From the Chair:
State of the CHS Union

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Columns of this sort are the academic equivalents of State of the Union speeches, opportunities to say that all is well and to take credit for the good times.

I can’t (and won’t) take credit for the healthy state of comparative historical sociology but I do want to encourage all of us to recognize the richness of our theoretical discussions and the breadth and depth of our empirical work. The mid-twentieth century revolution in historiography—the discovery and creative interpretation of previously ignored sources, many created by historical actors whose agency had been slighted and misunderstood—has been succeeded by the recent flowering of comparative historical work by sociologists.

We can see the ambition and reach of our colleagues’ work in the research presented at our section’s panels in Philadelphia and in the plans for sessions next year (see the call for papers elsewhere in this newsletter). The Author Meets Critics panel on Julia Adams, Lis Clemens, and Ann Orlof’s Remaking Modernity: Politics, History, and Sociology was emblematic of how our field’s progress got expressed at the Annual Meeting. While that book (and the panel discussion) explicitly place recent scholarship in the context of the past half-century of historical sociology, the papers presented on other panels (like the contributions to Remaking Modernity) demonstrate clear advances in our capacity to identify the ways in which multiple causal forces combine to produce contingent chains of historical change. Most impressive are the sophisticated ways the authors explain human motive. Adams et al. describe three waves of historical sociology: a first wave of classical sociology (which was brought low by simplistic...
modernization theory), a second wave of increasingly sophisticated structural analysis, and now a third wave that returns our attention to the agency of actors. Much of the third wave’s creativity springs from efforts to recreate the mentalities and milieus of long-dead actors who often left no documentary evidence of their desires and concerns, or who may have engaged in practices or left records intended to mislead others or which were at times self-deluding.

Efforts to derive agency from structural positions or through the logic of rational choice allow for important if limited advances. The cultural turn that is analyzed and exemplified in Remaking Modernity draws on the best of twentieth century historiography along with an array of insights drawn from more recent studies in organizational analysis, gender studies and other disciplines. What emerges are multi-dimensional images of humans in the process of identifying their interests and desires while also establishing and sustaining the social relations necessary to their achievement. Our ultimate goal, as it has been since Marx, is to show the causal and temporal interactions of those two aspects of social being: identity and interest, conception and social relation.

I heard fine examples of sophisticated understandings of motives and their attempted realization in the papers presented at the session on Political Violence and Terrorism organized by our outgoing chair, Jeff Goodwin. The presenters were engaged in public sociology of the highest order, excavating the sources of political violence. After hearing Elizabeth Wood and Michael Biggs, I came away with a fuller and more precise understanding of the motives behind and consequences of rape in warfare and protest through self-immolation than I could find in any other place. Georgi Derluguian placed the revolution in Chechnya in a world historic context that made sense of the revolutionaries’ motives, strategies and goals. Finally, Michael Schwartz, by distinguishing between terrorism and guerrilla war in terms of goals, tactics and actors, brought more illumination to the war in Iraq than any other analysis I have encountered. In some ways the session was depressing, for its grim subject matter but also because the ways in which sociologists think about these matters has so little influence on the puerile discussions of terrorism that appear even in the most serious news outlets and in papers by ‘foreign policy experts’ at Washington think tanks. At the same time, the rigor of the analyses was exhilarating.

Perhaps it is quixotic to hope that our colleagues’ insights can be injected into political debates, never mind policy. However, as academics we have a large collective audience in our students, and in the long-run (the sort of time period that is the subject matter of our discipline) truth has consequences. In any case the vision of historical sociology offers its own rewards. We can take pride that collectively our section colleagues are in the forefront of turning sociology from its fixation with the United States of the present moment. (There are times when I think the ASA motto could be ‘100 Years of What Happened in America Last Week’.) I thank all of you, my intellectual colleagues, for the insights you offer and invite you to share your current work by contributing to future issues of this newsletter, in sessions at next year’s meetings, and in all the other venues available to us.
Interdisciplinarity is the newest academic trend, but is it worth the effort? Bruce Carruthers argues that the study of the economy must be interdisciplinary, while George Steinmetz finds the division of history from sociology “disastrous.”

Frontier Arbitrage

Bruce G. Carruthers
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Boundaries are useful not only for what they hold together, but also for what they keep apart. Consider that a disciplinary boundary helps to unite a group of academics as sociologists, for example, and it also distinguishes them from political scientists, anthropologists, or economists. Such a considerable amount of professional energy is devoted to boundary maintenance that one cannot help but think of Mary Douglas’s discussion of purity and danger. Various anti-pollution strategies get deployed in pursuit of disciplinary rectitude: academic definitions (“sociology is the study of blah, blah, blah”); credentialing (a professional sociologist is someone with a PhD in sociology); informal networks (who are your grad-school pals?); professional social activity (which conferences does one attend); ritualized method (for historians, immersion in the archives; for economists, first use of a Nash equilibrium, Granger causality, or a Lagrange multiplier); ritual or totemic citation (signaling allegiance to Max Weber rather than Adam Smith, Kenneth Arrow, or Bronislaw Malinowski); rounding up the usual suspects – boys to be whipped and dead horses to be flogged (vulgar Marxists, logical positivists, reductionists, essentialists, anyone “pomo,” mindless empiricists, etc.); methodological one-upmanship (pooh-poohing quantitative research as unscientific, or pooh-poohing someone’s statistical methods as backward or old-fashioned); substantive one-upmanship (“... but we’ve known all this since so-and-so’s 1964 article – what is really new here?”); rhetorical refutations and finger-pointing (“So-and-so is completely wrong about X. If she is wrong about this, how can we trust anything she says about Y or Z?”); jokes (“How many economists does it take to screw in a lightbulb? – None. They leave it up to the market forces.”); and of course, jargon (examples are too numerous to mention but clearly use of Latin is a sine qua non for a special type of academic habitus, ceteris paribus). Much effort goes into the inscription and protection of such boundaries, and indeed practically the only things missing are a formal dress code, distinctive uniforms, or a secret handshake. Can summery rules for sociologists be far off?

Boundaries bolster academic identities and professional solidarity, settle jurisdictional disputes, and help police the disciplinary division of labor. But they also create unusual opportunities for the adventurous, as the etymology of the word entrepreneur suggests. Life on the disciplinary frontier offers the possibility of breaching barriers and transgressing boundaries, what we might call “constructive misbehavior.” Intellectual entrepreneurs can wander into foreign territory, bringing back tales of wondrous sights and strange baubles. They can, in short, perform a kind of arbitrage: taking ideas or facts from where they are commonplace and bringing them to where they are scarce, rare, or new. Ron Burt’s idea of brokerage (someone who spans a structural hole) gets at the same phenomenon. I am told that some economists browse physics and mathematics journals in the hope of seeing a theorem or result that they can import into their own discipline (see Mirowski 1989). Some sociologists (no names mentioned, thank-you) have built successful careers by introducing statistical methods.
that are new to fellow sociologists, but which are well-known or even routine elsewhere. This kind of translation work can be valuable to the profession, but it only functions if some kind of barrier exists in the first place.

Here I am not particularly interested in making a general argument about intellectual arbitrage, brokerage or interdisciplinarity. Rather, I am concerned with interdisciplinary work at one particular interface – that between comparative-historical sociology, economic sociology, and economic history. This nexus straddles at least three disciplines (sociology, history, and economics) and so is subject to all the purification strategies and boundary-maintenance activities mentioned earlier. It is a contested frontier. I confess to using caricature when I summarize the contest as follows: if historians believe that economists and sociologists let their accounts be overly-influenced by theoretical agendas, and without enough appreciation of historical complexity and specificity, economists criticize the absence of formal-mathematical-cum-quantitative rigor among the other two, and sociologists accuse historians of being too atheoretical while economists are too simplistically theoretical (and embrace the “wrong” theory, to boot). However, caricatures often contain more than a grain of truth.

What value can one derive by traversing this contested terrain? One of the easiest things to bring across the frontier, and profit by, are data. Can one ever have too much information or accumulate too much knowledge? One quality of mind that still impresses a contemporary reader of Marx or Weber is the omnivorous curiosity that animated the intellects of these two classical thinkers. Both were ferocious readers of political, social and economic history, and it is hard to match their bibliographic fervor. Disciplinary walls were less robust when they wrote, and so it was easier to wander around intellectually, but we should emulate them nevertheless. Arguments that propose general theories about society are much more convincing when made by someone who simply knows a lot about a lot of societies. While all theories necessarily involve simplification and exclusion (i.e., parsimony), such simplification should not be based on outright ignorance. Parsimony should be an act of commission, not omission. At the very least, knowledge of a wide variety of times and societies allows one to puncture theoretical balloons with a contrary case (“But what about the Bongo-bongo?”). More constructively, however, it gives one a better appreciation of the full range of social variation in the process or outcome that is of interest. Social phenomena cannot be properly understood without adequate knowledge of how, and along what dimensions, the phenomenon varies. They also cannot be comprehended without an understanding of context (social, historical, geographic, etc). To remain confined within existing disciplinary boundaries often means a gratuitous truncation of variation, and the absence of sufficient context.

Consider, for example, one social institution near and dear to my sociological heart: money and credit. One cannot seriously consider this topic for long before realizing how much can be learned by looking to other disciplines for knowledge. Four recent examples come to mind: Jane Guyer’s anthropological analysis (2004) of money in western Africa, Eric Helleiner’s book on the rise of territorial currencies (2003, a work of historical political science), Margot Finn’s study of credit in 18th and 19th-century England (2003), and Laurence Fontaine’s paper (2001) on credit in 18th-c. France. Among many other lessons, Guyer reminds sociologists of the importance of the informal economic sector, even for so canonical an institution as money, and the fact that money involves an ongoing interaction among multiple social orderings. Helleiner demonstrates that territorial currencies, i.e., the fact that countries have their own money...
(the U.S. has dollars, the Russians rubles, the Japanese yen, and so on), are an historical rarity and only emerged as a consequence of various political, economic and technological developments. Without using the language of sociology, Finn shows that (and how) English credit relations were embedded in social networks and cultural understandings. And in a straight economic historical analysis, Fontaine explains the social embeddedness of credit in early modern France. Virtually none of these insights and arguments would be so credibly demonstrated without a sustained examination of social or historical settings that ordinarily do not receive sociological notice. And of course, what these authors offer is intelligent analysis of evidence, not merely evidence.

Consider another fundamental economic institution: property. Although there are interesting developments occurring within the contemporary American property regime (e.g., the extension and specification of intellectual property rights from written text to software, genetic material, business practices, etc.), more dramatic variation can be found by looking abroad. The anthropologist Katherine Verdery (2003) studies the enormous change in property rights that occurred during the 1990s as Romania underwent the transition from a command to a market economy. Using ethnographic methods, she is also able to track the often considerable (and always consequential) discrepancy between formal/legal plans and rights, on the one hand, and actual facts on the ground, on the other. To rely on formal privatization laws as the principle measure of change in property rights would have been to overlook a much more complex and varied set of transformations that cannot be encapsulated by simplistic contrasts between private and public, or between state and market. William Alford (1995) studies the history of Chinese intellectual property law (copyrights, patents and trademarks), and shows convincingly how much it is embedded in China’s cultural traditions. Intellectual property is currently a matter of considerable dispute between developing economies (like China and India) and advanced economies, and Alford’s analysis makes clear that the conflict has deep historical roots.

Other ideational cargo can also be profitably brought across disciplinary borders. Instead of looked forms of variations, consider analytical constructs and mechanisms. These are sometimes portable, and they help bring in novel (for the receiving discipline) explanations, often with a memorable label. Whether “successful” or not, they spare people from re-inventing conceptual wheels and they can help engender constructive debates.

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Thanks to Stephen Jay Gould, for instance, the idea of “punctuated equilibrium” was exported from evolutionary biology to the social sciences, in part because it summarized so economically the idea that complex systems could over time switch between long periods of relatively stable reproduction (the equilibrium) interspersed with short, discrete periods of rapid change (the punctuation). Another idea enjoying wide-spread currency in sociology and political science comes from economic history: “path dependence.” As articulated by Paul David (1985) and W. Brian Arthur (1989), this builds on the idea of increasing returns to scale to recognize that under some circumstances, small initial differences can be amplified over time to become substantial differences, resulting in change that is hard (if not impossible) to reverse. Many sociologists have embraced this idea because it recognizes the temporal structure of social process, and invites researchers to focus on the specifics of initial conditions (Mahoney 2000). A number of scholars (e.g., Kiser and Hechter 1998) have imported ideas about rationality and rational decision-making primarily from economics. Their proposals have been very controversial within historical sociology (e.g., Gould 2005), but even if they cannot convince many of their sociological colleagues of the merits of rational choice theory, they have at the very least helped start a constructive debate about important issues.
There are many other examples of intellectual arbitrage. It involves a kind of academic bricolage in which existing ideas, concepts, or evidence are pulled together from a variety of different sources and put into new and eclectic combinations. Some of it succeeds, some of it fails miserably (who now remembers the differential topology that was packaged by French mathematician René Thom as “catastrophe theory,” and which was supposed to revolutionize social science?), and some of it fails magnificently (insert your favorite example here). Whatever the outcome, someone has to violate the disciplinary boundaries that collectively we labor so hard to construct and maintain. Impure acts and inappropriate behavior will doubtless attract unfavorable publicity and even opprobrium from some. But if successful they work like good analogies – providing insight by revealing an unseen likeness between two seemingly different patterns or objects.

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References


A Disastrous Division

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In this post-Foucauldian era every schoolchild knows that disciplinary boundaries are technologies and artifacts of power. From the standpoint of the underlying ontological and epistemological issues, the borderline between history and sociology seems as arbitrary as the political borders that European colonial powers engraved on the map of Africa. In Knowledge for What?, Robert Lynd described history as “the most venerable of the social sciences” and speculated that sociologists would soon begin to do their own historical writing (1939: 129, 138). Four decades later, Philip Abrams (1982) and Giddens (1984) concluded that there was no intrinsic difference between history and sociology in terms of their object or methodology. Both fields are concerned with human social practice in its willed or unintentional capacity for change and with social institutions’ paradoxical ability to reproduce themselves historically in forms that appear to be unchanging (de Gaulejac 2004: 75). History and sociology both belong to—or should belong to—the historical Geisteswissenschaften (sciences of culture). Bourdieu called the separation of sociology and history “disastrous” (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, p. 90).

But there is a gulf between “is” and “ought.” In reality the history-sociology relationship has long been a fraught one in the United States. This tension is due in part to the unequal resources that were provided to the two disciplines in post-World War II America, and also to the entrenched resistance among scientific sociologists to historical ways of thinking (Steinmetz 2005a). But historical sociology cannot convincingly claim to single-handedly represent all of historical thinking as a kind of self-appointed substitute within the discipline. Only by getting rid of the field’s Homeland Security Agents who try to seal the border against historical interlopers can sociology hope for a breath of historical fresh air. Otherwise it will only be the occasional escapees and the individual border-jumpers discussed by Bruce Carruthers who will have the benefit of interacting with a discipline that has been dealing for centuries with the same theoretical, epistemological, and methodological questions that concern us. And that would be a shame.

Let’s step back for a moment into the history of actually-existing history and sociology. If Lynd could foresee a melding of the two disciplines during the Depression, in the 1950s Hans Gerth (1959) and C. Wright Mills harshly criticized sociology’s ahistoricism and its anti-theoretical bent. Columbia sociologist Bernhard Stern (1959: 33) wrote that

Sociologists once talked of imbuing historians with correct perspectives. But now the situation is frequently reversed and it is the historian who can serve as an example to sociologists …. The frailty of sociologists lies in their tendency to abstract from historical reality ‘ideal types’ that are applicable everywhere and nowhere, beyond time and space, and hence in a netherworld of unreality …. Sociologists do not stress the great importance of the dimension of time …. Sociology will remain one-dimensional and hence shallow, and its concepts empty shells, unless the examination of historical concepts becomes a meaningful and disciplined task of sociologists.

From the standpoint of the underlying ontological and epistemological issues, the borderline between history and sociology seems as arbitrary as the political borders that European colonial powers engraved on the map of Africa.
During the 1980s, however, the two-way street between sociology and history became narrower and less frequently traveled. The fruitful exchange that had been emerging before was being replaced by a self-contained “historical sociology”...

But they were fighting a losing battle. Stern was a Marxist who was hauled before the House Un-American Activities Committee. Gerth languished in the shadow of his former student and coauthor, and Mills himself was himself marginalized in the years to come. By 1962 the “humanist” rebuttal to ASA President Paul Lazarsfeld’s call for an empiricist, presentist sociology at the annual meetings came not from a sociologist at all but from historian Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. (1962). In the concluding essay in *Theories of Society*, Edward Shils (1961: 1424) wrote that it is “the aim of general theory to become genuinely universal and transhistorical … attain[ing] a generality of scope … that render[s] it equally applicable to all societies of the past and present.” This vision of a sociology of omnihistorical general laws was anathema to any rapprochement between sociology and history, much less a synthesis of the two fields.

During the 1960s and 1970s, however, sociology and history gradually became more involved with one another. Initially the relation was unequal, tilted towards a certain sociological dominance. Social historians began to seek guidance in matters of theory and number-crunching techniques from sociologists, but they were expected “to remain inferior to the theory-producing disciplines” (McDonald 1996: 94; Sewell 2005). Despite a brief wave of epistemological critique in sociology, marked by Gouldner’s *Coming Crisis of Western Sociology* (1970) and the translation of the 1960s German positivism dispute between Adorno and Popper (Adorno et al. 1976), sociology remained wedded to scientism. The “triumph” of the “new social history” during the same period, as Bill Sewell, Jr. (2005: 173) writes, “marked the high point of a particular form of social-scientific positivism in the history profession.” The Social Science History Association, founded in 1976, initially reflected these priorities.

Soon, however, the power coordinates of the history-sociology relationship began drifting in the opposite direction. Historical sociologists became intrigued by debates that had originated in history, such as the discussion of narrative initiated by Hayden White’s *Metahistory* (1973). They also started to be deeply influenced by discussions among Marxist historians concerning particular events (e.g. Blackbourn and Eley 1980 on the course of 19th century German history) and more abstract theoretical issues, as in the debate over structure and agency kicked off by E.P. Thompson’s (1978) critique of Althusser (see Anderson 1980). Graduate courses in historical sociology included more and more writings by historians. Charles Tilly, who was professor of both history and sociology at Michigan in that period, included as contributors to his volume *The Formation of National States in Western Europe* (1975) three historians (Braun, Fischer, and Lundgreen) alongside two political scientists and two other sociologists. Sociologists began to follow Tilly and the historians into the archives. A relationship that had started off with sociologists dominating theoretically and methodologically in a synthesis along the lines of “history as social science” (Abbott 1991) was reversing direction, with historians providing methodological, epistemological, and theoretical inspiration for sociologists. In many respects historical sociologists’ work became indistinguishable from that of historians (compare, for example, Aminzade 1978 and Hanagan 1976, two Michigan dissertations by a sociologist and a historian, respectively).

By ignoring history, sociology risks reinventing the wheel. Historians have already dealt with many of the problems that historical sociologists periodically (re)discover.
During the 1980s, however, the two-way street between sociology and history became narrower and less frequently traveled. Historical sociology partly “domesticated” itself around a positivist covering-law format, a mimicry of statistical logics of inquiry, a refusal to historicize basic categories, and a recharged positivist distinction between “analysis” and “interpretation” (Calhoun 1996; McDonald 1996: 110; Somers 1996; Steinmetz 2005b). Historians turned to the “new cultural history,” and cultural anthropology and the humanities became more interesting interlocutors for them as a result. Historians now began criticizing sociologists’ approach to history as “merely the sociology of the past” and as “valuable above all because it increases the number of data points” (Sewell 1996: 246). McDonald (1996: 109) thematized sociology’s tendency to deliver criticisms of history “with little interest (or apparent information about) the doings of professional historians.” The fruitful exchange that had been emerging before was being replaced by a self-contained “historical sociology” that basically ignored historians or used them as “idiographic” content providers. Today the two disciplines have moved apart to such an extent that the venerable joint history-sociology position here at Michigan that was once held by Tilly and later by Bill Sewell will probably be discontinued.

What does sociology risk by maintaining or even strengthening its barriers against history? History has been around for more than two millennia, while sociology is barely a century old. Sociologists can strike a “high-modernist” stance and try to make a virtue of their field’s youthfulness, but this suggests an anxious fear of illegitimacy. The historians’ bookshelves are filled with timeless classics, from Herodotus’ Histories to E.P. Thompson’s The Making of the English Working Class. By contrast, U.S. sociologists only started to write books that were read widely outside the discipline in the middle third of the 20th century, books like Middletown (1929) and The Lonely Crowd (1950). And as Orlando Patterson (2002) recently complained, this period nowadays seems like a golden age of a “discipline that used to think big.” Historians are not afraid to revisit the same historical period or problem again and again, making new sense of old facts by interpreting them through new theories. The example of historical research on Nazi Germany and the Holocaust shows what enormous intellectual contributions can result from a willingness to continually revisit the same era. This is a much more fruitful approach to the growth and transformation of knowledge than the positivist conceit of repeating an experiment—as if a social scientists could ever step into the same river twice. Historians have been less wary about cross-border intellectual influences than sociologists, which means that their more ancient discipline is paradoxically more open than sociology to rejuvenating influences. Also ironic is the fact that sociology, the more presentist of the two disciplines, is much less closely attuned to ongoing events and contemporary crises than history. This is due in part to sociology’s apoliticism—paradoxical in light of the “liberalism” of most sociologists—and also to sociology’s residual commitment to the notion that only repeated events lend themselves to scientific treatment. To take just one example, historians have been intensely engaged in discussions about U.S. empire during the past three years, but the American sociology journals have barely registered this sweeping global transformation.
By ignoring history sociology also risks reinventing the wheel. Historians have already dealt with many of the problems that historical sociologists periodically (re)discover. Some of the greatest historians have discussed methodological problems like comparison and incommensurability; time and temporality; and the role of individual and collective agency, culture, and the unconscious in social change. Ethnographic sociologists who attempt to conjure up an entire mode of life on the page are revisiting territory already explored by Michelet’s “resurrectionist” historiography (Bann 1984) and Gadamer’s philosophy of history (1975). Sociologists invent or deploy technical terms like “scope conditions” to deal with the historiographic truism that context matters, and they use the term “path dependence” to give a scientistic spin to the even more basic truism that history matters.iii

As they re-engage with social material, a new generation of historians is looking again to sociology, but now in a spirit of antidisciplinarity rather than hierarchical interdisciplinarity (Eley 2005). After all, ours is the discipline whose name suggests that we are the specialists in theorizing and analyzing the social. Whether we have anything to offer historians is the question at this point. We as sociologists can only profit from a reopening of the border.

Notes

i James C. Coleman (1999: 77) wrote later that when he was a student at Columbia Mills “seemed to matter little” in the departmental “social system of sociology”--or that he “mattered only to those who themselves seemed to matter little.”

ii Abbott (1991), relying on Roy (1987), underestimates the degree of interpenetration at the level of graduate syllabi. In Ron Aminzade’s historical sociology seminars at Wisconsin in the early 1980s and in my own seminar in 1988 at Chicago, more than half of the reading list consisted of work by historians. Other syllabi more closely fit Abbott’s model, of course, including one from Robert Liebman at Princeton in 1981 and one from Theda Skocpol at Harvard from 1986.

iii Bruce Carruthers’s rendition of the concept “path dependence” in this issue of the newsletter is more specific and more plausible, probably because it hews closely to the term’s origins outside sociology, underscoring again the dangers of disciplinary autism.

References


McDonald, Terrence J. What we Talk about when we talk about History: The Conversations of History and Sociology.” Pp. 91-118


Comparative and Historical Sociology Section Sessions at the 2006 ASA Meeting

1. **Author meets Authors**: William H. Sewell, Jr. (*Logics of History: Social Theory and Social Transformation*) and Arthur Stinchcombe (*The Logics of Social Research*). Charles Tilly (*Trust and Rule*). Organizer: William Roy, UCLA (billroy@soc.ucla.edu). Presided by Nicola Beisel, Northwestern University (nbeisel@northwestern.edu).

2. "The Smallest N: What Makes a Case Study Rigorous." Open session. Organizer: James Mahoney, Northwestern University. (James-Mahoney@northwestern.edu). This session will feature papers that discuss or illustrate methodological rigor in case studies. The inspiration comes from Ragin and Becker's *What is a Case?*, which is now 13 years old. The papers for the session should be methodological in orientation, not just exemplars of case study method, though case studies can certainly be used for illustration. Some of the issues that might be addressed are: "What is a case?" "What are the boundaries of cases?" "What are the units of analysis in cases?" "What epistemologies underpin case-study analysis?" "How is methodological rigor in case studies achieved?" "How are counterfactual comparisons used in case studies?" "What are the standards for support or rejection of theory in case studies?" "How are cases are selected and constructed from non-cases?"

3. "Historicizing Boundaries" Open session. Organizer: Mara Loveman, University of Wisconsin (mloveman@ssc.wisc.edu). This session will include papers that discuss or exemplify issues involving the construction, enforcement, reification, and disintegration of boundaries, including groups, identities, organizations, institutions, and states/nations. Papers may be conceptual or substantive.

4. "The State's Monopoly Over Violence: Its Past and Future" Open session. Organizer: Karen Barkey, Columbia U. (kb7@columbia.edu). This session will address what is happening to the state's monopoly on violence with the rise of terrorism. Terrorism not only uses violence to disrupt the social order that states are supposed to maintain, but also defy conventional mechanisms of social control used by states.

5. Our section's **Roundtable Session** will be organized by Marion Fourcade-Gourinchas, UC Berkeley, (fourcade@berkeley.edu). Open session. All topics relevant to comparative-historical sociology are invited.

We are also co-sponsoring two sessions with other sections:

6. **Racial and Ethnic Minorities Section**: "Hurricane Katrina: Racism and the Effects of Historical Neglect" Open session. Organizer: Charles A. Gallagher, Georgia State University, (cgallagher@gsu.edu).

7. **Political Sociology Section**: "Religion and Politics, Past and Present." Open session. Organizer: Said A. Arjomand, SUNY Stony Brook, (sarjoman@notes.cc.sunysb.edu)
Barrington Moore Book Award

The section awards the Barrington Moore Award every year to the best book in the areas of comparative and historical sociology. Nominated publications should have appeared in the two years prior to the year in which they are nominated (i.e. for the 2006 award only books published in 2004, 2005 or 2006 will be considered). Books may be nominated by authors or by other section members.

Non-authors may nominate a book by sending a letter or email to the chair of the Moore prize committee, who will then contact the publisher to request that books be sent to committee members. Authors may nominate their book by sending a letter of nomination to the Moore prize committee and making arrangements for each member of the Moore prize committee to receive a copy. Nominations must be received by February 15, 2006 to be considered.

The committee members and their email and mailing addresses are:

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Comparative Historical Best Article Award

The section awards this prize every year to the best article in the areas of comparative and historical sociology. Nominated publications should have appeared in the two years prior to the year in which they are nominated (i.e. for the 2006 award only articles published in 2004, 2005 or 2006 will be considered). Articles may be nominated by authors or by other section members.

Author and non-authors may nominate a book by sending a letter or email to each member of this prize committee along with a paper copy of the article. The letter and copy of the article must be received by each member of the committee by February 28, 2006 to be considered.

The committee members and their email and mailing addresses are:

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Reinhard Bendix Student Paper Award

Every year the section presents the Reinhard Bendix Award for the best graduate student paper. Submissions are solicited for papers written by students enrolled in graduate programs at the time the paper was written.

Students may self-nominate their finest work or it may be nominated by their mentors. Author and mentors may nominate a paper by sending a letter or email to each member of this prize committee along with a paper copy of the article. The letter and copy of the article must be received by each member of the committee by February 28, 2006 to be considered.

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Jeffrey Broadbent (University of Minnesota) received a Fellowship from the East Asia Institute, Seoul National University, for teaching and research in China, South Korea, Taiwan and Japan, summer, 2006 ($17,500). Topic: “The comparative role of environmental movements and non-governmental organizations in East Asian political transition.”

Mounira Maya Charrad (University of Texas, Austin) received the 2005 Distinguished Service to the Tunisian American Community Ibn Khaldun Award, which recognizes a major contribution to “bringing a better understanding of Tunisian society, history, and culture to American universities, students, and educated public.” This inaugural award is named after the 14th century Tunisian philosopher Ibn Khaldun whose legacy is that a spirit of community and solidarity is essential to the welfare of societies.

Alex Inkeles (Stanford University) will give the Keynote Address at a conference of some 500 Japanese Ministry of Education Officers, Professors of Education, and school teachers.

Barbara R. Walters (Kinsborough Community College of the City University of New York) was awarded tenure and promoted to Associate Professor.

The Comparative and Historical Sociology Section would like to congratulate:

Charles Tilly, Columbia University
Winner of the 2005 ASA Career of Distinguished Scholarship Award

Beverly Silver, Johns Hopkins University
Winner of the 2005 ASA Distinguished Scholarly Publication Award for Forces of Labor: Workers’ Movements and Globalization since 1870 (Cambridge University Press)

Vivek Chibber, New York University
Winner of the Barrington Moore (Best Book) Prize of the Comparative and Historical Sociology Section for Locked in Place: State-Building and Late Industrialization in India (Princeton, 2003)

Marc Steinberg, Smith College
Winner of the 2005 Best Article Award of the Comparative and Historical Sociology Section, for “Capitalist Development, the Labor Process, and the Law” American Journal of Sociology 109: 445-495

Tammy Smith, Columbia University
Winner of the Reinhard Bendix (Best Student Paper) Prize of the Comparative and Historical Sociology Section, for “Narrative Networks and the Dynamics of Ethnic Conflict and Conciliation”
In the next issue of the Comparative and Historical Sociology Newsletter:

A Symposium on
Julia Adams’s
*The Familial State*
Cornell University Press

With Contributions by:

Mounira Maya Charrad
Ivan Ermakoff
Leslie Price
Charles Tilly