A century before “behavioral economics” became faddish, before Freakonomics was a bestseller, before Dan Ariely explained how economic relations really work among actual humans, not the fantasied puppets of conventional marginal utility theory, Uncle Fredo, our joint ancestor, had figured all this out and much more. First, he did it by means of complex equations, some forms of which he invented himself, and when he finished with “science” as such, he supplemented his global analysis with detailed historical commentary plus contemporary journalism (including 167 political articles he wrote between 1889 and 1893 while running for office; Finer 1966:10). Just as he died, a young Colorado native began pursuing his doctorate in Heidelberg in the mid-1920s—“in the shadow of Max Weber”—and it seemed then necessary for that young man to absorb the uniquely synthesizing scholarship of this particular thinker. So he went about doing so, as did many of his brightest peers.

An ever-shrinking pool of readers can remember the former importance of Talcott Parsons’ The Structure of Social Action (1937) which, in its paperback version (1968), found a place during the 1960s and 1970s on many sociologists’ shelves—before being eclipsed by Habermas, Giddens, Foucault, Bourdieu and others in the 1980s. Some of Parsons’ Structure seems strange today in that he wrote at length about Alfred Marshall (Parsons 1968: 129–177), the classical economist who, according to John Maynard Keynes, “invented” marginal-utility theory, similar in form to Watts’ invention of the steam engine (Parsons 1968: 131). Few sociologists then (or now) would have regarded Marshall as important to the creation of social theory in the usual sense (except perhaps for a subgroup among rational choicists). But for Parsons at the time, building a bridge between disciplines seemed vital to the success of his larger goals.

Parsons’ treatment of Marshall in Structure derived from a 1931 article in The Quarterly Journal of Economics, evidence of Parsons’ early education at Amherst College among “institutionalists,” fortified and modified at Heidelberg. Parsons wrote that Marshall was “exceedingly scrupulous in his attempt to stick close to the concrete facts of the world he was studying, the worlds of business and labor of his day” (p. 131). At this stage of his own theoretical creativity, Parsons, too, was trying to represent the world as it was rather than as it might or should be, the hallmark of his later, normatively inspired “grand theorizing,” which often seemed to float high above the empirically knowable. For this stratospheric posture, plus the stagnant prose style, he later became the target of so many critics.

Structure offered sustained coverage of four thinkers, with Marshall occupying 9 percent of the 547 pages given to pure exposition. Durkheim, probably closest to Parsons’ own worldview, received 27.6 percent, and Weber, the most often read and quoted of Parsons’ interpretations, winning out with 35.5 percent of the total pages available for commentary (and an entire volume to himself in the paperback edition). When “de-Parsonizing” efforts occurred in the 1970s, they were mostly directed at his interpretation of Weber, since the Weberian way of theorizing and analyzing social structure had by then became the favored mode for most sociologists in the United States and Britain—even as Durkheimianism fought to hold its own.

If Alfred Marshall quietly disappeared from sociological view, mainly because his ideas have been absorbed by later economic theorists and were no longer considered foundational for sociology, it was Wilfried Fritz Pareto (1848–1923; known universally as Vilfredo Pareto, an authentic marquis no less) who was forcefully banished from sociology’s collective consciousness. The
widespread, loudly proclaimed admiration for his ideas during the 1930s was wholly displaced by ignorance or contempt 30 years thereafter, except for routinized reference to “Pareto optimality.” But in *Structure*, Parsons lauded Pareto and committed 123 pages (22.5 percent) to analyzing his *Trattato* (1912/1916), which he read in French (known in English as *The Mind and Society*, 1935), plus other Paretian works. In so doing, Parsons began to turn away from the marginal-utility paradigm he had been taught when young, and started to take seriously the idea that “non-logical” action might play a significant role in human affairs.

Though one can legitimately question a fair portion of Pareto’s many sociological contentions, his unhappy posthumous reputation became in part an innocent victim of Benito Mussolini’s enthusiastic endorsement from 1928 when the latter’s *My Autobiography* was published in the United States—to considerable approbation (e.g., “The most perfect piece of self-revelation I have ever seen,” *The Saturday Evening Post*). Though one can legitimately question a fair portion of Pareto’s many sociological contentions, his unhappy posthumous reputation became in part an innocent victim of Benito Mussolini’s enthusiastic endorsement from 1928 when the latter’s *My Autobiography* was published in the United States—to considerable approbation (e.g., “The most perfect piece of self-revelation I have ever seen,” *The Saturday Evening Post*). Pareto honorably refused accolades from the Italian fascists in the early 1920s. Yet following the dictator’s ignominious end in 1945, anyone thought to be associated with him or his ideas, even remotely, became *persona non grata* in the academy. Pareto’s unapologetic temperamental and intellectual elitism, and momentary acceptance of fascism before he died in 1923, did not, of course, help matters. This must have accounted in part for Parsons’ subsequent inattention to Pareto’s thought, even as he continued work on Weber and Durkheim for decades. (Why he neglected both Marx and Simmel in his seminal 1937 study is yet another story.)

Parsons, Crane Brinton, Robert K. Merton, George Homans, Joseph Schumpeter, Clyde Kluckhohn, Elton Mayo, Bernard De Voto and other bright lights on the Harvard scene in the 1930s were impressed by Lawrence Henderson, a physiologist and sociological fellow-traveler. They could not discount his tremendous confidence in the value of Pareto’s sociology. After spending six years studying Pareto’s works and becoming an acolyte, Henderson offered a seminar which met from 1932 through 1934 wherein he guided his gifted readers through *The Mind and Society*, all 2033 pages of it (Heyl 1967: 318; also Keller 1984). He also wrote a short monograph about Pareto’s ideas which was well received at the time (Henderson 1935; reissued 1967), ending with these words: “Pareto’s Treatise is a work of genius” (p. 59). Franz Borkenau also wrote a study of the Italian’s ideas (Borkenau 1936), as did George Homans, his first published book (Homans and Curtis 1934). *The Saturday Evening Post*, arbiter of middle-class thinking, dedicated most of an issue to Pareto in the mid-1930s, as did the inaugural number of *The Journal of Social Philosophy* (1935: Vol. 1, No. 1), edited by the estimable Robert MacIver at Columbia University. The stunning collapse of Pareto’s sociological reputation from its extraordinary height in the late 1930s to its virtual disappearance in the 1950s must be attributed as much to the celebratory liberal-democratic postwar political climate as to meaningful evaluation of his ideas themselves. He was simply no longer read by “the masses.”

However, if Pareto lost his popular following, this was not true among theory textbook writers. Following Parsons’ lead, subsequent historians of social theory routinely committed serious attention to Pareto’s life and work, most notably Raymond Aron (1967) and Lewis Coser (1971; 1977). Extended treatments in other textbooks were not uncommon, and open ridicule never occurred, even if mighty reservations about his doctrines and terminology became common. Only during the last two decades or so has attention to Pareto’s ideas almost vanished from basic theory textbooks (various editions of George Ritzer’s textbook illustrate this: in the 8th edition, Pareto merits only a brief note). If one cares to investigate the larger points of his sociological theories, Coser’s beloved book (catalogued in some libraries as a “reference book”) is a comfortable entry point. And since it has been quoted with and without attribution on many internet sites, Coser’s canny and literate exposition often stands in for Pareto’s own words, especially if speed of comprehension becomes the primary goal.

Sociologists, however, are not the most important audience for Pareto’s genius. In fact, he remains fundamental to engineering, economics, econometrics, income distribution.
studies, and political science. “The Pareto Principle” (the famous “80/20 Rule”), “Pareto Ophelimity/Optimality” or “Pareto Efficiency,” “Constrained Pareto Efficiency,” “Pareto Distribution,” “Pareto Priority Index,” and “Pareto charts,” all continue to live and serve valuable functions (sic) in the practical worlds of the natural sciences, risk assessment, business practices, welfare economics, and so on. For instance, recently Branko Milanovic spent a chapter comparing Pareto with Simon Kuznets on global inequality (Milanovic 2011: 83–93). The latter is back in the news due to Thomas Piketty’s phenomenal *Capital* (see pp. 11–17). Less often noted than Piketty’s response to Kuznets’ theory is his interesting commentary, “Pareto and the Illusion of Stable Inequality” (pp. 64–68). (Among many items which testify to Pareto’s continuing presence in economics, see, for instance, Pomini 2011).

Like Comte, Pareto was a mathematical prodigy, applying his remarkable capability to civil engineering (his formal education), the analysis of socialist economics, everyday business enterprises (he managed railroads in Rome and iron mines near Florence), and income distribution. (An early example of his “revolutionary” approach to inequality already appeared in English 117 years ago [Pareto 1897], where, in addition to equations, he noted that “art is obliged to make use of certain rhetorical devices with which science has nothing to do” [p. 485]—a fond delusion he outgrew.) He virtually invented econometrics and was as capable a quantitative analyst as then existed in the social sciences as well as engineering. The math required to understand a Pareto Distribution thoroughly (“Moments of Pareto I-IV Distributions”) would surely have outstripped the capacity of any classical social theorist (with the possible exception of Marx, whose recreational “mathematical notebooks” evidence similar inclinations). Even today very few sociologists would be able to understand Pareto’s applied mathematical analysis regarding practical problems.

And yet, again like Comte (whom Pareto dismissed), after having scaled the heights of “the logico-experimental standpoint” via higher math, and along the way inventing several indispensable techniques of analysis, around the ripe age of 50 Pareto had his Damascus Road experience. (Inheriting about $4.1M in our dollars from an uncle might also have spurred his imagination, as he was thereby freed from formal labor [Finer 1966: 11].) He truly began to understand and accept the fact that the people he knew best and had tried earlier in life to court via political elections, plus those about whom he spent his sleepless nights reading, especially the ancient Romans, did not care a fig for his equations and his expectations of how they should behave as “rational actors.” It came to him that he could indeed model any sort of desirable human behavior, individual or collective, and could show reliably that certain things happen with some predictability; e.g., the “oscillating” movement in history between those aristocracies composed of “foxes” versus “lions.”

He knew the math that would describe these alterations, and many others, which increased in intensity over time (see *Mind and Society*, §1694). But, more importantly, he also knew that people would far rather “believe” in the non-logical than in the logical, would rather “believe” in *Das Kapital* on the Left or Edmund Burke on the Right than in any sort of empirically derivable data he could present which might contradict both steadfast positions. Rationality is not much fun. It is orderly, predictable, tidy, “sensible,” unromantic, gray-colored, and accounting-like. (On this Weber and Pareto agreed.) Thus, most of the 2000 pages that make up *Mind and Society* document with merciless persistence instances by the thousands of human actions that have occurred in full resistance to rational or logical thought and behavior.

The virtue of spending time with Pareto today lies not in his graphs, equations, or hypotheses. Once an engineer, always one, as clearly exemplified in his ready resort to calculus and the Cartesian axis when addressing any puzzle, mechanical or human. Unlike other classical theorists (Weber and Simmel paramount among them), Pareto had no ear whatsoever for music, as attested by Roberto Michels’ daughter, Manon Michels Einaudi, who spent long periods at Pareto’s “Villa Angora” when young, and quoted him: “Music—I never listen to it. It tells me nothing. To me it is like the creaking of a cart passing in the
street’’ (Einaudi 1935: 342). This spiritual handicap extended from everyday life into his understanding of other human delights, like child-rearing, for which he also had no aptitude nor tolerance. But his failure to appreciate certain fundamental human experiences—precisely those, many would argue, which give life its most significance—was counterbalanced by phenomenal scholarly discipline and energy, and an imaginatively skeptical perception of socio-economic life in which no sacred cow was safe from his acidic notice. One is reminded by his mindset of Pitirim Sorokin (Parsons’ early nemesis at Harvard) whose posthumous reputation declined not so much because his work was found wanting as due to its uniform gloominess, giving no quarter, no sentimental hope, for a better future. Put another way, those who equate music with a “creaking” cart in the street are not likely to understand human behavior very sympathetically.

Yet such a theorist can make indispensable inroads when analyzing certain spheres of social life, especially those that are cyclical in nature. If one can ignore Pareto’s fancied scientism, _The Mind and Society_ becomes what _Economy and Society_ and _Capital_ have been for so many thousands of readers: storehouses of human experience—codified, organized, terminologically reduced, and directive of thought. For a typical sample of Paretian rhetoric in a feuilleton, consider his observations to an anglophone audience who pondered “The Future of Europe”: “Our society presents, under certain aspects, striking analogies with Roman society at the end of the Republic. One of these analogies is the control over the affairs of the world exercised by a demagogical plutocracy. The autocrats of Rome bought at its election the privilege of exploiting the provinces, and out of the profits they extorted from the provincials they again bought the voters at home. Our plutocrats, likewise, prodigalize money to obtain legislative favors. Campaign expenses in the United States are quite as high as they ever were at Rome. The taxes levied on the common people by high tariffs and other modern political devices are more regular, less arbitrary, less lawless than the exactions of the Roman proconsuls, but quite as productive to the exploiting classes” (Pareto 1922: 447). Pareto then quotes Livy, concluding that “we are impressed with the slight change that has occurred during more than 2000 years in the forces that mould and animate society. We hoped for something better after the World War” (p. 448).

Of course, analogies between the United States and late Rome have been rampant lately, and given that Pareto would be dead of debilitating heart disease within a year of writing these dark comments, perhaps not too much should be made of his pessimism. On the other hand, he had committed 25 years of undisturbed scholarship that led to his _Trattato di Sociologia generale_, a marriage of advanced quantification, historical detail, political realism, and an almost frightening sobriety about “the human prospect.” For instance, in _Les Systèmes Socialistes_ (1902), he observed that “The qualities, for example, of a St. Francis of Assisi are quite different from those of a Krupp. People who buy steel cannon need a Krupp, not a St. Francis” (Finer 1966: 131). Though empirically correct, this is not the sort of observation that today’s sociologists would “feel comfortable” making, particularly given the notorious history of the Krupp family of armorers, which profited spectacularly under Hitler’s regime (Manchester 1968).

Pareto’s _Trattato_ (much longer than his _Cours d’Economie Politique_ [1896/07] or _Les Systèmes Socialistes_ [2 vols., 1902]) is a socio-cultural cornucopia that defies comparison. When Parsons and his three colleagues assembled their gargantuan _Theories of Society_ (1961), they included no fewer than six excerpts from Pareto’s works—more than those by George Herbert Mead and Georg Simmel. They thereby canonized his ideas about “the circulation of elites,” legitimate use of force, his theories of combinations, logical and non-logical action, on societal steady-state equilibrium, and cycles of interdependence. Yet given the limited market for their compendious textbook, these ideas did not become central to theoretical debate in the way that other classical theories did. As fertile as these ideas still remain, they represent the tiniest part of Pareto’s mighty oeuvre.

Consider, as one small instance, a few lines from Chapter III, “Rationalization of Non-Logical Conduct” (pp. 171–230), where he
probes the ideas of Pierre Bayle (1647–1706), "Bayle’s paradox," and responses to it by Montesquieu and others. Bayle was a great skeptic of his age, bounced thither and yon by religio-political forces that controlled Europe. As such he was centuries ahead of his time, simpatico today with Sam Harris, Richard Dawkins, and Christopher Hitchens. Pareto recognized a fellow spirit, yet he subjected Bayle’s ideas to the same level of critical analysis that he gave to equations purporting to comprehend income distribution. From ¶358: “Many statesmen, many historians, recognize non-logical actions without giving them that name and without going to the trouble of finding their theory. Just a few examples taken here and there from the works of Bayle, implicit in which are several theories of non-logical conduct—and it is indeed surprising to find in a writer who lived two centuries and more ago certain truths that are unappreciated even today. Bayle declares and repeats that ‘opinions are not the rule of conduct,’ and that ‘man does not regulate his conduct by his opinions’. . . . The existence and importance of non-logical conduct could not be recognized in plainer terms. Find a general form for this observation of a particular fact, and we get the starting-point for a theory of non-logical conduct.”

Warming up to Bayle’s approach to understanding human action, he quotes him further: From ¶359: “Man does not act according to his principles. He may be as rational a creature as you like, but it is none the less true that he almost never acts according to his principles. [In other words his conduct is non-logical.] He has indeed the strength, in speculative matters, not to draw wrong conclusions; for in such reflections he sins rather in his readiness to accept false principles than in drawing mistaken conclusions from them. But it is quite another matter when good morals are in question. . . he is always deciding in favour of his uncontrolled desires. . . The true principle of human conduct . . . is naught but temperament, the natural inclination to pleasure, the taste for certain things, the desire to please, the habits acquired in intercourse with friends, or some other disposition arising from the depths of human nature, whatever the country in which one is born and whatever the knowledge that has been instilled in the mind.” Pareto inserted critical remarks throughout in brackets—e.g., “The usual vague phraseology, but the substance accords with fact”—yet he has found a fellow traveler, if in need of guidance and clarification: “This comes very close to the facts. If we tried to give greater precision to Bayle’s language, and establish a stricter classification, would we not have a theory of non-logical actions— their great importance so becoming more and more apparent?”

Before applying Montesquieu, Rousseau, Henry Sumner Maine, Locke, and Voltaire to Bayle’s various pronouncements, Pareto summarizes one of Bayle’s most important notions. From ¶362: “He goes to some pains to prove that atheism is preferable to idolatry. To understand him aright we have to take account of the times in which he was living and the perils to which he was exposed. Just as in our time there are persons who give perpetual chase to ‘immoral’ books, so in Bayle’s time there were those who kept open season on books against Christianity. Unable to whip the horse, Bayle whips the saddle, and belabours idolatry with criticisms that apply just as well to all religions. At bottom his argument tends to show that since the majority of human actions are non-logical, forms of belief are of no great importance.” Perhaps needless to say, because Bayle expressed these ideas prior to 1700, he became a flashpoint for everyone who thought about such things for the next two centuries at least. (One wonders if Durkheim decided to sidestep Bayle when he wrote about non-logical beliefs and their role in promoting collective consciousness, or how his study of religion would have been altered with these ideas in mind.)

Pareto’s tireless appropriation of Bayle’s writing (not to mention hundreds of other authors’ works) serves as a solvent, diluting the childish earnestness that pervades so much “social science” then and now. While it is endlessly comforting to believe in human rationality—“Our child will study hard in college and avoid drugs and alcohol”—all our data point in the opposite direction. Motorcycle riders without helmets are known as “future organ donors” among ER staffs, and the riders know that, yet they ride without helmets because they damn well feel like it.
Not long ago a young sociologist, a new mother, an intellectual to the core, was heard to blurt out in exasperation, “Nobody told me before my baby arrived that I would go insane once he got here; there have been times when I would have killed anybody who threatened his safety; I do not recognize myself; it must be hormones....” As one surveys religious, sexual, and political persecution and terror around the globe, duly reported each day by Western media in wearying detail, one wonders if Voltaire did not give *homo sapiens* too much credit; if “the perfectibility of humankind” was not a juvenile illusion from the eighteenth century that should by now have died a polite, subdued death. Listening attentively to the owner of Villa Angora in Lausanne—he who worshiped his 20 feline pets and lots of other animals on the estate—would help us grow up, stare our dreads frankly in the eye, and theorize from a position of empirical strength rather than hopeful delusions.

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Vincent Mosco (Mosco 2004) calls myths “stories that animate individuals and societies,” provide “entrance to another reality” (p. 3) and argues that “the primary source of a myth’s power is its elasticity, which allows the reader or the listener to draw many conclusions from myth’s inherent ambiguity,” (p. 10) often providing support for the status quo. Robert Rowland (1990) suggests similarly that they justify social arrangements. Phillip Selznick (2011) focuses on institutional myths and how people want to understand their place in institutions. One technique by which they do so is, as he calls it, the “elaboration of socially integrating myths” (Chapter Five, Section Five, Paragraph Five). John Meyer and Brian Rowan (1981) argue that formal structures are not based on work that organizations set out to accomplish, but on “myths of their institutionalized environments” (p. 531) which lead to institutionalized rules that prescribe what things can be done, and how those things can be done. Whether or not they are useful or true, they are treated as legitimate, and are difficult to change, in part because people avoid situations that make them uncomfortable—the harder it will be to make a change, the less likely people will do it (Karl Weick 1981). Isomorphism ensues at an environmental level as institutions attempt to operate in the same way as others that have already been deemed legitimate (Meyer and Rowan 1981). Myths help to maintain control and harmony inside an organization and to mollify external stakeholders, and they build institutions (Selznick 2011). Lewis Hyde suggests that a “myth is a story you can’t get out of” (Hyde 2010:178).

The work of myth in certain conditions provides a plausible cover for a contradiction, and myths are also often constructed at boundaries. Susan Star and James Griesemer (1989) talk of boundary work as a rhetorical endeavor, aimed at differentiating one group from another, and it derives its direction from what Greg Wilson and Carl Herndl (2007) call a “demarcation exigence” (p. 132). They go on to suggest that boundary objects can also serve as a rhetorical construct to create an “integrative exigence” (ibid.) that allows for a temporary territory in which individuals from different groups can come together to collaborate, cooperate and attempt to understand one another. People decide who is in the group, who is out of the group, and do work at these boundaries to either keep them in or keep them out, but constantly reify these boundaries. These cultural boundaries in academia are drawn around departments, disciplines, methodologies, ideologies, axiology—boundaries abound, and they are ever shifting. Boundaries also exist at fixed points in processes, and these fixed points often take on their own mythic power. In scholarly communication, peer review and tenure are two of those points, and as Christine Borgman (2007) argues, they provide a bright line beyond which something or someone is considered legitimate.

There are at least four myths currently operating in the higher education system: (1) there is a crisis in the scholarly communication system; (2) there is a crisis in the humanities; (3) there is a crisis in the system of higher education; and (4) metrics can effectively measure the effectiveness of higher education. My main focus will be on the last one, as I would like to dismiss the first three immediately. Frank Donoghue (2008) argues that the word crisis is a dramatic term that suggests there is some problem that we can identify and then fix so we
can go back to business as usual. If we are in a network society as imagined by Manuel Castells (2010), then structures as they previously existed have been upended by networking logics, suggesting that the system and the behaviors of individuals in it need to be rethought, or at least, the system needs to be interrogated.

The Ptolemies founded the ancient Library of Alexandria intending to bring together collections from around the world, and they invited scholars to live and work there, often confiscating books from visitors—some they merely copied; others, they kept. The founding is dated at around 300 BCE, but despite its mythic status, it was not the first library. Clay tablets discovered in Syria suggest that there was a library in the palace of ancient Elba around 2300 BCE before invaders burned it. A library at Nippur dating to 2000 BCE contained what scholars believe is the first catalog, and at least two libraries existed in Assyria prior to 627 BCE (Lionel Casson 2001). The construction of collections in these early libraries was much different than modern practice, typically growing out of the needs of a particular regime, and ceased to exist when that regime collapsed or fell out of favor (James O’Donnell 1998). Greece and Rome would later bring libraries that began to democratize collection principles, but these early libraries in the Near East were among the first to use procedures that are still fundamental to library practice to this day (Casson 2001). Still central to the lives of scholars, academic libraries are now situated within institutions, and in the same anti-intellectual environment as the individual academies to which they belong.

Jorge Schement and Terry Curtis (1995) outline what they refer to as a “shadow education” system that began to develop in the twentieth century, in which corporations would have their own internal universities designed to educate workers on how to do specific jobs within those organizations. Community colleges grew out of this and serve similar purposes—the shift here, they note, is that education began to become far more vocationally focused. This does not mean that research universities were immune to any capitalist shift, as capitalists funded many of them across the United States (Stanford and the University of Chicago among them), many have relationships with corporations, and many of them are now expected to create patentable research and bring in significant amounts of external funding. A shift toward mass institutions redirects focus from academic to vocational study (Richard Hofstader 1963), along with a sense that universities exist as centers for job training. Martha Nussbaum (2010) suggests that the two need not be mutually exclusive, and argues for a middle ground. The humanities and arts, she argues, allow for a “watchful stewardship and a culture of creative innovation’’ (p. 10), and proponents of education for profit “have adopted an impoverished conception of what is required to meet their own goal” (p. 11). With a hyper-focus on vocational education, a system grows in which a school subject only has value if it can be applied directly to a clear real-life situation, and metrics can begin to take on a mythic quality.

A look at the impact factor of journals in which a scholar has published suggests the influence of a scholar’s work. Additional metrics like the g-index and h-index provide more in depth calculations of scholarly influence. These are only some of the measures to which scholars are currently subject. None is a suitable replacement for reading a scholar’s work. Some other numbers are worth discussion: in 1975, 45.1 percent of professors in the United States were on the tenure track. In 2011, 24.1 percent of professors were on the tenure track, and 16.7 percent had tenure. The number of GTAs increased from 161,000 to 356,000, and the number of part-time professors is up 305.3 percent over the same period (Keith Hoeller 2014). Association of Research Libraries (ARL) data shows that in 2011–12, member libraries spent 44.48 percent of their library budgets on materials (Libraries 2012c), with a 456 percent increase between 1986 and 2012 for ongoing resources (Libraries 2012b), a 322 percent increase for library materials over the same period (Libraries 2012b), while library expenditure as a percentage of university expenditure dropped from over 3.7 percent in 1984 to about 1.8 percent in 2011 (Libraries 2012a). The number of scholarly peer-reviewed articles doubles about every twenty-four years, surpassing fifty million in 2009 (Arif
Jinha 2010). Ninety-eight percent of articles and monographs from arts and humanities scholars are never cited (Frank Donoghue 2008). The cost of subscriptions has gone up at almost double the rate of healthcare over the last forty years, along with the profit margins of scholarly publishers. In 2010, Elsevier’s journal division saw a profit margin of 35.7 percent, which was larger than that of ExxonMobil (Peter Suber 2012).

So, in the system as it currently stands, a thing is only legitimate once it is published. A thing is only published after it has gone through peer review. Publications only add up to a solid tenure case if you have published enough things in the right journals. It is assumed that something has quality if it has gone through the appropriate channels. Professors and even graduate students are killing themselves to get enough publications. Commercial publishers are selling our work back to us at a huge profit for them. We have fewer and continually decreasing opportunities for tenure track jobs. I humbly suggest that this is a story we need to get out of.

Scholarly publishing was never intended to be a moneymaking enterprise. If we buy into the myth of metrics, and allow ourselves to be judged in this way, using this shorthand to determine quality, then, for a sociology scholar, the cover for the contradiction begins to look startlingly like the cover of The American Sociological Review. This should not be read as a denigration of the editorial board of The American Sociological Review or any other journal with a high impact factor—merely a suggestion that if the entire editorial board were working on an open access journal published through a university press, or some consortium, and not through Elsevier, the quality would be the same. The power of ideas lies not within the confines of a journal or a database, but in the minds of the scholars who write and edit the work.

As a way forward, I offer a brief story. Kimberly Douglas, University Librarian at CalTech, a school heavily geared toward science and technology, recently made the decision to cancel subscriptions to all Institute of Physics journals. These are the top journals in the field of physics. The physics faculty was not in the least bit concerned. Physicists, she learned, do not bother reading the top journals in their field. They publish, read and interact with scholarship in an online, open access system called ArXiv. They do still publish in these top journals, however, because they need the markers of legitimacy that those journals provide to make tenure cases to their administration (Holly Mercer 2014). To be clear, I believe that tenure and peer review are crucial elements of academia. These are, however, common sticking points when librarians suggest to faculty that open access is something they ought to at least consider pursuing. Open access in no way suggests a move away from peer review (Suber 2012). I do believe that we have enough infrastructures in place across the United States (and elsewhere) to start thinking about how we can bring all of this work back inside the academy. Scholars already, mostly for no pay, do all of the writing, reviewing, and editing.

A few projects that merit attention are the Digital Public Library of America, The Public Knowledge Project, BioMed Central, PlosOne and DataOne. Some tools that are similar to ArXiv are NINES and Romantic Circles for literary studies; MediaCommons for Media Studies, and Open Humanities Press for critical and cultural theory (Kathleen Fitzpatrick 2011). As a particular point of reference, the University of Tennessee has infrastructure in place to perform many scholarly activities. NewFound Press is the digital imprint for the University of Tennessee, and is part of the university libraries. NewFound Press publishes very specialized titles in e-book form, with a print-on-demand service that is part of the partnership with the University of Tennessee Press. NewFound Press also currently publishes one journal (Press 2014). In some libraries across the country, libraries and university presses have been reorganized into a single unit, or are working in very close partnership (James Mullins et al. 2012). This is a good first step toward extricating the academy from commercial scholarly publishing as it currently exists. Christine Borgman broadly (2007) groups the functions of scholarly communication into three categories: “legitimization; dissemination; and access, preservation, and curation” (p. 75). The first, I argue, should be the job of
the individual discipline, and the latter two should be the job of some arrangement of libraries and university presses or some manner of consortia. As the system currently stands, much of the infrastructure for all three exists outside the bounds of academia, in the for-profit commercial publishing enterprise. Transitioning to a system driven by the academy will be neither easy nor cheap, but in the interest of the academic enterprise, the conversation needs to be pursued.

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