From the Chair:
Comparative-Historical Sociology as an Identity

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C. Wright Mills famously characterized the sociological imagination as the intersection of biography and history. As comparative-historical sociologists we are acutely aware of the historical. Occasionally we need to reflect on the biographical part of that often clichéd partnership in relationship to ourselves. What difference does it make to us personally and professionally that we are comparative-historical sociologists? Is it merely a descriptive label to distinguish us from other sociologists? Does it represent how we think of ourselves as moral or political agents? In other words, is it an identity?

To start, let’s define an identity as a sense that people have of themselves in relation to other people that connotes some imperative of action. It is a bounded sense of “we-ness” that sets people off from others, implying some accountability to those who share the identity. It is one of the answers that people give themselves and others for why they do things and how they relate to people. The master identities sociologists most often study are of course race, ethnicity, nation, gender, class, and age. As scholars, we also have strong professional and disciplinary identities. Most of the people reading this are doing so because they have some degree of identity as a comparative-historical sociologist. What does that mean?
I raise the question because my generation of comparative-historical sociologists, part of the resurgence of the field in the 70s and 80s, had a very strong identity and were motivated, in part, at least by the feeling of being part of a path-breaking intellectual project. Our feeling that we were on the cutting edge gave us a sense of mission (and perhaps a certain swagger) that motivated us personally and provided a sense of community. As comparative-historical sociology has entered the mainstream of the discipline, I wonder what kind of identity younger practitioners have developed and how the identity of mature veterans has changed. So I will share my sense of comparative-historical identity and invite others to share their understandings in these pages as well. This issue includes the reflections of two other members of the section.

By definition, we are the people who think big, tackling Big Structures, Large Processes, and Huge Comparisons, as Chuck Tilly’s widely read book put it (Tilly 1984). Our studies may have small Ns, but our questions and ideas are big. Thinking big is not just a methodological style, but also a form of identity. I suspect most of us think big in our personal and professional contexts—our families, departmental meetings, political discussions, and hobbies. It is part of who we are to look through the telescope backwards to get the big picture. Even if we use ethnographic, survey, or demographic methods in our research, we are putting our data in a large context because we are comparative-historical sociologists. When we read the work of our non-comparative-historical colleagues we raise big questions that compare or contrast their subject with other times and places.

One of the ways we think big is politically. The revival of comparative-historical sociology in the 70s and 80s was very much driven by political commitments, manifested in the attention to revolution, social movements, underdevelopment, and world systems. Many of the graduate students who entered sociology in those years had been activists and understood comparative-historical sociology as a way to raise contentious issues in a relatively non-confrontational manner. Adams, Clemens, and Orloff, when discussing how comparative-historical sociology has changed in the last few generations, cite Philip Abrams’ rationale for historical sociology: “Doing justice to the reality of history is not a matter of noting the way in which the past provides a background to the present; it is a matter of treating what people do in the present as a struggle to create a future out of the past, of seeing the past not just as the womb of the present but the only raw material out of which the present can be constructed” (Adams et al. 2005: 2). As the cultural turn has influenced the field and a new generation of scholars has grown up, there is a still a critical spark. Even comparative-historical sociologists rejecting the political-economic approach of earlier scholars frame their critique in terms of destabilizing received categories, seen as an emancipatory potential, an avowedly political orientation.

Closely related to the radical political orientation of the earlier comparative-historical promoters was a sense of marginalization. Theda Skocpol in her introduction to the methodological manifesto that animated comparative-historical sociology in the 80s made explicit the connection between marginalization and political engagement (Skocpol 1984). Calhoun similarly describes how the early movement, migrating to sociology from student protest and the anti-war movement, mobilizing against the sterile mainstream of abstracted empiricism and grand theory, adopted a “siege mentality.” But, he laments, the field has become domesticated (Calhoun 1996). In fact, some younger scholars feel that the specialization has become an elite field, with jobs found mainly in the top research universities. There is some fear that the job market has become polarized with fresh PhDs finding jobs either at the elite universities or outside their training. There is no doubt that the opportunity to ask big and critical questions is a privilege. When non-elite universities come under increased pressure to focus on practical skills
and emphasize research with immediate payoff, comparative-historical research could be increasingly relegated to the top tier. It is important that our identity as practitioners and our activist orientation keep us aware of growing inequity in our own field.

Thinking big, our critical orientation, and our sense of marginality all adds up to a cosmopolitan identity, especially in relation to the “comparative” side of comparative-historical sociology. Even when we focus our research on one country or region, there is always an implicit comparison. Our journals, sessions at professional meetings, and for most of us, our collegial networks reach across national (and hopefully other) boundaries. Michael Burawoy points out that sociology (not just comparative-historical sociology) can best serve society when it recognizes the provincialism of its knowledge (Burawoy 2005). We do that best when we know the most about different times and different places. It is our cosmopolitanism that allows us to realize the specificity of what we study.

Having comparative historical sociology as an identity means that it helps shape what we do. As a professional identity it influences the topics we study, the methods we use, the audiences we speak to, and the way we read other work. As a personal identity it provides a sense of mission, the faith that we are making a difference even when our work seems to have only a remote relevance to society, and the satisfaction of being part of a consequential intellectual project. It is the way that our biographies enter into history.

References


In this section, comparative-historical scholars reflect on why they entered the subfield. We invite contributions to this section for future issues of the newsletter.

The Accidental Historian

Nicola Beisel
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When the newsletter asked me to write about becoming a historical sociologist and what that identity means to me, I pondered the various reasons why one might pursue this frustrating and time-consuming method of research. Some might go into history headfirst, driven by theoretical questions about “big structures and large processes” that demand historical research. Not me, I began work on the 19th century anti-vice movements theoretically clueless. Some might lead with their heart, their love of history drawing them to this career. Ha. I so hated high school history that I almost got my first “D.” In truth, I entered history the same way I entered the world: breech.

I started graduate school intending to study the relationship between changes in modes of production, women’s social status, and fertility. This choice was driven by a) wanting to save the world, particularly starving children in Africa, and b) a long-standing commitment to feminism, augmented in college with Marxism. Demography in the early 1980s not being a hotbed of Marxist/feminist thought, I was soon utterly miserable, and dropped out after two years. I returned determined to find a dissertation topic that would speak to my interest in reproductive rights. This quickly led to a dilemma: Kristin Luker had just published Abortion and the Politics of Motherhood, the most brilliant analysis to date of the pro-choice and pro-life movements. That was too tough an act to follow. I soon realized that Kristin’s insights would not have been possible had she not been able to see the world through the eyes of her pro-life activists – a hard task, given how unsympathetic sociologists are to such politics. I realized I was not yet mature enough to follow suit, as I was still too busy arguing with them. I needed another reproductive rights movement to study, one at a safer historical remove. I started with Margaret Sanger, who introduced me to Anthony Comstock, the 19th century anti-obscenity crusader who authored the laws used to prosecute her. Comstock fascinated the Marxist me because he and his organization, the New York Society for the Suppression of Vice (NYSSV), were supported by extraordinarily wealthy men. Nobody had written a book about Comstock for 50 years, no Abortion and the Politics of Motherhood problem here. Thus was born a study of why 19th century Robber Barons made birth control illegal.

Here are the theoretical tools I started with. Feminist theory in the 1970s discussed reproduction as the social basis of women’s oppression. This was implicit in the scant secondary literature on Comstock, which was mainly written by feminist historians who asserted that, in cahoots with physicians, Comstock and his cronies sought to make birth control and abortion illegal to reinforce women’s domestic roles. In so doing, they played on men’s fears of suffragists’ demands for women’s rights. Marxist feminism suggested that capitalists sought to control the means of reproduction in order to ensure a reliable labor supply.

None of the theories I started with gave me the least bit of traction on what I was finding. From this I’ve learned that the most important moment in research is when all your assumptions are proven completely wrong.
The few extant sociological studies of moral reform movements argued that such movements were peopled by status-anxious members of the lower middle class. In his Sorokin award winning book, *Puritan Boston and Quaker Philadelphia*, Digby Baltzell argued that Boston had a book-banning movement and Philadelphia did not because of the inherent tolerance of Quakerism.

Here’s what I didn’t know: much about history. What an archive was, and what to do in one. How to write historical narrative. But a trained Michigan empiricist could count – and pay attention to the validity of measures. I began with the easiest task – sampling Comstock’s supporters and looking up their occupations in the City Directory. So much for the lower-middle class basis of moral reform movements. I stumbled across the anti-vice movement in Philadelphia while reading the Annual Reports of the NYSSV; so much for tolerant Quakers. But the biggest shocker, and challenge to my politics and intellectual identity, came when I coded those Annual Reports.

One couldn’t code the Annual Reports for reasons why birth control should be suppressed without running headlong into validity problems. The laws banned distribution of obscenity, defined as lascivious pictures and information about, or devices to cause, abortion or contraception – two acts completely conflated in Comstock’s writings. When I coded the Annual Reports for justifications for suppressing obscenity, I found not one single mention of suffragists and rebellious women, in fact, I found no support for the arguments feminist historians had made about Comstock. Instead, I was confronted with concerns about “youth,” and it wasn’t unruly working class youth who were the problem – it was elite children. A year into my dissertation I knew a) the secondary historical literature on the anti-vice movement was wrong, meaning real historians had not gotten it right – and I, a mere sociologist, would have to convince historians that my historiography was better, b) feminist historians seem to have gotten it wrong because of imposing their (actually, my) politics on history, c) Comstock appealed to his upper class supporters by invoking concern about the effects of immorality on their children – since when did capitalists care about this? – and d) none of the theories I started with gave me the least bit of traction on what I was finding. From this I’ve learned that the most important moment in research is when all your assumptions are proven completely wrong and you’d better come up with better ones – but as a graduate student this was terrifying. (Now it is merely deeply anxiety provoking.)

About then a long-haired angel in a tie-dyed t-shirt appeared, saying “the most important moments in reading a historical document are when you don’t understand it, because then you know that you are using a different cultural schema than its author.”

Bill Sewell was the angel, and he said lots of other stuff, but that culture thing was the real stickler. I had Marxist and feminist problems with “culture.” The Marxism problem was simple intransigence: culture wasn’t material and therefore wasn’t real (was it?). The feminist problem was more profound: as a college student learning (and ranting) about practices such as foot binding and female genital mutilation, I was chided for not “respecting” other cultures and for imposing my values (like, say, women having feet and a clitoris) on them. I still struggle with how to justify one moral system versus another. Bourdieu eradicated the error of equating the material with the real; his work on “cultural capital” showed culture to be a basis of power. I became a cultural sociologist because I was in desperate need of tools to understand what my data were telling me – if I backed into being a historian, Comstock dragged me (kicking and screaming) into cultural analysis.
Actually, Comstock made me become a real sociologist. Working on the 19th century anti-obscenity movement did more than cast my politics into sharp relief. Anthony was a single-minded sexual purity zealot, but to understand the anti-vice movement I had to see the world with his conceptual categories. It probably helped that he’d been dead for 70 years and his politics seemed arcane rather than infuriating. Hopefully Comstock taught me the skill I so admire in Kristin Luker’s work, because my current study is on the American abortion conflict. This time history made me work forward. I thought I was writing a book on how racial language was used in the 19th century abortion debate until one day I realized that during all my years in abortion politics, I’d heard almost nothing about race – but I’d sure seen lots of pictures of white babies, whose race I’d never noticed. The enormous power of historical research is that it makes one see the taken for granted. Doing history is arduous and frustrating, sometimes theoretically terrifying, and anything but a route to quick publication – but it sure is interesting.

References


**For politically-oriented students in the desolate 1980s, the Sixties emerged as an alternative imaginary... a memory of a memory rather than a memory itself.**
If I were to venture a guess, part of it might be about Sixties’ politics still, however mediated through generation and media image. This was partially the case for me. As an undergraduate in the late 1980s, the political landscape of college campuses barely compared to the activism of the Sixties. It was dull. Marches were few and far between. No one was being drafted; few fretted about the invasion of Panama or the Iraq War. But amidst this landscape, and in part because of it, many of the sociology majors I knew still yearned for an oppositional politics. They found it in the Sixties’ spirit. The Sixties showed us what we lacked, and everywhere the Sixties was palpable. Not only did aging hippy drop-outs hang around campus, media culture fed our imagination. Retro music from the Sixties was in (remember Billy Bragg or Edie Brickell and the New Bohemians?), popular movies depicted Sixties’ student radicalism (in Hollywood form), documentaries such as Berkeley in the Sixties were shown on campus, Tom Hayden published his biography and James Miller’s Democracy is in the Streets was a top-seller. All the while, our professors – the so-called “tenured radicals” – sprinkled their lectures to us with references to ‘68, SDS, and protests against the Vietnam War.

For politically-oriented students in the desolate 1980s, the Sixties emerged as an alternative imaginary. And for us, taking classes with historical sociology content was one way to feed that imaginary. Reading about class, capitalism, and revolution in our classes was a circuitous way of proclaiming our loyalty to the radical spirit of the Sixties; a spirit we had not experienced directly, for we were much too young, but a spirit which we imagined, valorized, and sought to capture for ourselves. This was a nostalgia for a mediated memory. Reading historical sociology was like listening to a popular 1980s imitator of Phil Ochs; it served as a memory of a memory rather than a memory itself; a signifier of a signifier. Historical sociology thereby served as a site for critical politics and identification just as it might have served the second-wavers. It also served, by the same token, as a site of intellectual distinction, just as it might have served the second-wavers. By reading about capitalism, class, and revolution, we could differentiate ourselves from our sociology peers. We were outside the sociology mainstream; by implication we were outside of power’s reach.

Still, one can never step into the same river twice. If historical sociology was initially a radical social movement, the radical politics behind it had been watered down by the time it reached us. The referent was only a distant trace amidst the play of signifiers. And if historical sociology ever had the taint of a subfield working against the grain of mainstream sociology, thereby obtaining its critical intellectual identity, it could not be so for those of us who entered graduate school in the 1990s. Despite our political imaginary and our longing for an intellectual project that worked against the grains of mainstream sociology, the historical sociologists we read were teaching at elite universities. They were tenured. Their books were published in the major university presses. Some proposed methodologies emulating the scientism that had been previously and vehemently opposed. And they were respected even outside of the subfield. In a certain sense, historical sociology by the time we entered it was the mainstream. It had already become “domesticated,” as Calhoun (1996: 306) notes, “losing much of its critical edge and challenge to mainstream sociology.” Historical sociology simply could not serve as the same oppositional identity and medium of Sixties’ spirit that it might have served in the past. For those of us who entered graduate school in the 1990s, then, could historical sociology mean anything more than just another banal professional affiliation?

We came of age during the Reagan years and the global proliferation of neoliberalism in the 1990s. Pondering events and turning points helped us better apprehend “our ‘68”: the fall of communism in ‘89.

I can only speak for myself. For me, historical sociology still had an oppositional quality when I encountered it. The oppositional quality did not lie in its substantive thematic content. It did not lie simply in the fact that historical sociologists were
the only ones in sociology who readily and freely speak of things that happened in distant countries in the far distant past. At least for me, it lay in its willingness to admit of contingency; to speak comfortably of sequence, turning points, and events; to take seriously the structuration, and hence the history, of social life; in its capacity to offer alternatives to sociology’s mainstream claims of universal laws and atemporal causal relations, its assumptions of actors freed from the particularities of space and time; its unwillingness to recognize the historicity and hence cultural constitution of our conceptual categories. This was the stuff of historical sociology that I encountered as a graduate student in the early 1990s, regardless of whether the subject matter was capitalism, class, gender, race, or revolution. And in retrospect, it was the stuff of historical sociology that served as a key attraction; alongside the Sixties’ spirit signified by the second wave. Who else but historical sociologists questioned whether “economic” laws of supply and demand exist outside of historically-specific social formations? Who else pondered the meaning of “events”? Who else spoke of process, temporality, and the duality of structure and agency rather than just “causes”? Who else studied the historical constitution of cultural meanings and their relationship to social action? For the putatively politically-silent generation who entered the field in the late 1980s and early 1990s, historical sociology may not have had the exact same oppositional political identity it had for the Sixties’ generation, but it retained its strong oppositional intellectual identity.

It might be that this critical intellectual identity is exactly what prevented us, the post-post-second-wavers, from pursuing our intellectual interests in the discipline of history. After all, if one is positioned within the discipline of history, there is hardly anything oppositional in writing about events, process, temporality, and sequence. It might also be that historical sociology was attractive not only as a source of an oppositional intellectual identity but also, by the same token, an oppositional political identity still. After all, questioning the historicity of ostensibly universal causal laws or the cultural constitution of individuals facilitated a critique of neoclassical economics, and hence of capitalism’s self-representation (an important critique considering that we came of age during the Reagan years and the global proliferation of neoliberalism in the 1990s). Pondering events and turning points helped us better apprehend “our ‘68”: the fall of communism in ‘89 (or perhaps the Battle in Seattle a decade later). Thinking comparatively and historically compelled us (and still does) to consider what is different, if anything at all, about America’s more current empire that was first manifest in the 1991 invasion of Iraq. Introducing cultural meanings and their historicity enabled a critique of Orientalism and post-colonial legacies (noticeable amidst the struggle against Apartheid and turmoil in the Middle East). And theorizing structure and agency still had implications for thinking about social change (Tom Hayden spoke at the Battle in Seattle after all). If my own attraction to historical sociology at all resembles others of my generation, then historical sociology, by virtue of its oppositional intellectual identity, still serves as an important source of political opposition; even if the oppositional political identity does not entail memories of ‘68, SDS, and Vietnam; or a wearing a certain type of hair cut.

References


The Prada Bag Problem

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Comparative historical sociology is an extraordinarily successful subfield: since its rebirth in the 1960s CHS has brought us surprising new insights about the nature of the American and European worlds, and the subfield has been a pioneer in the attempt to take sociology into the non-western world. CHS scholars have rewritten the history of revolution, state formation, gender, political economy, and race, and are now pushing the frontiers of research on Islam, development, and the post-socialist transition, to name only a few of the cutting-edge topics. Six of the last ten winners of the ASA’s best book award have been comparative historical sociologists. By any measure, CHS is well-established.

But the success of the field seems to have hit a curious wall: CHS seems to be much more popular at research universities—the large private universities and the main branches of state systems—than at liberal arts colleges. CHS, one set of scholars has written, is the “Prada bag” of sociology, a luxury good that not all departments consider necessary or wish to own.

Does the Prada bag problem exist? If so, what effects is it having and how might the field address it? To answer these questions I spoke to students who have gone on the market in recent years (both those who did find jobs, and those who have yet to), as well as with faculty members in CHS. Interviews were conducted by phone and email between July and September.

Is CHS a Prada Bag?

This year the ASA has abandoned its old “Employment Bulletins” and created a computerized job bank. This allows a rapid examination of the relative strengths of various subfields by counting the number of jobs advertised in them (Table 1).

The top three subfields are Criminology/Delinquency, Criminal Justice, and Quantitative Methodology. CHS ranks #20: below Theory, Cultural Sociology, and Sex and Gender, but above Collective Behavior/Social Movements, Political Sociology, and Economic Sociology.

To measure whether CHS is more of a luxury good than other subfields, I calculated Prada Indices of CHS and several other subfields. Prada Index I is a measure of the proportion of job openings advertised this year at research-intensive universities as a proportion of total job openings advertised this year in the subfield (Table 2). Research-intensive universities are defined as those designated “Research University/Very High” in the Carnegie Classification of universities. These comprise 96 universities across the country, both public and private. CHS does seem to have a Prada bag problem, in that most of the new jobs are in these 96 universities; but the number of jobs is so small that one new job in a non-research university would change the rankings drastically.

Thus, Prada Index II measures CHS regular and associate members who are faculty at graduate degree-granting universities as a percentage of all regular and associate members, and compares this to the average for the Theory section (the most comparable of the top sections to CHS) and to the average for the whole ASA. Prada Index II is considerably higher for CHS than for the ASA as a whole, and higher even than for the Theory section (Table 3; Figure 1).

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2 I am grateful to Diego de los Rios and Michael Murphy of the ASA for the data on which this section is based.

3 One problem with this index is that many comparative historical sociologists end up in jobs that are advertised as “open” jobs, which this does not take into account. Since open jobs are more likely at top universities, this measure may underestimate the Prada bag problem. Another problem is that the index does not accurately take into account elite liberal arts colleges which would arguably be within the “Prada bag” definition. And it is not clear how to interpret the fact that jobs can be listed in multiple categories. These problems remain subjects for future study.
Table 1: Jobs Advertised in ASA Job Bank by Subfield (as of 9/16)

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The other 26 job categories did not advertise any jobs.

Source: ASA Job Bank
Table 2: Prada Index I

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<td>Family</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collective Behavior/Social Movements</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Sociology</td>
<td>0.00</td>
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</table>

*Prada Index I: Jobs Advertised in Research Universities as Proportion of Total Jobs Advertised*

*Source: ASA Job Bank, Carnegie Classification of Universities*

Table 3: Employment Sector of Regular and Associate (non-student) Members

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>University offering graduate degrees in sociology</td>
<td>75.0%</td>
<td>69.2%</td>
<td>54.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University offering undergraduate degree only in sociology</td>
<td>6.8%</td>
<td>11.1%</td>
<td>11.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Four-year college</td>
<td>9.6%</td>
<td>11.0%</td>
<td>13.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community/junior college or Elementary/Secondary school/system</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
<td>4.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal, State, or Local government</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not-for-profit organization</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For-Profit Organization</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consultants or self-owned business</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>99.5%</strong></td>
<td><strong>98.8%</strong></td>
<td><strong>99.9%</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(percentages do not add to 100 because of missing data)</td>
<td>(N=544)</td>
<td>(N=665)</td>
<td>(N=7170)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Sources: CHS and Theory: Michael Murphy and Diego de los Rios, ASA Sections; All ASA: “Employment Sector of 2004 Regular and Associate Members” table, http://www.asanet.org/*
Figure 1: Prada Index II

Prada Index II: Regular and Associate (non-student) Members Employed in Universities Offering Graduate Degrees as % of Total (non-student) Members; Sources: See Table 3

This is perhaps not news; it seems to have been the situation for decades. One faculty member writes: “I was amazed when I applied for jobs in [the 1980s] and saw that most were for methodology or criminology. There was not a single job listed in historical or comparative sociology. … That is a pity and a loss, especially now when undergraduates are becoming more worried about the country and world they will inhabit and are looking for disciplines that are about more than the personal trajectories that are the subject matter of most of mainstream sociology.” Another faculty member comments: “Historical sociology is, like all good and interesting knowledge, not immediately useful, and possibly not even useful in the long run. It is also a lot harder to do than standard sociology, at least in terms of the time investment, so if departments run according to the old … sociology department model, historical sociology is not likely to be desirable there.” Another speaks of having to defend comparative historical sociology to a departmental colleague who claimed CHS is on the decline. A younger faculty member sums up: “The only places that seriously considered my application were departments at the very top of the field. I was just too strange for the majority of jobs.”

Consequences: The Perception of Unfairness

If CHS remains confined to research universities, the market for it will remain smaller than it might otherwise have been. One department that placed a job ad specifically in this area in a recent year received 118 applications; another received 100. Of course, many comparative historical scholars find jobs that are advertised in other fields or are listed as “open,” but since those jobs are not reserved for comparative historical sociologists the competition for them is even stiffer. One young faculty member muses: “If, say, 200 people apply for a given job, and 20 of them are basically well-qualified, but you can only invite 2-3 of those folks on-campus for an interview, and more to the point the hire at the end of the day depends as much on suitability as a colleague as it does on any professional qualifications, can we really say that this is a market? Rather than, oh, say, a lottery?”

Quotes from students interviewed for this article suggest that the small size of the CHS market is creating the perception of unfairness in hiring: students seem to think that there is insider string-pulling in the job market or that the “fix is in” for the jobs they apply for, i.e. that the search committee has already decided upon a candidate and is
just flying them in as a formality. One says: “it probably helps if the dissertation committee members play an active ‘behind-the-scenes’ role to help their students. None of my committee members did anything besides giving letters -- something about which I’m proud -- but I can’t help thinking, looking at how people get jobs, that ‘social capital’ … play[s] a role.” Another thinks that merit may matter at the extremes, but not in the middle; s/he concludes: “If they [hiring committees] can’t be fair, they should at least try to be nice.”

Most faculty members deny the presence of string pulling in the hiring process. One faculty member writes: “There has always been a subterranean ‘discourse of suspicion’ among grad students about job market string pulling. And there probably always will be. But with the partial exception of the subfield of demography, which is more geared to patronage hiring than the rest of the discipline is, string-pulling is pretty much absent in junior faculty hiring.” Other faculty say: “As for behind-the-scenes string pulling, there is much less of that now than in past decades. The days of big men (and they all were men) offering each other’s graduate students positions in their departments are long gone.” “Although there is still a long way to go, there has been progress in opening up the pool….The number of candidates and jobs has made it harder to operate behind the scenes through small networks. This is especially true for blossoming fields like CH.”

The perception of unfairness may not reflect the reality of hiring decisions (at least as seen by faculty members), but it does seem to be common among students; while not necessarily a result of the Prada bag problem, this perception is surely a result of the small size of the CHS job market and the intense competition it fosters, which itself stems from the inability to place comparative historical scholars at liberal arts schools.

Solutions?

Interviewees disagree on whether and how this dynamic should be addressed. One faculty member argues that CHS is really a method, not a subfield; to that extent the job market dynamics are driven more by the substantive area a scholar

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Bucking the Trend: How One Liberal Arts College Specialized in Comparative Sociology

The University of Puget Sound is a small liberal arts college in Washington state, unusually successful at placing its students in graduate school. The college has no sociology department, but it does have a comparative sociology department—the only department thus identified in the nation.

In 1974 the department’s courses “focused primarily on US society with a ‘social problem’ emphasis, and not including what was called at that time ‘radical’ or ‘conflict’ sociology or using a comparative or historical perspective” says Charles Ibsen, the founder of the department in its current form. Dr. Ibsen specifically wanted to “make ‘comparative analysis’ an integrated part of each and every course we would offer.”

To those who fear that a more humanistic sociology will repel students, Dr. Ibsen writes: “almost all of our course offerings are full each semester, some with long wait lists. Not including our required courses, some examples of high demand courses are: Indigenous Peoples: Alternative Political Economies; Social and Cultural Change; Disability, Identity and Power; Latin American Identity; Migration and Diaspora.” Other departmental offerings include “Murderous Neighbors, Compassionate Strangers: Disparate Responses to Genocide” and “Critiquing Education.”

An unexpected benefit of this broad vision of sociology is that when the university started trying to diversify its curriculum, the department found itself able to offer courses in Asian studies, women’s studies, and the other interdisciplinary inventions of the 1990s. Dr. Ibsen says: “I would encourage departments to consider emphasizing an explicit comparative perspective. The benefits to students and faculty far outweigh the difficulties.”
chooses, and therefore the “problem” is not one that requires resolution. Those who did think the issue is a problem suggested either individual-level solutions, collective solutions, or both.

**Individual-Level Solutions**

Several faculty and students suggested that the best method for individual students to manage the issue is to specialize in another field along with CHS; a commonly mentioned alternative was theory. One faculty member says: “There are lots of people on lots of hiring committees who would love to bring in a fascinating, articulate historical sociologist (or any other sort of fascinating, articulate sociologist), but organizational priority goes to meeting a set of departmental needs for teaching. This tension exists at both big state universities and liberal arts colleges. So the challenge is to provide evidence that you can immediately help with bread and butter courses (thereby avoiding the Prada bag problem). It can be very helpful to build up a teaching portfolio that suggests that you could step in as a full contributor to the 5-person sociology and anthropology department at an elite liberal arts college or to the 20-person department managing 300-400 majors at a large public university.”

A graduate student argues, however, that this is not an ideal solution, because comparative historical sociology, unlike other kinds of sociology, seems to attract students who are particularly committed to it and defined by it: “Often the only jobs that are viable options are theory, and often that works just fine, but it’s a little bit disconcerting to have devoted your life to this particular methodology” and then be forced to hide that on the market: “I feel that comparative historical sociologists more than other kinds of sociologists have a particular philosophical attachment to doing this kind of work. To then have to say, actually, I’m a theorist, because those are the only jobs that are out there, is kind of weird. It feels so dishonest, I feel I have to closet myself, like will I have to come out to my parents now?”

**Collective Solutions**

Collective solutions for the field as a whole were also suggested. One faculty member suggests an easy way to increase enrollments: “One way of doing this … is to be more aggressive about cross-listing and (especially) listing in core/distribution requirements. The best predictor of class popularity in my current institution is not instructor quality/verve. It’s whether or not it satisfies one or more distribution requirements for the core curriculum. Comparative/Historical Sociology strikes me as exceptionally well-placed to take advantage of this kind of niche.” Another thinks the problem is that administrators don’t have a good sense of what courses students might like: “Universities’ ideas of imputed student preferences do matter, so universities don’t hire historical sociologists because they believe, on no evidence at all, that students only want to hear about the U.S. now, or about their own lives, or about people just like them, or about the future.” If this is the case, the solution is to convince administrators, and the question becomes how to do that.

A possible answer is glimpsed in the comments of the faculty member who says: “I am not so sure about this Prada bag analogy however—after all, universities have massive departments of history, which does not teach anything immediately practical. But they teach, and they have convinced universities that students need to know what they teach to be educated.”

Can comparative historical sociology achieve the kind of student enrollment that history departments achieve? One faculty member suggests: “Historical sociologists, students included, can … do a better job of connecting their work to today’s concerns.” S/he suggests, for example, that comparative historical sociologists are well-placed to study and teach the rise and history of Islam in the world. Other possibilities might include courses on the comparative history of race and slavery, comparative studies of genocide and the Holocaust, comparative history of sex and gender, or military history—these are the courses that pack in students in history departments.

The same faculty member notes: “I don’t mean that it’s not important for sociologists to value the study of history for its own sake. It is, it is. But we can do that quite fervently while avoiding antiquarianism.”
Read This Book!

Books by non-sociologists that may be of interest to section members.

The World Republic of Letters
Pascale Casanova
Harvard University Press, 2004

Reviewed by Richard Lachmann
SUNY-Albany

In a time when comparative historical sociology is taking a cultural turn it is worth our while to see how the tools of our discipline can be employed to understand culture itself. The most promising intervention comes from a Parisian Beckett scholar named Pascale Casanova in The World Republic of Letters (Harvard University Press, 2004), first published in French in 1999. Casanova addresses herself to literary historians and critics, but the method she develops is essentially sociological in that she shows how writers and their works are created and read in a global social system that has grown to encompass once autonomous local and national literatures.

Casanova examines how “Writers have to create the conditions under which they can be seen” (p. 177). They strive to create those conditions, however, in a world of inequality, a world in which some literatures and some languages have been able to claim a mantle of classicism due to their relatively long histories. French, Italian and English literatures were the first vernaculars to successfully challenge Latin and with it the dominance of clerical modes of thought and expression. Casanova shows how the oldest literary traditions are able to define the terms by which new writers are evaluated. Literary worth is set at the centers of the world republic of letters, above all Paris and London, whose translators and critics decide which peripheral works are worth of translation into French and English, the universal literary languages. Untranslated authors find it impossible to garner attention beyond their home countries. Faulkner, for example, was virtually unknown and unappreciated in the United States until Sartre championed him as a great literary innovator and arranged his translation into French. The Pulitzer and Noble prizes followed. Nabokov first won critical attention in Paris for Russian works translated into French. Gao Xingjian, the first, and so far only, Chinese writer to win the Nobel (in 2000) is a French citizen living in Paris.

Casanova, in true French academic fashion, writes at length (and convincingly) on why Paris rather than London or New York remains the literary capital of the world despite the decline of French literature. The power of Paris’s critics and translators, she argues, is augmented by its philosophers of literature, e.g. Foucault, Derrida and Lacan, even though they are championed mainly in U.S. literature departments. London is a center, but only for writers from its former colonies, and so elicits little translation. New York, she argues, is merely a commercial center, where few foreign authors are translated or read and where true innovation has been replaced by “a composite measure of fictional modernity. Restored to current taste are all the techniques of the popular novel and the serial invented in the nineteenth century: between the covers of a single volume one can find a cloak-and-dagger drama, a detective novel, an adventure story, a tale of economic and political suspense, a travel narrative, a love story, a psychological account, even a novel within the novel, the last a pretext for false self referential erudition” (p. 171). At this point you can insert your own examples of such bastardized writing. Casanova skewers David Lodge and Umberto Eco.

Faulkner, for example, was virtually unknown and unappreciated in the United States until Sartre championed him as a great literary innovator.
Writers from peripheral lands face the double handicaps of producing works in languages few non-natives read and of being seen as addressing provincial subjects in unsophisticated ways. Much of Casanova’s book is devoted to identifying the methods peripheral writers use to develop their national literary spaces and to advance their own careers. ‘Assimilationists’ abandon their own nation and national concerns and language. This strategy usually is unsuccessful; these writer end in obscurity both at home and in the literary center. When successful, such writers become the voice of the periphery in center, e.g. Naipaul.

Peripheral writers can instead follow a nationalist path and try to raise the prestige of their writing by widening the literary space in their home countries. This strategy, developed by the German writer Herder in the late eighteenth century, begins with the creation of a classical literature in the peripheral country’s native language. In pat this is accomplished by translating great foreign works, creating a borrowed classical tradition. The first authors often are conservative in style, and therefore garner little attention abroad. Their sacrifice lays the groundwork for writers who are revolutionary in style: Some combine high and vernacular language, such as Mark Twain who is the inventor of American English as a literary language. (Rabelais accomplished the same feat for French, as Mikhail Bakhtin demonstrated in Rabelais and His World.)

Once a first generation creates national literary resources, subsequent generations have the autonomy to break away from the nationalist model and develop innovative techniques “to transform the signs of cultural, literary, and often economic destitution into literary resources and thus to gain access to the highest modernity” (p. 328). The greatest innovators or the twentieth century (James Joyce, William Faulkner, Samuel Beckett, the authors of the Latin American ‘boom’ such as Garcia Marquez and Cortázar) redraw the world literary map. Faulkner wrote about “the South…a rural and archaic world prey to magical styles of thought and trapped in the closed life of families and villages,” (p. 337) but expressed it in modernist and innovative ways, not in realism. He “resolved in an utterly new and masterly fashion the dilemma and difficulties of deprived writers…” What Joyce did for “writers from disadvantaged urban backgrounds” Faulkner did for the rural” (p.338).

Casanova’s model of an unequal literary world allows her to track paths of literary influence from Faulkner’s segregated Mississippi to the Latin American admirers of Castro, Julio Cortázar and Gabriel Garcia Marquez, from Yiddish theatre to Kafka, from James Joyce to Henry Roth. Casanova’s recognition and analysis of the inequality of literary space and time “has the immediate consequence of rendering obsolete the most common representations of the writer as a pure being, standing outside history” (p. 351). It also requires a “new method for interpreting literary texts” (p. 351). Casanova provides that method and in so doing offers a radical new understanding of literary identity and influence. She explains how to locate authors both spatially and temporally within a world system and shows how each author is shaped and how a few succeed in transforming an international system of literary production and consumption. Casanova has taken a structural turn and in so doing constructed a powerful new framework and methodology for understanding culture. Her book should become central to our discussions of culture and the future direction of comparative historical sociology.
A special thematic session devoted to the career and scholarship of Seymour Martin Lipset was held at the 2006 ASA meetings in Montreal. Remarks from two of the panelists follow.

S.M. Lipset: A Canadian Appreciation

Samuel Clark
University of Western Ontario

In this tribute to Marty Lipset I would like to focus on how he has influenced and been influenced by Canadian scholarship. In Canada, as in many other countries, the understanding of a broad range of subjects has owed much to his writings; these include political institutions, political parties, electoral politics, voting behavior, the effect of social cleavages on politics, social movements, trade unions, the ideological orientations of intellectuals, and social stratification. More especially, of course, Canadians have benefited from his first major research project, *Agrarian Socialism*, published in 1950. It quickly became the definitive work on the democratic socialist Cooperative Commonwealth Federation (CCF) in Saskatchewan; it has been acclaimed as “excellent”, “brilliant”, “seminal”, not only in book reviews but also in many articles and books on Canadian politics and social movements (Englemann 1956; Kornberg and Thomas 1965; Paltiel 1974; Chandler 1982; Leithner 1993).

*Agrarian Socialism* alone would have created a considerable debt on the part of Canadian scholars to Lipset, but as you know, he did not stop there. Canada has remained central in his thinking, even when he returned his attention to studying the United States. It has done so primarily by providing him with a comparative reference for understanding the latter. I want to mention two intellectual traditions that Marty brought together in the encyclopedic research he did on this topic.

The first tradition is that of studying Canada-U.S. differences. Lipset was, of course, first exposed to this tradition when he came to Canada to do his doctoral research on the CCF, but this introduction was greatly strengthened by the two years (1946-48) that he taught as a young lecturer in the Department of Political Economy at the University of Toronto. When Marty was there the head of the department was H.A. Innis, a dominant figure in Canadian academia, who was firmly committed to the study of the economic, social, and political development of Canadian society. Innis had been trained at the University of Chicago and so was well aware of sociology as a discipline, but he encouraged a very different kind of sociology than that of the Chicago School, with much more of an historical orientation. Marty was also brought into contact with a number of scholars -- in this department and in the history department -- who studied Canadian history with one eye to the United States, almost instinctively comparing what they learned about Canada with its neighbor to the south.

The second intellectual tradition that Marty drew on was the evolving literature in comparative political science. In both North America and Europe this comparative literature had been, until the 1950s and 1960s, concerned primarily with com-
Comparative government, law, and constitutional history. Arend Lijphart (1971) suggested that it was not really a methodology at all, but merely a subject matter. Whether or not this is fair, it is undeniable that in the fifties and sixties this conventional comparative literature was supplemented by a new comparative approach in political science, which was much more methodologically conscious and more interested in political behavior generally, as opposed to just governmental structure, law, and constitution. Countries were compared systematically with one another, with clearly defined variables, in an effort to establish causal relationships. Marty was well versed in this new comparative approach. Although many scholars in both Canada and the United States were aware of this innovation in political science, no one more than Marty brought this intellectual approach to the study of Canada-U.S. similarities and differences.

In doing so he has made an enormous contribution to both. As in all his work, Marty gave to comparative research his special blend of sociology and political science: his insights into the interaction of social cleavages and political structures; his understanding of mass political behavior; and his comparative analysis of culture, of values and of the effects of values. More significantly, his research on Canada-U.S. differences sought to overcome the well known problem in cross-national comparisons of “too many variables, not enough cases” -- a problem that can be met either by increasing the number of cases, or, as Lipset and others have done, by means of reducing the number of explanatory variables by controlling at least some of them. In almost everything he wrote on Canada-U.S. differences Marty explicitly argued that the reason for comparing these two countries lay in the fact that they are so similar and have been affected in similar ways, as a result of which we are able to focus on their differences and the causes of those differences.

Thus, if we turn to his contributions to the literature on Canada-U.S. differences, one of these contributions has certainly been a greater understanding of the methodological basis of the whole enterprise. This is not to say that such an understanding was completely lost on Canadian scholars until Marty came along. His colleagues at the University of Toronto were certainly controlling for some variables when they discussed Canadian-American similarities, so that they could identify the variables that explained why and how Canada developed differently. Still, the explicit recognition of the role of this kind of analysis in causal explanation was certainly a new awareness that Marty brought to the subject; and his clear statements of the methodological advantages of comparing the two countries are often invoked by scholars studying Canada and the U.S. (e.g. Reimer 1995 and 2003; Hoover et al 2002).

Marty also brought to the subject of Canada-U.S. differences an almost unparalleled knowledge of the two countries. Not many can claim to have spent an academic career studying the United States while also having written a book on Canada comparable to Agrarian Socialism. Equally important, no student of Canada-U.S. differences can claim more sympathy for the two countries than Marty Lipset. While he has ceaselessly argued that there are significant differences between the two, the experience of having lived in both and having visited Canada innumerable times has led him to develop a genuine attachment to both, just as one can be equally fond of two very different human beings. Finally, at a more personal level, I am able to attest to the very instrumental role that Lipset has played in fostering close academic ties between Canada and the United States. He has always been very welcoming to Canadian scholars and graduate students.

Of course I do not agree with every argument he has made. In fact, I probably disagree with many of them, as would most of the Canadian scholars.
who have been influenced by his work (e.g. Grabb and Curtis 2005). This would not concern him at all. He has always been a passionate advocate of what he calls the “method of dialogue,” that is, the advancement of arguments by scholars so that other scholars can challenge them and show where they are wrong (Lipset 1963, 1990). He has also demonstrated, over the course of his career, a willingness to change his mind. Scholarship for Marty has been a venture, a never-ending quest, in which he would be the last to claim that he has had the final word. Nonetheless, there is no doubt that the word of S.M. Lipset has become one of the most respected in sociology the world over. It is a marvelous legacy of which he can be justly proud.

References


Learning from Seymour Martin Lipset

Mildred A. Schwartz
University of Illinois-Chicago
New York University

Reading Agrarian Socialism was my first contact with Marty’s work. This happened in a sociology course when I was either a third or fourth year undergraduate at the University of Toronto. If I try to reconstruct why Agrarian Socialism made such a strong impression, I am surmising about the thinking of a not very sophisticated young woman and her initial exposure to sociology over fifty years ago. Yet I feel confident in identifying at least three factors because of the way they continue to resonate with my intellectual life history.
The first thing that made *Agrarian Socialism* so fascinating was its concern with the CCF. Like many young people, I was drawn to the utopian promises of democratic socialism even though, neither then nor later, would I become actively involved in partisan politics. What attracted me was more a fascination with the CCF’s ideals, with the dedication of its leaders and activists, and their willingness to persist regardless of obstacles. I wanted to understand the CCF; I didn’t want to become personally involved with it. Marty’s book was a satisfying way to begin that process.

The second important attribute was its attention to Canada. Canada was where I was born and brought up, whose history I was taught, and where I expected to spend the rest of my life. Marty’s approach, repeated in so much of his subsequent writing, was to search for those features of Canadian society that would explain its particular historical trajectory. My first job after graduation was with the Canadian government in a setting that sensitized me to questions about what kind of country Canada was and where it was going, questions to which Marty’s work had already given some answers.

The third attribute was its substance as sociology. Despite the peculiar nature of the education I received at Toronto, I knew that I wanted to be a sociologist and I recognized that *Agrarian Socialism* was an important example of sociological thinking—it was not just a historical record of events and people, or a case study of contemporary social practices, but a search for the roots of events and practices and their consequences.

All three themes have remained important to me and, in different ways, to Marty. For me, interest in the CCF and later, in the NDP, is reflected first in my dissertation, published as *Public Opinion and Canadian Identity* in 1965, where I argued that voting behavior was a critical link between opinions and the expression of national identity, and most recently, in *Party Movements in the United States and Canada*, published in 2006, where I examine the sustaining strategies used by party movements like the CCF/NDP.

For Marty, the study of the CCF had begun with a search for understanding why the United States was the only industrialized society without a viable urban-based socialist or labor party. It would be followed over the years with specific attention to that question in a number of books and papers, most recently, with Gary Marx, in *It Didn’t Happen Here: Why Socialism Failed in the United States*, published in 2000. From that theme, Marty moved to a more general concern with American exceptionalism in works ranging from *The First New Nation*, published in 1963, to *American Exceptionalism: A Double-Edged Sword*, in 1996.

Democracy in general became central to Marty’s thinking and was the basis of the Julian Rothbaum Distinguished Lectures at the University of Oklahoma in 1997. The lectures and subsequent book were recently expanded by Jason Lakin into *The Democratic Century*. They became another opportunity for me to revisit *Agrarian Socialism* when Allan Hertzke of the Carl Albert Center invited me to write a paper on Marty’s work for its journal, *Extensions*. The invitation arrived when I was recovering from an autologous stem cell transplant and I explained that, as much as I wanted to participate, I might not be able to do so. The invitation and Hertzke’s sympathetic reaction proved to be enough of an incentive to give me the strength to do my first serious post-transplant writing. As I once again face cancer and a second transplant, *Agrarian Socialism* has an additional aura for me, one with healing and restorative qualities.
The study of Canada has been my life work. Even when I look at other countries, in particular the United States, I have taken guidance from Marty not only about the importance of close comparisons among relatively similar societies but also in how to use each society as a means to illuminate the special qualities of the other. Yet, with all I have done to make Canada a central part of my identity as a political sociologist, I recognize the downside of that commitment. I’ve heard it said that people who persist in studying small and relatively less powerful countries become associated with the limitations of what they study.

Marty has certainly given the study of Canada an enhanced dignity and his efforts have been well appreciated and honored in Canada. Yet Marty’s contributions have not made Canadian society a worthy subject for sociological analysis with much cachet outside of Canada. Nor has his work been immune to criticism within Canada. Among the most contentious issues is Marty’s thesis, elaborated in Continental Divide in 1990, that the American Revolution was the source of lasting value differences between the two countries. It is questioned by those who find more similarities than differences during their formative periods. Additionally, as both countries have undergone significant changes in values over time, in some cases diverging but in others converging, it is difficult to know how much significance should be attached to what are essentially relatively small differences. Michael Carroll argues that persistence of the debate about value differences attests to its roots in an unrecognized ideological premise about whether the “best” democracy is the United States, a position he attributes to Lipset, or has its roots in England, reflected in the views of sociologists like Grabb, Curtis, and Baer. It is hardly surprising that ideological nationalism may be an underlying premise in critiques of Marty’s work on Canada.

In my case, I bear a kind of double jeopardy. In the United States, my Canadian work remains of marginal interest to most of my colleagues. In Canada, I’m somewhat of a traitor who escaped to the seemingly plusher settings of Chicago and New York. If, unlike some expatriate Canadian colleagues, I remain willing to continue participating in Canadian professional associations and unwavering in my commitment to the study of Canada, it is not that I’m oblivious to my marginality or particularly thick-skinned. My intellectual choices rest, in part, on who I am and my appreciation, as a sociologist, of the advantages to being an outsider.

Tracing influences that began with Agrarian Socialism and helped shape me as a political sociologist are not just a personal testament. Marty Lipset’s work contains enduring messages that apply to all of us in sociology today. One is the need for a cosmopolitan sociology where our own society, whether Canadian or American, can best be understood when we look beyond national boundaries. Although we don’t all need to become historians, we can all learn from the experiences of Canada that history matters. A second message is the need for commitment to a professional sociology, one that treats both the mundane and the controversial through theoretically-guided data. Practitioners can disagree but should do so only on grounds that are subject to examination and testing. Political diversity is welcome but not the use of ideological labels to categorically dismiss the work of others. As Marty wrote in the 1981 edition of Political Man, we must not confuse ideology with validity. Through his career, Marty has personally demonstrated the value of such professionalism, displaying an intellectual openness and much kindness to those who treat scholarship with respect.

My intellectual debts to Seymour Martin Lipset are a small reflection of the indebtedness we all share. His work remains unique, with a panache that we can all admire and a breadth and stature that is beyond what most of us can achieve.
CIVIL SOCIETY FROM ABROAD: U.S. DONORS IN THE FORMER SOVIET UNION
Sada Aksartova
Princeton University
2005

Foreign aid and philanthropic donor organizations are important, but under-appreciated, agents behind the worldwide diffusion of Western cultural models. Since the early 1990s, when civil society assistance became an established element of donor programs, it has resulted in the creation of many thousands of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) around the world. The dissertation examines how US public and private donors promote NGOs in the two post-Soviet countries of Russia and Kyrgyzstan.

The donor-driven diffusion aims at imposing a familiar conceptual order on an unfamiliar society. The former Soviet Union was illegible to donors when they first set foot there. Populating the post-Soviet terrain with familiar organizational forms has made it more legible and created clients for donors’ funds. Since the early 1990s, American donors became institutionalized, having established a universe of local NGOs vying for their continuing support. At the same time, although NGOs appear natural to US donors, they represent an institutional form unfamiliar to post-Soviet society and derive their legitimacy from Western donors’ financial and moral support. When NGOs seek to influence the post-Soviet state, they do so by appealing to donors. As the earliest, largest, and most vocal promoters of NGOs, US donors in particular act as mediators between post-Soviet NGOs and the post-Soviet state. US civil society assistance constitutes a small share of the overall foreign aid flow. Since the early 1990s, Kyrgyzstan has become heavily dependent on foreign aid, while Russia has not. In Russia, NGOs live off foreign assistance; in Kyrgyzstan, both NGOs and the state do. Therefore, in Kyrgyzstan, unlike Russia, foreign aid itself structures the context in which US donor-supported NGOs operate, and the latter have to confront both the illiberal post-Soviet state and the multiple flows of foreign aid.

NON-WESTERN COLONIAL RULE AND ITS AFTERMATH: POSTCOLONIAL STATE FORMATION IN SOUTH KOREA
Ou-Byung Chae
University of Michigan
2006

How is it possible for the postcolonial state to simultaneously oppose and follow the colonial state in its structure? What explains those characteristics of the postcolonial state formation in South Korea that differ from the cases that passed through Western colonial rule? Working through two analytical axes of colonial structure and non-Western characteristics of Japanese colonialism, I examine how Korean anticolonialisms were framed during the colonial period, and how this framing affected the postcolonial state formation.

During the colonial period, the trajectories of anti-colonial nationalisms hinged on how colonial structure was constituted. By the end of the colonial rule, rightists remained, but liberal nationalism as an ideology was debilitated. Ethnic nationalism grew as a non-political intellectualism, produced as simultaneous ideological contestation and hegemonic inscription of colonial culture.

The postcolonial state culture, Ilminjuŭi, had its own idea of the state in which the state was identified with the nation and was depicted as a family in which the state-society distinction was nullified. It was nurtured by ethnic nationalism, but at the same time, it closely resembled the statist political culture of the colonizer. I identify two mechanisms that made this ironic resemblance possible. One was the simultaneous hegemonic inscription and ideological contestation that characterized ethnic nationalism. The other was the postcolonial political and ideological configuration that reproduced colonial political and ideological configuration, which enabled the politicization of ethnic nationalism. The way colonial structure evolved imposed strong structural constraints on postcolonial politics in a way that led to the reproduction of colonial culture in the postcolonial state formation.
THE ROOTS OF POLITICAL INSTABILITY AMONGST INDIGENOUS NATIONALITIES AND IN THE ‘NIGERIAN’ SUPRA-NATIONAL STATE, 1884-1990: A LONGITUDINAL AND COMPARATIVE HISTORICAL STUDY
E. C. Ejiogu
University of Maryland, College Park 2004

The ‘Nigerian’ supra-national state attracts the attention of scholars who want to account for its continuing poor political performance. Our inquiry into the roots of its continuing poor performance was conducted from the perspectives of Harry Eckstein’s congruence theory and the derivative framework from it that we called the E-G scheme. There is a high degree of social, economic, and political heterogeneity amongst the diverse nationalities that were compelled to constitute it, evident in their governmental and non-governmental authority patterns. The British formulated and implemented state building policies that preferentially favored the Hausa-Fulani but not the Igbo, the Yoruba, and others. The British were impressed by the inherent autocratic traits of the Hausa-Fulani, but not the obviously democratic traits of the indigenous Igbo and Yoruba authority patterns. Thus, while there emerged tremendous resemblances between the authority patterns of the ‘Nigerian’ supra-national state and those of the Hausa-Fulani, there emerged deep-seated disparity between them and indigenous Igbo and Yoruba authority patterns. The resultant state of affairs created and promoted commensurate bases of legitimacy for the authority of the supra-national state only in core Hausa-Fulani society but not in Igbo and Yoruba societies. During colonial rule high political performance in the ‘Nigerian’ supra-national state was region-specific. In spite of the resemblances shared by the authority patterns of the supra-national state and indigenous Hausa-Fulani authority patterns, their common incongruence and inconsonance with the indigenous authority patterns of the Igbo, Yoruba, and others constitute sufficient ground for the continuing poor political performance in the ‘Nigerian’ supra-national state.

WHAT DIFFERENCE DOES LOCAL PARTICIPATION MAKE?: CONTEXTS OF ENGAGEMENT IN REGIONAL CONSERVATION PLANNING
Caroline W. Lee
University of California, San Diego 2006

This study contests the universalism of public engagement models by comparing reports of participation in three state-centered processes for regional conservation planning. Each case study analyzes intensive interviews with community members engaged in conservation in coastal U.S. cities facing rapid growth: San Diego, CA; Charleston, SC; and Portsmouth, NH. While all three processes included similar stakeholders, the San Diego regime pursued a model resembling empowered participatory governance, the Portsmouth regime emphasized more privatized participation building on existing institutions, and the Charleston regime resembled an exclusive machine-style growth coalition. Researchers have foregrounded the importance of formal inclusion and transparency for equitable, reasoned decision-making, but I find that interviewees did not associate transparency and inclusion with process legitimacy or civic-minded discussion. Formal public participation was often seen as superficial pageantry precisely because it created a forum for those seeking attention for ends external to process goals. In each case, participants knew that partnership was rewarded at higher levels of government, but were skeptical of participation and collaboration for its own sake. Surprisingly, the process in San Diego, which was intended to empower locals, ended up dominated by interest group professionals, while the processes managed by national interest groups solicited lay participation from diverse and reluctant sources. These findings demonstrate that the study of democratic engagement can gain by exploring the contextual implementation of abstract deliberative ideals such as inclusion, publicity, and transparency. Socio-logically, it is the standards of the place that matter, not researchers’ assessments of what constitutes democratic success.
Cross-national statistical research consistently suggests that, on average, former British colonies are both more democratic and have more stable democratic transitions. I argue that former British colonies are distinct not because Great Britain was a democracy, or because the British were more altruistic. Rather, British colonial elites were more divided and thus more constrained. In particular, religious groups were more independent from state control in British colonies than in the colonies of France, Belgium, Spain, Portugal, and Italy.

Protestant missionaries were central to expanding formal education and vernacular printing in the colonies because they wanted people to read the Bible in their own language. Other religious groups invested in mass vernacular education and mass printing primarily when competing with Protestants. Missionaries also constrained colonial abuses when they were independent from both white settler funding and state control.

Non-state missionaries also fostered institutions outside state control; other religious groups responded, but copied these new organizational forms and tactics. Nationalist leaders later used these institutions to challenge British colonization and birth political parties.

Statistical analysis confirms the centrality of missions in expanding education and fostering democracy. Controlling for historic Protestant missions removes the association between democracy and most variables traditionally associated with it. Other controls (such as current GDP, current education enrollments, and colonial death rate) do not remove the strong positive association between historic Protestant missions and current level of political democracy.

The Association of Religion Data Archives (ARDA), located at www.thearda.com, provides free access to high quality quantitative data on American and international religion. The ARDA has user-friendly tools to help explore data online and over 400 data files available for download at no charge. Housed in the Social Science Research Institute at the Pennsylvania State University, the ARDA is funded by the Lilly Endowment and the John Templeton Foundation.


Eiko Ikegami’s book Bonds of Civility: Aesthetic Networks and the Political Origin of Japanese Culture (Cambridge University Press, 2005) received multiple book awards at the Montreal meeting: The 2006 Best Book Award, from the Culture Section of the ASA; The 2006 Distinguished Contribution to Scholarship Book Award, from the Political Sociology Section of the ASA; and Honorable Mention for the Barrington Moore Award, from the Comparative and Historical Sociology Section of the ASA. This spring, Bonds of Civility also won the Mirra Komorovsky Award (best book in all categories) from the Eastern Sociological Society. In addition, Bonds of Civility was featured in a whole-page review in the Times Literary Supplement.

John Foran’s book, Taking Power: On the Origins of Third World Revolutions (Cambridge: CUP, 2005) has won awards for distinguished scholarship from the Marxist section of the ASA, and the Political Economy of the World System section of the ASA.
CALLS FOR PAPERS

HEGEMONIC TRANSITIONS AND THE STATE
Simon Fraser University
Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada

The conference, “Hegemonic Transitions and the State”, aims to contribute to our understanding of complex interconnections between capitalist globalization and political authority. The character of the global system differs in different historical periods. How do we understand the current reorganization of states and the state system? What are the categories and concepts necessary to uncover central tensions and complexities involved in the making of a global economy? This conference will explore the historical reconstruction of global capitalism within the post-Cold War geo-military international context. The central focus of the conference is the global regulative framework of capitalism. More specifically, attention will be directed toward examining the forms and boundaries of power that are emerging to restructure states and the state system after the end of Cold War military blocs.

Please send your one-page paper abstract as an electronic attachment to Yildiz Atasoy: yatasoy@sfu.ca or by mail:

Yildiz Atasoy
Assistant Professor of Sociology
Department of Sociology and Anthropology
Simon Fraser University
Burnaby, BC,
V5A 1S6 Canada

Subject to funding, some travel subsidies may be available to graduate students whose papers are accepted.

Paper submission deadline is November 30, 2006.

CALL FOR GRADUATE STUDENT PAPERS: TAX POLICY WORKSHOP AND CONFERENCE
Northwestern University
May 3-5, 2007

Taxation is a central social institution of the modern world. Taxes define durable structures of inequality, delimit the capacities of the state, and affect social behaviors from marriage to philanthropic giving. Conflict over taxation has been a driving force in major historical and social changes from the French Revolution to the democratic transitions of the late twentieth century. In the contemporary U.S., tax policy is a central political battleground: changes in the tax code are the instrument of choice for policymakers seeking to promote new social policies, and also for lobbyists seeking benefits for particular industries and firms.

We invite the submission of papers or abstracts from graduate students for a one-day graduate student workshop to be held in conjunction with a two-day conference on comparative and historical approaches to taxation. The one-day grad student workshop and the two-day conference are sponsored by Northwestern University and the American Sociological Association, and will be held at Northwestern from May 3-5, 2007. The workshop will provide an introduction to classical perspectives on fiscal sociology, showcase new directions of research, and foster the growth of an active research community in this emerging field.

Participants will be asked to complete selected readings in advance of the workshop, and will have a chance to discuss their work with top scholars in the field. Housing and travel expenses will be paid.

The deadline for submitting papers or abstracts is Friday, December 1, 2006.

Submit papers or abstracts via e-mail to Elisabeth Anderson <aeander2000@gmail.com>

For more information, see the web site at http://www.cics.northwestern.edu/GPCHS_Conference.html
Barrington Moore Book Award

The section awards the Barrington Moore Award every year to the best book in the areas of comparative and historical sociology. Nominated publications should have appeared in the two years prior to the year in which they are nominated (i.e. for the 2007 award only books published in 2005, 2006 or 2007 will be considered). Books may be nominated by authors or by other section members.

Non-authors may nominate a book by sending a letter or email to the chair of the Moore prize committee, who will then contact the publisher to request that books be sent to committee members. Authors may nominate their book by sending a letter of nomination to the Moore prize committee and making arrangements for each member of the Moore prize committee to receive a copy. Nominations must be received by February 15, 2007 to be considered.

The committee members and their email and mailing addresses are:

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Comparative Historical Best Article Award

The section awards this prize every year to the best article in the areas of comparative and historical sociology. Nominated publications should have appeared in the two years prior to the year in which they are nominated (i.e. for the 2007 award only articles published in 2005, 2006 or 2007 will be considered). Articles may be nominated by authors or by other section members.

Author and non-authors may nominate a book by sending a letter or email to each member of this prize committee along with a paper copy of the article. The letter and copy of the article must be received by each member of the committee by February 28, 2007 to be considered.

The committee members and their email and mailing addresses are:

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Reinhard Bendix Student Paper Award

Every year the section presents the Reinhard Bendix Award for the best graduate student paper. Submissions are solicited for papers written by students enrolled in graduate programs at the time the paper was written.

Students may self-nominate their finest work or it may be nominated by their mentors. Author and mentors may nominate a paper by sending a letter or email to each member of this prize committee along with a paper copy of the article. The letter and copy of the article must be received by each member of the committee by February 28, 2007 to be considered.

The committee members and their email and mailing addresses are:

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Comparative and Historical Sociology Section Sessions
At the 2007 ASA Meeting

1) "Transitions to Capitalism, Past and Present"
   Open Submission
   Organizer: Rebecca Emigh (emigh@bigstar.ucla.edu)

2) "Religion and Politics in Comparative and Historical Perspective"
   Open Submission
   Organizer: Phil Gorski (philip.gorski@yale.edu)

3) "How New is the New Left in Latin America?"
   Invited Session
   Organizer: TBA

4) "Nationalism and Imperialism"
   Open Submission
   Organizer: Peter Stamatov (peter.stamatov@yale.edu)

5) Roundtables
   Open Submission
   Organizer: Mara Loveman (mloveman@ssc.wisc.edu)
New Publications of Section Members


Bodemann, Y. Michal, 2006, “Between Israel and Germany. From the ‘Alien Asiatic People’ to the New German Jewry” *Jewish History* 20: 91-109


Bodemann, Y. Michal, 2006, “The Jewish Minority and the Turkish Immigrant: The German Jewish Trope as Master Narrative for German Turks,” with Gokce Yurdakul (forthcoming in German Politics and Society)


The Comparative and Historical Sociology Section would like to congratulate:

**Michael Mann, University of California-Los Angeles**

Winner of the Barrington Moore (Best Book) Prize of the Comparative and Historical Sociology Section for *The Dark Side of Democracy: Explaining Ethnic Cleansing* (Cambridge, 2005)


Committee: Mathieu Deflem (Chair), Vivek Chibber, James Mahoney

**Monica Prasad, Northwestern University**


Committee: Muge Gocek (Chair), Mark Steinberg, Paul McLean

**Amy Kate Bailey, University of Washington**

Winner of the Reinhard Bendix (Best Student Paper) Prize of the Comparative and Historical Sociology Section, for “Fertility and Revolution: When Does Political Change Influence Reproductive Behavior?”

Committee: Mara Loveman (Chair), Tammy Smith, Miguel Angel Centeno
In the next issue of the Comparative and Historical Sociology Newsletter:

Symposium on

Vivek Chibber’s
Locked in Place:
State Building and Late Industrialization in India

Princeton University Press

With Contributions by:

Elisabeth Clemens
Jeffery Paige
Leo Panitch

…plus a personal reflection by Rebecca Emigh, and more!