Interorganizational Activation In Urban Communities:

DEDUCTIONS FROM THE CONCEPT OF SYSTEM

by Herman Turk

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Arnold Rose was my teacher and my friend. I was fully aware, before his untimely death, of his sense that sociology needed a publication outlet of the sort provided by this Series; and I was dimly aware of his hope that his and Caroline's gift would meet that need. I am grateful to the American Sociological Association for providing me the opportunity to help fulfill Arnold's hope.

Sheldon Stryker
Editor

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attractive, introspection tells me now, rests upon two personal convictions: First, today’s most urgent social problems must be addressed at the macrolevel, even those whose effects are seen in the individual. Second, the social scientist’s most relevant contribution to effective social practice is basic research in which these problems are considered as data rather than as concepts.

Something one of my students said during a seminar on formal organizations at the University of Nebraska in the spring of 1966 prompted me to wonder why there was no general theory of the relations between organizations. Of course I soon found out that there was some— including part of what Myron Lefevre and I had written in “Towards a Theory of Representation between Groups”— but very little, and even quite recent. This in itself might have been sufficient challenge. However, during the next week a representative of the U.S. Department of Labor asked whether I would like to conduct a summer research project in my field of formal organizations, mentioning as one possibility the problem of relations among anti-poverty organizations. I accepted with alacrity, and (thanks to George Weber’s imaginative administration) the work continued for two summers.

At first I tried to predict interorganizational relations on the basis of such conventional intra-organizational variables as size and decentralization. That these tactics were not productive may be attributable only to the crude indicators I was forced to employ, for others have since succeeded. But I was led to speculate upon whether the urban setting might not have something to do with outside influences upon relations among its organizations. Thus, for example, net population growth was taken as an indicator of the city’s organizational instability, and number of inhabitants as a measure of its visibility to, say, federal anti-poverty agencies. Using conventional, but omnibus variables such as these enabled me to predict, but sometimes for the wrong reasons. Returning to the literature (especially Roland Warren’s writings) with new anticipations, I arrived at the guiding assumption that the large-scale urban setting not only predicts interorganizational relations but that the setting itself is interorganizational. Armed with this idea, one can go back at least as far as Durkheim and move ahead in time through Simmel, Wirth, Blumer, to Form and Miller in the near present, to see how close to emerging this interorganizational level of macroanalysis had always been. Clearly a future step will be to seek its limitations.

Any “new” frame of reference owes an intellectual debt to whatever scholarship has gone on before. I have tried to make mine as clear as possible and shall continue to do so throughout the present work. Still there are some who contributed more immediately to this book. I am grateful to Michael Aiken, Carl-Gunnar Janson, and Arthur L. Stinchcombe, who waded through the first draft in its entirety and made specific and incisive comments. Terry N. Clark, Daniel Glaser, Enrico Quarantelli, and Theresa G. Turk considered the germ of the book as presented in a paper read at the 1971 Annual Meeting of the American Sociological Association, and their reactions were indeed useful. James F. Short, Jr., and his editorial staff of the American Sociological Review contributed in the same way; moreover, they mentioned the ASA-Rose Monograph Series as an alternative to cutting this “monster” in half. Sheldon Stryker and Helen MacGill Hughes were kind and helpful editors.

PREFACE

How inquiry into small groups can lead to the macroanalysis of communities may be puzzling. But one generally perceives his own professional development as orderly—especially in retrospect—and I am no exception. To be sure, much of my earlier work had to do with the microanalysis of formal organizations and was appropriate to such publications as Sociometry. Yet I have always been fascinated by “grand” theory and consequently tend to select or formulate propositions that either make sense at all levels of analysis or distinguish the various levels from one another. The works of Emile Durkheim, Max Weber, and Talcott Parsons have led me to explore “The Division of Labor in the Dyad” and “Task and Emotion, Value and Charisma.” The latter study became part of an editorial venture which featured debate over George C. Homans’ provocative challenge that the only level of sociological analysis is psychological.

It has been my working assumption that even what we call “reasoning by analogy” may often not be analogy at all, but rather evidence of the diffusion of common models of thought among contemporaries—including those who belong to different parts of the scientific community. My willingness to consider the essentially nonsociologically rooted concept of system, which has become central to the present study, is based upon this assumption.

The empirical transition to macrosociology began in my case during a stimulating colleagueship with urban sociologist, Joel Smith, several of whose ideas about community integration proved to converge with my own conceptions of small-group cohesion. Together we secured reports by locally well-informed persons which were used to construct one of my current indicators. The collaboration helped make the transition feasible. That it also was
Perhaps the book would have no flaws at all had I taken all of everyone’s advice. Two colloquia sponsored in Burg Alter/Bonn by Professor Werner Kaltefleiter, Herr Wolfgang Falke, and their colleagues, and informal conversations with them added to whatever cross-national perspective this book may offer. Financial assistance by the University of Southern California and the Federal Republic of Germany’s Academic Exchange Program (Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst) enabled such amendment during a sabbatical semester.

Formulating the theory began under a Health Sciences Scholar Award to the author by the National Institutes of Health—National Library of Medicine. In this connection Herbert Fockler deserves mention, not only for his administrative acumen but also for some scholarly hints. The main support of the writing of the book and the research it describes is USPHS Grant Number HS00541 from the National Center for Health Services Research and Development. Either I have been very fortunate or Federal research agencies are filled with administrative talent; I have in mind the Center’s Sherman Williams and Feather Hair, who must also be singled out in this respect. The University of Southern California’s Computing Center and the Health Sciences Computing Facility (sponsored by the National Institutes of Health under Grant FR-3 to the University of California, Los Angeles) provided computing assistance.

The University of Southern California’s Department of Sociology and Anthropology contributed in many ways: my departmental colleagues with their tolerance and active help, the director and staff of the Population Research Laboratory with facilities and technical assistance, my friends and co-workers in the Laboratory for Organizational Research with their hard work and good humor. Far from least, the Department provided opportunity for many encounters with that mellow, aggressive, supportive, abrasive, naive, wise and always stimulating bunch, the graduate students.

Herman Turk
Bonn, 1972
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INTRODUCTION: AN OVERVIEW

This monograph runs the full course from most abstract to most concrete. It begins with the concept of "system", which, stripped of accretions, simply means "linkage among units" and "relationships among variable states or properties". Even when taken out of this manifestly content-free context and used to describe social phenomena, the term does not necessarily imply "equilibrium", "consensus", "conservatism", or other related labels. Equally, "change", "conflict", and "revolution" are appropriate labels—and just as unnecessary. As a matter of fact, the kind of empirical system to be described is one that I shall assume to be partly in a state of conflict and partly in one of accord.

Eliminating the non-essentials allows one to inquire whether and how much any contiguous set of social actors constitutes a system. (The notion that human systems are either inevitable or absolute is unwarranted.) This means asking to what degree the actors are linked to one another and how inter-related are the variables that describe their states in the aggregate. Posing these two questions is worthwhile in seeking a description of almost any concrete social setting. In this work I have incorporated both questions into a single proposition about modern urban life: that an empirical association exists between the availability of linkage among an aggregate of organizations as the actors, on the one hand, and the extent of positive relationship between the demand for their collective effort, and its subsequent interorganizational supply, on the other. Obviously, very slight changes in wording would permit the proposition to embrace other kinds of social aggregates, from multipersonal to multi-societal.

Clearly, relationships of supply and demand can originate by fiat, at one extreme, or as a result of market-like transactions among free agents, at another. Both extremes, as well as the points between them, may be subsumed under our view of system. Indeed, the idea of system as linkage explicates what might otherwise be overlooked: that the variables, demand and supply, affect one another only to the extent that the relevant actors do or can interact with each other—or are at least aware of each other's existence.

The present framework also rests upon ideas at a somewhat lower but still very high level of abstraction. We move from the general idea of system, which also applies to non-social phenomena, to a topology of social structure and process in which different kinds of systems are distinguished from one another by their mode of translating information into action. At the one pole needs are perceived and central decisions made about supply by the same one or two actors, who enjoy "imperative control" over the remaining actors. At the other pole needs are articulated as demand and the relevant supply is arrived at spontaneously through the give-and-take of conflict, compromise, and bargaining called "social choice." This process occurs among larger numbers of actors that form the temporary and changing linkages of associationalism. Itself only a heuristic device, the typology is approximated, one might also note, in the contrast between the main features of centrally planned and laissez-faire social systems. It is possible—though not necessary—and assumed in the empirical cases investigated here that either type of decision can occur on the basis of shared overarching values, particularly those of the broader sociocultural environment.

The claim being made here is that modern, urban society leans more closely toward the second type of linkage and process of decision than toward the first. This proposition follows from a second basic conception of social structure and change at a similarly high level of abstraction. In my earlier writings I argued that to study modern complex society or one of its major components is to study formal social organizations (including business firms, government agencies, and other associations) and their relations to one another. Empirical investigation upheld the utility of this interorganizational level of analysis. Subsequently, it proved reasonable and feasible to couple it with some of the pioneering work in interorganizational relations of the early 1960's, which stipulates that the very nature of interorganizational relations is one of partial conflict—however much the participating organizations might need one another. This is because different organizations pursue different goals.

It follows from this theoretical coupling that the organizations of, for example, a large city will resist attempts at imperative control by any one or few of their number. Rather, they should constitute a system, in the sense here meant, mainly to the extent that the general availability of associational linkage among the organizations affects the degree to which demands may be generated through social choice and through social choice related to the appropriate supplies. The probability of valid hypotheses based on these deductions was adjudged to be especially high in the empirical studies to be described, since the demand for community effort could be met by interorganizational supply.
Under conditions of associationalism and social choice, the general availability of linkage determines the potential for coalitions among organizations that can mobilize degrees of power which single organizations lack. Therefore, it is essential to identify organizational characteristics that are linkage-producing for a wide range of community issues. To this end, I have attempted to draw together ideas from the substantive areas of community, formal organizations, interorganizational relations, urban economics, and urban politics. On their bases it appears as though sufficient coalitional linkage can be made available if there are present in the community organizations capable of: (1) initiating coalition-formation, either as nucleus or as outside influence, in a number of activities, or (2) resolving conflict and mediating common interests among potential members of coalitions. Large, diversified, visible, and decentralized organizations tend to surpass others with respect to the first of these capacities, provided they can resist total internal fragmentation. Organizations that can stave off fragmentation as well as others which are visible and which pursue diffuse, noncontroversial goals stand out with respect to the second coalition-producing capacity.

Yet coalitions alone are not sufficient for community action unless winning coalitions emerge. The mere availability of linkage could produce stalemates as readily as solutions. Although simple contest among interested coalitions could decide issues or effect change, it appears more typical of United States cities (from which the empirical cases at hand are drawn), and perhaps of organizational aggregates elsewhere or of different kinds, that strongly opposed positions are not adopted. The needs that the community has translated into relatively uncontested demands and the interorganizational means with which it ultimately proposes to meet them are likely to have been formulated within a framework of shared, abstract standards, such as those of the more inclusive society. It is around such values that a dominant coalition can form. The mere availability of linkage in the modern city—many of whose organizations are externally oriented—and the presence of visible organizations with diffuse, noncontroversial goals can only mean support for these societal values—national, in the instance of the empirical cases at hand—and their increasing salience to the few decisions that are eventually implemented. Implementation, as the term is used here, means activation of an interorganizational network. The network may be new, or it may have been either dormant or formed for other purposes. It may consist of the coalition itself—either in whole or in part—or it may lie fully outside it.

To this point the model provides an application of the proposition deduced from the concept of system that makes sense in any modern, urban setting. Yet, once the specific linkage-producing and interest-mediating organizations are named, caution must be exercised in generalizing to other societies, where the requisite characteristics may be found in organizations with entirely different names. In large United States cities, possession of these characteristics depends upon: (1) scale and degree of diversification within the municipal government, (2) political party strength, and (3) the extent to which the impact of local voluntary associations is community-wide and uncontested.

These specific properties of American organizations are indicators of the availability of linkage and the mediation of values. As one might guess, these indicators were used to predict the positive correlation between the community's need for interorganizational activation, according to national standards, and the subsequent local supply of such activation.

In four empirical tests, regression analyses of the 130 largest United States cities (by 1960 standards) supports the hypothesis. The indicators of government and voluntary association, more so than of party strength, did predict degrees of positive correlation between (1) poverty level and the existence of federally-sponsored anti-poverty networks, (2) poverty level and welfare costs, on the one hand, and interorganizational activation in the Model Cities Program, on the other, (3) death rate and health costs, on the one hand, and interorganizational evaluation of health on the other, and (4) number of hospitals and influence exerted by the local association of hospitals. Simplifying the present model may be possible.

These are the main concrete results. Although not directly generalizable to higher levels of abstraction, they bear at several levels upon broad issues in social theory. These will be discussed in a concluding statement.
CHAPTER I

SYSTEMS, ASSOCIATIONALISM, SOCIAL CHOICE, AND AN INTERORGANIZATIONAL THEORY OF MACROSOCIAL PHENOMENA

Though it begins by referring to any kind of social aggregate, from a small number of persons through multi-national systems, the present chapter ends by considering the organizations that interact with one another within a modern urban setting. This entails making explicit use of a fundamental proposition stemming directly from how the concept of system has been defined. It also means explicating the analysis of social phenomena at a new level called interorganizational, which is likely to give rise to a special kind of social system—described by the concepts, “associationalism” and “social choice.” It is a social system that could not be described as an unyielding monolith, although in some quarters the term has been accused of promoting that kind of conception of itself.

The Concept of System

When a scientific term has been employed in what appear to be different ways, it is well to explore the possibility of intuitive connections among the several ideas to which it refers.1 Such exploration can lead to hypotheses about association between the separate indicators produced by these different usages.

The word "system" has two principal meanings to social scientists. The one is structural or topological and denotes linkage among a set of social units. The other, borrowed from classical mathematics, denotes relationships between variables that describe more temporary states of the set and other variables that describe its organized responses to these states.2 Clearly, the two meanings are not distinct from one another, for “organized” implies “linkage”. Yet the availability of linkage and degree of relationship between state and organized response can have separate empirical indicators, whose association with one another—once verified—has far-reaching implications for all manner of social analysis.

It should be noted at the outset that social units linked to one another through conflict can constitute systems, according to these fundamental meanings, no less readily than social units that are linked through accord. Nevertheless, social systems labeled as such have most often been considered in terms of the degree of their integration, which accounts for the fact that social system theory is sometimes accused of conservatism. Here, however, we shall consider partial conflict as change-producing, but system nonetheless, and also refer to the conditions of total conflict in passing.

Explicating its two meanings also makes it clear that a system does not always occur and that when it does eventuate it does so by degree. One can inquire into how much linkage is available and into how much of a relationship there is between state and response. The assumption that systems are all-or-none phenomena is as unwarranted as are assumptions about their inevitability or their universal resistance to change. Yet systems of social actors and of action occur with sufficient frequency to be interesting objects of study. Here we shall have little to say about why they occur when they do, but much about the bearing of the availability of linkage among social units upon relations among variables that describe social conditions—i.e., states—on the one hand, and social responses elicited to them, on the other.

The frequently used variable, level of demand, describes one such state, which may be defined as the articulation of collective need in the sense in which macro-level economists use the term;3 and level of supply may be used to describe the organized responses to that state. The guiding theoretical proposition being developed here combines these several aspects of system in the following manner:

The linkage available among a set of social units determines the degree of positive correlation between collective level of demand and collective level of supply.

In short, availability of linkage specifies the conditions under which supply and demand correlations occur. Here it is important to observe that unqualified application of the present line of reasoning means positive association

1While this is neither the place to describe the linguistic analysis of scientific concepts nor to defend its worth, the fact that its informal application was important to the present work must be noted. The best known texts on the construction of social theory have little to say about the generation of the rationales on which formal models are based. Perhaps this gap could be filled if every investigator were to tell how he got his ideas.

2Combining discussions by Bertalanffy (1968: 19-21), with those by Nagel (1956: 254-263) and others led to this depiction of the two meanings.

3By Margolis (1968), for example.
of the availability of linkage with met needs, needed supply, and also non-supply in the absence of need. Availability is inversely associated with unmet needs and unneeded supply.

That the argument is not trivial can be shown immediately; that it is empirically productive will be shown later. To refute triviality, there is the fact that the variables whose correlation is subject to specification are broadly suggestive of variables employed in at least two major conceptions of social systems, where demand, need, and supply have their counterparts. General systems theory, for one, employs the key concept of feedback, namely, information about collective adaptation; and our use of demand may be said to approximate one of that concept’s forms. Functional explanation, for the second, incorporates a related concept, the homeostatic variable, whose values are said to indicate levels of tension and to trigger outputs by certain adaptive structures that return the variable to a non-triggering state. In our present sense, level of need is an instance of the homeostatic variable’s value; and supply is the output of structures which defuse (term mine) the homeostatic variable, in the language of functional explanation; or effect collective adaptation in that of general systems theory.

Also the availability of linkage has its referents in the two other views of social systems. It is a generic term under which may be subsumed the communicative and selective mechanisms of the general systems and functional models that are said to connect the several feedback-generating (or homeostasis-indicating) demands with one another, and with elements of the responding structure as well. In our language, such mechanisms connect needs to one another, enable the articulation of certain needs as demand, generate the supplying structures, and ultimately connect the state called collective need with the collective response called supply.4

Type of System: Associationalism, Social Choice, and the Possibility of Shared Standards

Our general formulation of system, like the other two conceptions to which it has been compared, leads to the view that linkage among social units is a necessary antecedent of demand-supply relationships within the larger unit that they comprise. Thus how much of a system exists is problematic. However, what kind of system it is—i.e., the manner of linkage and the consequent way in which supply is related to needs—is equally problematic. Since system means linkage and relationships, the concept can refer to fief, class struggle, free enterprise, or with equal facility to other social forms, perhaps not yet envisaged. Yet the empirical content of this study prompts emphasis upon two ideal-typical sketches of large-scale social structure and process.

In the first of these—described only by way of contrast to the second, which is actually to be used—linkage is by “imperative control,” which means that in any particular instance a specific powerful social unit influences activities of the remaining units through coercion or consent. Here the evaluation of need as well as the provision of supply is by central decision, the powerful

4For pertinent descriptions of the general systems and functional approaches, respectively, see Buckley (1967, esp. 206-207) and Stinchcombe (1968: 80-130).

5This discussion of linkage and decision types was freely adapted and synthesized from materials by Banfield (1961: 326-327); Parsons (1971), and Simpson (1971). These scholars provided the terms but are not to be held responsible for present modifications in their use.
ern urbanized community, which can range, of course, from neighborhood to international system.

Community from an Interorganizational Perspective

Any effort involving broad sectors of the community—including nationally defined adjustments between need and supply—depends upon local organizations; being mainly composed of organizations, such modern urban settings as large cities of the United States may be studied at the interorganizational level of analysis.

At this level, large-scale social settings are investigated without reference to such non-organizational or sub-organizational units as populations and status-role categories. Our rationale lies in the assumption that patterns of individual behavior depend upon the presence of organizations that encourage or accept them and that organizations are primary determinants of regularities and uniformities in human potential for such patterns. Organizations must be assumed to be both the formators and the means of individual action: they are the actors which comprise any large and complex structure.

Populations and subpopulations are seen in terms of their effects upon large-scale social settings through the various organizations which they form or join, which they serve, for which they are source objects, from which they acquire norms or receive status, and which can act on their behalf. Populations are clienteles and electorates, repositories of specialized knowledge and bureaucratic talent, recruitment reservoirs, and diffuse sources of legitimation or ideological denial through collective expression. They may also be viewed as undifferentiated means of disposal and support through such mechanisms as consumption, donation, taxation, and investment. These various behavioral and attitudinal potentials of the population are themselves assumed to be organizationally determined.

Once certain more conventional thought models are put aside, it becomes difficult to identify community roles or revolutionary roles within large urban settings which are not already defined by such enacted formal groups as voluntary associations, government agencies, churches, militant groups, commissions, the public relations departments of large corporations. It proves to be even more difficult to conceive of societal roles outside the context of national and international organizations. Power positions within larger cities and nations appear to rest heavily upon organizational memberships; prestige may depend upon organizational memberships; and organizations appear to have an ever-increasing number of occupational roles, including some, which are craft-like, or professional. Even diffuse orientations vis-a-vis the broader setting may be acquired and exercised through contact with organizations of all kinds, and not only those specializing in the transmission of influence. Further, settings marked by cleavages might also be expected to include a variety of organizational proponents for each point of view and of organizational means of implementation.

If mass responses to the broader setting are both formulated and enacted by organizations, it is reasonable to redefine the setting in terms of such organizations and the relations which exist among them. Recently, sociologists have used such familiar concepts as consensus, conflict, exchange, differentiation, and integration to refer to interorganizational relations within broad settings. The same concepts may be used to describe the setting itself interorganizationaly.

Organizations are interdependent communities either lack collective effort or are polarized into opposing forces that prevent it (Coleman, 1957:21-23; 1966). Banfield (1958: passim), for example, attributed the absence of such effort in an Italian village to the lack of locally sponsored organizations, which he traced to the intrusion of externally controlled organizations coupled with near-exclusive reliance on the immediate family. He found that various civic proposals in Chicago, on the other hand, were generated, supported, opposed, modified, tabled, and implemented through interaction among large organizations (1961: passim, esp. p.263). More recently, comparative data have enabled Turk (1970, 1973) to predict the nature of organizational participation by large cities in the Federal War on Poverty and in networks of hospitals on the basis of preexisting organizations and their interrelations with one another, and have led Aiken and Alford (1970) to agree with him that nationally sponsored local innovations in urban renewal, public housing, and poverty programs can best be understood in interorganizational terms. Where organizational means are lacking, need cannot be expressed as demand; nor can the community provide the appropriate supply, which itself is organizational in the cases to be considered here. But the simple number and variety of organizations in a community—though minimizing the chances of its total polarization—do not guarantee the emergence either of demand (i.e., transmitted need) or interorganizational supply, let alone any association between the two. The presence of organizations constitutes a necessary condition for the covariation between level of need and supply. However, the remaining necessary conditions have to be sought in the linkage-affecting varieties, relative potencies, and interrelations of the organizations of one community as compared to those of another.

It is in the latter sense of an interorganizational level of analysis that the characteristics of municipal government, political parties, and voluntary associations are important in United States cities, and their counterparts or functional equivalents are important elsewhere. It shall be assumed that large, modern communities like the cities studied here are not organizationally barren, but that their respective capacities to relate variables of need to those of interorganizational supply—one aspect of system—depend upon organizational characteristics that estimate the amount of overall linkage available to the community's organizations—the other aspect of system.

6These inferences were drawn—and in some cases virtually echoed—from such varied material as those reported by Rostow (1953: passim), Mills (1956: passim), Galbraith (1958: passim), Babchuk et al. (1960), Freeman (1968: passim), Hawley (1963), Stinchcombe (1963), Perrucci and Pilisuk (1970).

7This phenomenon has been accounted for in several complementary ways. For example, see Parsons (1936), Eisenstadt (1965), Stinchcombe (1965), Turk et al. (1966).

8Levine and White (1961); Litwak and Hylton (1963); Levine, White, and Paul (1963) have pioneered in examining relations among organizations in such terms. Warren (1967) and Turk (1969) have used them with reference to entire interorganizational fields.
These characteristics of organizations follow in part from the special character of multi-organizational environments and will be discussed next in those terms.

**Characteristics of Linkage-Providing Organizations in the Multi-Organizational Community**

To say that a community is multi-organizational is not to say that power differences and common values do not exist, but only that any system it comprises is (1) controlled more by association than by imperative and that adjustments among the magnitudes of variables which describe states in such a system and consequent responses to them are (2) based more on social choice than on central decision. Nor can possibilities be denied under certain conditions that associationalism and social choice (3) can themselves be based upon certain shared, abstract standards and/or (4) facilitate the activation of interorganizational forms of all kinds. These considerations have specific implications for the characteristics of organizations likely to signify the availability of linkage with or among the community’s (other) organizations.

Organizations having certain characteristics can affect linkage through participation in or mediation of coalitions, whether these be temporary or permanent, past or present, latent or active. Some of the same organizations, as well as some with still different characteristics, affect linkage by bringing about other interorganizational forms, such as the non-instrumental solidarities that may cluster about a community’s few abstract values. Effects such as these determine how much of a system the urban community can be.

1. **Associationalism and Linkage among Organizations**

Because they embody specific, separate, and often opposing values, sometimes by decree, and because their respective goals may be mutually incompatible, organizations exist in competition and partial conflict with one another. But with their increasing scale they have also become increasingly dependent upon one another, not only as adversaries but also as exchangers of services and regulators of competition. Thus they constitute partly changing systems of interorganizational linkage. Organizations probably surpass individuals in their ability to maintain such dual relationships with one another, because different situations involving the same organizations may involve different specialized representatives (cf. Turk and Lefcowitz, 1962; Freeman, 1968).

Nonetheless, the same dualism can account for the observation that interorganizational relations tend to be horizontal, rather than hierarchical, and specific rather than diffuse and, further, that in the modern urban setting, composed of organizations, decision-making is decentralized for the greater for whatever is considered non-problematic or is pursued unswervingly is non-negotiable.

A major process of establishing linkage in the community is that of forming coalitions on the bases of compromise, sanction, and bargain through which support for various interests and values may be exchanged or combined in such a manner that the opposing propositions do not meet the opposition which often causes them to be tabled. The resources associated with organizational scale, as noted, facilitate both sanction and bargain, provided the organization can adapt itself to a constantly changing environment. Diversification within an organization means that it has a multiplicity of resources which it has applied or can apply in this manner, but that it can also participate in what might be an even more fundamental means of effecting adjustments between supply and demand. Concerning the latter two processes might involve the exchange of support by each organization in matters it considers minor with other organizations that need it, in return for support in matters it considers major. The more diversified an organization, the more numerous the specific issues it will span and the larger the stock of support it has on hand to make available for exchange. Moreover, that an organization’s diversification is associated with its meeting issues politically, as we have argued it is, means that its various interests are negotiable rather than absolute.

3. **Contextual Values and Linkage among Organizations**

The idea of a system in which organizations are linked to one another in exchanging support for specific interests and values does not belie the supposition that certain values can have far greater potency than others in the process of evaluating various needs, generating and modifying demand, or engineering the “satisficing” mode and level of supply. Whether because of their search for predictability in uncertain environments, or their interlocking memberships and crosscutting lines of conflict, or their being penetrated by representatives of the community itself, organizations can hold in common certain abstract and overarching standards that affect their interaction with one another and even contribute heavily toward determining its products. Relatively permanent and inclusive formal interorganizational linkage can be formed—albeit linkage that is horizontal and loose—on the basis of these shared standards. In short, linkage may have solidarity as well as material underpinnings.

The idea that the shared standards are those of some broader social context is in keeping with Warren’s suggestion (1970) that a community’s values are likely to be those of the more inclusive social system; it is also in keeping with various discussions of mass society. That agreement about such con-

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9This observation has been made separately by Form and Miller in writing about the industrialized community (1960a), and by Tereberry (1968), in writing about interorganizational fields.
10Levine and White (1961); Litwak and Hylton (1962); Levine, White, and Paul (1963); and Clark (1965) have viewed these attributes as fundamental to the study of interorganizational relations.
26See Greer’s 1967 interpretation of Banfield’s case studies (1961: passim) to this effect.
27For an individual-based approximation of this exchange model, see Coleman (1964).
28These reasons for common values among organizations are not as independent of one another as they may appear upon casual glance. The following works emphasize one or the other of these aspects, however: Predictability—Form and Miller (1960:6), Emery and Trist (1965), Tereberry (1968); Interconnections—Coleman (1966:22, 1964), Parsons (1955), Gomson (1966); Penetration—Parsons (1960), Eisenstadt (1965), Stinchcombe (1965).
29However else they might otherwise disagree. See, for example, Vidich and Bensman (1958: passim), Kornhauser (1959:75), Stein (1960: passim), Shils (1962), Etzioni (1968:432-465).
textual values or standards—as they shall be called from now on—is possible at a local level might also mean that the values are themselves outcomes of processes of social choice among organizations, but ones that occurred at a societal or even higher level. Where the values that apply are contextual standards, according to these arguments, they are also more likely than others to influence the outcome of social choice, because they are more likely to produce the largest and most uncontested coalitions of organizational actors. The extra-local ties of many local organizations plus the diffusion of information through mass media and national or international professional associations among the functionaries in such organizations and among those in other organizations as well (not to mention the high interorganizational mobility of such persons) attest this probability.

The diffuseness of an organization’s manifest goals is associated with its adaptability to a changing environment (works cited by Wilson, 1966). Goal diffuseness may be illustrated by a nonspecificity that enables competing organizations to join the same Chamber of Commerce, or by stated intentions to civic betterment and the public good, and by attention to bringing various community elements together.

Such goals may contribute either to the resolution of intraorganizational conflict, since the more numerous the interests and values, the more abstract must be the means of their reconciliation, or to political capabilities, since interests and values that are only loosely tied to main goals can more readily be used for negotiation. If an organization with diffuse goals were also to exhibit a tendency to conflict avoidance, however, it would be capable of selecting from among a wide variety of values but inclined to advance only the relatively noncontroversial. Under these conditions, an organization is likely to provide solidary linkage, at least in part, since its diffuse goals enable it to adopt and proclaim standards of some more inclusive social context than the community which are least likely to arouse controversy. Provided that they are visible, neutral organizations that advance common values—though not themselves reactants in the process of social choice—can nonetheless have a catalytic effect upon the probability of community action through the linkage that they mediate. The diffuse purposes of such organizations and their failure to threaten the attainment of goals by other organizations enable them to be used as legitimizers. Organizational contestants may be said to form the imaginary coalitions with such neutral organizations that are implied by claims of membership in a common interest bloc, and rival positions might draw closer together as a result. Neutrality also enables organizations to provide linkage more directly by the overt assumption of mediating and conciliating roles. Or they can constitute assemblies for the contesting organizations, in particular, and play the roles of disseminating and reinforcing agents of the values that organizations share, in general.

Once such organizations enter the arena, other organizations may use the common (contextual) standards that are articulated as negotiating devices to shift the balance of power, or they may adopt them as central symbols around which more discrete interests and values can cluster. In terms of our research problem, the linkage made available by neutral organizations serves to mediate coalitions in terms of values around which consensus on issues can focus. Such linkage has positive effects in general upon the linkage formed among other organizations by promoting uncontested outcomes. It has positive effects in particular upon the probability that the stress placed upon the linkage that is at stake will cause such standards to prevail in relating the level of demand for interorganizational activation to its subsequent supply.

Here as well as elsewhere one might expect a division of labor among organizations, for organizations that are active contestants as regards social choice are not as likely as others to play mediating roles in terms of contextual values. However, this is not to say that the existence of the one kind of organization precludes the existence of the other. Nor is it to deny that the more numerous and varied the linkage offered by any organization, the more likely it is to promote contextual standards in adjusting supply and demand. It is only to say that organizations which avoid contest are the most credible in the promoting of such standards. Contextual standards may be promoted by linkage of any kind, because interaction produces consensus. Or it may be because numerous contacts bring increased awareness of the usefulness of standards in the formation of viable coalitions. But it may also be because multiple commitments increase the need of contextual standards for avoiding the loss of linkage in a given area on the basis of those that are formed in the next.

4. Interorganizational Activation and Linkage among Organizations

The mode of supply considered in the present research is the establishment of linkage which is expected to be more or less long-term, or the renewal of such linkage. Clearly, whether any such interorganizational activation can occur with ease depends upon the overall linkage available among a city’s organizations. That organizations which most affect the availability of linkage in general are also most capable of participating in the activated network is evident. But whether the main linking organization participate directly or not, activation among them is likely to be affected by the availability of the linkage they are or have been capable of producing. Therefore, the amount of linkage is not only likely to determine the degree of relationship between the independent variable of need and the dependent variable of supply; it may also be expected to have a direct effect upon supply on the basis of the interorganizational capacity that linkage-production signifies for the city. For wherever something is plentiful it is more likely to be supplied, whatever the level of demand, than when it is scarce. Moreover, the deduction is possible on the basis of what has just been said about the effect of widespread linkage upon the salience of common values: that the greater the

30 For example, “The press supports us in this view” or “We are as one with the Church in defending this principle.”

31 This observation is in accord with general ones that separation among organizations is a device through which contradictory requirements may be fulfilled by society (Litwak and Hylton, 1962) and that overcoordination among organizations can lead to the loss of certain community outputs (Black and Kase, 1963).

32 This argument resembles one by Boulling (1953:passim) that the prevalence of contemporary organizational forms depends more upon “the supply side”—i.e., the availability of means to create them—than it does upon demand.
effect of linkage upon supply—i.e., the greater the direct effect of the city’s interorganizational capacity—the more likely is the manner of supply to accord with standards of the more comprehensive social system, here called “contextual.”

Recapitulation: A Formal Model of the Community as an Interorganizational System

In terms of the foregoing discussion of the modern urban community as a social system, it may be said that the availability of linkage among its organizations will have direct and indirect effects on the ways in which contextually defined local need is translated into demand—demand that comes to influence interorganizational supply. Figure 1 provides a formal model of these effects, but shows first the hypothetical (epistemic) paths from the organizational properties to be measured and used as operational definitions of linkage to other properties of the city that cannot be measured directly.

The most immediate effects of an organization’s scale, diversification, visibility, and decentralization (some of these are interrelated) are upon its political capabilities summarized in the manner shown on the figure. These capabilities affect the organization’s capacity to enter into unopposed coalitions or to mediate coalitions among other organizations. They also signify the retention of coalitions it has effected in the past or their presence as latent linkage; such actual and potential coalitions influence, in turn, the availability of linkage with respect to any given community problem. Adding to these effects, the more equipped an organization is with the means of resolving its internal conflicts, or the more other organizations produce solidarity because of their diffuse goals, coupled with whatever visibility they have and their avoidance of conflict, the more linkage will be made available through the mediation of unopposed coalitions. It should be noted that these effects upon the availability of linkage are cumulative and do not cancel one another out. Therefore, if any one of them should subsequently prove to be missing, the main thrust of the model would not be seriously affected.

Where the left-hand portion of Figure 1 refers to the more slowly changing properties of the system having to do with the usual availability of linkage, the central part focuses on variables that describe the system’s overall state with respect to any given issue (see the first few pages of Chapter I). The community’s contextually defined state of need is assumed to be the result of conditions that lie outside the model, although actually need is very likely to be organizationally determined. How much stress is placed on contextual standards in actual linkage formation around an issue is another variable of the state of the system (though the standards themselves are constants). This is a variable that is influenced, however, by the diffuse, nonconflict relations that certain organizations can effect and by the mere availability of linkage for the formation of coalitions as well. The third state of the system of interest here is the community’s overall capacity to respond to the issue by supplying interorganizational activation, which is an independent correlate of the general availability of linkage.

33 Especially, as we have noted, if the effect is one produced by organizations that avoid contest.
Together with the availability of linkage, these three variables in state affect the response variables in the extreme right portion of the figure. To what degree overall demand is based upon contextually defined need for interorganizational activation depends upon the accessibility of certain channels. These are channels that employ criteria relevant to the broader system in selecting for transmission that particular need and its level at the expense of competing needs (including the self-oriented demands of potential suppliers). The operation of such selectivity depends, in turn, upon the joint effects of the availability of linkage upon the transmission of need in general and the stress placed on contextual standards in such linkage, as well. As seen on the right of Figure 1, the association between demand (even if based on nationally defined need), on the one hand, and the subsequent supply of contextually defined interorganizational activation, on the other, depends upon the use made of contextually determined prototypes in deciding upon the mode of supply. Such use rests, in turn, upon the stress placed on contextual standards; but implementation of any prototype also depends upon the community’s general capacity for interorganizational activation. The latter variable has an independent effect as well on the level of supply; for, as noted, the mere abundance that such capacity implies can partly determine supply.

In the light of certain models of mass society, and in anticipation of the empirical portion of this report, one might also consider the effects of sources of material support for interorganizational activation from the community’s context. The availability of such support should increase the stress placed upon contextual standards at the same time that it increases any community’s interorganizational capacity by affecting the viability and desirability of certain links. According to our model, and without changing its meaning, these effects will increase the correlation between contextually defined need and the subsequent supply of interorganizational activation. Support is often granted, however, on the joint bases of a community’s contextually defined need and a feasible plan or demonstration of interorganizational capacity. This means that outside support can exaggerate the observed effects of need and capacity but that it will not alter their nature. If outside support were to be granted on other bases—say, political favoritism (Greenstone and Peterson, 1968)—the result would constitute a conservative test of our three-part hypothesis. On the other hand, the more material support is either unnecessary for interorganizational activation or is provided from the outside (which is the case in the empirical studies to be described), the greater is the investigative control over local economic factors, whose operation is not explicitly included in the present model.

As in the case of explaining the amount of linkage, one might also note that the detailed empirical effects which the variables of state and response have upon one another can depart from the model (indeed several of them cannot be measured directly) without requiring major reformulation. Again the effects, even if joint, are cumulative and do not cancel one another.

To summarize this chapter and conclude presentation of the theoretical framework: The greater an organization’s capacity to influence (or to have influenced) the availability of linkage among a community’s organizations—either for issue-oriented coalitions or for more solitary structures that stress abstract contextual standards—the more will levels of need be transmitted and selected in terms of their contextual relevance, so that they constitute the basis of the overall demand. The same influences upon linkage also affect the community’s capacity for interorganizational activation and the use it makes of contextual interorganizational prototypes. The latter variables affect the correlation between contextually relevant overall demand for interorganizational activation and its subsequent supply. In short, the present model shows that characterizing a community as a system of linkage among organizations, whose specific pattern, while it may change, does remain relatively constant in manner and amount, can serve to explain the community’s operation as a system of relationships between more momentary variables of state and response.
DERIVED HYPOTHESIS: LINKAGE BY LOCAL GOVERNMENT, PARTIES, AND VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATIONS

The theoretical discussion thus far and the formal model to which it led purportedly apply to any modern urban setting, no matter how dominated it may be externally. Even the execution of national directives requires local linkage in certain spheres. However, the concrete types of organization which are most capable of the linkage-producing characteristics described in Chapter 11 may vary in such capability from one comparable community to the next. Here the theory moves to the middle range; because once the specific linkage-producing organizations are named, generalizing to other societies, in which concrete organizations with entirely different names may possess the requisite characteristics, must be attempted with caution. Yet, literature produced mainly within and about the United States may be combined to suggest pathways—perhaps even contrasting ones—to research elsewhere.

An obvious version of the proposition stated early in the preceding chapter is that the linkage available among a city’s organizations determines the positive correlation between the community’s level of demand and its relevant interorganizational supply. It could be restated as the following hypothesis, tested in 130 of the largest United States cities:

(1) The larger the scale of municipal government and the more diversified it is, or (2) the greater the local political party strength, or (3) the more community-wide and uncontested the impact of the local voluntary associations, respectively, the more positive will be the correlation among cities between need at the level of community of interorganizational

activation according to national standards, and the community’s subsequent supply of the activation.

The present chapter provides a synthesis of the literature intended to defend this proposition by showing the ways in which government, parties, and voluntary associations can cause cities to vary along several of the linkage-producing dimensions of the model.

Individual businesses and similar special interest groups within the city are comparatively too small in scale, too little diversified, too little visible, and too specific and controversial in their community-relevant goals to play major parts in either the formation of coalitions or the production of solidary linkage around national values. Nor can “business” be considered as some form of superorganization within the community with appreciable political capability. For the individual components are too numerous and too independent of one another to permit coordination without prohibitive loss of time, and their respective interests are too divergent to allow for the resolution of conflict (Banfield, 1961: 291-294 or to render them visible as a single entity. Business might provide the only values that are shared among the organizations in certain cities, but these may be the very ones that are contested by, say, organized labor in other cities (Form and Miller, 1960: passim; Schnore and Alford, 1963). Therefore, the ability of such voluntary business associations as Chambers of Commerce to provide linkage around common local values by avoiding controversy in the pursuit of diffuse goals may be assessed in each city; but it should not be taken for granted. Local newspaper organizations, on the other hand, may either enjoy the scale, diversification, visibility, and decentralization required to produce linkage in coalitions or the diffuse and noncontroversial content, given their visibility, needed to effect linkage through common standards. However, data are lacking at present to assess their effects.

Municipal governments, local political parties, and those voluntary associations (including certain business associations) whose community-wide significance, visibility, and noncontroversial activities have been established each have major linkage-producing capacities. Even the least compelling examples within each type are either sufficiently large in scale, diversified, visible, decentralized, and capable of resolving internal conflict, or sufficiently visible, noncontroversial, and divergent in their respective goals to warrant their use in measuring the linkage available among a city’s organizations with respect to any given community problem.

Municipal Government

Warren and Hyman (1968) found governmentally sponsored action systems to be overwhelmingly associated with disensus—i.e., political situations. The agencies of diversified local government may or may not be deliberately constituted to serve as what Warren calls community decision organizations (1967a, 1967b). Yet where their scale is large they can control enormous resources—human, technological, and material—that enable them to bargain and play a part in power struggles.34 Their capabilities of autonomous

34This may be inferred from a combination of main points made by Sayre and Kaufman (1960: passim.), Banfield (1961: passim., esp. 266-267), and Greer (1967).
action within their respective spheres—the measure of government’s decentralization—vary positively with their scale (Gardiner, 1968; Derthick, 1968). To the extent that these agencies are differentiated from one another, they form coalitions amongst themselves and with private organizations—as core organizations regarding certain issues and as satellites concerning others (Sayre and Kaufman, 1960: 709-713). Themselves differentiated, the agencies of municipal government exist in states of partial conflict both internally and with one another to such an extent that their respective goals are even more diffuse and the interests available for bargaining more numerous in comparison with those of businesses than one might expect on the basis of government’s general role as a mobilizer of community power. But problems of coordination and potential for conflict are not so great—as they are in the business sector—that the governmental sector is incapable of acting as a “whole”—amorphous though that whole may be. Indeed, resolving internal conflict might be the principal activity of its top executive body, which also mediates conflict with and among non-governmental organizations. That large-scale and diversified government tends to operate under conflict conditions may reduce any solidarity-producing effects it may have as a generalized source of national standards; yet certain resources of municipal agencies, like those of expertise (Banfield, 1961:330-331), can be employed to generate legitimating symbols for one course of action or another. And since government is at the very center of a community’s affairs and represents some of them at the national level (Greenstone and Peterson, 1968), it may also come to symbolize some of the community’s main nationally rooted values (cf. Shils, 1962; Turk, 1971) or at least to advance them in seeking winning coalitions. That large-scale and diversified government can command multiple and varied points of contact is clear and that as a possible resource it is highly visible to other organizations is evident from the extensive treatment it is given by the press—perhaps because the contentious situations in which it tends to play a part are newsworthy.

It may have been noted that large-scale and diversified municipal government measures the properties indicated by boxes at the left of Figure 1. Moreover, it may also be said to operationalize, in part, their correlates of political capabilities, capacity for membership in coalitions and for mediation in coalitions, and stress on national standards, all of which are conservatively labeled unmeasured on the figure. For all of these reasons the hypothesized association between the scale and diversification of municipal government, on the one hand, and the correlation between nationally defined need for inter-organizational activation and its subsequent supply, on the other hand, may be expected to hold true.

Political Parties

Like large-scale and differentiated municipal government, political parties are suited to the accommodation of interests under the conditions of bargaining and contest appropriate to associationalism and social choice. They are probably the most diversified of any of the city’s organizations, since they are concerned with the bringing together of whatever set of interests and values will bring about a winning coalition—the one between government and party. Unlike government, the party (or its branches in one-party cities) has at least one like-structured and institutionalized adversary. Here linkage permits specific issues to be subsumed under more diffuse issues, much as linkage permits the subsumption of specific organizational goals under broader values. Unlike other organizations, parties need not seek coalitions whose power is nearly absolute—although they may do so, even jointly —, since resort may be had to referenda as institutionalized alternative means of deciding the winning coalition.

Such organizations emphasize conflict resolution among the groups subsumed under their respective labels through the means that they use to bring together similar interests, encapsulate various social cleavages under a few broad ones, simplify issues through compromise and exchange of support, and otherwise mold issues to a form in which they can be dealt with. Their precinct and ward units as well as their points of contact with such non-geographic sectors as business or labor (Rossi and Cutright, 1961) may be conceived as differentiated accommodators to—i.e., linkage-producers with—whatever organized interests and values there are within the zone of contact. They may be seen also as bargainers and contestants at the next highest level of organization, where conflicts are resolved and where they are rivals for the material inducements (e.g., patronage, favors, even money) and value changes (e.g., campaign "planks") necessary to facilitate such accommodation. Clearly the scale of these organizations is large.

The diffuse goals that their dependence upon majority support necessitates and their participation in national politics as well make it likely that local parties stress national standards in effecting winning coalitions, even to the point of seeking the participation of elements that weaken their political machines. To the extent that national standards do not threaten the political machine, they are even more likely to be implemented under strongly partisan conditions than under others. Parties tend to avoid extreme positions, while at the same time paying close attention to the interests of various segments of the community (Banfield, 1961:235-250, 1965:12-14). The comparative data of Lineberry and Fowler (1968) suggest greater responsiveness of municipal revenues and municipal expenditures to what we might take to constitute overall demand—i.e., such factors as class and ethnic composition and residential types—under strong party and ward systems than under weak ones. That responsiveness failed to extend to racial composition suggests that the political relevance of population categories depends upon their organizations, and those of racial minorities were either too weak, too fragmented, or non-existent. It should follow that political parties emphasize national standards wherever these can constitute the bases for overall demand on any given issue.

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35 Ibid., also Morris and Rein (1964).

36 The aggregative effects of party politics have been suggested in slightly different ways by Parsons (1959), Greer (1967), and Lineberry and Fowler (1968) among others.

37 Suggested by Banfield's references to the accomodativeness of parties to "clean government" elements and to elected officials, whoever they may be (1961:249-250).

38 See Greenstone and Peterson's evaluations of federally sponsored programs in selected U.S. cities.

39 See Wolfinger and Field (1968) and Aiken (1970) for data-based assertions that nonwhites tended to lag behind other social categories as a political force.
Some support is provided by Banfield’s observations that Chicago (1961: 245-250) and nine other large United States cities were “honestly and ably run”, no matter how materialistic or opportunistic the political machine through which municipal leaders were elected (1965:11-12).

The values of “good” or “reform” government advanced in opposition to machine politics may work against whatever role remains for political parties as agents of legitimation in certain issues, given their active participation in contests. Yet consistent voting on the basis of party affiliation (reported in Lipset, 1960:288-294) suggests that parties may legitimate political positions in some parts of the country for some organized sectors of the community.

The coalitions that a party forges as a result of trading in material inducements and the promotion of values enable it to support the actions of any government it places in power. Its dependence on that government, once elected (Banfield, 1961:245-250), makes such support likely. Nor is the provision of support likely to be costly to the party, for the electoral process makes majority opposition to elected government unlikely, and minority opposition must seek the party’s aid if it is to be effective. One might suggest that municipal government’s great freedom to initiate action under strongly partisan conditions is due to the stable coalition it has formed with the political party. The party itself, as has been hinted, already reflects an elaborate system of coalitions through its numerous and various interfaces.

The alternative to party-ward government, as we have noted, is “good” or “reform” government, entailing at-large and nonpartisan elections or appointed professional officials such as city managers. Centralized, and presumably based upon ideological assumptions of underlying consensus or “correct, non-political solutions” of problems—assumptions sometimes challenged by organized non-elites (Schnore and Alford, 1963)—its proposals are likely to have been submitted for public endorsement and to have suffered public defeat (Rosenthal and Crain, 1968; Crain, Katz, and Rosenthal, 1969:177-205).

The government whose decisions are centrally arrived at must be small and weak, given our assumptions; if it is permitted to exist in a multi- organizational environment. Where the values the government advances or the interests it pursues are other than the few that the city’s other organizations share, it becomes only one more proponent among several. Moreover, impartiality, disapproval of patronage and “deals,” and other non-political reformist norms may impede it in forming coalitions with particular interest groups. Its failure to offer appropriate inducements (cf. Wilson, 1966) very likely prevents the satisfaction of any demands reform government might generate.

Because of a moral commitment to “serve” the public or to speculate—perhaps because the power of minority Protestant elites has increased (Williams and Adrian, 1959; Banfield and Wilson, 1963:138-186), reform government appears to be favored by the middle and upper socioeconomic strata (Banfield and Wilson, 1963:138-186; Schnore and Alford, 1963), presumably by their organizations, if our present view is correct. The absence of strong grass-roots party organization means that the interests of lower strata and their organizations go unexpressed and unrepresented unless and until mobilized in a polarized situation. It also means that reform government can easily be dispossessed and that therefore it will avoid controversial, hence important, issues (Banfield and Wilson, 1963:165-167). This, coupled with dependence upon consensus may mean that reform governments are more capable than one-party governments of advancing shared values. But even shared values may be misread, inadequately transmitted, or ignored in arbitrary decisions; for the more numerous points of contact provided by party-ward organizations are lacking as well as the greater visibility that attends fighting governments. Given these conditions, reform governments also need not be as highly diversified as others.

In summary, party-ward governments are better equipped than are reform governments to form the coalitions necessary under conditions of associationism and social choice; and they are very likely to be as well equipped to advance whatever national values are shared with the community. Party-ward governments tend to be larger in scale, more diversified, more decentralized, more visible than reform governments, just as diffuse in their goals, and as capable of resolving conflict. The question whether reform governments can serve better as agents of legitimation is moot; their purportedly greater reliance upon consensus indicates an affirmative answer, but their lesser responsiveness suggests otherwise. The strength of political parties, measured by partisan-ward governments without city managers, has been discussed not only as a measure of linkage-availability in the manner stipulated by the formal model but also in terms of political capabilities, of capacity for coalition membership and coalition mediation, of stress upon national standards, and certain aspects of the need-demand relationship. Therefore, the hypothesized relationship between party strength and the correlation between nationally defined need for interorganizational activation and its subsequent supply may be expected to hold.

Community-Wide Associations

In certain cities certain voluntary associations exist that pursue diffuse goals and avoid conflict by advancing abstract and uncontested values purportedly oriented towards the interests of the entire community. To the extent that civic or service organizations of this character are unopposed by government, political party, or any of the community’s other organizations they may be described as solidary groups that reflect whatever consensus exists among organized sectors of the community, although they may ignore, even override, collective sentiments in the local unorganized sectors. Indeed, that members of higher socioeconomic strata join voluntary associations in disproportionate numbers makes it likely, be it noted, that certain values and interests are

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40See empirical findings and discussion to this effect by Rosenthal and Crain (1968), Crain and Vanekko (1968), Wilson (1968), and Crain, Katz, and Rosenthal (1969:182).

41See Footnote 23.

42Banfield and Wilson noted the existence of organizations like these (1963:252), but failed to recognize the nature of their importance to community action.

43See, for example, Wright and Hyman (1958), Williams and Adrian (1959), Greer and Orleans (1962), Hyman and Wright (1971).
not represented. Belonging to a general class of structures believed to have integrative import for broader social contexts, these associations—henceforth called community-wide associations—tend not to enter into coalitions or otherwise take sides for fear of losing members; for the latter's ties to their organizations, being voluntary, can readily be severed. Their emphasis upon consensus makes their internal differentiation unlikely.

Community-wide associations can, however, initiate and pursue noncontroversial measures and play mediating roles by introducing undisputed value inputs for partisans to employ as legitimating forces (Banfield, 1961:269-270). In cases where previously absent opposition arises, they come to draw members from only certain segments of the community and thereby constitute the potential political force that some investigators (Williams and Adrian, 1959; Rossi, 1961; Greer and Orleans, 1962) believe they do. For example, according to Rossi (1960) the development of voluntary civic associations may reflect the loss of political power by groups high in status which subsequently succeeded in controlling organizational contexts that were unaffected by the mass vote of those of lower status.

Community-wide associations may, thus, produce disproportionate consensus among members of the higher strata to whom they are available and which themselves may constitute the elites of other organizations. If this is so, community-wide associations are a means of mitigating strong interorganizational conflict by means of overlapping and crosscutting memberships. They are also a means, then, of articulating shared values and applying them to the resolving of conflicts that would otherwise divide the other organizations their members represent. The shared values are likely to be national; for, however much social scientists disagree concerning the involvement in community affairs of extralocally oriented organizations—e.g., absentee-controlled corporations—most sources imply or refer directly to the participation of their officials in noncontroversial civic associations. In these organizational elites and their local counterparts national values are most likely to be the ones held in common.

By reason of their elite membership and the diversity of the organizations they represent, community-wide associations may be expected to offer numerous points of contact to other organizations and to constitute highly visible means for the latter to make use of.

In sum, community-wide associations have diffuse goals and advance abstract and unopposed values likely to be national which, together with their nonparticipation in controversy, enable them to articulate consensus and—through the number and variety of participating organizations—to reduce conflict. The diffuse nature of their goals and the variety of other organizations their members represent probably mean that the solitary linkage which they provide is loose, amorphous, and undifferentiated. They are, however, highly visible and afford numerous points of contact. The conditions under which these broad-based and contested associations arise cannot be fully identified here. But the more a city's voluntary associations are of this order, and for whatever reason, the more likely are they to produce or mediate the solitary linkage among organizations that affect the hypothesized correlation between nationally defined need for interorganizational activation and its subsequent supply.

Main Features of the Three Kinds of Organization

The larger the scale of municipal government and the more differentiated it is, the more numerous its interests and the greater its visibility and decentralization. The more likely, therefore, are its components to provide a flexible set of points around which (or in response to which) coalitions either exist or can be formed, or can acquire some legitimation on the basis of national standards. The more powerful the local political parties—i.e., the greater their visibility, scale, and diversification—the more can they reconcile fragmented interests, reducing decision-making to moderate controversy among a few positions that can be decided by contest. The more, too, can they serve to establish winning coalitions with municipal organizations that may be responsive to nationally oriented demands. The more community-wide and contested the city's voluntary associations—therefore also the more diffuse their goals, the greater their avoidance of conflict, and the greater their visibility—the more can the solitary linkage they provide serve to support consensus on values shared by other organizations, to legitimate social-choice decisions, and to suppress conflict. Reform cities may display characteristics similar to those of cities with community-wide associations, but they do so at the expense of the capacity for coalition that local parties have.

These are the main variables among three kinds of organization that are likely to affect linkage, which in turn affects need-supply processes on any issue. Whether in the self-interested search for winning coalitions or in establishing the priorities of shared "public" values, the greater the influence of each kind of organization upon such linkage, the more likely are national standards to prevail. In brief, the more a city is characterized as "high" in terms of the three concrete organizational properties just discussed, the more will it constitute a multi-organizational network that can deal with most issues. Such a network filters out all but the appropriate levels of nationally defined need and proposed sources of supply—thereby effecting the outcomes anticipated on the basis of the general discussion of social system above. Moreover, the higher a city scores on these properties, the greater will be its capacity to provide interorganizational supply. Therefore, the higher the values of these variables in some of the city's key organizations, the more positive the correlation between need for interorganizational activation according to national standards, and its subsequent supply—for the reasons of our formal model and as the three-part hypothesis has indicated.
CHAPTER III

COMPARATIVE EVIDENCE OF LINKAGE BY THESE ORGANIZATIONS IN 130 OF THE LARGEST CITIES

The general theory provided by Chapter I and its partly nation-bound adaptation in Chapter II permit empirical comparison among large numbers of communities rather than in the one or few selected cases where the preponderance of urban research is still to be found. To this end, the present chapter and the one which follows will concern themselves with the statistical study of all 130 incorporated cities in the United States that had more than 100,000 inhabitants in 1960.

Each city was classified according to each of the following three dichotomous indicators of linkage availability, which refer to the three concrete organizational types discussed in Chapter II: (1) the scale and diversification of municipal government, (2) local political party strength, and (3) the uncontested and community-wide impact of local voluntary associations.

The remainder of this chapter must consider the validity of each indicator, new and untried as it was, in the light of the relationships it might be expected to show with other variables according to our general and middle-range theory. The few existing comparative urban studies and much of the remaining literature on the community, as well as the more general literature on organizations are concerned with these relationships in their own right. Therefore, the details of definition and measurement not only serve to validate our procedures but also to replicate and extend other substantive findings or to shed some light upon current substantive and methodological issues.

Scale and Diversification of Municipal Government

The per capita number of municipal employees was the measure of the scale of each city's government; and the degree of similarity among its rankings in 1960 expenditures per capita for education, fire protection, health, highways, police protection, sanitation, and welfare indicated diversification (all data being from the U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1962). Per capita employee rates could have been used in lieu of budget items had they been available in all of these service categories, but the fact that those which were available yielded substantial correlations with expenditures lent confidence to the substitution. Diversification was expected to assess the degree of the government's differentiation as well as the multiplicity of its interests. Taken jointly, scale and diversification were expected to indicate government's power and visibility to other organizations and the number of linkage points provided for them as well.

Thirty-seven cities which showed more than the median number of employees and above median values on the index of diversification were defined as having relatively great scale and diversification. The remaining 93 were considered to have little.

Over and above the theoretical necessity of the complex index, employing scale and diversification jointly prevented undue effects of single municipal programs that might be idiosyncratically either large or small. One might consider our dichotomous indicator of scale and diversification to have validity on its face as a measure of the extent to which the city's life is under several vast governmental agencies, but other validating criteria are also at hand. The latter consist of the types of community settings as well as other governmental characteristics that might be expected to be correlated with any proper measure of governmental diversification and scale.

Although the general per capita levels of municipal revenue or expenditure are unreliable as measures of the city government's control over resources (Banfield, 1965:9-10; Turk, 1970)—one aspect of its political capabilities, as claimed in Chapter I—, either measure should yield some correlation with the index of scale and diversification. The economist W. R. Thompson, for example, suggests that the larger and more complex the local government, the more monopolistic are its services, the more demands for service can it generate, and therefore, the greater will be its taxing power (1965:255-283). The correlation \( r / r \) of .71 observed among the 130

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50 The Pearsonian product-moment correlation coefficient \( r \) between per capita municipal revenue and per capita municipal expenditures in 1960 is .94 among the 130 cities studied here.

51 Statistical Note. All continuous variables (like the municipal budget measures just described) have been transformed to 130-point ordinal scales, so that they could be used in product-moment computation and complex regression analysis without ad hoc adjustment for individual peculiarities of distribution. Unless noted otherwise, all reports of statistical association are based on 130 cases and are significant at least the .05 level.

Where dichotomous (dummy) variables are employed, Pearsonian product-moment correlations \( r \) will sometimes be expressed as explicit proportions of their absolute values under maximum contingency \( r / r \) max). It can be shown that the original coefficient is undisturbed by this correction where skewness has not affected its value, but the adjusted value communicates the degree of association more faithfully where skewness has such an effect.
cities between the present municipal scale-diversification index and per capita municipal revenue lends validity to our indicator.

City government may also be viewed as an enterprise that provides services to and secures support from various organizations (Thompson, 1965: 262; Eyestone and Eulau, 1968; Williams, 1968); in our terms, as an enterprise whose size and complexity depend upon how multi-organizational is the urban setting. It is to be expected, then, that the more numerous and varied these other organizations, the more diversified the government and the larger its scale (also see Clark, 1971). Several approximations of organizational number and variety which were indeed positively correlated with the index of governmental scale and diversity provided further evidence of its validity. Older and larger cities are likely to surpass others in reflecting such urban complexity and its effect upon governmental structure, as well as in indicating large-scale municipal bureaucratization directly (Williams, 1968; Dye, 1968; Aiken and Alford, 1970). Further, the inverse association between a city’s size and its extent of specialization (Williams, 1968) suggests that the larger the city, the more diversified the services required of its government.

Indeed, the correlations (r/\( \text{r max} \)) between the present municipal government measure were .63 with the city’s age and .45 with its size.\(^{52}\) Moreover, the more numerous and diversified the city’s export establishments, the greater its requirements for various local services should have been, the more likely their support, and, therefore, the greater the scale and diversification of municipal government. These expectations were upheld by a correlation (r/\( \text{r max} \)) of .38 with industrialization (suggested, among other meanings, to serve as an indicator of urban differentiation by Aiken, 1970). These expectations were further confirmed by a correlation of .33 with an index of diversity of export ties that varied directly with the degree of similarity among a city’s respective rankings which were based upon the number of establishments within each business category that appeared to emphasis export.\(^{53}\) This index varied directly also with the means of the rankings.

The most immediate validating criterion for the municipal government measure, however, is not only its relationship to conditions likely to affect its magnitude, but also its positive relationship to decentralization in both structure and process, which has been discussed as a correlate of scale and diversification in any organization. The more diversified the municipal government and the larger its scale, the less centralized are its effects on city life (Sayre and Kaufman, 1960: passim; Greer, 1967). Or, as was argued, either the city’s other organizations will prevent centralized government from becoming too great in scale and scope or centralized government does too little to require diversification and scale, as was also argued.

The present data are in accord with this expectation. The commission form of government has been called the least centralized of all (Schnore and Alford, 1963; Alford and Scoble, 1965), and its correlation (r/\( \text{r max} \)) with the present measure is .30. City manager government, considered to be the most centralized (Alford and Scoble, 1965) yields a negative correlation (r/\( \text{r max} \)) of \(-.35\).\(^{54}\)

The directions of all of the correlations used to validate the present municipal government index tend to remain the same when they are calculated region by region. Most important, however, is the indicator’s relationship to the actual structure of community decision-making. For it appears obvious that communities with decentralized structures for decision-making have decentralized governments. Thirty-three of the 51 cities whose decision patterns had been studied by the National Opinion Research Center (NORC) in 1967 were also among the present 130. Each of these had received a decentralization score across four actual issue areas (Clark, 1971). It proved possible to predict, from the 1960 measure of municipal government used here, the decentralization of decision-making in 1967. Ten of the 14 cities (71%) high in both scale and diversification of municipal government had decentralization scores above the median, while only six of the remaining 19 (32%) had scores as high. The next section will show even greater accuracy in predicting decentralized decision-making, once the municipal measure is combined with one of political party strength.

There is no reason to doubt, then, that scale and diversification of municipal government have been measured by the present dichotomous index, or that, as expected, the index is also associated with command over resources, with the multi-organizational nature of the urban setting, and with the conditions of social choice implied by decentralization in the structure of the city’s decision-making. Our indicator’s association with governmental visibility can probably be claimed without proof, but the extent of its association with conflict resolution, diffuseness of goals, and non-avoidance of conflict can rest only upon the literature cited. More direct measurement of these latter linkage-affecting variables rests upon assessment of party strength and the measure of community-wide associations which follow.

**Political Party Strength**

As in other research,\(^{55}\) the strength of local political parties—meaning their ability to bring together many interests by linkage through social choice into a few—had to be measured somewhat indirectly. Partisan and at-ward elections of councilmen were taken to reflect greater party strength than non-partisan and at-large elections. As observed, wards mean that parties have numerous points of contact; partisan elections, that local party structures exist at all. Mayor and commission forms of government were considered evidence of greater party control than those employing a city manager and indicative of the conflict rather than consensus approach deemed necessary here for linkage-production in multi-organizational cities. Cities having any two of the

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\(^{52}\)Age was measured by number of censuses taken before the city had at least 50,000 inhabitants and size by total number of inhabitants in 1960 (both measures from U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1961).

\(^{53}\)Detailed descriptions of both differentiation measures may be found in the author’s earlier report (Turk, 1970).

\(^{54}\)Type of government was taken from Nolting and Arnold (1963).

\(^{55}\)We follow Alford and Scoble (1965), Wollinger and Field (1968), Lineberry and Fowler (1967), Alford and Lee (1968) in this respect, but look at their measures in reverse. Where they refer to “reformism,” the present study refers to its opposite, “ politicization.”
following “non-reform” attributes were considered to have relatively strong political parties: partisan elections for the city council, at least some councilmen elected by wards, and government other than by city manager. Seventy-one cities had strong parties in these respects: 59 did not. 56 Data were lacking to consider the possible political fragmentation of cities holding partisan elections but having virtually one party (Greer, 1967; Greenstone and Peterson, 1963). Also certain governmental and electoral forms are determined by state law rather than by community structure and, perhaps for this reason, are sometimes circumvented in fact though not in name. 57 Nonetheless, combining the three features into a four-point index (see Clark, 1971; cf. Lineberry and Fowler, 1967) yielded an estimated Spearman-Brown reliability coefficient of .75 for the 130 cities studied here; the dichotomous version actually should have even greater reliability. Dichotomization also allowed for the possibility that city-manager governments are strong when they are permitted to exist within highly politicized localities (Rosenthal and Crain, 1968; Crain, Katz, and Rosenthal, 1969:195-205).

How persuasive party strength is as a measure of linkage availability may further be assessed through relationships with certain external criteria that refer to the effects of party strength upon the community or of community characteristics upon party strength. Political parties are likely to derive power from cleavages within the community. Cutright, for example, construed as support for this view his correlations between the proportions in the population of Catholics and of employees in manufacturing (religious and economic cleavages), on the one hand, and partisan elections, on the other. 58

The proportion of the population native born of foreign or mixed parentage (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1962) is more likely to reflect organized ethnic cleavage than is the proportion foreign born, because the forming of interest groups takes time. This indicator supports Cutright’s argument by yielding a correlation (r/r max) of .29 with the present measure of party strength, thereby lending validity to the latter.

It may be added to Cutright’s argument that per capita value added by manufacturing (industrialization) and the proportion of blue-collar workers (both from U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1962) could each yield an estimate of the strength of labor unions. Unions challenged the idea of local consensus among organizations upon which “reformist” (i.e., weak party or partyless) organization is based (Schnore and Alford, 1963).

These two indicators of possible economic cleavage yielded correlations (r/r max) of .40 and .45 with local party strength, respectively. Correlations (r/r max) of .27 with the 1960 Democratic proportion of the county’s two-party Presidential vote and of .44 with median school years completed by adults (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1962) support this interpretation, and also confirm the proposition that reform government tends to be an upper- and middle-class device as well.

56 Based on 1962 data found in Nolting and Arnold (1963).
57 For example, see Banfield and Wilson (1963:151) and Lineberry and Fowler (1967) concerning token nonpartisanship in Chicago and Boston.

That political contest rather than its obverse, reform government, tends to prevail in cities with decentralized power structures has been the conclusion of other comparative studies (Gilbert, 1968; Walton, 1968; Aiken, 1970; Clark, 1971). In fact, that the reliability coefficient permitted incorporating type of executive into the present reform index, along with partisan and ward elections, shows this; for, as noted, one way in which nonmanager forms of government differ from their city-manager counterparts is in the degree of their decentralization.

The present research further establishes the relationship between party strength and urban decentralization by demonstrating positive association between the present political measure and the aforementioned NORC decentralization scores. Ten of 14 cities with strong parties in 1962 (71%) had scores above the median in 1967, while only 6 of the remaining 19 cities (32%) had scores as high. Similar results were reported for all 51 NORC cities by Clark (1971).

Further, large-scale and diversified government has been taken to reflect decentralized urban structure in terms of our theory, an assumption empirically supported in the course of the effort to validate the municipal government measure. Moreover, Lineberry and Fowler (1967) found a tendency toward smaller budgets, i.e., a crude indication of smaller scale and less diversification, in reformed cities than in unreformed cities. It may be that budgetary size as well as number of municipal employees are politically motivated outcomes in decentralized communities (Aiken, 1970; Clark, 1971). For all these reasons, any valid indicator of party strength should be associated with the scale and diversification of municipal government. Among the 130 cities, such association (r/r max) indeed proved to be .36.

Taking the government and party measures together as indicators of linkage availability under conditions of associations and social choice, the decentralization of decision-making, measured in 1967, could be predicted with considerable accuracy on the basis of organizational structure, measured in 1960-62. All five cities with strong parties and diversified large-scale governments (100%) had NORC decentralization scores that were above the median; 9 of the 17 cities that had only one of these features (53%) had scores as high; and only 2 of the 11 with neither feature (18%) had above median scores. For reasons already given, the correlation of the index of party strength with the index of municipal diversity and scale as well as additivity of the two measures in accounting for the decentralization of decision-making strength confidence in their validity. However, this finding accomplishes even more: It lends weight to the incidental observation made earlier that large city power structures reflect the organizational composition of the community at the very least and may even consist of organizational representatives, in the main, rather than of autonomous individuals.

That our indicator of party strength is positively associated with voter turnout in local elections has been suggested by Williams and Adrian (1959) and by Alford and Lee (1968). Moreover, results reported by the latter authors were similar whether or not local elections were concurrent with state and national elections. 59 These observations assist in considering the correlation

59 Bollen (1961:184-420) and Turk, et al. (1966) also reported findings suggesting that voting in any one type of election is correlated with voting in the other types.
(r/r max) of .35 between the proportion of the county’s adults voting for President in 1960 (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1962) and the present measure of local party strength to support the latter’s validity. In the terms we have been using, the strength of political parties is likely to have affected the bringing together of interests and their translation into organized action at the polls; in related terms (Lineberry and Fowler, 1967; Alford and Lee, 1968), nonreform cities are likely to exceed others in the extent to which the social and political structures are integrated with one another and therefore make such individual political action as voting meaningful to the community’s various subsectors. Further, if large voter turnout reflects cleavage and if cleavage determines party strength, as has already been suggested, this correlation provides still another reason to claim validity for the party measure.

In general, the dichotomous measure of local political party strength proves to be consistently associated in expected directions with the criteria employed for its validation as an indicator of linkage availability. Such association also tended to hold when sought separately (wherever numbers of cases permitted) on a region-by-region basis.

Extent to which Voluntary Associations are Uncontested and Community-Wide

Form letters were mailed early in 1961 to the incumbents of each of the following positions in each city: mayor or city manager, city planner, city editor, school board head, Chamber of Commerce official, fund drive organizer, urban sociologist, or to their respective designates. The letters elicited essay answers by one or more of these knowledgeable informants in 104 of the 130 cities (at a mean rate of 2.3 respondents per city) to broad questions about citizen participation, civic pride, cohesion, conflict, and the distribution of power. Although phrased in terms of “persons,” “groups,” and “kinds of people,” the questions yielded unsolicited but explicit mention in a number of the cities of one or more voluntary associations that either implemented or supplemented their manifest purposes by symbolizing, serving, coordinating, influencing, or acting on behalf of the community itself. Such community-wide associations, as we have already called them, included broad-based fraternal organizations, booster groups, community chest organizations and other fund-raising groups (not just drives), boys’ clubs, a labor council, a taxpayers’ association, Chambers of Commerce, and various business-professional clubs. A dichotomous index was constructed which distinguished 76 cities in which one or more community-wide associations were mentioned (by persons other than their functionaries) from the remaining 54. These reports were unaccompanied by any reference to the organized representation of contested and enduring special interests. Presumably the respondents did not consider contested organizations to be community-oriented.

Adopted to assure comparability in the cases used from one analysis to the next, this scoring method tends to depress rather than inflate correlation with the other variables used as validating criteria, for some of the cities scored as having no integrative associations (i.e., those from which no replies were received) might indeed have had them. But the bias is conservative in its effect and resulted in an understatement of correlation.

It might be argued that the unqualified mention by informed persons of publicly oriented organizations which they and others found to have integrative significance and their failure to speak of organizational contestants constitute evidence that community-wide associations occurred in the sense that we have defined them. Nonetheless, there were other means of assessing the validity of the index.

First, the split-half agreement between informants in voluntary mention (or non-mention) of at least one such association was 70% by Robinson’s method (1957) in cities providing multiple replies. This means that guided by their separate experiences, individual observers concurred on the degree to which certain of the city’s associations were broadly oriented and uncontested.

Second, if the existence of these associations were to have depended in part upon at least some values that the community’s organizations could hold in common, then one might expect their occurrence to be inversely associated with ethnic and economic cleavage. The correlation (r/r max) with the proportion of native born of foreign or mixed parentage is -.19, but with per capita value added by manufacturing it is only -.09 and with the proportion of blue-collar workers it is only -.01; the latter two values are not significant. It might be that service associations can escape the effects of industrial conflict, but that their community-wide status is adversely affected by the presence of associations which serve ethnic subcommunities exclusively.

Furthermore, the presence of community-wide associations was inversely correlated with the strength of political parties—the most general measure of value contest—at a level (r/r max) of -.30. This result is also in accord with the connection claimed between civic associations and the reform movement (for example, see Banfield and Wilson, 1963:249), which further supports the idea that as reform governments allegedly do—the community’s voluntary associations, whether community-wide or not, tend to avoid conflict. Thus, community-wide associations appear to be found under conditions of abstract consensus and to emphasize it. The negative correlation with ethnic cleavage and the measure of party strength tended to remain the same by region.

Third, it has been noted that the community’s organizational richness has a positive effect upon consensus on abstract values and therefore upon the likelihood of community-wide solidarity. From the observation that the elaboration of organizational ties occurs over time (Coleman, 1957: passim, 1966; Aiken and Alford, 1970), a city’s age might be expected to be positively associated with the presence of community-wide associations. However, the older a city the more likely is it to have scored high on the indicators of non-reform government and ethnic cleavage, just discussed as negative correlates of community-wide associations. Further, a city’s age appears to be associated with fragmentation through the extralocal orientation of its organizations. Indeed the number of national headquarters of voluntary associations in the city proved to have an independently negative effect upon the presence of community-wide associations (see Turk, 1970). Although the zero-order correlation (r/r max) between age of city and the index of community-wide

60 Consider references cited in Footnote 44 in conjunction with Greer and Orleans (1962).
associations was -.03, the standardized partial regression coefficient (beta/ beta max) proved to be a positive .45, once these effects of cleavage and fragmentation were controlled.61

Clearly the other two measures of linkage availability (already discussed in this and the preceding chapter) were expected to and apparently did indicate the elaboration of interorganizational ties. However, party strength indicates cleavage and, for that reason, presumably, it proved to be inversely related to the presence of community-wide associations. Nor did the scale and diversity of municipal government yield any overall positive relationship with that indicator, in spite of the consensus-promoting interdependence implied by the municipal variable. Twenty-three of 37 cities (62%) with high scores on the government measure also rated high on the associations measure, in contrast to the virtually equal rate of 53 among the 93 cities (57%) with low scores on the first. Still, it will be recalled that the municipal index was positively correlated with party strength, itself a negative correlate of community-wide associations. That index was positively correlated with both the city's age, whose independent effect on community-wide associations was also positive, but also with a potential indicator of economic fragmentation, which has a negative effect upon community-wide associations.

Repetition of the previous regression analysis after including the measure of municipal diversification and scale allowed control over these influences—but upheld them. The procedure yielded a positive standardized partial regression coefficient (beta/beta max) of .31 for the effect of the municipal variable upon the measure of community-wide associations, a value that came very close to significance at the .05 level. In short, all things being equal (which they are not) community-wide associations tend to be found in the presence of large-scale and diversified municipal government. Coupled with the other validating criteria employed, this result fortifies confidence in the index of community-wide associations.

Community-wide associations do appear to be especially capable of occurring in cities rich in interorganizational linkage, and neither fragmented nor marked by cleavage. That they also have linkage-producing effects such as those implied by the more general literature is determined by the very nature of their measurement. Informed citizens mentioned them voluntarily—and tended to agree in doing so—only if they served the entire community and apparently had no rivals. That such associations were visible is attested by their very mention. That they avoided conflict can be inferred from their being uncontested and from their co-existence with reform government, which also is said to avoid conflict. Finally, that they specified national values may be implied by the conventional type of organization mentioned by the well-informed (see the examples provided).

The consistent results of attempts at validation lent confidence to the dichotomization of all 130 cities according to an indicator that measured the extent to which local voluntary associations in each were uncontested and community-wide in their impact.

**Interrelations among the Three Indicators of Linkage Availability**

The relationships reported among the three measures of linkage availability served to support the validity of each. Yet they raise a procedural issue in testing the main hypothesis stated in the last chapter. For party strength has been found to be positively associated with the scale and diversity of municipal government, one measure of linkage availability, but negatively related to community-wide associations, a second such measure. Indeed, 10 of 14 cities (71%) with large-scale and diversified governments but no community-wide associations had strong political parties, compared to 13 of 23 cities (57%) with both 19 of 40 cities (48%) with neither, and only 17 of 53 cities (32%) with community-wide associations but without large-scale and diversified governments. This means that party strength alone can account for very little of the correlation between the need for interorganizational activation and its subsequent supply and that its overall effect upon such correlation will tend to lie midway between the effects of the other two measures of linkage, to which it is related in opposite directions.

Small numbers of cases as well as certain substantive difficulties prevent assessing the effects of party strength independently of its association with the other two measures of linkage. One might argue, on the one hand, that, given large-scale and diversified government as a basis of coalition, any reform aspects that it might have should be complementary, aiding articulation of shared values. On the other hand, the non-political nature of reform government, its centralization, and its failure to insulate its executive elements may modify the effects of diversification and scale.

The lack of relationship between the municipal government measure and community-wide associations, however, enables the assessment of each one's overall effect without speculating how it might be intensified or attenuated by various combinations of the two.62 Therefore, although the results having to do with party strength will be reported, statistical significance will be computed and more elaborate analyses performed only for the other two measures of linkage.

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61 The regression analysis did uphold the negative effects of foreign stock and party strength, which were implied by the zero order correlations above, and that of the national headquarters measure, as well.

62 Since our theory stipulates the measures to have only certain kinds of linkage-producing effects in common, and since they are positively associated with one another only along certain paths, it is dangerous to assume simple additivity between the two indicators in each case. They did prove to have an additive effect upon the occurrence-nonoccurrence of hospital associations (Turk, 1972). But they might even prove to weaken one another's effects in the case of the federally sponsored programs to be described, because of the concrete interests represented by the two kinds of local organization, in addition to the abstract linkage-producing capabilities they are intended to measure.
FOUR COMPARATIVE TESTS OF THE HYPOTHESIS: LINKAGE AND NEED-SUPPLY RELATIONS IN THE 130 CITIES

Multivariate analyses of the 130 cities provided four tests that government, parties, and voluntary associations have the hypothesized effects upon the correlation between the need for interorganizational activation, according to national standards, and its subsequent supply. It will be recalled that the cities were divided into those whose governments were large-scale and diversified in 1960 and those with other kinds of government; those with strong parties in 1960 and those with weak; those with community-wide associations in 1960 and those without. In each of the four cases the need-supply correlation for cities in the upper half, according to each of the three indicators of linkage, was compared with the need-supply correlation for those in the lower half. Clearly such comparisons could be meaningful only where cities can have similar yardsticks for judging need and generating supply. Hence the operation of national or other standards that may be transmitted from one city to the next is crucial; the arenas of health and welfare were selected for study with that in mind.

Need and Supply in Health and Welfare

Though they are generally matters of concern at the level of community, the amount of change needed in local delivery systems of health and welfare services has been considered nationally for more than 25 years. Such need may be for more information, increased service, the joint provision of various services, or the effecting of economies in delivery. The societal organizations that define levels of need in these respects—foundations, national (sometimes international) federations of local health and welfare agencies, branches of the federal government, and national professional associations—also tend to provide relevant models of supply that require cooperation among the delivering organizations. Whether they differ much or little on the breadth of the service sector involved or whether the appropriate interorganizational model entails loose federation for airing conflicts or central coordination for their elimination, these national organizations in the period studied still advanced standards that pointed to interorganizational activation.63

Nationally defined levels of need for interorganizational activation in the delivery of health and welfare services are not necessarily transmitted as demands by the affected organizations. Nor do these necessarily transmit nationally established information about supply. Organizations such as the three linkage-producing varieties already discussed or the local branches of national associations may have much more to do with transmission. To the extent that competition and conflict characterize relations among health and welfare agencies (see for example Levine and White, 1961; Litwak and Hylton, 1962; Levine, White, and Paul, 1963; Schottland, 1963; Black and Kase, 1963), the stirrings of agencies for autonomy might outweigh their inclination to cooperate, even for purposes of securing outside funding (Banfield, 1961:15-56; Morris and Rein, 1969:151-163). Interorganizational activation among them, whatever it be, may be attributable to the actions of other local organizations. Perhaps interagency conflict, together with these broad outside influences upon the organization of health and welfare activities account for the observation (Hunter and his associates, 1956:226-240; Wilson, 1968:83-98) that the manner in which a community goes about solving its health problems, for example, follows its pattern of problem-solving in other areas. Their pairing also suggests the relevance of the general model provided above for the community as a system. The health and welfare arenas may be used to relate the two meanings of system to one another with which we began: linkage of associationalism and relationships between variables of need and supply through social choice.

Four cases will be described in which there is relatively little doubt that national standards existed for establishing a city's need for interorganizational activation, as well as the appropriate interorganizational model, to the extent that need existed. The material resources required for activation either were trivial or were provided externally; therefore, the operation of national standards and interorganizational capacity could be assessed relatively independently of each city's economic base.

The Four Tests

The empirical restrictions set by the lack of independence (reported at the end of Chapter III) between the effects of political party strength, on the one hand, and those of municipal government and community-wide associations,
on the other, require that emphasis be placed upon the latter two measures of linkage. Uncorrelated with one another as they are, their respective effects upon the correlation between need and supply may be considered as quasi-independent events, and one might therefore combine the two effects for heuristic purposes to provide overall approximations of the significance of outcomes. Small numbers of cases and, as we have already mentioned, inability to evaluate various patterns of government, party, and association considered jointly, dictated separate comparisons under the three parts of the hypothesis and, in the light of the particular interrelations among those comparisons, made consistent outcomes from one test to the next all the more compelling.

**First Test: Interorganizational Networks in the Poverty Program**

The Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 (Public Law 88-452) and its subsequent amendments required that Neighborhood Youth Corps work-training projects be sponsored by Community Action Agencies wherever possible. A Community Action Agency was an umbrella organization designed to coordinate local anti-poverty activities at the time of study, and its governing body consisted of major functionaries from the community's other organizations (for example, the mayor or his representative, the school superintendent or a member of his staff, labor union officials, officials of the Catholic archdiocese, and representatives of various civic groups and associations of businessmen). Its sponsorship of Neighborhood Youth Corps activities also meant the involvement of organizations providing the work-training sites and regional offices of both the U.S. Department of Labor, which funded all Neighborhood Youth Corps projects, and the U.S. Office of Economic Opportunity, which funded the Community Action Agencies. By June 6, 1966, 29 of the cities had activated such complex interorganizational networks, and the remaining 101 either had simpler networks or none at all (source: U.S. Office of Economic Opportunity, 1966; U.S. Department of Labor Files). This dichotomous indicator was taken to signify supply.

Need for these anti-poverty networks in terms of national norms was defined as the actual poverty rate measured by proportion of families with incomes under $3,000 in 1959 (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1962). The process of translating need into demand may have involved simple petition by organizations that represent the poor or the perception of a ready clientele by federal or local agencies. Competing demands may have been made by agencies seeking to preserve their autonomy or by organizations that were ideologically opposed to “welfare economies” or that feared political changes for which Community Action Agencies were intended (for example, see Greenstone and Peterson, 1968).

The War on Poverty data yielded clear confirmation of the hypothesis. The correlation between poverty rates in 1959 and the establishment of the anti-poverty networks from 4 to 7 years later was .5765 among cities in which the municipal government was large-scale and diversified and .02 among the remaining cities. Correlation was .32 among cities with strong political parties and .10 among those with reform government. Its magnitude was .32 for cities having at least one community-wide association and -.14 among those with none.66 The differences between correlation coefficients were significant at least at the .005 level in the case of municipal government and of community-wide associations.

**Second Test: Interorganizational Coordination in the Model Cities Program**

The Comprehensive City Demonstration Programs, enacted in 1966 (Public Law 89-754) and commonly known as the Model Cities legislation, had as their state purpose “...to provide financial and technical assistance to enable cities of all sizes to plan, develop, and carry out locally prepared and scheduled comprehensive city demonstration programs containing new and imaginative proposals to rebuild or revitalize large slum and blighted areas.” The legislation specifically stated that “...financial assistance will be provided...only if the application for such assistance has been approved by the local governing body of the city...that there exist administrative machinery through which coordination of all related planning activities of local agencies can be achieved, and evidence that necessary cooperation of agencies in related local planning can be obtained” (italics added). Whether a city was one of 42 in the first wave of Model Cities (Los Angeles Times, November 17, 1967) was, it seemed, a planned event requiring much coordination (Glazer, 1970), apparently oriented to established power at the time of study (Rein, 1970), and especially to the institutions of local government (Moyunihan, 1969:185). Devised to coordinate various services at the neighborhood level, the Model Cities Program required widespread organizational participation in the initial application for funds by such entities as city planning agencies, the Community Action Agencies, boards of education, Urban Renewal Agencies, and health and welfare councils. The local government was required to designate City Demonstration Agencies in these applications for the purpose of coordinating the activities of the other agencies serving the model neighborhood.

Here only approximate measures of need are available in terms of national standards, since the program was aimed at the entire spectrum of urban problems. However, emphasis appears to have been placed on slum problems (Glazer, 1970); therefore the poverty indicator, proportion of families with less than $3,000 income during 1959, may again be used to measure nationally defined need—and for the same reasons as before. The rationale for using this index is the same as in the War on Poverty; so is the presumed process of

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64 For example, are the solidarity-producing effects of community-wide associations weakened by strong government? Are large municipal agencies more potent where parties are strong than where parties are weak?

66 These correlation coefficients and all those to follow are no longer expressed as proportions of their respective maxima, so as to avoid unnecessary complications in comparing their respective values with one another. However, as the ensuing discussion will show, care was taken, to determine that differences in correlation occurred for reasons other than differences in marginal distributions.

66This is the only finding based on analysis in which the most general aspects of the present *a priori* theoretical basis—i.e., the two meanings of system—had not yet fully been made explicit. But some of the detailed theory was first explicated in writing after analysis was completed.
translating need into demand. The second measure of need is per capita municipal expenditures for welfare in 1960, since an explicit objective stated in the Model Cities legislation was to “... reduce dependence on welfare payments” (also see Glazer, 1970, concerning the alleviation of municipal expenditure for neighborhood improvement). Thus welfare expenditures are used as indicators of the municipal government’s need for assistance (as defined by national norms), which public and private organizations of the city have translated into demand at the point where the city has decided to apply for funds. The official reasons given at the federal level for approving or rejecting applications had to do both with need and the city’s apparent capacity to carry out its plans (Los Angeles Times, November 17, 1967) – it would seem its nationally defined need and its interorganizational capacity in our own terms.

Though the indicators are crude, these data also tend to support the hypothesis, though not as convincingly as before. Model City status in 1967 proved to be correlated with the poverty rate in 1959 among cities with large-scale and diversified municipal governments (\( r = .19 \)) and not among those without (\( r = -.05 \)). Correlation among cities with strong parties was higher (.12) than among those with reform governments (.07) and higher among those with community-wide associations (.11) than for those without (.03). Although only the first of these differences between pairs of correlation coefficients approaches significance (\( P < .12 \)), all three are in the expected direction. The correlation between 1967 Model City status and 1960 welfare costs is .40 among cities whose municipal governments are large-scale and diversified and only .13 among the other cities.\(^67\) .42 among cities with strong parties and .23 among the remaining cities, .36 among cities with community-wide associations and .31 among those without. Only the first of these latter differences is significant at the .10 level.

This second test of the hypothesis might have lacked the conviction of the first through the possible intrusion of factors not having to do with our model which, however, would serve to depress need-supply correlations. At the time the awards were made there were charges and denials that political considerations entered into the selection of cities (New York Times, November 17, 1967; Business Week, November 25, 1967). If true, such action would have made our results all the more compelling, since the initial screening of applications might have elicited only minimally acceptable degrees of interorganizational activation, and further screening would have introduced only irrelevancies.\(^68\)

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\(^67\) Since the measurement of diversification of municipal government included welfare expenditures, it was necessary to ascertain whether difference in correlation between supply and need was affected by marginal difference in welfare costs under the high and low conditions of the municipal variable. However, using \( r / r _{max} \) to allow for this possibility made the difference in correlation even more pronounced than before.

\(^68\) The possible effects of political partisanship were controlled by recomputing all the partial regression equations having to do with Model Cities (to be described in connection with Table 1), after including the Democratic proportion of the county’s two-party Presidential vote in 1960. All six differences in regression coefficients remained undisturbed.

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Third Test: Interorganizational Cooperation in Evaluating and Planning Health Services

Health and welfare councils have constituted federated means of coordination among agencies and, to lesser extent, of interagency planning (for example, see Warren, 1966). They appear to present neutral fields within which controversy can be aired and conflict avoided, and they take action in the name of the total community only where overwhelming consensus has been achieved (Morris and Rein, 1968).

At the national level, the various local councils interact with one another through such organizations as the United Community Funds and Councils of America, Inc. National standards in the field of health, in turn, have placed increasing emphasis on joint comprehensive planning by local groups and organizations concerned with health services. The Hospital Survey and Construction Act of 1946 (Public Law 79-725, commonly known as the Hill-Burton Law) provided for coordination in the establishment and improvement of hospitals and health facilities at a statewide level, but required proposals and matching funds to be generated at the community level (Abbe and Baney, 1958). The 1965 amendment (Public Law 89-239) to the Act broadened its goals to include coordination of health activities of all kinds for research and the improvement of health manpower. The Comprehensive Health Planning and Public Health Services Amendments of 1966 (Public Law 89-749) provided for the establishment of state health planning councils composed of state as well as local agencies and groups that either provide or consume health services. This growing national emphasis on local health planning was expected to have had impact on the planning activities of city health and welfare councils.

Bibliographies (United Community Funds and Councils of America, 1961-1969) listed health and welfare council reports prepared in 41 of the cities during 1961-1969 that turned out to deal with broad questions concerning the community’s delivery of health services. Such broad reports, requiring interagency cooperation as they did, are taken as evidence that the city activated an interorganizational network in accordance with national emphasis on coordinated planning, especially since more than half of them were produced after the comprehensive planning legislation of 1966.

Need for this form of activation could be assumed to follow the demands made upon health care implied by the city’s 1960 death rate\(^69\) and the inclination to reduce community costs implicit in the city’s 1960 per capita municipal health expenditures (both measures from the U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1962). Regarding the latter index, allocation of funds and other resources is a major concern of health and welfare councils (for example, see Morris and Rein, 1968) and may therefore be considered immediately relevant to their planning activities. Both needs may be assumed to be nationally defined.

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\(^69\) Although the crude death rate measures a variety of factors, including dependency ratios, socioeconomic deprivation, and the quality of health care, simultaneously, it does indicate need for health planning for all of these reasons. Either before or after death, whatever its cause, generally involves or has the potential for involving health service.
In the first instance supply was correlated with prior need at a level of \( r = .20 \) among cities with large-scale and diversified municipal organization and only \( .04 \) among cities without. Cities with strong parties, however, yielded correlation of \( - .02 \), compared to \( .18 \) for those with reform government. The latter result very likely occurred because of the relatively strong effect of the community-wide associations (none were themselves health and welfare councils), with which party strength is inversely related. For the correlations between the death rate and the broad council-prepared health report was \( .27 \) for cities with community-wide associations and \( .06 \) for those cities without them, only the last difference being significant at the .05 level. The second indicator of need, municipal health expenditures, produced slightly more consistent results. Differences between correlation coefficients were in the expected directions between high and low levels of municipal government (.19 and .08)\(^{70}\) and between the presence and absence of community-wide associations (.23 and .06). Both effects being virtually identical, it is not surprising that the effects of party strength fell exactly between them (.19 and .19). None of the latter three differences was significant. Still, the overall pattern of differences suggests support for the hypothesis, especially since the party measure had no independent effect.

Fourth Test: Interorganizational Relations in the Delivery of Health Services

The same growing national insistence upon the coordination of organizations is detectable in the formation of local hospital associations—even more so in the earlier case of coordinated hospital construction. Between 1961 and 1969, twenty-nine cities, having established active local federations accredited by the American Hospital Association, yielded data for scoring; these cities may be considered together with 85 others that never had any such federation (source: a list provided the author by the American Hospital Association). That only 12 cities had hospital associations predating 1961 and that slightly over half of the remaining hospital associations were formed after the comprehensive planning legislation of 1966 attests the progressively increasing influence of national standards upon supply. Two raters scored publications by the associations together with letters or telephone conversations between them and their executives along a twelve-point scale of influence upon the city’s hospitals. (The influence index had a Spearman-Brown reliability of .89 among the 29 hospital associations.) The supply of interorganizational activation in this instance is based upon the presence of a hospital association weighted by its influence.

Preexisting need was measured by the mere number of short-term general non-proprietary hospitals in the city in 1960 (source: Hospitals, 1961), it being assumed that, given national insistence upon the need to coordinate, such need is likely to be considered greatest in cities where the elements to be coordinated are the most numerous. Here we argue, together with Emery and Trist (1965) and Terreberry (1968; also see Evan, 1966), that the simple quantity of organizations of a given type can create interdependence among them that generates joint needs to regulate competition, to institutionalize conflict, and to develop other means of facing the common, complex environment to whose development they have contributed. Their number can also affect outside pressure for them to establish formal interorganizational relations. Other organizations, such as municipal agencies and voluntary associations, may experience the need to exert such pressure, if only to represent the public interest or to avoid the inconvenience of having to deal with them singly.\(^{71}\)

The correlation between need and supply was .54 among cities with large-scale and diversified municipal government and .20 for those without. .56 for those with strong political parties and .35 for cities with reform government, .43 among cities with community-wide associations and .38 for cities lacking them. Only the first of these differences is significant at the .05 level. But the general pattern they reveal, considered together with the three cases cited earlier of interorganizational activation, provides strong support for the three parts of the main hypothesis; that there is a positive correlation between the demand for interorganizational activation and its subsequent supply which is specified by the linkage made available by certain organizations.

Summary of Findings and Alternative Explanations

Table 1 brings together the 18 comparisons among correlation coefficients already discussed.

All but two of the 18 differences were in the hypothesized direction. The deviant outcomes—one reversal and one lack of difference—occurred only in the case of party strength, where the correlational differences associated with the voluntary associations’ index of integrative linkage (a negative correlate of the party measure) outweighed those associated with government (a positive correlate of that measure). Since, however, the scale and diversity of municipal government proved to be unrelated to the rate of community-wide associations, one might consider the two pairs of correlation coefficients yielded by these latter measures in any one of the six subproblems as quasi-independent events—hence justifying combining their respective probabilities for expository purposes only. It may be seen in Table 1 that each such estimate is either significant or approaches significance at conventional levels. Although the probabilities are approximate, they are compelling in the aggregate. It is not necessary to consider any one of the tests conclusive in order to claim broad support for the main hypothesis. Yet the results could have occurred for at least two main reasons other than those discussed: the possibility of invalidity in the statistical operations, or the possibility of another model from which the same outcomes can be deduced. These alternative reasons for the findings must be explored.

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\(^{70}\) Like their welfare counterparts, health expenditures were also part of the municipal government index; and this may also have contaminated the results. Yet using \( r / r \text{max as before (see Footnote 67)} \) led to considerable increase in the initially reported difference in correlation and consequently even greater confidence in it.

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\(^{71}\) Litwak and Hylton (1962) suggest a curvilinear relationship between number of organizations and formal coordination among them; for as number exceeds a certain threshold, coordination becomes unfeasible. However, the critical number is not likely to be reached in the present empirical instance—that of hospitals; thus any relationship between number of organizations and formal relations among them may be assumed to be monotonic.
Table 1. Zero Order and Standardized Partial Regression of Four Kinds of Interorganizational Activation upon Relevant Indicators of Demand among 130 Cities, by Three Measures of Overall Linkage

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator of Demand</th>
<th>Measure of Overall Linkage</th>
<th>Interorganizational Activation Supplied</th>
<th>Relative Scale and Diversity of Municipal Government</th>
<th>Relative Political Party Strength</th>
<th>Community-Wide Associations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Great (r beta)</td>
<td>Small (r beta)</td>
<td>Pr. of Diff. (r beta)</td>
<td>Any (r beta)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty 1959</td>
<td></td>
<td>.57</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.001bc</td>
<td>.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Network, 1966</td>
<td></td>
<td>(.64)</td>
<td>(-.13)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(.17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty 1959</td>
<td></td>
<td>.19</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model City, 1967</td>
<td></td>
<td>(.11)</td>
<td>(-.03)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Munic. Welf. Costs,</td>
<td></td>
<td>.40</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.077b</td>
<td>.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costs, 1960</td>
<td></td>
<td>(39)</td>
<td>(1.0)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(.35)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Death Rate, 1959</td>
<td></td>
<td>.70</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.209bc</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rept., 1960-69</td>
<td></td>
<td>(.10)</td>
<td>(.15)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(.14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Munic. Hth. Costs,</td>
<td></td>
<td>.19</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.288bc</td>
<td>.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costs, 1960</td>
<td></td>
<td>(.19)</td>
<td>(.04)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(.10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of Hosp., Asst.,</td>
<td></td>
<td>.54</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>.033b</td>
<td>.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961-69</td>
<td></td>
<td>(61)</td>
<td>(-.01)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(.47)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NUMBER OF CITIES (N)</td>
<td></td>
<td>37</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The two probabilities of difference between Pearsonian r's were combined by Sousel's method.

The six N's (left to right) were reduced to 29, 43, 30, 64, 67 in the sixth analysis above, to allow prospective prediction by removing cities with hospitals associated that were established before 1961.

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Explanation of the Correlation Coefficients

The consistency of outcome throughout six subproblems having different alternative meanings but does not entirely eliminate the possibility of attaching spurious meanings to all of the correlations between the five demand measures, either singly or together, can be imputed to the absence of other measures of demand that could actually have been measured by any of the indicators of need, such as income, hospital costs, and death rates. The correlation of the five contact variables with the five measures of demand (in descending order of importance) was selected over income-based alternatives as the measure of socioeconomic status since the correlation is to control for the distribution of the distribution of the distribution of socioeconomic factors (i.e., occupational and educational status) in the present analysis. It is not the direct effect of the distribution of life chances, which are already controlled for, but the indirect effect of the distribution of life chances, which are already controlled for.
each kind of activation upon the one or two relevant indicators of need was assessed in conjunction with the effects of the measures of status and population. The standardized partial regression coefficient (beta) that appears in parentheses on Table I directly below the corresponding zero order correlation coefficient (Pearson’s r) shows the effect of each indicator of need independently of the influences of the other indicator, if any, and of the two variables used for purposes of control.

It may be seen in the table that, overall, the differences between regression coefficients are much like those between the zero order coefficients considered earlier. In some instances initial differences are increased in the hypothesized direction, as in the cases of anti-poverty networks and hospital associations. In others, notably in those where colinearity between demand measures may have depressed the effect of one or another, some differences became smaller, constituting in three of 18 instances slight reversals of the predicted differences. Yet the pattern of difference clearly is overwhelmingly the one hypothesized—compellingly so in the light of: the omnibus nature of the control variables whose effects were held constant, the conflicting correlates of party strength, and the instabilities that higher order partial coefficients tend to display. The regression analyses did not support any idea that the results have been misinterpreted.

An Alternative Model

Differences in correlations such as those observed could have reflected either the expected differences in the extent to which needs are met and unneeded supply avoided, or a simpler multiplicative relationship. This relationship would be based upon a model predicting supply where there is both the need and the capacity to generate it, and non-supply where either ingredient is absent (Turk, 1970). Attempts were made to select from between the alternative models by first trichotomizing need, except in the case of welfare and health expenditures, whose skewed distributions required dichotomies. The rates of interorganizational activation were then examined at the highest and lowest levels of need under the separate conditions of high and low availability of linkage. Because of the non-independent effects of the measure of party strength, only the twelve comparisons involving municipal government and community-wide associations are considered.

Under the simpler model one would expect to find the highest rates of activation where both availability of linkage and need were highest. Yet this occurred in only eight of 12 comparisons (these eight are identified by “b” in Table 1). Moreover, the direct effect of interorganizational capacity shown at the top of Figure 1 was upheld by an overall positive association between activation and supply, when need was not considered, in 11 of the 12 cases. (The one exception was lack of association between community-wide associations and Model City status.) This should have increased the tendency for the highest rates of activation to occur where linkage is readily available and need is great, given the applicability of the simpler model; it lends some weight to the four exceptions. Nonetheless, sampling fluctuations based on small numbers of cases could also have caused the latter.

A more critical comparison, however, is between rates of activation where need is not great. Strong support would be given to the more complex model developed here if these rates of unneeded activation were invariably higher where there is a smaller supply of linkage than where it is greater. Actually, this proved to occur in only six of the 12 comparisons (identified by “c” in Table 1), but the chance expectation of the event must be considered greater than one-half in the light of the overall effect of linkage-availability upon activation. Once the activation rates were weighted on the basis of this effect, the number of contrasts favoring the model developed here over its simpler alternative increased to 11 out of 12. It is very likely that a permissive error was introduced, however, because of the disproportionate contribution made by the high-linkage, high-need cities to such weighting, in the light of the eight of 12 contrasts already discussed. Although the weight of the evidence favors the model developed here, ambiguity introduced by the methods by which evidence had to be generated necessitates further study with larger subsets of cities and continuous measures of linkage and activation. Until that is done, our full model should be retained since it does not contradict the simpler one—indeed subsumes it—and allows for the operation of processes affecting supply which, even if they had failed to materialize in the present four cases, could still occur in others not yet investigated.
SUMMARY, THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS, AND PROSPECTS

The three-part deduction from the concept of system has been strongly supported overall by analyses of data from the War on Poverty, the Model Cities Program, associations of health and welfare agencies, and associations of hospitals in 130 of the largest United States cities. Taken together, the results point to the conclusion that, in the United States at least, where there are clear national standards of need on the level of the community and of the means to its fulfillment and where material resources are accessible, the availability of linkage in a city is associated with the correlation between the need for interorganizational activation and its subsequent supply.\textsuperscript{73} Availability was measured by the scale and diversity of municipal government, local political party strength, and how community-wide and uncontested was the impact of the local voluntary associations.

Government, Party, and Voluntary Association

The effectiveness of voluntary associations and government in the integration of large, modern social systems has been widely claimed—mainly by social scientists in the United States, to be sure. Yet much of the evidence backing these claims is drawn from case study or rests upon such remote data as the heightened civic participation of members or of citizens. What is not fully recognized is that the major integrative function of the two kinds of organization is less the linking of individuals to their environments and more the linking of organizations to one another.

The case that can be made for Western political parties is not as clear. Although present findings in no way negated their integrative significance—indeed tended to support it—some question still remains whether parties have a direct effect upon the availability of interorganizational linkage that is in some way independent of the effects of government and voluntary association. Still, in the literature on urban politics the findings of the few analyses of the role of parties in the presence or absence of other kinds of organizations encourage further investigation within an interorganizational frame of reference.

Linkage Availability in Urban Settings

Linkage availability is a comprehensive term that refers to the permanent coalitions and community-wide solidarities likely to be signified by measures such as the three used here as well as the latent connections based on past coalitions and potential points of present contact also represented by such measures. The term was developed on the basis of a static, structural definition of the modern urban community as a social system and was associated with a second definition, that of the process of the community's organized responsiveness to the needs it articulated as demands.

The resulting proposition underlies much general sociology and merits wider test. It is simply that social actors must be connected to one another if they are to define and respond to situations collectively, especially where the responses are themselves the establishment of new connections between actors. Whether linkage is anything more than recurrent process and responsiveness is not simply intermittent linkage is moot; indeed, characterizing the urban social system as changing patterns of interorganizational relations implies the affirmative. But whether artificial or not, the distinction still highlights the necessary conditions that the broader and relatively stable properties of a set of social actors provide for any of the more specific and briefer regularities.

Viewing linkage as necessary but not sufficient for responsiveness to defined needs (taken in conjunction with the crudity of available measures) helps to account for the absence of high correlation between local need for interorganizational activation defined according to the standards of some

\textsuperscript{73} The conclusions reached by Rogers (1971:passim.) became available after completion of this manuscript. On the basis of a few of the writings reviewed here, plus three cases of his own, Rogers reached similar empirical conclusions about the parts played by party strength, community-wide associations, and conflict-resolving entities in affecting interorganizational activation for some of the kinds of delivery systems here considered. Although only implicit, his underlying formulation appears to resemble that portion of ours which relates linkage availability to interorganizational supply on the basis of interorganizational capacity (at the top of Figure 1). Rogers did not explicitly view the translation of needs into demands and competition with other demands as problematic, however; therefore, his analysis did not extend to that required by the three-part hypothesis tested here. His emphasis upon supply over demand very likely led to his playing up of the dysfunctions of large-scale and diversified municipal government over its coalition-producing capabilities.
more inclusive social context, and its subsequent supply. Just because events can transpire among social actors does not mean that they will.

**Associationism, Social Choice, and the Marketplace**

At its highest level of abstraction, our approach purports to be general, applying not only to urban phenomena but also—in small systems as well as large—to the relationship between “cohesiveness,” “integration,” or “conflict,” on the one hand, and “adaptation,” “goal attainment,” or “revolutionary outcome,” on the other. As noted, the kind of linkage and the ways in which need and supply are concerted vary.

In the present instance, reference has been made to the operation of market-like structure and process called “associationism” and “social choice” for the concerted of supply and demand, tempered by broader contextual standards of “taste” and “utility.”

What sometimes fails to be recognized in studying markets—using the term in its most comprehensive sense, which includes but goes beyond the mere provision of economic goods and services—is that in order for supply to bear any relation to demand there must exist the necessary sets of linkages called a marketplace, through which wants and dispositions to provide can be articulated with one another, even if for no other reason than that they have become known to their respective holders. Today, organizations are required to generate any large-scale marketplace, which after all provides the means by which “needs”—often uncritically accepted as universal “givens”—may be articulated and transmitted as competing demands. Similarly, the mere existence of facilities—here claimed to be mainly interorganizational—cannot affect anything unless there are linkages through which availability of these facilities is translated into supply. One has only to take the obvious example of the stock market on days when stock exchanges or brokerage firms close their doors.

Moreover, in order to compare markets with one another as is done here in large United States cities it was necessary to investigate comparable needs and comparable supplies. For this to be done, common standards have to be available from one market to the next on the bases of which need may be decided and the appropriate supply generated; otherwise what may be considered, say, high health expenditures to be met by inter-hospital coordination in one city may be considered either low or unimportant or procurable by different means in another city. In this research, the common standards were those of a more inclusive social context, the nation. This is not to say that these were the sole standards, only that they proved to be dominant, once linkage enabled most of the relevant organizations to enter the arena of social choice.

**The Present Model and Its Scope**

In the present empirical development of the two meanings of system, cities were conceived of as multi-organizational entities. This means that decisions are made primarily through coalition-formation among organizations. Cities differ in the general availability of linkage for such coalitions, for the transmission of relevant information about values and needs, and for interorganizational responses to value-based demands. Where there are several conflicting values and needs, linkage alone may be insufficient for predicting the correlation between any given need and the city’s interorganizational response. Where linkage is missing prediction is impossible.

The literature suggested the model, and the present empirical outcomes failed to contradict it. Yet data were lacking to operationalize all of its concepts, nor did the analysis of data unequivocally rule out the applicability of a simpler model that it subsumed. Still the entire model’s retention is justified if for no other reasons than its codification of a variety of ways to analyze the urban setting and its utility as an accounting scheme for the operation of processes that may vary from one empirical situation to the next.

Even though our detailed model transcends the data, it is not the most complete one that can ultimately be constructed on the basis of our central proposition about systems. For it falls short of pointing directly to the absurdity of distinguishing between “consensus models,” “conflict models,” “equilibrium models,” “change models,” and so on. Yet it suggests that all such so-called models are actually ideal types whose occurrence or non-occurrence can be measured by the geometry of the linkages formed among social units within large-scale social settings and by the corresponding contest, concert, modification, and other forms of interplay among various interests and values.

Here we have only touched upon foundations of the theory that can spell this out. The partial conflict among organizations and their facilitating dependence upon one another means the operation of contest and bargaining in the determination of outcomes as well as the assimilation or emergence and retention of overarching standards that make certain outcomes more probable than others (that provide information rather than energy in a cybernetic sense). Industrialized nations and multi-purpose cities appear to behave in this way. We might also propose, but with greater hesitation, that where organizations are few or where crosscutting lines of interorganizational conflict and dependence do not occur, decisions may just fail to be made. Then again they may be made on the basis of imperative control in terms of absolute values or imposed interests. Or, instead, they may be the outcome of total conflict between separate interorganizational coalitions involving equally absolute but mutually incompatible values. Or whatever organizational fabric exists may break down. Emerging nations and bedroom communities seem to fit one or the other of these possibilities. In all cases, where value systems fail to dominate or where they fail short of being main counter-forces it is difficult to conceive of lawlike social process. Still, the ensuing turbulence may cease and predictability return, once chance or some other factor has produced a new mix of values.

Though the results of our analyses of data are congruent with what has been written about the effects of government, party, and voluntary association upon...
urban process in the United States, every effort has been made to place their
telling characteristics in the broader context of organizational and inter-
organizational theory. By these means empirical inquiry may be extended to
include cities with non-Western modes of social organization. For example,
Eastern European nations do not have competing political parties and private
voluntary associations comparable to those in the United States; but they are
likely to contain other kinds of organizations that vary from city to city as to
scale, diversification, visibility, decentralization, the resolution of internal
conflict, diffuseness of goals, avoidance of conflict, and other linkage-
producing properties. Such variation should permit cross-national replication
of the present research.

That the organizations which participate in coalitions are generally not also
the ones providing the solidary linkages that embody current common standards
was an idea that issued from our comparisons of politicized with reform
cities. The tentative explanation was offered in the light of the more abstract
organizational characteristics just referred to; it may be seen to bear a close
resemblance to Parsons’ structural distinction (1961:57-59, 1967:347-348,
1971b:22-26) between the social units most potent in the mobilization of
power and other resources and those most potent in the preservation of social
and cultural integration — whatever the particular society may otherwise be
like.

The Community’s Relations with More Inclusive Social Systems

The boundaries drawn between environment and any aggregate of organi-
zations whose systemic nature is to be assessed are somewhat arbitrary. This
is because, first, contemporary social forms often tend to be open systems —
i.e., linked to the broader social context and responding in it; and, secondly,
because the social environment is itself composed of organizations: of county,
state, and federal agencies; national labor unions; the United Nations;
national and international voluntary associations; and so on.

Indeed, from earlier work (Turk, 1970) came the conception of two mutually
opposing effects of linkage between a city’s organizations and those of the
national system of cities. On the one hand, “extralocal integration,” as it was
then called, provided material support to the city; on the other hand, the city’s
organizations apparently tended to be oriented more to organizations else-
where (even perhaps being branch offices) and less to one another. In short,
eextralocal linkage places inputs at the disposal of an aggregate of organi-
zations but may tend to fragment that aggregate — i.e., impede its operation as
a system. The notion of mass society connotes this, as do more general
theories of in-group relations with the out-group, from Sumner to Sherif.

The relative weights of the two extralocal effects are likely to vary from
one sociocultural context to the next. For instance, one can imagine countries
without any local autonomy. It might be that in some strongly centralized
countries having the ultimate in national or regional planning, supply is
allocated according to rigid formulae, or follows criteria unrelated to local
demand. This might not cause major local disturbances, especially if vari-
ations in demand are small from one community to the next. It is also possible
that networks of central agencies in control of supply may create their own
systems of estimating local demand and the extent to which it should be
satisfied. Linkage and demand-supply relations could also exist at more com-
prehensive levels than the individual city or metropolitan area. For that
matter, associationalism and social choice need not occur among local
organizations at all. It is conceivable, for example, that decisions be reached
through interplay among large, extralocal organizations — private as well as
public — that fully determine the activities of their local branches.

One solution to any such apparent dilemma would be to shift focus from
samples of cities as systems of reference to samples of more comprehensive
societal units, even nations. Our theory is sufficiently abstract to permit this;
for, as mentioned already, even the local indicators of linkage availability
and of correlations of demand and supply will probably differ from one country
to the next. The extent to which the criteria hypothesized to be linkage-
facilitating exist — those of intra-organizational differentiation and scale,
visibility, conflict-reducing capabilities, and diffuse, noncontroversial goals —
can be observed in any large, modern social setting and at any level. To
give an example: one would guess that among modern, industrialized nations
interorganizational activation at the national level would also depend upon
coalitions under conditions of social choice for reasons already given, even if
these were to occur exclusively among agencies of the national government.
Testing such a guess calls for cross-national research.

Yet one should be loath to abandon the local urban setting as an appropri-
ate object of study anywhere until several possibilities have been ruled out,
preferably through research. Clearly, the more centralized the broader setting,
the more pertinent is that part of the formal model that has to do with con-
textual standards. But it is also hard to believe that organizations — even
“branches” — can exist in, say, a city without taking one another into account
and without having the capability of collective outputs — even if these outputs
are simply requests made by the city of the more powerful entities to which
it is subject. Certain matters, such as regional planning, pollution control,
and the allocation of locally obtained revenues seem to be territorially bound
and, at the very least, capture the interests of local organizations. If this
surmise should be wrong, the very least that cross-national inquiry can estab-
lish are the empirical limits of interorganizational structure and process in
local communities or — for that matter — in subdivisions of larger systems
which are not territorially based.

Moreover, central legislation sometimes demands coordination at the local
level. Something short of this was implied in the Model Cities program
described above. Even closer to the idea is West German law that requires
widespread local participation in city planning. Our model suffices to predict
relative outcomes of such requirements from one city to the next. In similar
vein, certain central planning philosophies seem to assume the impossibility
of imperative control and central coordination in large multi-organizational settings, be they circumscribed or comprehensive. Here emphasis is placed upon enriching the social environment in such a way that local social choice tends more toward certain general outcomes than toward others. Non-specific financial grants-in-aid to local governments constitute only one example. The analogy comes to mind that intermediate units like local communities may mediate between larger and smaller social units, much as small groups mediate between large organizations and their members.

Finally, our basic empirical question only had to do with the association between the availability of local linkage and the correlation between local demand for interorganizational activation and its subsequent supply. Where linkage is slight or local demands are few one would expect to be operating only on different portions of the relevant continua, not on different continua. The strength of support for the local version of the more general proposition with which we began may depend upon the degree of autonomy enjoyed by the local unit; it may even drop to zero in certain cases, a doubtful possibility, however, given any interdependence among local organizations—whether based upon conflict or mutual need.

General Theory, Interorganizational Analysis, and Classic Typologies

Returning to the abstract for the moment, what has been said about systems makes sense, regardless of the unit of the study. In some countries, cities may never be systems; it is even conceivable—a frightening thought to many—that nations may one day cease to be systems according to our criteria of linkage and relations of demand and supply. But somewhere, one would surmise, there will always be some application of the concept of system and of the proposition deduced from it.

The utility of an interorganizational level of analysis (Turk, 1970; 1973) has also received further confirmation. The present analyses based prediction of the correlation between need and subsequent interorganizational events on the fundamental organizational structure of cities. Need had clear organizational referents in municipal expenditures for welfare, municipal health expenditures, and numbers of hospitals. One might even argue that the need implied by poverty and death rates has organizational origins as well and that organizations respond to them in those terms. Despite their global nature, the more customary population variables of size and socioeconomic composition did not intervene in the causal chain between organizational antecedents and interorganizational activation. There is no reason to assume that this level of analysis would be anything but even more useful in studying social settings larger and more complex than cities.

Although unsupported by the idea of partial conflict among organizations, any view of our four empirical cases as empty gestures or as national con-
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