THE AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION SECTION ON

THE SOCIOLOGY OF PEACE & WAR

14933 Oaks North Drive   •   Dallas, TX 75240   •   (214) 392-2649   •   SPRING/SUMMER, 1990

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Member's Forum

The Changing World and Section Business

By Louis Kriesberg, Chair-Elect,
Peace & War Section, Syracuse University

Being in the midst of a world in transition is intellectually exhilarating, and it gives our work even greater significance than it already had. In such fluid times, interpretations of the past, analyses of the present, and envisioned possibilities for the future can have profound effects.

For example, the work of European peace researchers has contributed significantly to the transformations underway in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe (Dragesda, 1989). But in the United States, political leaders generally claim “We won,” and that is usually asserted to vindicate the hardline approach, which was escalated in President Reagan’s first years in office. That implies that the U.S. government should assume an even more dominant military position in the world.

Are there other explanations for the transformations? I think so; they include the evolving integration of Europe and of the two Germanys in accord with Brandt’s “ostpolitik,” the increased exchanges between the United States and the Soviet Union resulting from official and unofficial agreements and practices, the resistance of major segments of the American society to many of the Reagan Administration’s jingoistic and militaristic policies, and so on. (Continued Page 4)

International Peace Research Conference

By Elise Boulding,
Secretary General, IPRA

Please consider this your personal invitation to attend the 25th anniversary International Peace Research Association Conference to be held in Groningen, The Netherlands, July 3-7, just before the ISA Conference in Madrid. You will find it a wonderful opportunity to become acquainted with the international community of peace researchers of which you

(Continued Page 4)

Why The Cold War Is Melting: Toward A Sociological Analysis

By Sam Marullo,
Georgetown University

In the previous issue, I outlined several factors that contribute to the continuation of the arms race despite the warming relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. These include: continued adherence to a strategic policy of extended deterrence and forward based

(Continued Page 5)

We encourage our members to submit articles on any subject that you feel is pertinent to Section members. Deadline for submission to the next edition of the Newsletter is Oct. 1, 1990.
Section Meetings In
Washington, D.C.

The ASA Annual Meeting will be held on August 11-15, 1990, at the Washington Hilton Hotel in Washington, D.C. The Peace and War Section have some exciting activities planned for this year’s meetings.

Sunday, August 12 - Times & places to be announced

I. PAPER SESSION ON "PEACEKEEPING"

Organizers and Presidents: John Lofland, University of California, Davis and David R. Segal, University of Maryland at College Park.

The Social Construction of Peacekeeping.
Dana Eyre, U.S. Military Academy

The UN Peacekeeper - A New Type of Soldier?
Mauritz Mortensen, National Defense Headquarters, Norway

Peacekeeping After the 1988 Nobel Peace Prize.
Robert Waldman, University of Maryland at College Park

Donald P. Irish, Hamline University

II. REFEREEED ROUNDTABLES

A. Paradigms in the Study of Peace and War

Presider: R.E. Canjar Wirtz, University of Maryland at College Park.

A Hierarchy Theory of Peace Negotiating.
J. Lynn England, Brigham Young University

World Order and Images of the World: Toward a Sociological Mapping of International Relations.
David Jacobson, Princeton University

War and Peace - A Multiparadigmatic Science.
R.E. Canjar Wirtz, University of Maryland at College Park

B. Military Institutions and National Security Strategy

Presider: Sam Marullo, Georgetown University

Technology, Rationality and Strategic Thought: The Case of the Navy.
Paul Eisenhauer and David E. Pearson, Lafayette College

Gregory Hooks, Indiana University and Gregory

McLauchlan, University of Oregon

Why the Arms Race Continues.
Sam Marullo, Georgetown University

C. Peace Movements and Politics

Presider: H. Edward Price, Jr., Western Carolina University

Becoming a Peace Activist: A Life Course Perspective.
James T. Hannon, Clark University

Are Oligarchy and Professionalization Essential for Success? An Analysis of a Disarmament Organization.
H. Edward Price, Jr., Western Carolina University

Congress, the Grassroots and Arms Control in the Late Reagan Era: A Quantitative Analysis.
Brian Kelly and John MacDougall, University of Lowell

D. Cohesion in Military Organizations

Presider: Jen Elavacek, University of North Texas

Cohesion in American and Chinese Military Units.
Xiaolin Li, University of Maryland at College Park

Durkheimian Fatalism and the Dysfunctions of Unit Cohesion.
John Daniel Schubert, University of Maryland at College Park

E. Effects of Participation in Military Organizations

Presider: Rachel Ivie, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

Models of Value Socialization of West Point Cadets.
John Hammill, University of Maryland at College Park

The Impact Education of Vietnam-Era Veterans' Occupational Attainment.
Jere Cohen, University of Maryland at Baltimore County, David R. Segal, University of Maryland at College Park, Lloyd V. Temme, University of Maryland at College Park

Military Experience and Attitudes in Later Life: Contextual Influences Across Forty Years.
Rachel Ivie, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

III. COUNCIL MEETING

IV. SECTION BUSINESS MEETING
Monday, August 13, 5-8 pm
Reception at the Capitol

The Peace and War Section will hold a joint reception with the Collective Behavior and Social Movements Section on Capitol Hill. The reception will take place at the House of Representatives, Cannon Office Building, 3rd floor, Cannon Caucus Room.

Members of Congress like to attend these types of receptions. So contact your Congresspersons and invite them to participate in this exciting event. Also, invite colleagues who have an interest in the sociology of peace and war but have not yet joined our Section. This is a good way to introduce them to the membership in a relaxed, informal atmosphere.

The Cannon Office Building is at Independence Avenue and First Street, S.E., Capitol South, Metro Station, Blue Line. You may take a taxi from the hotel or use the subway system. To use the subway, get on the Metro at DuPont Circle (Red Line), Go to Metro Center and transfer to the Blue Line toward Addison Road. Get off at Capitol South, Metro Station. Walk one block north to the Cannon Building.

Other Relevant Activities

On Saturday, August 11, Section member William Gibson, California State University, will present a paper, "Beyond the Nuclear Holocaust and Onward to the Stars: Stealth Bombers and Fighters as Starships," at a refereed roundtable sponsored by the Sociology of Culture Section.

In addition, William Gibson is organizer of an ASA informal roundtable entitled "Will the Cold War Create a Crisis in American Political Culture?" Time and place to be announced.

Calls For Papers


One number in each volume will be devoted to the philosophical analysis of the cognitive, methodological and applied aspects of the major theoretical orientations and frames of reference in each of the social disciplines — cultural, anthropology, economics, sociology, political science, history, social psychology, human geography, and formal education. The other number of each volume will consist of assorted articles relevant to the generic topic of the journal.

All manuscripts will be reviewed by selected members of the editorial board which consists of leading scholars in each of the social disciplines and philosophy.

For further information and "Guidelines to Authors" please contact: Joseph B. Gitler, Editor, FOUNDATIONS, Robinson Hall, Room 3503, George Mason University, Fairfax, Virginia, 22030. Telephone 703-273-3284.

The Justice Without Violence Working Group is developing a proposal for a conference with invited papers, and subsequent edited volume. The focus will be on developing areas, particularly Latin America. (Conflict Resolution Consortium, Sociology 327, University of Colorado, Boulder 80309)

ATTENTION: Section Officer and Council elections are in progress. If you have not received your official ballot, immediately contact Caroline Bugno, ASA Office, 202-833-3410.

Miscellaneous

The Peace Studies Association is moving its executive offices from Bethel College, Kansas, to the University of Colorado, Boulder. Section member, ROBIN CREWS, is Executive Director. ABIGAIL FULLER, University of Colorado, will serve as his assistant.

Member News

LESTER KURTZ, University of Texas, Austin, sends his greetings from Delhi, India, where he is studying the impact of Gandhi’s teachings on foreign policies in India. He says that "living in India has been a transforming experience". Les says that his research is going well and that he has remarkable access to everybody from Gandhian activists to government officials. Section members can expect to see an article written by Les for our Fall edition of the Newsletter.


Recruit One Member! Invite them to Section activities in August!
The Changing World (Continued From Page 1)

These and other alternative explanations should be examined and put forth in the academic and political arenas (Kriesberg, 1989a, 1989b).

The transformations underway also mean that we should give attention to many issues in addition to the threat of nuclear war. Among the issues claiming more attention are regional conflicts and their emergence and intractable character, conflict settlements that are equitable and enduring, and life damaging inequities and other forms of structural violence.

For the members of the Peace and War Section, the challenges and opportunities are exciting. Sociological insights can contribute to our understanding of the bases for the nuclear war threat, militarism, and other issues mentioned above, Cuzzort (1990) has usefully reviewed how several major theoretical approaches help explain the nuclear war threat. Many other sociologists have written about particular aspects of peacemaking as well as of war-making (e.g. Burton, 1987; Galtung, 1988; Kurtz, 1988; McCrea and Markle, 1989; Kriesberg, 1988; Kurtz, 1988; Patchen, 1988; and Sharp, 1985).

We are drawing from and adding to several intellectual currents that can help explain how the risk of large-scale organized violence are lessened and how international disputes are settled, how enemies become reconciled and how integrative networks are constructed. Among these currents are conflict resolution and discourse analysis.

For the Section as an organization, we should continue what we have begun and constructed over the years. The annual meetings should continue as a major time to exchange ideas and develop relations that will help sustain us in our teaching and research after the meetings. We should also try to encourage our colleagues in other areas of sociology to consider how their work contributes to understanding the bases of wars that can be avoided and movement toward peace be furthered. Too often, even our colleagues, see the issues of war and peace as too large and intractable to be usefully addressed by them.

More attention needs to be given to teaching about issues of peace and war. The rapid expansion of peace studies programs in U.S. colleges and universities means that the Section should give attention to the implications of that development. A first step would be to exchange information about these new programs. At the graduate level, a variety of forms have appeared. For example, the Department of Sociology at the University of Colorado offers a concentration in conflict studies within its Ph.D. program. George Mason University, with its interdisciplinary faculty including several sociologists, offers a Ph.D. in conflict resolution. Notre Dame University offers an interdisciplinary M.A. degree in peace studies. Syracuse University offers a Ph.D. in social sciences, sociology, international relations, and other disciplines within which a student can concentrate on peace studies and conflict resolution.

The expansion of the field also means that the opportunities for funded research in the area of peace studies have greatly increased. The Section should provide information about these developments, helping its members to share experiences about the United States Institute of Peace, the MacArthur Foundation, and other possible sources of support.

I am excited about doing sociology pertaining to peace and war issues, particularly now. The field is growing, there are new relevant ideas, and the peoples of the world are in great need of our work in the field.

References


International Peace Conference (Continued from page 1)

are already a part — as a member of the Section of ASA. The conference theme is "The Next Twenty-Five Years in Peace Research: What Have We Learned From The Past? Where Are We Going?"

With events changing the face of several world regions from day to day, the panels at our five plenary sessions will have a challenge to prepare their presentations on the future of Europe, North-South issues, the state of conflict and peace research, the relationship between the environment, development and peace, and new breakthroughs in conflict resolution. But you will find that the women and men from all continents speaking on these subjects are definitely up to that challenge!

You will have a hard time choosing among the 11 commissions that will be meeting for two to four sessions each. You will be able to manage to take in two, perhaps three, series, if you plan carefully. The Commissions correspond to IPRA's Peace Education Commission and ten Study Groups: 1) Communications, 2) Ecological Security, 3) Human Rights and Development, 4) Internal Conflicts and Their Resolution, 5) International Conflict Resolution, 6) Nonviolence, 7) Peace Education (which will include two special sessions on University Peace Studies), 8) Peace Movements, 9) Religion and Conflict, 10) Women and Militarism, 11) Weapons and Technology and Disarmament.

In your free time you can explore the delightful medieval "old town" part of Groningen, take a boat ride on the canal, and visit with your fellow peace researchers from far parts.

If you don't have a conference brochure and registration form, write to us at the IPRA Secretariat, Box 327, University of Colorado, Boulder, CO 80309 and we will send you one at once. The brochure will contain the
names and addresses of Commission conveners, if you wish to submit a paper. There will be a special poster session organized by Riitta Wahlstrom of Finland for presenters who are not able to get a slot in a Commission session, so everyone who wishes will be able to present something somewhere! Some Commission programs are already full, so we are glad Riitta came up with the suggestion of poster sessions, used increasingly at international conferences these days.

We are hard at work raising funds to bring Third World scholars to Groningen. Any of you who have had occasion to try fundraising recently will know this is, paradoxically, a particularly hard time to raise funds for peace-related activities. Potential donors seem to think that peace is no longer an issue — it has been achieved! So if any of you feel able to send a contribution toward the airfare of an IPRA member from Asia, the Middle East, Africa or Latin America, or their board and room at Groningen, this would be very much appreciated. Checks can be made out to the IPRA Foundation, a tax-exempt body, and mailed to the IPRA Secretariat. Anything welcome, from $10 to $1,000.

I hope to see you at Groningen!

**Why the Cold War is Melting**

(Continued from Page 1)

forces; the lack of a political mechanism for evaluating this policy; economic incentives embedded in the operations of the military-industrial complex; pork-barrel politics in Congress; the political clout of extremist conservative rollback advocates; Federal budget-making practices; and the internal decision-making processes in the Pentagon, Executive agencies, and Congressional committees. In this issue, I examine some of the political claims about the end of the Cold War and explain their inadequacies, and offer instead an enumeration of some of the structural and institutional factors that I believe have in fact contributed to the rapid demise of the Cold War.

Inadequacies of Conventional Explanations

The conventional political wisdom regarding the end of the Cold War is inadequate as a social scientific explanation. Political conservatives would have us believe that the crumbling of the Soviet empire and other sporadic outbreaks of peace are due to the nuclear force modernization undertaken by the Reagan Administration. Boldly stated, their claim is that peace through strength works. Obviously there is much political vested interest on the part of Republican party leaders to make such claims, and we heard them recently from Senate minority leader Robert Dole, Republican party chair Lee Atwater, and even President Bush himself.

On the other side of the aisle, Democrats want to share the credit by claiming, as Senate majority leader George Mitchell has, that it has been a bipartisan approach for over forty years to "stand firm" in containing communism. Mitchell is correct in the sense that containment has been U.S. policy since the late 1940s, supported by Presidents of both parties, and it has been funded by the Congress (mostly controlled by the Democrats) throughout the postwar era. It is precisely the consistency of this policy that makes it impossible to attribute casualty to it as an explanation of recent changes in Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, Afghanistan, Namibia, and Central America. As any scientist — even a political one — would readily acknowledge, a change of status of a dependent variable cannot be explained by a constant independent variable.

Besides this policy consistency, the actual Reagan buildup of the 1980s was not large enough to pose a new level of military threat to the Eastern bloc. It was certainly expensive, with Pentagon spending totalling over $2.3 trillion during the Reagan era, but this resulted from increasing manpower, readiness, R & D, and conventional weapons procurement that did relatively little to change the nature or perception of the threat posed by the United States. The most threatening buildup, nuclear force modernization, was limited (wisely, I believe) by the Congress before it constituted a real first strike danger: only 50 MXs, 100 B1 bombers, and 9 Trident submarines were actually deployed; and the Strategic Defense Initiative was confined to the research labs. This is one of the great ironies of the United States' and Soviet Union's "overkill" capable nuclear arsenals — even the large jump in firepower accompanying the acquisition of these weapons constitutes only a marginal change in capabilities. Instead of having 10,000 nuclear warheads aimed at the Soviets as we did in 1980, there are now roughly 13,000 — enough to make whatever rubble remains bounce a bit higher.

One could nevertheless try to sustain the argument that the U.S. buildup was responsible for forcing the Soviets to expend their scarce resources on weapons modernization which finally led to their system's collapse in the late 1980s. Although there is a logic to this argument, the reality is more complicated. In terms of a historical explanation, the sequencing of events simply does not match. The third generation nuclear modernization begun in the United States in the late 1970s and greatly accelerated during the Reagan era constituted an average yearly growth rate of 8% in defense spending from 1979-1985. The Soviets completed their second generation modernization in the early 1980s by averaging 4-5% growth in defense spending during the 1970s. Since then Soviet military spending increased an average of only 2% in the first half of the 1980s, after which it has declined. In short, the Soviet Union has chosen to make only selective improvements in its arsenal since the late 1970s — choosing not to compete in the race — rather than engaging in modernization of their entire force. The Soviets may have hit a ceiling in terms of the proportion of their GNP they would devote to the military, but they reached it in the early to mid-1980s. Rather than seeing the Soviet defense balloon as having burst, a better image is one of Soviet leaders deciding to let the air out slowly.

The Great Man Theory and Its Limitations

So if U.S. containment policy remained constant, the buildup was not so great as to constitute a new level of threat, and the Soviets quit racing before matching the final round of U.S. modernization, how do we account for the changes occurring now? The obvious and much discussed phenomenon is the ascension of Mikhail Gorbachev to Soviet leadership. The economic stagnation in the Eastern bloc created the crisis conditions that enabled Gorbachev to promote calls for drastic change, as articulated in his policies of glasnost and perestroika. Previous eras of stagnation in the Soviet economy were
overcome by tapping large reserves of new resources: human labor during Stalin's collectivization efforts, defense procurement-induced heavy industrialization during the 1960s, and tapping natural gas and oil reserves in the 1970s. Comparably inexpensive resources were no longer available in the 1980s, so Gorbachev has attempted to tap the investment made in the military-industrial complex and the costs of maintaining an empire in order to enter the post-industrial, hi-tech era.

The immediately precipitating event would have to be defined as Gorbachev's explicit renunciation of the Brezhnev doctrine and acceptance of strategic "new thinking." This has enabled the "revolutions" in Eastern Europe and opened the door for deep cuts in military arsenals. But this "great man" theory espoused by more liberal pundits and only begrudgingly acknowledged by their more conservative colleagues is insufficient as an explanation of the changes now underway. Although Western containment served as a constant structural pressure and Gorbachev's new thinking was the precipitating factor, they are not sufficient to explain the speed and even the direction these reforms have taken.

Indeed, we could imagine, and in fact some still fear, that there could be a crackdown and reversion to more totalitarian tactics, including the purge of Gorbachev and the ascension of a new Stalin. This is not very likely, however, given the several intermediary factors that are needed to help explain these changes.

The Overlooked Unilateral Initiatives

Before turning to the intermediary structural conditions that have facilitated the thawing of the Cold War, one additional set of precipitating events should be given some credit. These are the unilateral initiatives taken primarily by the Soviet Union, apparently at the initiative of General Secretary Gorbachev, and the United States as a result of Congressional action. The Soviet nuclear test moratorium from August 1985 to January 1987 demonstrated the seriousness of their "new thinking" about halting the qualitative nuclear arms race, a competition which they perceived they could not win. This initiative was dismissed publicly by Reagan officials as a disingenuous ploy, but was seen internally as a threat to continued U.S. force modernization. In response to this, U.S. officials implemented a strategy to forestall further pressures to halt nuclear testing by devising obtuse verification protocols to attach to the unratified Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty and the Threshold Test Ban Treaty. Upon completion of those agreements, the Bush Administration announced its intention to not participate in negotiations on a Comprehensive Test Ban, as previously agreed, on the grounds that it is not in the U.S. interest to halt testing. However, pressure is again growing for a test ban, as Non-Proliferation Treaty signatory nations, grassroots groups, and Democratic legislative initiatives in the House are demanding that testing be stopped, or at least severely restricted.

The most important unilateral initiative, however, was Gorbachev's withdrawal of 500,000 troops and 10,000 tanks from its western military region in Eastern Europe during 1989 and 1990. Gorbachev announced this initiative during his December 1988 United Nations speech which outlined Soviet "new thinking," focusing especially on global problems such as North-South relations, development and debt issues, and environmental dangers.

Although greeted skeptically at first, Western observers and officials later granted credibility to the cuts, verifying that they in fact reduced the risk of a Soviet conventional attack on the West and doubled NATO's warning time of such an attack.

The Irreversibility of Warming Relations

The intermediate structural and institutional factors needed to explain the rapid thawing of the Cold War include: the state of the global economy and the Soviet Union's position in it, the development of an opposition movement's infrastructure, peacemaking efforts by third parties, U.S. domestic policies — especially the effects of peace movement activities, and other cultural changes. As these additional factors are discussed, it becomes clear why growing numbers of analysts have concluded that East-West relations have changed irreversibly.

The Global Economy

The global economy is now a reality that can no longer be ignored by the Soviet Union and its Eastern European trading partners. Prior to the 1980s, the industrialization of the CMEA (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance) nations, though relatively inefficient and unable to provide much in the way of consumer goods, was adequate to provide for their basic military and infrastructural needs. As new computer and robotic technologies revolutionized basic industries, lowering the price of steel, transportation equipment, machine tools and consumer products, the CMEA nations could no longer keep up production of defense and basic goods.

Simultaneously, information technology changed so that the awareness of consumer products and Western lifestyles became known to those in the Eastern bloc. As the rest of the industrialized world was becoming more integrated and consumption oriented, the people of Eastern bloc nations became more aware of their increasing relative deprivation. If their material conditions were to be improved, it was clear that the CMEA economies would also have to enter the information age and become part of the global economy. Massive infrastructural investments and redirecting of capital would be required.

At the same time, a modicum of relations was maintained between East and West, especially through the intra-German border. Throughout the postwar era, even during the frigid Cold War era of the early Reagan years, there have been substantial trade, diplomatic relations, and travel between the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic. This policy of "ostpolitik" sustained a flow of products, ideas, and people through the iron curtain. As much as this sustained "aid and trade" served as the bane of Western conservatives, such links have proved to be essential in demonstrating the desirability of Western political and material culture. It is no small irony that links maintained during the Cold War primarily through "liberal" policies and groups' activities, despite vehement opposition from the Right based on their presumed seditious nature, have paved the way for the commercial openings to the East that now hold such promise for vast profits for Western business elites.
Development of Opposition Movements

During the last several months of 1989, we witnessed massive numbers of East Europeans flooding their city squares demanding reform. Obviously, such large numbers do not just happen to show up on their way home from work and, when the state controls the media, it is difficult to rely on official channels for the spread of information. What is needed is an opposition movement infrastructure to coordinate demonstrations, articulate demands, and eventually negotiate settlements with authorities. In the past, it has taken months, even years for opposition movements to create such infrastructures. The apparent speed with which the opposition jelled in Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Bulgaria, and even Romania is stunning at first glance. Upon closer examination, however, we realize that the opposition movements of the Eastern bloc nations have been differentially long in forming, having operated covertly for years in some cases, and have relied on both hi-tech and face-to-face communication to advance their work.

Organizational Bases: To a large extent, the opposition movements have grown out of the standing institutions of the East European societies — primarily the churches and workers' organizations. Although church and union groups did not explicitly challenge the state, they provided for communication among their members and created a common oppositional ideology. When opposition was tolerated, the churches and unions were coopted by dissenting leaders to serve the movement's objectives. The role of the Roman Catholic church as a source of opposition, a means of organizing, and in providing some protection against state repression were crucial for opposition organizing in Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Romania. The same role was played by the Lutheran church in the GDR.

In addition to the church and labor organizations, more recently created groups — to some degree explicitly oppositional in nature — have also played an important role. These are human rights, peace, environmental, cultural exchange, and independent political groups. Some of the human rights groups have been in existence for ten or more years and have opposed repressive state measures, often landing their leaders in jail.

Information Flows: A critical precondition enabling change in the Eastern bloc has been the dramatic increase in recent years of the flow of information internally and from West to East Europe. This increased information flow has facilitated organizing for opposition movements and spreading democratic values and knowledge of Western culture. Several infrastructural tasks in creating an opposition are facilitated by improved internal information flows: leadership development, dissemination of the opposition's ideas, and spread of information needed to coordinate opposition efforts. The spread of Western values provides not only an alternative to the existing Eastern Communist systems but includes a critique of them. Conveying knowledge of Western culture, especially regarding lifestyles and consumption patterns, contributed to a sense of relative deprivation among East Europeans, making them aware of the noninevitability of the material shortages they faced. Perhaps most importantly, however, was the promotion and realization of the values of freedom and democracy by the United States and Western Europe, albeit imperfectly, that provided the inspiration for Eastern bloc dissidents to sustain their hopes and efforts.

Travel: Travel between East and West, although restricted, was allowed in increasing numbers throughout the 1980s. This is especially the case for Germany, where over three million pensioners and one million other East Germans (of 16 million total population) traveled to West Germany in 1988. The exchange visits between West and East European, U.S. and Soviets groups and churches also played an important role in warming relations. Formal student exchanges and student visas for East bloc students to study in the West enabled the travel of thousands through the rather porous iron curtain.

Domestic Politics

There was a massive surge in nonofficial peace efforts throughout Europe, the Soviet Union and the United States during the 1980s. The efforts were larger and more challenging in the West than in the East, but even the officially sanctioned peace groups in the East proved to be important conciliatory influences. In the United States, small traditional pacifist groups and newly formed organizations experienced tremendous growth in conjunction with the nuclear freeze campaign from 1981-84. In Western Europe, thousands of local and national groups formed and grew to win massive support in opposition to NATO's Euromissile deployment decision. In the Eastern bloc, official groups authorized to protect against NATO deployments quickly learned about the Soviet's role in escalating the arms race and more or less quietly began targeting some criticism at Moscow. The unofficial or independent Eastern bloc groups tended to be much smaller but were more likely to target the Soviet Union as their object of criticism and were more systematic in their critique of the arms race. In terms of their roles in the peace movement, the Western pacifist groups and Eastern independent groups tended to be the movement vanguards. The Protestant and Roman Catholic churches played an important part in providing infrastructural support and moral grounding for Western and Eastern peace movement activities. Professionals, especially in the health care, education, social work and legal fields, were important contributors to the movement in terms of the resources they contributed and the credibility they lent to it.

In the United States, the Democratic party platform endorsed the nuclear freeze and placed greater emphasis on arms control than did the Republicans. This forced the Administration to compromise its weapons modernization agenda and participate in arms control negotiations, despite the president's lifelong antipathy toward arms control. In the end, fewer weapons were built than were requested, SDI was restrained to being a vigorous research program rather than a quickly deployed ABM system, ASATs were put on hold, several questionable big-ticket items were slowed or cut altogether, and defense spending was perennially cut from the Administration's requests. Even the language of the Reagan Administration changed, from the early 1980s imagery of the United States being locked in mortal combat with the evil empire against which we had to prepare to fight and win a nuclear war, to a public
relations campaign to "sell" SDI on the moral high ground, to ultimately acknowledging Gorbachev as a dynamic business partner with whom we could discuss global disarmament and ultimately sign treaties.

**Peacemaking Efforts**

In a sense, the grassroots peacemaking efforts contributed to the peace infrastructure at the micro level to influence domestic politics. A comparable infrastructure role was played at the macro level in the realm of international relations by United Nations peacekeeping and mediation initiatives in the Sinai, Namibia, Angola, Afghanistan, Iran and Iraq. Similarly, third party diplomatic initiatives to play the mediator role have had partial success in Southern Africa (with Sweden as mediator) and in the Middle East (with the United States as mediator). In addition, multilateral peace initiatives have begun to develop, as evidenced in Central America through the Arias peace plan, the Palme Commission on Common Security, the Partial Test Ban Treaty signatories demand for an amendment conference to halt nuclear testing, and the Five Continent Peace Initiative.

**Cultural Changes**

The material products, symbols, language and even forms of entertainment play a role in creating social relations as well as reflecting them. For forty years, the Cold War permeated U.S. culture, at times playing a crucial role as a fundamental belief influencing decisions of national importance — as, for example, the critical role played by Kennedy’s fabrication of the bomber gap to win votes in the 1960 elections — and at other times serving as a seemingly mindless diversion to help entertain the public — as in "Rambo" movies of the early 1980s. These cultural appeals to the Cold War framework not only reflected the reality of U.S./Soviet relations, but also helped to shape them by creating and reinforcing anti-Soviet sentiments that influenced policy. This process operates at all levels of society, from the influences that shape the way individual think and ultimately vote about foreign policy matters, to the forces that shape organizational decisionmaking about their participation in the arms race or peacemaking activities, to directly influencing the elites responsible for shaping policy.

**Conclusion**

In these two issues, I have made claims about institutional practices, structured operations, and cultural beliefs that have changed at different rates to explain why the arms race continues even though the cold war is melting. Each of the claims can be taken as a working hypothesis requiring greater empirical substantiation than I have been able to provide. One of my hopes is that through these articles I have been able to stimulate greater interest on the part of sociologists to do research in this area and to demonstrate the breadth and importance of the topics to which we can address ourselves as sociologists. If you have any comments, insights or reactions you would like to share with me on any of these issues, please contact me at the Office of the Honorable Lee Hamilton, 2187 Rayburn HOB, Washington, D.C. 20515, (202) 225-5315; through June 30, 1990.

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**Editor’s Note:** Sam Murillo is currently an arms control Fellow in the office of Congressman Lee Hamilton. His fellowship, from the American Association for the Advancement of Science, is to work on arms control and international security.

**Is War Intrinsic To Human Nature?**  
(Continued from Page 1)

A pessimistic view were less likely to participate in peace activities than those persons with more optimistic attitudes about humans. This widespread belief in the inevitability of war gives some indication of the problems faced by sociologists involved with peace research, educators associated with peace studies programs, activists engaged in peace work, and politicians involved in national security matters. If war is inevitable, why fund peace research? If war is inevitable, why study peace issues? If war is inevitable, what good does it do to become active in peace movements? If war is inevitable, why cut defense spending?

A group of internationally known scientists saw the need to educate the public on this question and in May, 1986, drafted the Seville Statement on Violence. The statement was patterned after the UNESCO Statements on Race that declared there was no scientific justification for belief in superior or inferior races. These Statements on Race gave impetus to the work against racism. Therefore, it was felt that a similar statement regarding human violence might do the same for the struggle against war (Adams, 1989).

The Seville Statement presents five propositions which declare that it is scientifically incorrect to say: 1) that we have inherited a tendency to make war from our animal ancestors, 2) that war or any other violent behavior is genetically programmed into our human nature, 3) that in the course of human evolution there has been a selection for aggressive behavior more than for other kinds of behavior, 4) that humans have a violent brain, and 5) that war is caused by instinct or any single motivation.

Many organizations have already endorsed the Seville Statement, including the American Anthropological Association and the American Psychological Association. Correspondence from David Adams, Wesleyan University, states that UNESCO is "not only disseminating the Seville Statement around the world but is also organizing an international interdisciplinary seminar to study the cultural and social causes of violence as a contribution to further reflection on the subject." He concludes that the "Seville Statement cleared the ground by establishing what war and violence cannot be blamed on. The new seminar will begin the task of building for peace by addressing the more difficult question of what can be blamed as the causes of war and violence."

This sounds like sociological research to me! However, when I received a list of U.S. sociologists who are part of the Seville Statement support network, there were only seven. One is our Section’s chair-elect, Louis Kriesberg. Another is Section member, Elise Boulding, who is also Secretary General of the International Peace Research Association. When Dr. Boulding was asked her opinion on whether the Peace and War Section and the American Sociological Association should endorse the Seville Statement, she replied, "To me, cross-cultural research and my own experience and observations of the
relationship between child rearing patterns and aggressive behavior in children and adults, made the proposition that biology does not condemn humanity to war obvious years ago. Yet a number of sociologists, even among peace researchers, are uneasy with this conclusion where psychologists and anthropologists are not. I understand why political scientists prefer to remain with the conventional view of inherent aggression, since it simplifies the theory of power relations, but for sociologists to prefer it seems to me to be intellectual laziness in theory-building. I am complicit in that laziness, for different reasons — will try to reform.

I suggest to our members that we discuss Section endorsement of the Seville Statement as well as ASA endorsement. There is a research party going on and we have been invited. Sociologists with their unique expertise are not only wanted but vitally needed in this area. David Adams, who heads up the support network of the Seville Statement on Violence, writes to our Section, "I do think that it would be appropriate to ask the American Sociological Association to endorse the Statement, especially since it has previously been endorsed by the Psychological and Anthropological Associations. Because of the endorsements, it is now finding its way into psychology textbooks — and shouldn't it get into the sociology texts as well?"

My answer to that question is that not only should it get into the sociology texts, but sociologists should be more actively engaged in developing the research and educating our colleagues about the sociological aspects of peace and war issues. What better way to engage other sociologists in discussion than leading the movement to get the Seville Statement on Violence endorsed by the ASA?

I have included the full text of the Seville Statement starting on this page of the Newsletter for your perusal. Please plan to attend the Section business meeting in August in Washington, D.C., where you can express your views on this subject. If for some reason you cannot attend and would like your views known, write me at the Newsletter address.

For those who would like to become a part of the support network of the Seville Statement on Violence and receive its Newsletter, contact David Adams, Wesleyan Psychology Department, Middletown Connecticut, 06457.

References
Adams, D.
Adams, D. & Bosch, S.

Statement on Violence

Believing that it is our responsibility to address from our particular disciplines the most dangerous and destructive activities of our species, violence and war; recognizing that science is a human cultural product which cannot be definitive or all encompassing; and gratefully acknowledging the support of the authorities of Seville and representatives of the Spanish UNESCO; we, the undersigned scholars from around the world and from relevant sciences, have met and arrived at the following Statement on Violence. In it, we challenge a number of alleged biological findings that have been used, even by some in our disciplines, to justify violence and war. Because the alleged findings have contributed to an atmosphere of pessimism in our time, we submit that the open, considered rejection of these mis-statements can contribute significantly to the International Year of Peace.

Misuse of scientific theories and data to justify violence and war is not new but has been made since the advent of modern science. For example, the theory of evolution has been used to justify not only war, but also genocide, colonialism, and suppression of the weak.

We state our position in the form of five propositions. We are aware that there are many other issues about violence and war that could be fruitfully addressed from the standpoint of our disciplines, but we restrict ourselves here to what we consider a most important first step.

IT IS SCIENTIFICALLY INCORRECT to say that we have inherited a tendency to make war from our animal ancestors. Although fighting occurs widely throughout animal species, only a few cases of destructive intra-species fighting between organized groups have ever been reported among naturally living species, and none of these involve the use of tools designed to be weapons. Normal predatory feeding upon other species cannot be equated with intra-species violence. Warfare is a peculiarly human phenomenon and does not occur in other animals.

The fact that warfare has changed so radically over time indicates that it is a product of culture. Its biological connection is primarily through language which makes possible the coordination of groups, the transmission of technology, and the use of tools. War is biologically possible, but it is not inevitable, as evidenced by its variation in occurrence and nature over time and space. There are cultures which have not engaged in war for centuries, and there are cultures which have engaged in war frequently at some times and not at others.

IT IS SCIENTIFICALLY INCORRECT to say that war or any other violent behavior is genetically programmed into our human nature. While genes are involved at all levels of nervous system function, they provide a developmental potential that can be actualized only in conjunction with the ecological and social environment. While individuals vary in their predispositions to be affected by their experience, it is the interaction between their genetic endowment and conditions of nurturance that determines their personalities. Except for rare pathologies, the genes do not produce individuals necessarily predisposed to violence. Neither do they determine the opposite. While genes are co-involved in establishing our behavioural capacities, they do not by themselves specify the outcome.
IT IS SCIENTIFICALLY INCORRECT to say that in the course of human evolution there has been a selection for aggressive behaviour more than for other kinds of behaviour. In all well-studied species, status within the group is achieved by the ability to cooperate and to fulfill social functions relevant to the structure of that group. 'Dominance' involves social bondings and affiliations; it is not simply a matter of the possession and use of superior physical power, although it does involve aggressive behaviours. Where genetic selection for aggressive behaviour has been artificially instituted in animals, it has rapidly succeeded in producing hyper-aggressive individuals; this indicates that aggression was not maximally selected under natural conditions. When such experimentally-created hyper-aggressive animals are present in a social group, they either disrupt its social structure or are driven out. Violence is neither in our evolutionary legacy nor in our genes.

IT IS SCIENTIFICALLY INCORRECT to say that humans have a 'violent brain'. While we do have the neural apparatus to act violently, it is not automatically activated by internal or external stimuli. Like higher primates and unlike other animals, our higher neural processes filter such stimuli before they can be acted upon. How we act is shaped by how we have been conditioned and socialized. There is nothing in our neurophysiology that compels us to react violently.

IT IS SCIENTIFICALLY INCORRECT to say that war is caused by 'instinct' or any single motivation. The emergence of modern warfare has been a journey from the primacy of emotional and motivational factors, sometimes called 'instincts,' to the primacy of cognitive factors. Modern war involves institutional use of personal characteristics such as obedience, suggestibility, and idealism, social skills such as language, and rational considerations such as cost-benefit analysis, planning, and information processing. The technology of modern war has exaggerated traits associated with violence both in the training of actual combatants and in the preparation of support for war in the general population. As a result of this exaggeration of traits, wars are often mistaken to be the causes rather than the consequences of the process.

We conclude that biology does not condemn humanity to war, and that humanity can be freed from the bondage of biological pessimism and empowered with confidence to undertake the transformative tasks needed in this International Year of Peace and in the years to come. Although these tasks are mainly institutional and collective, they also rest upon the consciousness of individual participants for whom pessimism and optimism are crucial factors. Just as 'wars begin in the minds of men', peace also begins in our minds. The same species who invented war is capable of inventing peace. The responsibility lies with each of us.

Seville, May 16, 1986

DAVID ADAMS, Psychology, Wesleyan University, Middletown, CT 06457, USA
S. A. BARNETT, Ethology, The Australian National University, Canberra, Australia
N. P. BECHTEREVA, Neurophysiology, Institute for Experimental Medicine of Academy of Medical Sciences of USSR, Leningrad, USSR
BONNIE FRANK CARTER, Psychology, Albert Einstein Medical Center, Philadelphia (PA) USA
JOSÉ M. RODRÍGUEZ DELGADO, Neurophysiology, Centro de Estudios Neurológicos, Madrid, Spain
JOSÉ LUIS DÍAZ, Ethology, Instituto Mexicano de Psiquiatría, Mexico D.F., Mexico
ANDRZEJ ELIASZ, Individual Differences Psychology, Polish Academy of Sciences, Warsaw, Poland
SANTIAGO GENOVÉS, Biological Anthropology, Instituto de Estudios Antropológicos, Mexico D.F., Mexico
BENSON E. GINSBURG, Behavior Genetics, University of Connecticut, Storrs (CT) USA
JO GROEBEL, Social Psychology, Erziehungswissenschaftliche Hochschule, Landau, Federal Republic of Germany
SAMIR-KUMAR GHOSH, Sociology, Indian Institute of Human Sciences, Calcutta, India
ROBERT HINDE, Animal Behaviour, Cambridge University, UK
RICHARD E. LEAKEY, Physical Anthropology, National Museums of Kenya, Nairobi, Kenya
TAHA H. MALASI, Psychiatry, Kuwait University, Kuwait
J. MARTIN RAMÍREZ, Psychobiology, Universidad de Sevilla, Spain
FEDERICO MAYOR ZARAGOZA, Biochemistry, Universidad Autónoma, Madrid, Spain
DIANA L. MENDOZA, Ethology, Universidad de Sevilla, Spain
ASHIS NANDY, Political Psychology, Center for the Study of Developing Societies, Delhi, India
JOHN PAUL SCOTT, Animal Behavior, Bowling Green State University, Bowling Green (OH) USA
RIITTA WAHLSTRÖM, Psychology, University of Jyväskylä, Finland