**BEST BOOK AWARD**

The Best Book Award committee consisting of Steve Pfaff, Gwen Moore, Dana Fischer, and Bayliss Camp received 24 valid entries and 5 books were identified as finalists.

Of the submissions, the committee decided to award the prize to **Javier Auyero** for his book *Routine Politics and Violence in Argentina: The Gray Zone of State Power* (Cambridge University Press 2007). The Committee praised Auyero’s book as an exemplary work of political ethnography.

Auyero’s book advances the study of political protest by helping to reveal the conditions under which the distinction between institutional and non-institutional political behavior collapses. In the Argentine crisis of 2001, riot, looting, and public disturbances were not simply violations of ‘law and order’ but were triggered andabetted by political authorities, including party organizations and local officials as part of a concerted political strategy. Auyero calls this the ‘grey zone’, between politics and crime. In addition to extensive ethnographic...
observation and in-depth interviewing, Auyero also employs statistical analysis to help explain the location and intensity of rioting. With its comparative focus on an important Latin American case, its innovative and mixed methodology, and provocative theses on contentious politics, Auyero’s book is bound to be influential.

We would also like to make an honorable mention for another impressive, innovative work that came close to winning the award. This is Clem Brooks’ and Jeff Manza’s Why Welfare States Persist: The Importance of Public Opinion in Democracies (University of Chicago Press 2007).

BEST STUDENT PAPER AWARD

The committee consisted of John Skrentny, Chris Bonastia, Caroline Lee, and Catherine Lee. The committee gave the best student paper award to Djordje (George) Stefanovic’s contribution, “The Path to Weimar Serbia? Explaining the Resurgence of the Serbian Far Right after the Fall of Milosevic,” which was published in October 2008 in Ethnic and Racial Studies. This article is a powerful and provocative analysis of ethnic politics in Serbia. Stefanovic probes the sources of the resurgence of support for the ultra-nationalist far right. Using multivariate analysis of city election data, Stefanovic examines theories developed for Western European and North American cases. Specifically, he assesses whether economic vulnerability and ethnic threat explain the rise of the right in Serbia. In a very careful and clearly articulated examination, he finds that theories of the Western European far right and North American inter-racial relations explain some, but not all, of the election patterns in Serbia. Most importantly, welfare resentments in Serbia are not directed toward new immigrants but toward allegedly disloyal minorities who have lived in Serbia for centuries. The stakes are high indeed in understanding this phenomenon; as Stefanovic notes, economic dislocations created from neo-liberal economic transitions may lead to more support for the right, which in Serbia has been linked to war. Stefanovic’s work contributes both to scholarly debates and universal struggles for peace.

The committee gave honorable mention to Liza Weinstein’s elegantly written paper, “Mumbai’s Development Mafias: Globalization, Organized Crime and Land Development.” This paper was published in March 2008 in the International Journal of Urban and Regional Research. It perceptively explores the understudied role of organized crime in contemporary real estate development through a qualitative case study of Mumbai. Rather than simply linking informal governance and mafia activity in local property markets to the global scale, Weinstein deftly demonstrates how these processes are in fact multi-scalar and interlinked. Organized crime groups (OCGs) are simultaneously embedded in local communities and in global processes, making them ideally positioned to take advantage of regional political and economic opportunities afforded by liberalization and globalization. Weinstein argues convincingly both that studies of informal governance should pay renewed attention to urban restructuring and place-based politics, and that OCGs deserve a place in urban political theory alongside institutional actors and local elites. Her conceptual work—for example, on when the state chooses to “supportively neglect” illegal activity out of self-interest—is likely to be transportable. It is a unique contribution to the study of urban politics and organized crime.

BEST ARTICLE AWARD

The committee consisted of Pam Paxton, Greta Krippner, Umut Bespınar Ekici, and Robert Mackin. The award went to Nathan Martin and David Brady for “Workers of the Less Developed World Unite? A Multi-Level Analysis of Unionization in Less Developed Countries” (American Sociological Review 2007). In this impressive piece of research, Martin and Brady examine determinants of unionization in less developed countries (LDCs). While there is an extensive cross-national literature on unionization, to date it has focused on affluent democracies rather than the experience of developing countries. In examining individual- and country-level factors associated with union formation in 39 less developed countries, Martin and Brady significantly extend knowledge of this phenomenon outside of the developed world. Their findings offer evidence that the legacy of state socialism is an important predictor of unionization, that the debt crisis negatively impacted union levels, and that social class is a major organizing principle for union formation in the less developed world. Martin and Brady also find that industrialization and democratization—two processes associated with unionization in developed economies—are not salient in less developed country contexts. Factors associated with globalization present more of a mixed picture, with some indicators of globalization (signing an IMF agreement) negatively affecting unionization while others (trade, FDI) show no effect. This article represents model work in political sociology, raising a key problem for analysis and then examining that problem with both methodological rigor and conceptual clarity. Future generations of unionization researchers will be elaborating on, extending, and further explaining Martin and Brady’s findings for some time to come.

Honorable Mention was given to Rory McVeigh and Juliana M. Sobolewski for, “Red Counties, Blue Counties and Occupational Segregation by Sex and Race” (American Journal of Sociology 2007). In this innovative paper, McVeigh and Sobolewski challenge the conventional wisdom that culture has trumped class interests in matters of voting. McVeigh and Continued on p.3
Award Winners Continued...
Sobolewski explore the possibility that occupational segregation by sex and race rather than income inequality per se shape Presidential voting in "red" and "blue" counties. McVeigh and Sobolewski present convincing evidence that occupational segregation was associated with support for Republican George W. Bush in the 2004 Presidential contest, further suggesting that this effect was most pronounced where segregation was vulnerable to challenge by non-dominant groups. Committee members were especially impressed with the creativity of the thinking behind this paper, which marshals a number of complex arguments in order to explore a problem of considerable contemporary relevance.

2009 ANNUAL MEETINGS

I am really impressed by the vitality and energy of section members: many of you sent in great suggestions for panels, and choosing was not easy. As I hope you can see from the attached list, I tried to put together a mix which would include both detailed examinations of current trends in the US and internationally, and papers involving reflection on contemporary theoretical debates. And, as always, the section's roundtables offer a venue for even more papers. I'm looking forward to next year's sessions!

Gay Seidman

“New Dynamics in American Electoral Politics” Organized by Sarah Sobieraj of Tufts University (sarah.sobieraj@tufts.edu). This panel will explore changing dynamics of American politics, from issues of race and geography to new patterns of contention. Although we expect many of the papers to refer to the 2008 presidential election, we hope some papers will also offer a more historical perspective.

“Democratic Paths and Trends” Organized by Barbara Wejnert, University at Buffalo (bwejnert@buffalo.edu) The session will addresses changes and developments of democratization from historical and contemporary perspectives. It includes discourse on diffusion of democracy, paths of democratic transitions, worldwide trend towards democratization, as well as democracy in retreat. Discussed case studies include democratic development in the United States, post-colonial and post-Soviet democracies, as well as recently-democratized countries in the 2000s.

“Citizenship and the New Politics of Community in the Global South” Organized by Kathleen Fallon, McGill University (kathleen.fallon@mcgill.ca), and Brian Dill, University of Illinois (dill@illinois.edu) The goal of this session is to explore the meaning of citizenship across the global South. In asserting political, social and cultural identity, a wide array of groups have expanded and redefined their rights through the use of innovative yet often volatile tactics. We invite papers that examine how individuals challenge notions of citizenship as they seek recognition, representation, and power.

“Transnational Movements / Local Politics” Organized by Erik Larson, Macalester College (larsone@macalester.edu) Papers submitted to this panel should concern the intersections of global or transnational movements and domestic or local political contention (both broadly defined). Potential themes may include: examination of the ways in which transnational and national forces and actors (re)constitute agency, identity, and agendas; exploration of the dynamic between the universal and particular; and analysis of how actors deploy global resources in domestic contexts. Substantive foci could include social movements (minority groups, environmental, indigenous peoples); political change (democratic participation, transitional justice); or policy orientations (human rights, strengthening or changing regulation).

“Classes, States, and Movements: Piven and Cloward’s Contribution to Political Sociology” Organized by Gay Seidman, University of Wisconsin-Madison (seidman@ssc.wisc.edu) From social movements to electoral politics and the welfare state, few recent thinkers have had as much direct impact on political sociology as Frances Fox Piven and Richard Cloward. This panel will focus on Piven and Cloward’s contributions to these issues, and papers will explore how their contributions bear up across time and place. Does globalization force us to re-think their work? Is their work applicable across regions? How can we use their work to explore new issues and questions?

Roundtables, Organized by John Stephens, UNC-Chapel Hill (jdsteph@email.unc.edu)
Symposium Continued...

did when he spoke about “welfare queens.” And another tactic is to assail affirmative action as Jesse Helms did in his North Carolina Senatorial campaign in the 1990s. Helms ran political ads that suggested that Whites would lose jobs because of affirmative action.

Given the well worn and rather effective campaign strategies based on racial appeals, it is interesting that the “attack politics” in this election cycle appear to have taken on a somewhat different formulation. First, the extremely broad range of attacks is in itself noteworthy. The Republican Party, as well as its formal and informal supporters, leveled a wide array of charges against Senator Obama. Some of these charges included elitism, inexperience, a Black radical predisposition, a “street” organizing past, and suggestions that he is a potential pedophile, and even a likely candidate to be the antichrist of biblical lore. As implausible as this grab bag of othering claims may be, they spread virally through email and online blogs as well as through mainstream news outlets and entered popular discourse – just as intended.

Second, and most important, Obama’s opponents crafted a narrative that merged notions of American identity with nationalism, security, and White nativism and cast him in opposition to these ideas. This combination of themes was no doubt infused by our particular historical era (consider 9-11 and fears of subsequent terrorism and our ongoing wars in the Middle East) as well as Obama’s personal history and identity. Additional dubious charges, that he is a closeted Muslim who was sworn into the Senate on the Koran, that he is a terrorist sympathizer with socialist leanings and will not place his hand over his heart during the national anthem, will not wear a U.S. flag pin, and his hard to pin down “foreignness” mark him as not only racial other but also as worldly or “cosmopolitan” and thus a distinctly un-American stranger. This attack narrative seems to provide a mélange of otherness that extends beyond most prior political othering techniques. And, importantly, it provides grounds for voters distance themselves from a supposed and feared Manchurian candidate.

These peculiar claims about Obama are symbolic assaults that resonate with more than a few of our fellow citizens and effectively prime racial and other resentments (Jerit 2004). This can be seen as a boundary formation strategy with appeals to sacred Americanness and profane foreignness - what is ultimately, a struggle to define reality and win the election. But such appeals can be dangerous. Consider the events at some GOP political rallies where McCain asks “Who is the real Barack Obama?” or Palin declares that “[Obama] sees America as so imperfect that he pals around with terrorists.” The queries and accusations elicited emotional outbursts of “traitor,” “off with his head,” and some reports even suggested that crowd members yelled “kill him.” It was recently revealed that after the rhetorical attacks from these campaign events spread through the media, the Secret Service noted a marked increase in threats to Obama.

The Republicans invoked rhetoric that is typically reserved for assumed foreign enemies – particularly communists and terrorists. This move, in effect, makes Obama appear as more than an alien other. Within these rhetorical frames he is a dangerous enemy. In light of these attacks, I could not help but think of the anti-communist furor of historical figures such as Father Charles Coughlin and Joe McCarthy. These thoughts were reinforced when Michelle Bachman, House Representative of Minnesota, basically called for a revival of the House un-American Activities Committee investigation into un-American politicians in a diatribe aimed squarely at Obama. And McCain supporter, Representative Robin Hayes of North Carolina, made similar comments. In a farcical way, history appeared to repeat itself.

Classic studies by Milgram and Zimbardo illustrate that messages from authority figures matter. When political leaders and other authorities sew the seeds of hatred, conspiracy theories and even violence can ensue. It is comforting to know that the multitude of othering strategies did not sway the election. But an NBC post-election poll showed that 23% of McCain supporters were fearful of an Obama presidency. And several post-election interviews suggested that quite a few people bought into the “Obama as enemy” mantra and believe that they will have a potential threat in the White House. This is troubling for those who aspire toward a more united future.

On numerous occasions, Obama denounced the politics of division and intimated a post-partisan future. In his victory speech he spoke of a “determination to heal the divides that have held back our progress” and he reached out to his opponents by saying “And to those Americans whose support I have yet to earn, I may not have won your vote tonight, but I hear your voices. I need your help. And I will be your president, too.” We will always have cleavages in the U.S. But what might it take to bridge some of the cultural and other gaps in our great nation? I do not know the answer and it is unlikely that any one individual can close such chasms. This may particularly be the case for a President who was so thoroughly othered. But perhaps Obama is close to being just such a transformative figure - more so at least than any major political figure we have seen in quite some time. It is not possible to predict Obama’s legacy. He faces substantial crises on many fronts. But history has taught us that crises also bring with them a good deal of opportunity for change. Given the historical magnitude of this election, we have much cause to be hopeful.
**Symposium Continued…**

“Metro-Piedmont, Black Belt, and the College Towns: How Obama Won North Carolina in 2008” by Paul Luebke, University of North Carolina Greensboro and N.C. State Legislature

North Carolina, until this year, was a reliable Southern state in the Republican presidential column. Beginning in the late 1960s, the national Republican Party’s “Southern strategy” bore fruit, as thousands of North Carolina Whites supported Richard Nixon’s successful presidential campaign in both 1968 and 1972. As a White Southerner, Jimmy Carter temporarily interrupted the GOP success; he carried North Carolina – as well as most other Southern states – on his way to the White House. But by 1979 Senator Jesse Helms had been elected to his second term – the state’s first Republican U.S. senator in the 20th century. Meanwhile, Ronald Reagan was launching his bid for the 1980 Republican nomination, firmly linked to Helms and his organization, the National Congressional Club. Reagan defeated Carter 49%-47% in 1980, and in 1984 trounced Democrat Walter Mondale 62%-38%.

From the nadir of 1984, the Whites who controlled the North Carolina Democratic Party fought back, by seeking to promote presidential candidates who could be perceived, in a culturally traditionalist state like North Carolina, as moderate, not “liberal.” Thus, in March 1988, party leaders, including former governors Terry Sanford and Jim Hunt, backed fellow Southerner Al Gore in the Super Tuesday primaries. To their dismay, and to the dismay of many White Democrats elsewhere in the South as well as in Washington, D.C. (read especially: the Democratic Leadership Council), another Southern-born Democrat spoiled the modernizers plan. Jesse Jackson, a 1963 graduate of N.C. A&T State University competed with Gore across the South.

In North Carolina and elsewhere in the South, Jackson won as many convention delegates as Gore. The subsequent 1988 battle among national Democrats resulted in the nomination of Massachusetts governor Mike Dukakis. In November 1988, Dukakis lost North Carolina to Vice-President George H.W. Bush. But, significantly, one key region of the state showed substantially higher support for Dukakis than it had for Mondale in 1984. This region consisted of six counties, known as the Metro-Piedmont, all of which were located in Piedmont North Carolina, along the Interstate-85 corridor.

The Metro-Piedmont would, in November 2008, become the core of Democrat Barack Obama’s successful electoral coalition when he defeated, by the narrowest of margins (49.9% to 49.5%), Republican John McCain. The Metro-Piedmont’s six counties shared some common characteristics. First, these counties had, since at least World War II, dominated the economy of North Carolina. Second, and more importantly, these counties were the magnets for Northern in-migration to North Carolina. Between 1976, when Jimmy Carter won the presidential race in North Carolina, and 2008, North Carolina’s population jumped from 5.5 million to 9 million. Most of the migrants settled in the three spots along I-85: in the three largest cities of the counties that constituted the Research Triangle area (Raleigh, Durham, and Chapel Hill), in the two major cites 50 to 75 miles west of the Triangle, the Triad cities of Greensboro and Winston-Salem, and in the state’s largest city, Charlotte, 90 miles southwest of the Triad.

Third, these migrants were disproportionally college graduates (primarily Whites) who were attracted to the Metro-Piedmont for one major reason: the new service economy, based on high-tech industry, the universities, and banking. As the in-migrants’ numbers increased, so did support for the national Democratic nominees. Durham, home to the Research Triangle Park, voted 54%-to-45% for Dukakis in 1988; 63% to 35% for Gore in 2000; and 76% to 24% for Obama in 2008. Charlotte did not support either Dukakis in 1988 (40% to 59%) or Gore in 2000 (48% to 52%), but in 2008 provided a 62% to 38% majority for Obama.

The pattern is clear: in the two decades from 1988 to 2008, support for the Democratic presidential nominee increased in each county by a whopping 22%. Further, insofar as these counties were growing at a faster rate than the rural and small-town counties that usually supported the Republican presidential nominee, the importance of this winning percentage margin took on even greater significance as a source of votes.

A fourth factor helped explain the likelihood of winning a county for the Democratic nominee at all, or the size of the winning margin, in five of the six Metro-Piedmont counties (the exception was Orange County, dominated politically by the university town of Chapel Hill). This often-overlooked factor is the relative percentage of African-Americans in each county. For example, in Durham, with two and one-half times more Blacks than the neighboring county of Wake (Raleigh-Cary), Gore defeated George W. Bush in 2000 by a 63% to 37% margin, and Obama defeated John McCain 76% to 24%. This contrasts with Wake County, which voted for Gore in 2000 by just 50% to 49% and for Obama in 2008 by 57% to 42%.

A final factor is efficacy of political organization. Durham’s winning margins were facilitated by the voter registration and turn-out skills of the Durham Committee on the Affairs of Black People (DCABP), one of the oldest and most effective African-American organizations in the South and perhaps in the United States. (Full-disclosure: this writer, in his role as state legislator, was heavily indebted to the DCABP when he was first elected to the North Carolina State House in 1990).

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North Carolina’s Black Belt begins along the South Carolina line 30 miles east of Charlotte and ends at the Virginia border, 50 to 75 miles north and northeast of Raleigh.

Sixty percent of the state’s Black Belt counties (20 of 33) provided majorities for Obama. It is historically significant that Obama won all of the Black Belt counties that had supported Democrat Hubert Humphrey’s 1968 presidential candidacy. Recall that 1968 was the first presidential election of the 20th century in which Blacks were able to register and vote, due to the passage of the 1965 federal Voting Rights Act. But the numerical impact of these Black Belt counties was relatively small. The total two-party 2008 vote in some of the Black Belt counties was the same as one large voting precinct in Raleigh.

As early-voting began in North Carolina in mid-October, pundits debated whether the newly-registered youth in North Carolina would in fact turn up at the polls. One important indicator of the answer to that question is provided by examining the vote in the sixteen counties in which a University of North Carolina-system has a campus.

These campus range from Western Carolina University in Jackson County (2 percent African-American) and Appalachian State University in Watauga County (also 2 percent African-American) to campuses in North Carolina’s Black Belt, in which the Black population exceeded 30 percent of the total (UNC at Pembroke in Robeson County, along the South Carolina line; and Elizabeth City State University in Pasquotank County, which lies close to Virginia’s Tidewater region). Among these sixteen counties, fifteen provided a majority for Obama. Obama lost the sixteenth county, New Hanover, home to UNC at Wilmington, by 50% to 49%. While some campuses had more student voters than others, the college towns were a critical source of Obama votes.

The three-legged Obama coalition was based on an understanding of existing and potential change in North Carolina. The majority support that Kerry had gained in 2004 in the Metro-Piedmont, which relied on the votes of the many newcomers to this region, was an important start. Increasing the African-American registration and vote in the Black Belt was a second goal. Finally, the Obama strategy of registering and turning-out students made a significant difference in North Carolina.

North Carolina Democratic politicians like me are grateful for the Obama initiative. Without Obama’s extraordinary campaign, it is questionable whether incumbent U.S. senator Elizabeth Dole would have been defeated. For certain, the Democratic gubernatorial candidate would not have prevailed over her Republican opponent. This year is only the third time in forty years that modernizer Democratic leaders in North Carolina were pleased with the presidential candidate (the other years were Carter in 1976 and Clinton in both 1992 and 1996). It is an open question whether Obama will be similarly viewed as an asset to the in-state Democratic ticket in 2012.

“I, Too, Can Become President! Or Can I?”, by Roxanna Harlow, McDaniel College

History has been made! Barack Obama is now the first Black president of the United States. As a Black Democrat, I should be elated – jumping for joy, on top of the world, crying like Jesse and Oprah. As my mother said, this is OUR time now. Right? So why don’t I feel like it’s OUR time? Why was I the only one at the election party not hooting and hollering as state after state was called for Barack Obama? The emotional energy of the crowd was so palpable that my lack of affect drew attention; one puzzled partygoer described my impassivity as “tempered enthusiasm.” If this is OUR time, why was I awakened early the next morning, not by the excitement of the previous night, but by an irritating numbness and an overwhelming sense of concern?

I find it difficult to explain my feelings to people who, beaming with that “Isn’t this GREAT?!!” look, ask me about my thoughts on the election. How do I explain why I do not share their enthusiasm over this historic event, when the pull of the illusion of racial harmony and profound change is so strong that their emotion and ideology overpower reality, crowding out all critical thought? And who wants to be a party pooper?

People are already joking about reorganizing the historical timeline into BB and AB: Before Barack and After Barack. Hmm. Before Barack (BB), the United States was a racist, patriarchal, imperialistic power that, through the language of freedom and democracy, strived to maintain White, global dominance. Now, After Barack (AB), the U.S. is a racist, patriarchal, imperialistic power with a Black head of state that, through the language of freedom and democracy, continues in its efforts to maintain White, global dominance in a smarter and less obvious way. That “change” doesn’t excite me.

In the endless writings, analyses, speeches, and discussions published and aired since the election, there’s often a passing acknowledgement that racism still exists and nothing will change overnight. Yet the dominant narrative remains that “This is a different nation than it was just last night” (Brian Williams, NBC News, Nov. 5). Apparently, the election of Barack Obama has created a new period in our history where racial barriers have fallen and hard work really does put everyone on equal footing.

“Obama Elected President as Racial Barriers Fall,” read a November 5th New York Times headline. “Hopes are High for
Symposium Continued...

Race Relations,” according to a headline in the November 7th USA Today where the results of a post-election USATODAY/Gallup Poll revealed that “Barack Obama’s election has inspired a wave of optimism about the future of race relations in the United States” (p.1); of over 1,000 people polled, 70% believe that as a result of the election, race relations will improve. This is not surprising given the media’s framing of Obama’s election as the culmination of the fight for civil rights and racial equality. In the words of President Bush in his response to Obama’s victory, “This moment is especially uplifting for a generation of Americans who witnessed the struggle for civil rights with their own eyes, and four decades later see a dream fulfilled.”

Black commentators state that now there are no more excuses for Black people, as if the election proves that the problem has been Black excuse-making, and causes of inequality no longer exist. Echoing this theme, NBC Evening News showed Michelle Obama explaining how she and her husband grew up with the same values “that you work hard for what you want in life, your word is your bond, and you do what you say you’re going to do.” Paired with the coverage of Black school children crooning, “Now I know if I work hard I can do anything I want!” Shelby Steele, Dinesh D’Souza, and Ward Connerly must be on cloud nine.

The problem, of course, is not that Black children shouldn’t strive to work hard. The problem is that racism is not dead or even a little ill, but strong, healthy, and updated for the 21st century. As social science continues to conclusively establish, it is an entrenched, structural phenomenon endemic to our society, not simply an individual level occurrence or relic of the past as we are constantly led to believe. So after the Black community fills with pride and the children look to President Obama and say “I, too, can become president one day!” they will go back to their poor, segregated schools and neighborhoods, the lack of economic opportunity and resources, the racial profiling, the lead paint, and wonder what they are doing wrong.

And White people will look at President Obama, note his success, smile with pride at how wonderfully equal their country is now that we’ve overcome the “race problem,” watch the evening news with Black people profiled as criminals, and then continue with their predominately White lives where they are in charge and people of color serve their meals and empty their trash. So while President Obama may be on the television screen, it does not eliminate the fear or suspicion generated by the Black person walking down the street, or into the store, or encroaching upon their White communities; in other words, electing Obama changes nothing structurally for Black people. It provides the illusion of racial resolution and equal opportunity where there is none. The myth of the American Dream is now more entrenched than ever before.

In his acceptance speech on November 4th, Barack Obama stated, “If there is anyone out there who still doubts that America is a place where all things are possible, who still wonders if the dream of our founders is alive in our time, who still questions the power of our democracy, tonight is your answer.” I guess I’m one of those people still in doubt; unfortunately, election night did not provide me with a satisfactory answer.

Let me be clear that I am well aware of the very real impact this first Black president has had on people all over the world. I recognize how emotionally overwhelming and meaningful this moment must be to those who lived through the indignity of legalized inferiority. My mother and others recall the humiliation of growing up having their every movement regulated by race, enduring everything from name calling to physical attack, and how the Obama presidency, for once, makes people feel good about being Black. He generates a sense of pride in and hope for Blackness and race relations, and is an unprecedented role model for youth. He serves as a healer of the pain and shame caused by the inhumanity, denigration, and humiliation of racism. He provides vindication for those who fought so hard to change things in this country, and symbolizes the final acceptance of Black people as full, equal, and deserving citizens worthy of Whites’ respect.

But the feelings generated from the powerful symbolism of the first Black U.S. presidency do not change the fact that Black spaces are still regulated and Black people are still marginalized pseudo-citizens of this nation. For sure, Black oppression is more tolerable than it used to be, and that is undeniably important. However, the ability to live in greater comfort while still, as a group, remaining at the bottom economically and socially is hardly the Dream fulfilled.

Whenever I explain my lackluster enthusiasm, people tend to agree that systemic racism is still firmly in place, and change will not happen immediately. That agreement is quickly followed by the caveat that this election is a step in the right direction. Barack Obama has broken the barrier, and more victories eroding racism will follow.

While my peers imply it, those in my parents’ generation explicitly attribute my attitude to youthful impatience—that I want instant gratification and everything to be solved NOW. Although I was not raised during the era of Jim Crow segregation, born in 1970, I’m no spring chicken either. In addition to internalizing (as my own) my mother and father’s pain from the racism they’ve had to endure throughout their lives, I’ve had my own share of overt and extensive covert racist challenges affect my life. So my stance is not due to youth, impatience, and historical ignorance. My problem is that I’m a sociologist and a realist who studies race (and ok, yes, a pessimist and a cynic when it comes to the good will of this nation) and is able to see beyond the tempting imagery of racial harmony and inclusiveness.

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Symposium Continued...

People tend to conflate the change Barack Obama will bring to the country as a Democrat, an intelligent man, and a new president, with the change that they think he will bring as a Black man and a member of a marginalized group. As the former, I have no doubt that things will improve over time as he works to clean up the mess that President Bush has created; as a citizen, I am thrilled about the outcome of this election. But that is not the same as addressing the country’s racial and economic inequality and discrimination (not to mention the global inequality and oppression that the country reinforces to serve its own interests).

I am impatient, but it has nothing to do with solving inequality overnight. I’m impatient because people are looking in the wrong place for social mobility and change. Even if President Obama were in office for 50 years with an entirely Black cabinet, Black America would still struggle. I am frustrated because people think this election means something in regard to eliminating racial inequality. White supremacy doesn’t end simply by putting people of color into political office. It is much too embedded and enduring. Political power alone will never bring about economic and social equality for the group. What is needed is Black collective economic independence and power together with political power; this takes not only years of patience to slowly build over time, but the collective will, support, and intention to do so. Of course, Black nationalist groups have been saying this for years, but because of their unpopular arguments about racial separation, this critically important point gets lost.

In the meantime, I will continue to roll my eyes and scowl every time I hear a story about how proud everyone is of this country and how Black children now have unimpeded opportunity for success because President Obama is the American Dream fulfilled—he is “proof” of the promise of freedom and justice for all. He is the reliever of White guilt and serves as confirmation that the U.S. is finally racism-free and therefore full of officially good people. The election of a Black president appears to have absolved this country of all racial crimes, and now I fear that there will be an increase in blatant and explicit racism again.

As African Americans struggle, stereotypes about inferiority will become justified given the perception that racial barriers have been eliminated. Programs to level the playing field have already come under attack, and now people will be even less inclined to support them. I expect the “N-word” to come back in style as Chris Rock’s comical distinction between hard working Black people and lazy “niggas” moves out of the realm of Black comedy and into the broader cultural discourse.

Despite my concerns, I do think the country has made some progress. Indeed, a young, Black, Harvard educated, charismatic, intelligent man with the ideal-looking family, unprecedented amounts of money, advertising and news support, the best managed political campaign in U.S. history, and a White male, vice-presidential running mate who has extensive experience in politics and foreign affairs, can beat a White male who has no charisma, graduated at the bottom of his class, struggles with public speaking, was unaware of the failing economy, continued to support an unpopular war, belongs to the disaffected political party, is disliked by his own political base, would be the oldest person to become president, and chose a female running mate who uses slang during debates and in speeches, lists being mayor of a tiny town, governor of Alaska for two seconds, a hockey mom, PTA member, and living near Russia as credentials for vice-president, was investigated for ethics violations, and displayed her incompetence so consistently that it became the source of comedy routines.

Perhaps there’s hope after all.

“More than Just Numbers? Clinton, Palin and the 2008 Campaign” by Catherine Bolzendahl, University of California Irvine

For the first time in U.S. history, two women were viable candidates for office in the executive branch. While neither will see their goal accomplished from this election, their campaigns do represent an important advance for gender equality. Women comprise about 50% of the population, and even more among those aged 50+, the population from which elected officials are disproportionately drawn. However, women’s entry into the national political arena has been slow. The first woman elected to Congress was in the House of Representatives, Jeanette Rankin, a Republican from Montana, in the 65th Congress (1917-1919). Since then, women’s proportion of seats in the House remained in the single digits until the 1990s. As of the 2008 election, women still hold only 16% of seats in the House and Senate. Compare this to the Nordic nations with representation at over 41%, and approximately 27% for other Western European countries. Thus, from a numerical perspective this year’s campaigns were an important indicator of progress, yet they say nothing about what it means to have women in office. That is, why does it matter if (these) women run for or are elected to political office?

Recently, I posed this question to Representatives in the House and received two types of answers. A few argued that it was a matter of fairness. Specifically, if women are half the population, they should hold half the seats in congress. In comparison, most felt that women brought something other than politics as usual, with particular experiences, values, and priorities that differed from those of their male colleagues. Their answers illustrate a long-standing debate in the field between descriptive and substantive representation. With regard to descriptive representation, or simply proportionate outcomes, this election cycle brought parity in the executive branch closer than ever before. Substantively, however, Clinton and Palin were worlds apart.

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From the perspective of substantive representation, what matters is whether women in office are actually representing the interests of women (Molyneux 1985). These interests are equality in general, but are also often framed as issues that affect women as partners and mothers in particular, such as domestic violence, rape, reproductive rights, child care, and maternity benefits. Research on the topic confirms women’s greater interest in and commitment to such issues (Paxton et al. 2007). “Women’s interests” are occasionally broadened to include education, health care and welfare policy, with recent work suggesting female elected officials tend to be more supportive of these policy areas as well (Bolzendahl and Brooks 2007). Perhaps it is not surprising then, that with respect to political outcomes, these differences favor the Democrats. As was clear this election year, more women vote for Democratic than Republican candidates, and most elected women are Democrats (e.g. CNN exit polls show that 53% of women voted for Obama, and 43% for McCain. Among men it was 49% and 48% respectively; see also Manza and Brooks 1997). In fact, of the 17 women recently elected to the Senate, only 4 will be Republican. In the House, 4% of all Representatives are Republican women and 10% of Republican Representatives are woman. Are such outcomes also proof that Democratic women are acting in the interests of women?

From the perspective of Clinton supporters, the answer is yes. A large number of those supporting her Presidential campaign were women (and men) with feminist beliefs excited about her potential to break “the ultimate glass ceiling.” In comparison, they resented Palin’s nomination for Vice-President and what was perceived as the assumption that women would vote for her simply because of her gender. Many argued that Palin’s views were “anti-woman” given her opposition to abortion rights, the infamous rape-kit charges, and her conservative religious views on gender (e.g. Steinem 2008). While a passionate concern about these issues was conveyed, another perhaps more subtle message was also sent: Women should not be a larger part of government simply because they are women, but because they bring something different (in this case, feminist) to the table. Yet the polls from Election Day may suggest that not all women feel similarly. While women’s political leanings toward Democrats and liberal issues were often decisive, they were not necessarily overwhelming. In fact, CNN exit polls showed that 43% of women voted for the McCain/Palin ticket in comparison to 48% of men and a quick look at exit polls for the various House and Senate elections shows similar patterns of gender difference. Women do cast more votes for Democrats, but a substantial amount also vote for Republicans.

What about these Republican women? With this question we return to the tension of Clinton vs. Palin and women’s interests. Clinton had been forwarded as the candidate of and for women. Yet, in her campaign she took particular care to portray herself as a candidate and not a female candidate. As Clinton was distancing herself from an identity as a woman, many American women simultaneously held her up as the prime example of what a woman could (and should) be. In comparison, Palin’s candidacy as a woman was never a matter of debate. She is a former beauty queen and a mother to five, including a newborn with Down Syndrome and a pregnant teenage daughter. Despite references to bulldogs and lipstick and partisan vitriol, she was generally charming, folksy, fashionable, and even a little bit flirty. She was feminine. Thousands of women (and men) identified with her, appreciated her tough stance on abortion and respected her traditional religious views. The socially conservative women that Rebecca Klatich (1987) and Kristin Luker (1984) wrote about in the 1980s are still voting and they “liked Sarah.” These voters are just as aware of their interests, and clearly felt that these interests, as women, would be forwarded by Palin.

Thus, framing the role of gender in this election as being about substantive representation is not entirely fair. Gender is not made or unmade by one candidate, one election, or even one political party (Casey and Carroll 2001; Carroll 2001). Had either Clinton or Palin been elected to office it would have marked a historic moment in women’s descriptive representation, and for at least some women, substantive representation as well. As political sociologists we understand that issues of gender and politics are important because they determine distributions of power. As political sociologists, however, we understand that gender is an organizing construct that operates independently of an individual’s sex, race, and political affiliation. Campaigns can neither ignore nor control how gender operates. It is this fundamentally sociological perspective that will be increasingly useful as gender continues to play out in the political arena.

“Notes on a Remarkable Election” by John Aldrich, Duke University Political Science

What a remarkable election, offering so many things to study and think about. The 2008 presidential general election campaign shares aspects with other (and as it happens, also unusually significant) elections. I draw comparisons here to 1992, 1980, and 1960.

In many ways, 2008 most resembles 1992. The outcomes, for example, are remarkably similar. Clinton and Obama earned 6% more popular vote than their Republican opponents. Perot, of course, received nearly 20% of the popular vote in 1992. His supporters were almost evenly divided between rating Clinton higher than Bush and vice versa, so Clinton would have defeated Bush by an estimated 6% of the vote in a two-person campaign as well. Clinton won 370 electoral votes, Obama will

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win either 364 or 376 electoral votes, depending upon the outcome in Missouri and Nebraska’s second district. The 103rd Congress opened with 57 Democrats in the Senate and 258 Democrats in the House. The 111th Congress will open with the Democrats holding between 57 and 60 Senate seats and 256 and 262 House seats.

Of course, this electoral result occurred under a northern, mixed-race presidential candidate on the Democratic side instead of a White Southerner. Conversely, Clinton represented the shift from one generation to another, just as does Obama. Both also won several (albeit different) southern states, Clinton carrying Arkansas, Georgia, Louisiana, and Tennessee for 39 electoral votes (47 including Kentucky) and Obama winning Florida, North Carolina, and Virginia for 55 electoral votes. In any event, both start with a very similar political power base. The ability to squander it rather rapidly should not go unremarked. Obama is taking at least initial steps to avoid that by moving far more rapidly in putting together a White House staff. Still, a common theme to these comments is that, in the long run, nothing succeeds for presidential politics like success.

One might ask how likely it is that the Democrat surge of 2008 will hold into the future? The answer depends upon how satisfied the public is with the Democratic use of power and especially that of the Obama administration (cf. Clubb, et al. [1980] on New Deal realignment). One clue can be found in the behavior of the newest voters. In this, Obama’s success compares with that of Ronald Reagan in 1980. Both won 54% support the youngest cohort of White voters, although, of course, Obama did far better among the youngest (and newest) non-White voters, carrying 66% of all youth voters (according to exit polls). Winning the youth vote is often a harbinger of long term change – the “bump” in support for Republicans from the youngest cohort in 1980 is still visible in cohort analyses today. And this was key also to the New Deal coalition (cf. Clubb et al. 1980). Again, only time (perhaps as little as 2 to 4 years) will tell if the Democrats are able to cement that support into long-term identification.

Obama shares another thing with Reagan (in addition to running during a substantial economic eruption with the US involved in a Mideast crisis). Both made dramatic gains in popular support during the campaign, quite possibly associated with their debates. Reagan trailed Carter, albeit often closely, in most polls throughout 1980. Before the last week of the campaign (and the only Reagan-Carter debate on October 29), it was “too close to call.” Reagan soared to an eventual 10 point victory on November 4 after the debate, often cited as the source of that burst. In this view, Reagan’s key to success was to defuse the attempt to paint him as an “unsafe” choice, as the Democrats had painted his ideological predecessor, Barry Goldwater, in 1964. As for Obama, he needed to appeal to enough White voters to win. One part of this, quite similar to Reagan, was to be the calm, reasonable, non-scary candidate. In this, Obama was aided by the behavior of his opponent, perhaps most vividly in McCain’s decision to “suspend” his campaign, cancel his debate appearance, and go to Washington to “solve” the economy crisis, a set of decisions reversed in time for the debate. Carter’s handling of the Iranian hostage crisis, including cancelling US participation in the Olympics and especially the failed rescue attempt (not to mention being attacked by the “killer rabbit” albeit before the campaign) likely aided Reagan as well.

In any event, Obama, like Reagan, “won” the debates and, in this context, did so in significant part by appearing calm, collected, and on top of things. Each made themselves perceived as far less risky than the opponent’s sought to portray them, and they were able to do so directly in front of voters’ eyes. As a result, they were able to be assessed more on the usual fundamentals of parties, issues, and candidate qualities, without the addition of being a risky alternative. That simply made it easier, perhaps even possible, for voters to imagine at least the possibility of voting for them.

John Kennedy’s campaign in 1960 was notable to students of campaigns for two particular things. One is his handling of the question of his religion. At the time, it was certain, according to conventional wisdom, that a Catholic could not win office. He addressed this issue by competing in primaries (the first winning nominee to do so as a part of their positive campaign strategy) to demonstrate that he could win public support. Most famously, he addressed the relationship between his faith and his politics only once, at least in an extended address. In his case, it was in an appearance at a conference of Baptist leaders in Houston, Texas. He rarely directly addressed these questions on the campaign trail, campaigning more or less as though he were a candidate for president and not the Catholic candidate for president. In this, Obama followed his example remarkably closely, including the speech in Philadelphia. While each was simply the Democratic candidate for president, both did, of course, draw unusually heavily from their faith/race, and did relatively poorly among Protestants/Whites. But, both did draw significant and sufficient support across religious/racial lines to win – Obama much more comfortably than Kennedy.

Finally, Kennedy conducted what is seen in many ways a revolutionary campaign in terms of new campaign technologies. He was the first genuine candidate of the television age, as Obama is first genuine candidate of the internet age. McCain, like Nixon, had employed the medium in important ways – Nixon most famously with his televised “Checkers” speech, McCain as the first presidential candidate to employ web based activity in 2000. But Obama and Kennedy fundamentally changed campaigning through their adoption of new technologies. Kennedy was also the first candidate to have his own pollster (Louis Harris of UNC-Chapel Hill), the first to charter his own jet, and many other firsts. Obama is the first to decline general election campaign financing, freeing him to raise remarkable sums, sums that permitted him to campaign in ways and places he would not have seriously considered if restricted, as McCain was, to the mandated federal limits. Or, they seem to be such

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remarkable sums today, but it is likely that next time or the time after, campaign finance as we know it will be all but gone (all but the limits on donations), and the stunning sums Obama raised will pale with greater experience, acumen, and habituation. As a final note, I hope to call attention to new research platforms using the 2008 election and to inform you about possibilities for to do work using this election data. First, as good fortune would have it, there are a number of new data gathering venues for the study of public opinion and elections this year, so it promises to become a lab for a large number of innovative studies. The standard ANES study, for example, is augmented by a multi-wave, web-based panel (drawing a new set of respondents especially for this panel). They opened the process for getting questions on both surveys, holding competitions to get questions included in a pilot study in 2006 (www.electionstudies.org/studypages/2006pilot/2006pilot.htm; reports may also be found in Aldrich and McGraw, forthcoming). For reports on the 2008 ANES as they become available, see www.electionstudies.org/studypages/2008prepost/2008prepost.htm (with data releases expected early 2009). Second, following the successful implementation of a collective academic exercise on the “cooperative congressional election study” of 2006, there is another CCES in 2008, through which teams of scholars bought portions of a web-based study of the congressional elections in 2008. In addition, Polimetrix, now a part of YouGov, also ran a parallel cooperative study of the presidential campaign, the Cooperative Campaign Analysis Project. These have provided for innovations in topics, questions, designs, and modes, and go along with TESS (Time Shared Experiments in the Social Sciences), among others, to provide a dramatic decentralization of access to national samples. The possibility for innovative research is thereby increased by at least an order of magnitude.

### “Beyond Credit & Blame” by Tom Medvetz, University of California San Diego

To paraphrase one of my graduate school advisers, sociologists should be careful about shooting at moving targets. Analyzing history as it unfolds is a tricky business, and so it must be with great caution that we consider the sociological import of Barack Obama’s historic victory in the 2008 election. It seems clear nonetheless that one of the main stances that set Barack Obama’s candidacy apart from those of his opponents was his early opposition to the Iraq War. This anti-war view, expressed most famously in an October 2002 speech in Chicago, undoubtedly helped the junior Senator from Illinois in the fierce primary contest against Sen. Hillary Clinton. Likewise, in the general election against Sen. John McCain, Obama’s early opposition to the war helped to distance him from President Bush’s foreign policy and to neutralize the argument that he lacked experience.

Yet the idea that Obama possessed superior foresight actually helps to obscure what I believe is one of the Iraq War’s main sociological lessons. For the woeful fact is that it did not really require unusual prescience or exceptionally good judgment to oppose the war from the start. Rather, it required sorting through a complex but mostly vacuous discussion and heeding rather conventional expertise on the most relevant topics. Here, for example, were Middle East experts Conrad C. Crane and W. Andrew Terrill of the Army War College, writing in February 2003, one month before the Iraq invasion: “The possibility of the United States winning the war and losing the peace in Iraq is real and serious. Rehabilitating Iraq will consequently be an important challenge that threatens to consume huge amounts of resources without guaranteed results. The effort also threatens to be a long and painful process, but merely ‘toughing it out’ is not a solution. The longer the occupation continues, the greater the potential that it will disrupt society rather than rehabilitate it…. However, a withdrawal from Iraq under the wrong circumstances could leave it an unstable failed state [and] result in civil war.”

One could also cite Scott Ritter, the chief U.N. weapons inspector in Iraq from 1991 to 1998, who correctly predicted that Iraq would not have weapons of mass destruction. Or longtime foreign affairs adviser Brent Scowcroft, whose August 2002 Wall Street Journal piece, “Don’t Attack Saddam,” warned that an invasion would weaken America’s international partnerships, prove more costly than anticipated, and probably require a “large-scale, long-term military occupation.” There were also many academic scholars who understood that Americans would not be “greeted as liberators,” and that invading a country whose boundary was drawn arbitrarily around three rival ethnic groups by the British Empire would likely produce sectarian violence. Prominent among them was the group Historians Against the War, whose members also decried “the undermining of constitutional government in the U.S. [and] the egregious curtailment of civil liberties and human rights at home and abroad.” Finally, our own ASA argued that invading Iraq would “undermine the already weakened UN, the League of Arab States, and the rule of international law, and will bring more harm than good to the Iraqi people.”

Of course, those who made these predictions publicly saw their arguments overwhelmed (and their loyalty to the nation questioned) in a public debate that was essentially over before it began. Since the false premises and reckless mismanagement of the Iraq War have become widely known, there has been a great deal of soul-searching about the content of our public debate. But in my view the problem with this soul-searching is that, like the discussion above, it tends to reduce very quickly to a tallying of individual credit and blame rather than an examination of the profound misfirings of institutions. A postgame scorecard is no substitute for genuine inquiry into the deeper rules of public debate, which at present tend to ensure victory to the holders of the loudest megaphone over the bearers of evidence, to broadcast ratings over journalistic integrity, and to vigorous flag-waving over rigorous analysis.
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A revealing symptom of this problem is that the best soul-searching has arguably been carried out by comedy shows like *The Daily Show* and *The Colbert Report*, which lampoon the insipidness of mass media discussion on a nightly basis, but in their solitariness and ironic detachment – that is to say, in their role as court jesters – are perhaps better positioned to inoculate the general public against serious reflexivity than to give them a taste for more of it.

The pre-war debate also show that moneyed interests and entrenched political authorities can establish their own intellectual machinery as a substitute for more self-directed knowledge. This situation is perhaps best personified by the think tank-affiliated ‘policy expert,’ who cultivates all the trappings of an expert save for the capacity to actually challenge the current political orthodoxy. The policy expert’s main credentials are the ability to speak in sound bites, to anticipate “hot” policy issues before they arise, and to carry out rapid-response production according to the cycles and norms of Washington. It is fitting that the Bush Doctrine was devised in one think tank, the Project for the New American Century, and given the patina of expert support by many others. That policy experts have one foot in the academic world only obscures the fact that their role with respect to the political field is essentially a sheltering one.

Make no mistake, I believe President-elect Obama deserves an ‘A’ in courage for opposing the Iraq War publicly in 2002. Yet there is something deeply problematic in the idea that anticipating this failure required some kind of superhuman prescience. Perhaps one of the war’s few bright spots is the idea that anticipating this failure required some kind of superhuman prescience. Perhaps one of the war’s few bright spots is the idea that anticipating this failure required some kind of superhuman prescience. Perhaps one of the war’s few bright spots is the idea that anticipating this failure required some kind of superhuman prescience. Perhaps one of the war’s few bright spots is the idea that anticipating this failure required some kind of superhuman prescience. Perhaps one of the war’s few bright spots is the idea that anticipating this failure required some kind of superhuman prescience. Perhaps one of the war’s few bright spots is the idea that anticipating this failure required some kind of superhuman prescience. Perhaps one of the war’s few bright spots is the idea that anticipating this failure required some kind of superhuman prescience. Perhaps one of the war’s few bright spots is the idea that anticipating this failure required some kind of superhuman prescience.

REFERENCES TO SYMPOSIUM


For years scholars criticized regulatory agencies for failing to impose adequately stringent penalties. Starting in the 1980s, however, some scholars argued that because regulators address potential harms rather than actual harms, persuasion and negotiation are generally more appropriate than deterrent penalties. In this dissertation I refer to the first viewpoint as capture theory; the second, as compliance theory. This dissertation uses inspection data from the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA). I examine how workplace accidents, which are actual harms, affect the relationship between enforcement and statewide political environment. A capture perspective would predict that penalties will be higher in pro-labor states for routine inspections, but that this effect of pro-labor political environment will be either smaller or unchanged for post-accident inspections. A compliance perspective would predict that pro-labor states will have a greater tendency to increase penalties in post-accident inspections, relative to routine inspections. As predicted, penalties for post-accident inspections were higher than for routine inspections. However, political environment had at most inconsistent effects on OSHA enforcement. My findings suggest that, at least as regards OSHA enforcement, states do not have a unitary political environment; instead, political institutions influence enforcement according to their own resources and goals.


Since September 11, 2001, the United States has been engaged in a “war on terror.” But what does it mean to declare war upon an enemy which is not a state, or even a single organization, but a concept whose very meaning is hotly contested? My dissertation, Disciplining an Unruly Field: Terrorism Studies and the State, 1972-2001, draws upon archival and published textual sources, interviews with terrorism researchers, and network maps of terrorism experts to analyze how the contemporary concept of “terrorism” was constructed through an ongoing conflict over expert knowledge. I argue that the emergence of terrorism expertise as a relatively un-institutionalized arena of study resulted in the construction and maintenance of terrorism as an unstable concept. While terrorism experts have often complained of their inability to stabilize the definition of “terrorism,” I find that the very plasticity of the term is in fact a central feature of its power, forming the basis for a discourse open to use by a variety of actors with differing agendas.

Sourabh Singh, “Locating a Short Lived Authoritarian State in the History of Politics and Social Space in Postcolonial India,” Ph.D. Candidate Rutgers University

On 26 June 1975, Indira Gandhi’s government imposed a state of Emergency on India. Law enforcement agencies were given powers to detain any individual without any formal warrant. All leaders of opposition parties and the ruling party known for criticizing Indira Gandhi’s government were arrested. This spell of authoritarianism ended on the 18th January 1977. Why did the postcolonial Indian state acquire an authoritarian form? On the basis of quantitative analysis of data on 3,746 Indian parliamentarians elected during Nehruvian and Indira Gandhi’s era, I argue that the appearance of authoritarianism in postcolonial India was a result of changes in parliamentarians’ social and political networks and their experiences of various cultures of politics between the Nehruvian and Indira Gandhi’s era of politics. During Nehruvian era Congress party’s parliamentarians had close political and social network with each other and with opposition parties’ parliamentarians, and had high amount of experience of cultures of politics. During Indira Gandhi’s era Congress party’s parliamentarians had weaker political and social network with each other and with opposition parties’ members, and had lower amount of experience of cultures of politics than their predecessors. These changes in structure and culture of the world of postcolonial Indian politics precipitated a brief period of authoritarianism in India.

David W. Woods, “Rebuilding Lower Manhattan: Participatory Democracy, Civic Renewal & the Question of Citizen Voice,” Ph.D. Candidate Fordham University

This study focuses on four coalitions of middle class urban professionals with specialized knowledge who were highly motivated to become involved in an example of post-disaster urban planning: the rebuilding of Lower Manhattan in the wake of the destruction of the World Trade Center by terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. The four coalitions – The Civic Alliance to Rebuild Downtown New York, New York/New Visions, Imagine New York, and Rebuild Downtown Our Town – were formed as a direct result of the now-historic terrorist attacks. Their aim was to help ordinary citizens to influence decision-makers with institutional power to decide the future of the 16-acre World Trade Center site and surrounding areas in Lower Manhattan. The key leaders of these four civic renewal coalitions were people who had been educated in the fields of urban planning, architect

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architecture, sociology and law. Consequently, they had accrued various kinds of capital – both economic and cultural – at the same time they developed and held to an ethos of democratic public service. As this study will show, this shared professional ethos guided their interest in playing leading roles in a process of empowering other citizens to participate in post-9/11 rebuilding process.

David Dietrich, "Rebellious Conservatives: A Study of Conservative Social Movements," Ph.D. Candidate Duke University

The idea of oppressed groups fighting for rights denied to them has become the default conception of social movements, from peasant movements in Europe to the Gay Rights Movement in the contemporary United States. However, we are increasingly seeing a different type of movement, whose participants are primarily White, middle-class, and Christian, thus occupying a majority and privileged societal position, and whose goals are not to secure denied rights, but to fight threats to existing privilege. The dominant theories in social movement research, including political process theory and culturalist theories, have difficulty accounting for the ideology and practices of these conservative social movements, e.g. the anti-immigration movement. I contend that to adequately study conservative movements we must refine and extend existing social movement theory. I argue that, unlike progressive movements, conservative movements do not respond primarily to political opportunity, but to threats to their privileged position. To better understand this threat imperative, I turn to race theory, specifically Blumer's group position theory. I will refine, expand, and synthesize existing social movement theories as well as group position theory to develop a new theoretical framework that will account for mainstream conservative social movements. This model will be developed and tested through a qualitative analysis of print and online literature, Internet message boards, and interviews from organizations in two case movements: the anti-abortion movement and the anti-immigration movement.


Recent development literature, despite its significant merit, has highlighted either the role of the state and domestic institutions or the country’s participation in global production networks as a crucial factor to economic development with little consideration of how they interact with each other at different time periods. Building upon the cross-national historical comparative research on industrial development, this dissertation examines how and why the development trajectories of the animation industry were differently shaped in India and South Korea in different periods and how the state, foreign capital, local firms, and business associations affect the divergent path. Using the interviews and archival data collected through fieldwork, it analyzes the way changing international division of labor in animation production affects and is facilitated by industrial governance at the national level, and simultaneously how the state’s intervention in animation production and consumption shape not only the structure of the local industry but also its linkage to global value chains. This research addresses the questions through a cross-national case comparison between the two countries as well as a temporal comparison within each of them between before and after the mid-1990s, which represents a historical juncture for the industry’s path in both countries.

Kristen Hopewell, “Shifting Hegemony and the Governance of Neoliberal Globalization at the WTO,” Ph.D. Candidate University of Michigan

For almost their entire history, the institutions charged with the governance of the international trading system – the World Trade Organization (WTO) and its predecessor the GATT – have been dominated by the U.S. and a small group of other advanced industrialized states. However, in the last decade, the power of developing countries, led by Brazil, India and China, has increased significantly at the WTO. Since its inception, the WTO has been a key driver of neoliberal globalization, pushing for the removal of barriers to trade and capital flows and the expansion of self-regulating markets on a global scale. The creation of the WTO and its neoliberal policies were driven primarily by the U.S. and its industrialized country allies, who structured the rules of the international trading system in order to benefit their economic interests and those of their multinationals. The rise of developing countries, with presumably very different institutional and policy objectives, has the potential to therefore prompt a major revision of the workings and policies of the WTO. In my dissertation, I am analyzing the rise of developing countries at the WTO and the impact of their growing power on the neoliberal agenda of the WTO.

Matthew Baggetta, “Civic Development in Apolitical Associations,” Ph.D. Candidate Harvard University

What effects do civic associations have on their members? Scholars have long noted the correlation between joining Continued on p.15
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associations and a variety of individual outcomes, but particular features of associations that might drive these outcomes are understudied. My dissertation uses new multilevel data from a population of apolitical civic associations and their members to fill this gap. Using structured interviews with leaders and surveys of members, supplemented with ethnographic observations, I collected data on 1,032 volunteer singers in 25 Boston area choral societies (independent, self-governed associations of vocalists). The study’s quasi-experimental design (individuals are “assigned” to different organizational “treatments” based on the non-civic dimension of music preferences) controls for some common selection effects problematic in prior research. Additionally, the demographic similarity of groups and their apolitical nature provides for particularly stringent tests of the effects of structure. I find that choral societies provide as many or more formally structured opportunities for “civic” activities than other political and service-based associations. In practice, however, formal civic structures (e.g. committees, elections) have little apparent effect on individual civic outcomes (e.g. political participation, community engagement). The informal structure of groups (e.g. degree of social integration), however, does significantly influence outcomes for members. These results have general implications for our understanding of associations as Tocquevillean “schools of democracy” as well as specific implications for the 250,000 choruses and nearly 30 million choristers in the U.S. – and millions of participants in other apolitical groups.

BOOK ABSTRACTS

Anita Waters, Planning the Past: Heritage Tourism and Post-Colonial Politics at Port Royal (Lexington Books)

This book studies the way a post-colonial society reconstructs its national history and grapples with its colonial past, specifically in Port Royal, a Jamaican village with a dramatic history of pirates, naval admirals, and earthquakes. Waters argues that the plans for Port Royal’s heritage tourism development represent a chronological record of historical revisionism, and the fact that none of the plans has been realized reflects post-colonial social processes and national ambivalence about piratical and naval history. This interdisciplinary study will be valuable reading for students of historiography, piracy, Caribbean history, Caribbean politics, and heritage tourism.


This book examines the strategies of the most successful and racially diverse community organizations. Collective action through organized social movements has long expanded American citizens’ rights and liberties. Recently, the Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now (ACORN) has helped win living wage initiatives in more than 130 cities across the country. Likewise, congregation-based groups have established countless social programs at city and state levels. Despite modest budgets, these organizations—different in their approach, but at the same time working for social change—have won billions of dollars in redistributive programs. Looking closely at this phenomenon, Swarts explores activist groups’ cultural, organizational, and political strategies. Focusing on ACORN chapters and church federations in St. Louis, Missouri, and San Jose, California, Swarts demonstrates that congregation-based organizing has developed an innovative cultural strategy, combining democratic deliberation and leadership development to produce a “culture of commitment” among its cross-class, multiracial membership. By contrast, ACORN’s more homogeneous low-income class base has a national structure that allows it to coordinate campaigns quickly, and its seasoned staff excels in tactical innovations. By making these often-invisible grassroots organizers evident, Swarts sheds light on factors that constrain or enable other social movements in the United States.


Paul explores both how and why U.S. military intervention decisions are made. Pursuit of that inquiry requires the identification of decision participants, thorough examination of the decision making processes they employ, and recognition of several factors that influence intervention decisions: the national interest, legitimacy, and the legacies of previous policies. This book provides chapter length treatment of each of these issues. The research is based on detailed historical case studies for the four U.S. “Marines on the beach” military interventions in Latin America since World War II: The Dominican Republic (1965), Grenada (1983), Panama (1989), and Haiti (1994). Additional cases (notably Afghanistan and Iraq) enter the discussion when considering findings with broader implications. Of the existing theories of governance that compete to explain government policy making, Paul finds that elite theory provides the best general model for intervention decision making, but that the notions of

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both pluralist and class theorists contribute to a complete explanation, and sometimes in an unexpected way. Findings also indicate considerable contribution from and constraint by institutional sources. However, far from finding that institutional factors are wholly deterministic, this research offers support for a “choice-within-constraints” model. Conclusions suggest that top decision-makers (especially the president) enjoy wide latitude in framing the national interest and in choosing where to and where not to intervene.


This book is based on eleven years of fieldwork in a poor community on the outskirts of Guadalajara, Mexico. Those years were a period of extensive change in Mexico, as political democratization was instituted during a period of unremitting neoliberal globalization. The political economy of neoliberalism, Shefner argues, opened alternatives to the community organization, limiting state spending prerogatives and created a political environment in which diverse organizations worked together across class and status lines to achieve common goals. Positive changes in political process, however, did not translate into gains for the neighborhoods, as later periods of fieldwork demonstrated little material progress for the community. The lack of material progress despite a coalesced opposition suggests that theory regarding the contribution of civil society are unduly optimistic and analytically problematic. The coalescing of poor and middle class organizations appeared to be the quintessential case of civil society mobilizing for common cause. However, an internal hierarchy privileged organizations representing higher class and status constituencies over their poor counterparts. Decisions over strategy and goals were imposed by the more powerful organizations. After the transition to electoral democracy, the coalition broke apart, leaving the organization of the poor without their allies. These experiences show the unity of civil society is illusory at best; that societal hierarchy is re-created even in progressive coalitions, and that those disadvantaged groups that enter into civil society activity may be no less disadvantaged when struggles end.


Why do two countries that have as much in common as the United States and Canada have such different political cultures? This book explores the length and breadth of North American history in the search for answers. The book offers a unique perspective on the political development of two of the world’s newest, most successful, and most widely emulated democracies. Unlike existing accounts of “the Continental Divide,” this book features historical accounts of pre- and post-revolutionary factors in North American political development, including Canadians’ reluctance to join the American quest for independence, the founding ideals of both new nations, and the development of new political and economic institutions to facilitate national goals. Comparisons are made of key events on both sides of the border, including early land grants and colonial governance, territorial expansion (“the West”), and relations with immigrants and indigenous people. This book concludes that differences in the legal rules overseeing relationships between people, groups, and governments help explain much of the divergence in political culture and public policy across these otherwise similar societies. Legal culture is explored more generally as a novel perspective on national political development worldwide.

Erik Kuhonta, Dan Slater, and Tuong Vu (eds.). Southeast Asia in Political Science: Theory, Region, and Qualitative Analysis (Stanford University Press 2008)

This book argues that Southeast Asian political studies have made important contributions to theory building in comparative politics through a dialogue involving theory, area studies, and qualitative methodology. The book provides a state-of-the-art review of key topics in the field, including: state structures, political regimes, political parties, contentious politics, civil society, ethnicity, religion, rural development, globalization, and political economy. The chapters allow readers to trace the development of Southeast Asian politics and to address central debates in comparative politics. The book will serve as a valuable reference for undergraduate and graduate students, scholars of Southeast Asian politics, and comparativists engaged in theoretical debates at the heart of political science.


In the aggressive image of nation-state formation that infuses political sociology, populations lie prone while the state surveils, penetrates, cages, contains, disciplines, coerces, and extracts resources from them. In exchange, states provide populations with protection and negotiate civil, political, and social rights of national citizenship. But what do states do when much of
their population simply gets up and walks away? In Mexico and other migrant-sending countries, mass emigration prompts governments to negotiate a new social contract with their citizens abroad. After decades of failed efforts to control outflow, the Mexican state now emphasizes voluntary ties, dual nationality, and rights over obligations. This book examines a region of Mexico whose citizens have been migrating to the United States for more than a century. It finds that emigrant citizenship does not signal the decline of the nation-state but does lead to a new form of citizenship à la carte, and that bureaucratic efforts to manage emigration and its effects are based on the membership model of the Catholic Church.


Scandal is the quintessential public event. Here is the first general and comprehensive analysis of this ubiquitous moral phenomenon. Taking up wide-ranging cases in society, politics, and art, Adut shows when wrongdoings generate scandals and when they do not. He focuses on the emotional and cognitive experience of scandals and the relationships among those who are involved in or exposed to them. This perspective explains variations in the effects, frequency, elicited reactions, outcomes, and strategic uses of scandals. This book offers provocative accounts of the Oscar Wilde, Watergate, and Lewinsky affairs. Adut also employs the lens of scandal to address puzzles and questions regarding public life. Why is American politics plagued by sex scandals? What is the cause of the rise in political scandals in Western democracies? Why were Victorians sometimes very accommodating and other times very intolerant of homosexuality? What is the social logic of hypocrisy? Why has transgression been so central to modern art?


The World Bank and other multilateral development banks (MDBs) carry out their mission to alleviate poverty and promote economic growth based on the advice of professional economists. But as Sarah Babb argues in this book, these organizations have also been indelibly shaped by Washington politics—particularly by the legislative branch and its power of the purse. Tracing American influence on MDBs over three decades, this volume assesses increased congressional activism and the perpetual “selling” of banks to Congress by the executive branch. Babb contends that congressional reluctance to fund the MDBs has enhanced the influence of the United States on them by making credible America’s threat to abandon the banks if its policy preferences are not followed. At a time when the United States’ role in world affairs is being closely scrutinized, this book will be necessary reading for anyone interested in how American politics helps determine the fate of developing countries.


What induces groups to commit political suicide? This book explores the decisions to surrender power and to legitimate this surrender: collective abdications. Commonsensical explanations impute such actions to coercive pressures, actors, miscalculations, or their contamination by ideologies at odds with group interests. Ermakoff argues that these explanations are either incomplete or misleading. Focusing on two paradigmatic cases of voluntary and unconditional surrender of power, the passing of an enabling bill granting Hitler the right to amend the Weimar constitution without parliamentary supervision (March 1933), and the transfer of full executive, legislative, and constitutional powers to Marshal Pétain (Vichy, France, July 1940), this book recasts abdication as the outcome of a process of collective alignment. Ermakoff distinguishes several mechanisms of alignment in troubled and uncertain times and assesses their significance through a fine-grained examination of actors, beliefs, shifts in perceptions, and subjective states. To this end, he draws on the analytical and methodological resources of perspectives that usually stand apart: primary historical research, formal decision theory, the phenomenology of group processes, quantitative analyses, and the hermeneutics of testimonies. In elaborating this dialogue across disciplinary boundaries, this book restores the complexity and indeterminate character of pivotal collective decisions and demonstrates that an in-depth historical exploration can lay bare processes of crucial importance for understanding the formation of political preferences, the paradox of self-deception, and the makeup of historical events as highly consequential.


The book analyzes the politics of workfare in New York City during the 1990s under Mayor Rudolph W. Giuliani. Workfare is the practice of making welfare recipients work as a condition of receiving their welfare checks, so workfare workers are defined under law as compensating the public for the support they get, rather than as workers or employees. The book focuses on the efforts of community organizations, legal advocates, antipoverty activists, and unions to roll back the workfare
program, and asks what kinds of actions and what kinds of claims shaped the changing terms of debate over the course of ten years. By considering the creation of political speech in the contexts of urban political economy, institutional politics, the media, and in intra-organizational settings, the book weaves together a novel, interdisciplinary approach to understanding how we make political claims, change our minds, and change what appears politically and socially possible.


Thoroughly revised and updated in its fifth edition, this book illustrates the broad social bases of politics and also shows how politics and governmental actions can influence the fate of nations and their citizens. Providing insight into recent political sociological theories, Orum and new coauthor Dale help students make sense of the many major social and political changes taking place in the world today. They examine such timely topics as the economy and politics, states and societies, civil society and politics, basic forms of political rule, power and equality in modern America, political parties, and citizen participation. Bringing together a wide variety of perspectives and ideas, this unique text also familiarizes students with recent scholarship on the American welfare state, social networks, and the business world. Throughout, the authors provide students with current assessments of popular incendiary topics, increasing their awareness and encouraging them to become more involved in the material. Classic and comprehensive, this book is ideal for upper-level undergraduate courses in political sociology.


Now, for the first time in one volume, this book integrates Weber's exploration of the spirit of capitalism's origins with his larger project: a multi-causal analysis of the West's distinctiveness and sources. Weber's texts present wide-ranging discussions of the Western city, state, forms of rulership and law, and modes of economic innovation. Moreover, he offers in many selections in-depth and insightful comparisons to China and India. Readings on the "economic ethics" of Confucianism, Buddhism, Hinduism, Islam, Judaism, and Catholicism further illuminate the distinct qualities of the West's trajectory and its diverse causes. A separate section examines the long-range influence of the ascetic Protestant sects and churches on American political culture today. This volume includes extended introductions by the editor that situate "the Protestant ethic thesis" and Weber’s "rise of the West" project, many new translations, a chronology of Weber’s life, numerous clarifying endnotes, an extensive glossary, and a bibliography. Kalberg’s introductions address a variety of debates in Weber’s time as well as in our own.


This is an innovative study of the experiences of Mexican men who have sex with men and who have migrated to the United States. Cantú situates his analysis within the history of Mexican immigration and offers a broad understanding of diverse migratory experiences ranging from recent gay asylum seekers to an assessment of gay tourism in Mexico. This book complicates a fixed notion of sexual identity and explores the complex factors that influence immigration and migration experiences.

ANNOUNCEMENTS

Conference Participation Invited:

Junior scholars (graduate students and assistant professors) are invited to apply to attend the Women in Politics – Global Perspectives Conference, Friday April 24, 2009 at Ohio State University. The conference will include sessions such as women and democracy, national security, and conflict; women’s global organizing; and women in politics – gaining access, changing institutions. The conference website is http://www.sociology.osu.edu/wip/index.php. Ten junior scholars will attend the conference and receive lodging, meals, and up to $350 in travel expenses. Interested graduate students or assistant professors should send a vita and a one-page statement on their related research to Pam Paxton, Department of Sociology, 238 Townshend Hall, 1885 Neil Avenue, Columbus, OH 43210-1222. The application deadline is February 1, 2009 and award decisions will be made by mid-February. The conference is sponsored by the Mershon Center for International Security Studies at Ohio State University. Additional funding for junior scholar participation was provided by the Ohio State University Departments of Sociology, Political Science, Anthropology, and Women’s Studies, as well as the College of Social and Behavioral Sciences.

Continued on p.19
Announcements Continued...

New Dataset

The Standardized World Income Inequality Database (SWIID) by Frederick Solt, Southern Illinois University

Cross-national research on the causes and consequences of income inequality has been hindered by the limitations of existing inequality datasets: greater coverage across countries and over time is available from these sources only at the cost of significantly reduced comparability across observations. The goal of the Standardized World Income Inequality Database (SWIID) is to overcome these limitations. A custom missing-data algorithm was used to standardize the United Nations University's World Income Inequality Database; data collected by the Luxembourg Income Study served as the standard. The SWIID provides comparable Gini indices of gross and net income inequality for 153 countries for as many years as possible from 1960 to the present along with estimates of uncertainty in these statistics. By maximizing comparability for the largest possible sample of countries and years, the SWIID is better suited to broadly cross-national research on income inequality than previously available sources. A complete description of the SWIID, forthcoming in the *SSQ*, and the dataset itself are available from the author's website: <http://www.siu.edu/~fsolt/swiid/swiid.html>.

New ASA Section-in-Formation

We are proud to announce a new Section-in-Formation of the ASA: Disability in Society. We engage with many issues that are of interest to political sociologists – such as the study of the welfare state; the politics of protest, activism and identity politics; employment and social inequality; state policies and citizenship – but we add an awareness of the impact of a disabling society and the development of a disability movement to this frame of analysis, and often come up with innovative results. We are keen to further explore the connections between various forms of social inequality and disability and urge you to join us. This new Section-in-Formation is a great place to network, engage with other scholars, discuss recent events, and pursue avenues for grants, teaching, research and service. The Disability section is also pleased to be offering FREE membership to 40 graduate students who are current members of ASA who would like to join the section. We encourage potential members to contact the chairs of the membership committee, Liat Ben Moshe: lbenmosh@maxwell.syr.edu or Mark Sherry: markdsherry@yahoo.com

SECTION STATISTICS

At the close of 2008, the section’s membership stood at 834. This was a slight decline from 844 in 2007. However, this was the second highest total since at least 2001 (as far back as ASA lists membership information – the third highest was 771 in 2006). For comparison, ASA saw total section memberships decline modestly last year as well. The Political Sociology section still ranks as the eighth largest section (only two behind Social Movements and four behind Theory).

EDITOR’S NOTE AND CALL FOR CONTRIBUTIONS

In the next issue, we will have a symposium on “Politics in Africa.” Although we’ve already locked up a few excellent contributors, we certainly have room for more. Keep the book and dissertation abstracts coming! Finally, please feel encouraged to contribute anything you have to say to the section on politics, political sociology or sociology in general. If you have a letter to write in response to something in the newsletter, I’ll publish that as well. Submissions should be sent to my email below. Best regards,

Dave Brady
brady@soc.duke.edu

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