlying desire for world destruction and world renewal underlying the behavior of war system elites?
   • E.g. Is the war system profoundly chauvinist?

4. Goals and Motives?
   Why do the U.S. and other war systems act as they do?
   What are the U.S. war system’s “motives” and aims, as stated publicly and as held secretly and/or unconsciously?
   • E.g. Are military planners secretly trying to develop a first-strike capacity? (And, do they already have it?)

5. Effects?
   What are past, current, and likely effects of the U.S. and other war systems?
   • E.g. What are cultural, psychological, and political effects?
   • E.g. Would a “nuclear winter” result from a nuclear war?
   • E.g. Are there negative effects on technological development because of diversion of engineers and other technical personnel into non-productive military work?
   • E.g. Are there negative environmental effects on the communities near nuclear facilities?
   • E.g. Are there negative effects on communities near U.S. military installations around the world?
   • E.g. Are there negative effects on gender relations?

6. Technical Adequacy?
   Which doctrines, programs, and weapons of the war system are technically adequate or inadequate within the frameworks of ends and means used by their promoters?
   • E.g. Does the Sergeant York do its job?
   • E.g. Is mutually assured deterrence stable?
   • E.g. Are the current number of nuclear weapons really needed to have a stable deterrence?
   • E.g. Can Star Wars work?

7. Geo-political Adequacy?
   Which geo-political analyses offered by war system elites are accurate or inaccurate?
   • E.g. Is “forward defense” in Europe stabilizing or destabilizing, defensive or offensive?
   • E.g. Is there a Soviet Threat?
   • E.g. Are revolutions around the world instigated by the Soviet Union?

8. Moral Adequacy?
   In what ways are various aspects of the war system morally and ethically good or bad or legal or illegal?
   • E.g. What is the morality of the doctrine of deterrence, of nuclear weapons, of covert operations, of forward defense, of massive military spending itself?
   • E.g. Are aspects of war system policy illegal under international law?

9. Alternative Policies?
   By means of what national and international policies, programs, and actions can war systems be made safer, reduced in size, or eliminated altogether?
   • E.g. Can a bilateral nuclear freeze on the development and deployment of nuclear weapons be the opening of a new era of Soviet and American relations?
   • E.g. What alternative and new concepts of national, common, or alternative security are needed?
   • E.g. What new local institutions, such as “municipal diplomacy,” are needed in order to gain leverage over national policies and to redirect and replace the U.S. war system?
   • E.g. What new national institutions are needed?
   • E.g. What new international institutions are needed?
   • E.g. More fundamentally, what new concepts of peace, justice, and violence itself are required?

10. Citizen Action?
    By means of what citizen actions can government policies that maintain and expand war systems be changed and how are citizens actually acting to achieve such changes?
    • E.g. What are the forms and logic of nonviolent direct action; how effective are they?
    • E.g. How should peace activists best posture themselves with regard to conventional politics and how do they posture themselves?
    • E.g. What relations should peace-oriented people have with other movements for peace and justice, especially to environmental, women’s, minority, and anti-intervention movements? What relations do they develop?

As I have commented, this list of ten questions is highly abstract and thus “sociologically bloodless.” While the list serves to show us central preoccupations of the recent period—revealing some special concerns of that period—it does not provide us a sense of who peace studies people “are.”

ROLES
To gain such an understanding we need to employ an organizing principle that is more rooted in structure. One such principle is provided by the notion of “social roles,” here used to refer to labels that people publicly apply to themselves and others as ways of characterizing their major lines of activity. Some of these are quite well articulated in everyday life and in common use, some are less so.

Role occupants have tended to specialize in one or more of the ten questions I have just described. I order my presentation of them from the more narrow and weapons-technical to the wider and globally political.

1. The Atomic Scientists.
   Virtually from the moment of the detonation of the first nuclear weapon at Alamogordo, New Mexico on July 16, 1945, some scientists who worked on it have thought that the American government had had inadequate policies regarding it and have carried on technical and other criticism of successive regimes. Expressing themselves in such organizational forms as the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists and the Federation of American Scientists, they have been a key, legitimizing force within peace-striving in general and within peace studies in particular. Unfortunately for both peace-striving and peace studies, this “magic”
underlying problems of humans as quite profound, as, for example, (1) a human propensity to death and destruction in the hope of renewal; (2) the workings of an aggressive, masculine ethic; (3) a human need to project personal defects as enmity and, therefore, a need for enemies.

7. Peace and Conflict Researchers.
Attuned to one or another degree to all the above types of work, but not featuring any of them, a somewhat more "removed" role cluster of intellectuals has striven to develop a dispassionate but also morally engaged science of the causes of war and peace. This is the specialization that has been most prominently associated with efforts to establish "peace research" as a legitimate form of intellectual enterprise in higher intellectual circles. Naturally enough, some people have tended to regard peace research and peace studies as synonymous. As is obvious, I am taking a much broader view.

8. Peace Scheme Developers.
Sometimes overlapping with peace and conflict researchers, a nonetheless distinctive genre of intellectuals has concentrated on devising schemes of political and other arrangements that would reduce or eliminate war and/or preparations for war and plans for how to get to such a peaceful world. Efforts of this sort have been quite varied in scope and focus and have included enterprises in which groups of people have tried systematically to "image" an alternative peaceful world, detailed plans for a new world in a radically revised form of the United Nations, and have rethought conceptions of "national security" (as in "alternative security"), and non-military national defense.

Individual intellectuals have tended to specialize in creating and elaborating one or another form of the above types of analysis, even though they might do additional kinds of work on this list in a secondary way. This last role—or task—is rather different in this respect. Although there is a fair-sized literature addressing it, the topic of criticizing past citizen peace action strategies and proposing new ones has not been the distinctive undertaking of a significant number of people. Instead, it is a preoccupation of a great many intellectuals—and others—that is addressed in a way that is secondary to other forms of the kinds of work listed.

Culture-creating and elaborating intellectual work of the nine types just described is rather different from work centered on preserving historical records of peace-seeking and developing such records into formal histories. This latter work may be understood as culture-creating and elaborating in the sense that history is created socially in the acts of preserving and analyzing it. A history that would not in this sense exist is therefore created by acts of assembling it. Comparatively, over many decades, peace-seeking organizations and individuals have been quite striking in the degree they have sought to preserve their papers and other artifacts for future study. The diversity and complexity of these collections has advanced to the point that there are now even publications listing institutional and individual peace archives. From these and other sources, several dozen historians have written a variety of histories of peace movements, including a new wave of analyses of the eighties. A number of these
CONCLUSION: OUTLANDER VERSUS PEACE STUDIES PEACE INTELLECTUALS

The reality constructionist perspective and more recent deconstructionist thinking have fostered in us a consciousness of the high degree to which all concepts, when inspected closely, are "essentially contentious," or, in a different trendy label, "contested terrain." Less conflictual in formulation, deconstructionists urge us, further, to appreciate the fundamentally ambiguous character of all language, that is, of all meaning. I think the concept of "peace studies" is reasonably characterized in such ways.

When we inspect a number of the formal schemes people use to organize a discipline implicitly or explicitly conceived as peace studies, we find great diversity among them, and, moreover, several important divergences from the focus I have reviewed above. I refer, for example, to such formulations as:

- George Lopez's (1989) nine-area "conceptual map of peace studies" derived from the intersection of the two variables of the "levels of human interaction" (individual, group and international) and "substantive focus" (on violence, methods of reducing and resolving violent conflict, peace values, norms, institutions).
- David Barash's (1991) 613 double-column page Introduction to Peace Studies consisting of twenty-four chapters organized around the four topics of the nature and frequency of war, causes of war, paths to negative peace, and paths to positive peace.

There are obviously many additional schemes (in, for example, Smoker et al. 1990, Wallenstejn 1988, Thomas and Young 1989, Galtung 1988), but these examples serve to suggest that while such schemes are clearly related to peace as a topic of study, relevant topics and how to approach them are highly diverse.

In particular, the two descriptive schemes I have outlined encompass a range of people and topics not commonly found in the more formal or logical conceptions of peace studies. Contemplating this difference in coverage, I have begun to think it is useful to distinguish between all intellectual work on peace topics and peace studies as a distinctive academic discipline and enclave. We might then say that the two descriptive schemes I have presented strive to encompass peace intellectual work in general in the recent period and not simply the work of those intellectuals most closely identified with the formal or logical enterprise called peace studies.

I am encouraged in this distinction by the fact that such a division is also seen with regard to a discipline I have known much longer than peace studies, that of sociology. Within that discipline, too, there is an enormous diversity of topics and approaches—diversity that is even more dramatic than within peace studies. And, in addition, there is a great deal of sociological work going on in the world that is not routinely identified as sociology or considered formally a part of the discipline by people who are in the business of making assertions about what "is" sociology. Paralleling the distinction between peace intellectuals and peace studies, there are a great many sociological intellectuals who are not involved with or ratified as disciplinary sociologists. In both cases, we may think of this "other" category as "outlander" intellectuals. Among peace intellectuals, we can point to people such as Daniel Ellsberg, David Dellinger, and Robert Aldrich, among a host of others. Examples of sociological outlying intellectuals include Eric Hoffer, Jane Jacobs, and William H. (not F.) Whyte.

If a distinction between outlander and disciplinary intellectuals is valid, we can raise the same question about both peace studies and sociology: Is each construing its domain too narrowly? This question, of course, brings us back to the deconstructionist characterization of all concepts as fundamentally ambiguous, continually constructed, and unceasingly negotiated.

REFERENCES


PNVA

(Continued From Page 1)

Krishnalal Shridharani's War Without Violence: A Study of Gandhi's Method and its Accomplishments (first published in 1939 and thoroughly revised in 1962) is one of the earliest such works in social science. After participating in the Salt March of 1930 and spending time in prison for other activities associated with the CDM, Shridharani came to the United States in 1934 to complete his dissertation on the movement with the political science department at Columbia University in the late 1930s. (Shridharani then taught in the Sociology Department before returning to India in 1946). Gene Sharp's dissertation in sociology, later published in India (1960), was a trio of case studies of nonviolent campaigns during the Indian anti-colonial struggle that echoed the concern for analyzing Gandhi's strategy evidenced in Shridharani's work, and in Gregg's writing (1929, 1935).

Later, the adoption of principled nonviolent tactics by the leadership of the civil rights movement would inspire a new round of American graduate students in sociology (see Lacey, 1965). Movement leader Ralph Abernathy completed a study of the strategic aspects of the Montgomery bus boycott for his
master’s thesis in sociology at Atlantic University. American sociology journals in the early 1960s contained a number of studies of nonviolent action or activists (see Searles and Williams 1962; Vander Zanden 1963; and Von Eschen et. al. 1969).

Since the 1960s, much writing on PNVA has taken the form of case studies, usually historical accounts of nonviolent action in settings around the world, some quite insightful and meticulous (like Parkman’s Nonviolent Insurrection in El Salvador). But collectively the work has remained idiographic, with little effort expended toward generating a framework for analyzing nonviolent social movements across cases and contexts. This is in sharp contrast to developments in the sociology of social movements and of historical sociology—the work on the Civil Rights Movement is most useful as a model here (McAdam 1982; Morris 1984).

Still, these works do not explicitly address the more problem-oriented issues that I suspect are of most concern to those who study principled nonviolent action: (1) what are the historical limitations of its efficacy and how does this compare with other strategies in similar contexts; and (2) can we specify the conditions which contribute to the adoption of a nonviolent strategy by viable coalitions of SMOs and which preclude or disrupt such a development?

A research team headed by Doug Bond at Harvard is currently employing Sharp’s famous (if underutilized) taxonomy of items in the repertoire of nonviolent action while assembling a cross-national dataset on episodes of PNVA during the twentieth century. The material is coded primarily from New York Times accounts of protest events and supplemented extensively by secondary material. This is one of a number of on going projects (see for instance Krueger 1990) at the Albert Einstein Institution (AEI) and Harvard’s Program on Nonviolent Sanctions (PNS) in Conflict and Defense (at the Center for International Affairs). The two organizations were both founded by Sharp, whose research (especially Sharp 1973) has done more for legitimizing PNVA as worthy of research than that of any other scholar. AEI and PNS work jointly to promote research and analysis of the “strategic use of nonviolent sanctions” and provide opportunities for researchers, visiting scholars, pre- and post-doctoral fellows, and activists to discuss their work.

Two recent pieces represent a successful blend of nomothetic concerns with idiographic case studies. Pagnucco and McCarthy (forthcoming 1992) describe the importance of transnational organizations and networks in facilitating the emergence of Servicio Paz y Justicia en America Latina (SERPAJ). The organization, led by Nobel Prize winner Adolfo Perez Esquivel, “is the most important organized advocate of principled nonviolent direct action in Latin America” and, among other things, provided organizational support and international linkage for the campaign of the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo. SERPAJ is not a membership organization, and Pagnucco and McCarthy emphasize the role of bystander publics—namely European Protestant Churches, the Roman Catholic Church, and international pacifist networks, especially the International Fellowship of Reconciliation—in funding the continued operation of SERPAJ and in legitimating its authority to speak around the world on Latin American human rights issues.

Smith (1992) employs a political opportunities structure model to discuss how bureaucratic reforms in the Chinese government during the 1980s opened up new possibilities for political participation by students, which in turn provided an infrastructure of academic journals and other newly founded forums, independent of the party apparatus, from which students could mobilize. Though the student leadership adopted a rhetoric and posture of principled nonviolent action, Smith shows how the meteoric rise of the Tiananmen Square campaign undercut the movement’s ability to build a cohesive nonviolent social movement organization that might have put organizers in a better position for negotiation to avoid the repression in Beijing, or at least to sustain the movement afterwards.

These two pieces make it apparent that the study of principled nonviolent action should be intimately associated with the field of collective action and social movements generally. What distinguishes the former from the latter is a problem-oriented concern with the factors that influence choice of tactics within social movements and the comparative effectiveness of items within a tactical repertoire. All signs are that this growing sensitivity to a broader movements literature will continue to characterize the study of nonviolent action in the coming years.

REFERENCES


