HIROSHIMA, THE HOLOCAUST, AND
THE POLITICS OF EXCLUSION*
1994 Presidential Address

William A. Gamson
Boston College

In most societies, there is an ongoing contest over who is the "we," to whom specific moral obligations apply, and who is the "they," to whom they do not. This paper explores and contrasts the most blatant forms of active exclusion, which includes genocide, and indirect exclusion, which is characterized by subtle forms of exclusion through social invisibility. In genocide, the targeted groups are not simply excluded from life integrity rights, but offenses against them are explicitly encouraged, rewarded, and sanctioned by the regime. In indirect exclusion, the exclusion is implicit in cultural and institutional practices and is often unintentional. I examine the difficulties and dilemmas involved in resisting and preventing active exclusion and in challenging the cultural codes that maintain indirect exclusion.

On this day, the 49th anniversary of the nuclear dawn, our world is full of contradictions. On the one hand, there is abundant evidence of an increasing global consciousness. A transnational environmental movement promotes the idea of planet-wide ecological interdependence. Ideas of common security, which assume mutual interdependence, were once treated as the baggage of soft-minded paceniks, but are now respectable fare in official discourse. Observations about worldwide economic interdependence are now clichés and have become part of the operating assumptions of governments and corporate players.

On the other hand, we live in a world of increasing fragmentation. For example, neighbors with different religions and ethnicities coexisted peacefully in Bosnia-Herzegovina, thinking of themselves as part of the same community, perhaps even as part of a larger community of Yugoslavs or Europeans.1 But within a brief historical moment these neighbors became an "other" to each other, and basic human rights were neither given nor expected in return. Mean-spiritedness, clannishness, tribalism, xenophobia—we can think of many examples of these behaviors at home and abroad. So, while some may be thinking globally, there are clearly many others who don't think beyond their own backyards.

This discourse provokes a sense of déjà vu. Think back to 1946. The passionate tribalism of World War II had begun to subside, but the future seemed uncertain. In the new nuclear age, uncertainty bred anxiety with an edge of terror. The unspeakable horrors

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*Direct correspondence to William A. Gamson, Sociology Department, Boston College, Chestnut Hill, MA 02167. This paper was presented on August 6, 1994 at the Presidential Plenary session of the American Sociological Association meeting in Los Angeles, California. I thank the 90 facilitators who led a discussion of the paper during this session. Many were kind enough to send me detailed comments on an early draft, sometimes several pages in length. Others who read the version distributed at the ASA meeting sent me detailed comments as well. There is insufficient space to acknowledge these comments individually, but I have considered them carefully, made some changes in this paper as a result, and added many items to my future list of books and articles to be read.

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1 Botev (1994) suggests that, peaceful co-existence notwithstanding, there has been considerably less social integration of ethnic minorities in Bosnia than is commonly assumed. Using intermarriage as the key indicator of social integration, he shows that, especially in Bosnia-Hercegovina, Croats, Serbs, and Moslems "remained very much closed (endogamous)" (p. 475).
of the Holocaust were being spoken and seen, giving the world a lasting image of how far the construction of an “other” can ultimately go.

Like today, there were many examples of global consciousness in 1946, or what would then have been called “internationalism.” For example, Boyer (1985), describing the atomic scientists’ movement of that period, cites the five-point statement written in October 1945 that would soon become a rallying cry in their mobilization effort:

1. Other nations will soon be able to produce atomic bombs.
2. No effective defense is possible.
3. Mere numerical superiority in atomic weaponry offers no security.
4. A future atomic war would destroy a large fraction of civilization.
5. Therefore, international cooperation of an unprecedented kind is necessary for survival. (P. 52)

For most, this unprecedented international cooperation was given its fullest expression in a vision of World Government. In late August 1945, only a few weeks after Hiroshima, the New Yorker’s “Notes and Comments” declared that “Nuclear energy insists on global government.” Prestigious journalists, such as Walter Lippman, claimed that nations will be “compelled” to create a world government, not through the persuasion of its advocates, but through “the inevitability of the truth.” The Catholic journal, Commonweal, argued that creating a world state is the only defense against the atomic bomb: “If we do not wish to be morally guilty of suicide, the establishment of such a world power is the only thing left to us.” Kirchwey, writing in the Nation, captured the mood: “We face a choice between one world or none.”

In American public discourse after World War II, isolationism was thoroughly discredited, its advocates effectively silenced. American withdrawal from world affairs after World War I and its failure to support the League of Nations were treated as tragic er-

rors. The concept of “no entangling alliances” with European powers was dismissed as a historical anachronism, inappropriate for the modern world.

A bipartisan consensus existed: No more fortress America. One world. Prominent Republicans and conservatives joined the chorus. Boyer (1985) describes how Mrs. Ogden Reid told delegates to a world affairs conference that the bomb had created “a common kinship, overriding national boundaries.” Even the Reader’s Digest was on board, announcing that “the atomic bomb has made political and economic nationalism meaningless. No longer merely a vision held by a few idealists, world government has now become a hard-boiled, practical, and urgent necessity.”

But, like today, there were strong countercurrents to this vision of one world. The emerging contest over political control of the postwar world in Europe, the Middle East, Africa, and Asia had already begun. Clashes between the United States and the Soviet Union over Soviet troop movements in Iran and Manchuria dominated the United Nations proceedings in March and April of 1946. In Greece, a civil war between pro-Western and pro-Communist forces was underway. The Cold War had yet to solidify, but “One World” was already on its way to becoming two worlds, with the concept of a Third World not far away.

While nationalism was being repudiated in American discourse, it was very much in fashion in the rest of the world. National identities were being asserted as rallying cries for liberation from colonial rule. As wars of national liberation erupted to overthrow colonial regimes, communal violence and threats of civil war loomed in India and Palestine as Great Britain prepared to end its imperial role.

We know what happened after 1946 to the grand ideas of world government and the international control of atomic weapons. Internationalism became defined in the United States as political-military alliances in Europe and elsewhere that opposed and excluded the Soviet Union and its client states. For its advocates, internationalism meant the United States carrying out its mission of defending and spreading political liberty and free markets to the benighted. For those more

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2 This description of the discourse on world government that occurred after World War II is drawn from Boyer’s (1985) rich and thorough account. See especially pages 34–35 and pages 374–75 for the full references for items cited here.
critical of United States foreign policy, "internationalism" came to mean an ideological cover for the projection of American military and political power on a worldwide basis.

But today is not 1946, and the outcome of the cultural contest between voices of global consciousness and voices of nationalism and ethnocentrism is still in doubt. The contest becomes most visible in open historical moments such as the present, when culturally dominant frames have broken down and new ones have not yet become established. The language used here has loaded the dice in favor of more inclusive definitions of collective identity: Globalism, it appears, is the voice of enlightenment; nationalism and ethnocentrism the voices of darkness and ignorance.

Anderson ([1983] 1991) offers a useful caution here:

In an age when it is so common for progressive, cosmopolitan intellectuals . . . to insist on the near-pathological character of nationalism, its roots in fear and hatred of the Other, and its affinities with racism, it is useful to remind ourselves that nations inspire love, and often profoundly self-sacrificing love. The cultural products of nationalism—poetry, prose fiction, music, plastic arts—show this love very clearly in thousands of different forms and styles. (P. 141)

In the following discussion, especially in the critique of false universality, I attempt to recognize the legitimacy and appeal of less inclusive definitions of collective identity.

THE POLITICS OF EXCLUSION

As both Hiroshima and the Holocaust demonstrate, there is a great deal at stake in this ongoing cultural contest. Genocide represents one polar extreme, constructing a pariah group whose members must be destroyed. At the other extreme, inclusion is not contingent on virtue or good behavior; even the most reprehensible acts by one's children, for example, may not be grounds for exclusion from the family.

The cultural contest is over who is the "we," to whom specific moral obligations apply, and who is the "they," to whom they do not. Fein (1977), in trying to understand the dynamics of genocide and sanctioned massacres, uses the concept of a universe of obligation. These are the people who "must be taken into account, to whom obligations are due, by whom we can be held responsible for our actions" (p. 7). Once people are defined as being outside that universe, offenses against them are not violations of the normative order and do not trigger criminal sanctions. Excluding a group from the universe of obligation is a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for genocide.3

Fein (1977) argues that this universe of obligation can be inclusive or exclusive. It is inclusive when its boundaries match the boundaries of the society; it is exclusive when one or more collective categories within the society are outside its boundaries. This definition offers a useful beginning, but it must be elaborated and specified in at least two ways.

First, it is helpful to treat inclusion, not as a dichotomy, but as a continuous, multidimensional variable with many fine gradations. Any group that has experienced discrimination or oppression will remind us of the many available flavors of exclusion. Some forms may be barely noticed by the included but may hurt more than overt and more obvious varieties. Witness this discussion of affirmative action by a group of African Americans reported in Talking Politics (Gamson 1992). Waverly, a nurse's aide in her twenties, Robert, a cook in his thirties, and Tessie, a child-care worker in her thirties, are responding to the question, "Would

3 Scholars who have attempted to analyze and understand the processes that lead to genocide are often frustrated by the tendency to so expand its meaning that the core elements become obscured. While arguments continue about which precise definition is most useful, there is considerable agreement on these core elements. First, the perpetrator is a regime, even though it may employ a variety of covert agents and take other measures to maintain some degree of deniability. Second, the effort is purposeful and sustained over time. Third, it is aimed at the destruction of the target group and is carried out through acts of physical violence. The target group may be defined in terms of some communal characteristic such as race, religion, ethnicity, or nationality, or by its political opposition to a regime. The latter is sometimes called "politicide" to distinguish it from the former, but there is general agreement that both should be included in the phenomena to be explained.
you say that anything that has happened on this issue of affirmative action has affected you personally or has affected your friends and relatives?"

Waverly: I was laid off a job. They just lost all the work in one day, and then they had a meeting that afternoon. And we all lost our jobs. I felt cheated, but there wasn't anything I could really say. My boss told me and my boss's wife—and I'm not prejudiced either—but she told me, "I'm gonna always have a job. It's 'you people' I'm worried about."

Robert: What'd she mean by "you people?"

Waverly: So when she said "you people," I knew she was prejudiced, so when I lost the job, I didn't really care after that.

Tessie: So when you were at your job, you were feeling like they were always looking at you like "you people?"

Waverly: Yeah, all the time.

Tessie: It did something to you mentally.

Waverly: I was shocked when she said that. You know, 'cause I worked with them before this job. I worked with them.

Robert: You ain't got to feel defeated, though.

Waverly: Before she said that, she always, you know, when she moved up in another nursing home and she asked me to come work for her. Called me and asked me, and I told her I couldn't do it. So she asked me why, and I didn't tell her that was the reason, but that's what I felt. She always looked down on me. (Gamson 1992:101–102)

Many different universes of obligation exist simultaneously, each with its own set of rules about how members are to be treated in contrast to outsiders. Only some of the obligations that we feel we owe to our family members are extended to our friends and acquaintances; only some of these extend to other members of the various collectivities with which we may identify—neighborhoods, organizations, movements, and solidarity groups of various sorts; only some of the moral obligations we extend to members of our own society are extended to members of other societies.

Second, the concept of universe of obligation does not adequately capture the important distinction between active exclusion and indirect exclusion. The targets of genocide, for example, are not merely outside the most basic universe of obligation; offenses against them are explicitly encouraged, rewarded and sanctioned by regimes. The destruction of targeted groups becomes itself a moral obligation backed by authorities. Active exclusion contrasts with other forms of exclusion in which the withholding of rights or privileges does not carry obligations to take active measures. In the contrasting case of indirect exclusion, rather than being persecuted, the excluded are often accorded some rights and privileges, albeit less than that provided to the fully included.

In most societies, the boundaries of some of these universes of obligation are often hotly contested and changing. Social movements that challenge cultural codes—the civil rights movement, the women's movement, the gay and lesbian rights movement, for example—typically challenge these boundaries of obligation. Who gets to vote, who gets admitted to the club, who gets to serve in the military, and many other specific issues involve the broader cultural contest over inclusion.4

I focus here only on the two extremes—genocide and mass killings, the most blatant form of exclusion, and social invisibility, the most subtle and indirect form. While there are some continuities of process at different points along the exclusion continuum, there are also important discontinuities in how some of the relevant variables operate and in the strategies of inclusion. Visibility of the target population, for example, is a necessary condition for mobilizing genocide, but social invisibility is a condition for more subtle forms of exclusion.

LIFE INTEGRITY RIGHTS
The most fundamental universe of obligation includes the right to be free of gross violations of what Fein (1990) calls "life integrity rights": to life; to personal inviolability; to

4 This contest is often animated by competition between groups over scarce resources rather than by prejudice or hatred. My purpose here, though, is not to explain the causes of exclusion but to explore the process through which it operates and is maintained.
be free of fear of arbitrary seizure, detention, and punishment; to own one’s body and labor; to free movement; and to procreate and cohabit with family. The ultimate form of exclusion is to be barricaded outside of this universe of rights merely by virtue of membership in a designated collectivity, regardless of one’s own conduct or choice. Genocide, sanctioned massacres, and indiscriminate bombings of civilian populations of the “enemy” in war all imply the existence of an “other” to whom one is not obliged to extend the most basic human rights.

The evils of the twentieth century have produced a rich literature written by those who would have us understand how such horrors can occur, presumably with the hope that people of good will can use this knowledge to prevent their repetition. This hope has remained an elusive goal, but we now understand a good deal about how the process of exclusion operates.

**Genocide and Sanctioned Massacres**

Kelman and Hamilton (1989) explain the social process that allows large numbers of people to carry out the routine, daily actions that are necessary to sustain sanctioned violence against members of an excluded collectivity. They acknowledge that psychological states, such as hatred and rage, may play a part, but these are often outcomes rather than causes of violence-supporting actions: “They serve to provide the perpetrators with an explanation and rationalization for their violent actions and appropriate labels for their emotional state” (Kelman and Hamilton 1989:15). It is more instructive, they suggest, to look at the social processes that erase the usual moral inhibitions against violence rather than at the psychological motives for acting violently.

The three processes that eliminate moral inhibitions are authorization, routinization, and dehumanization:

Through **authorization**, the situation becomes so defined that the individual is absolved of the responsibility to make personal moral choices. Through **routinization**, the action becomes so organized that there is no opportunity for raising moral questions. Through **dehumanization**, the actors’ attitudes toward the target and toward themselves become so structured that it is neither necessary nor possible for them to view the relationship in moral terms. (Kelman and Hamilton 1989:16)

Without awareness of these processes, one might think that genocide was mostly about hatred, intolerance, and hostility toward the “other.” This view focuses attention on a history of deep-seated animosity and prejudice in which genocide is the final result of a slippery slope of active exclusion that, once begun, is difficult or impossible to reverse. In its most active form, in this view, hysteria or mob psychology envelops normally rational people who then willingly, or even enthusiastically, participate in the exclusion process.

But I emphasize the opposite here—an “other” can be easily created without a prior history of animosity, the process is reversible in either direction, and human compliance is typically incomplete and problematic. I readily acknowledge, however, that a history of enmity and lesser forms of exclusion can pave the way for more extreme forms. Hence, a history of anti-Semitism in the Christian church and the larger society made it easier for the Nazi regime to authorize the exclusion of Jews from successive universes of obligation, including ultimately from life integrity rights. But this is more a cultural explanation than a psychological one; the citizens who complied or looked the other way did not themselves need to harbor hostility toward Jews. The past creates sociocultural fault lines that make certain collectivities more likely to be singled out for exclusion when the wrong historical conditions arise.

**The Construction of the Enemy in War**

**Creating and reversing exclusion.** What seems most surprising and noteworthy, however, are the bewilderingly rapid shifts that can take place in this exclusion process and its reversibility. This seems most apparent in international wars and their aftermath, where authorization, routinization, and dehumanization are very much a part of demonizing the enemy in war. No history of past wars or prior exclusion of the enemy seems necessary to move these processes along in a matter of months.
With official promotion and encouragement, images of the enemy emphasizing crude and dehumanizing ethnic and racial stereotypes, backed by dehumanizing language, can permeate a culture rapidly. Distinctions between combatants and noncombatants and between those who exercise power and those who are subject to it become irrelevant. The enemy collectivity is personified in its leaders, and the entire collectivity is moved outside the universe of obligation.

But wars end, and these processes are typically reversed. If the re-humanization and de-authorization process is not quite as rapid, it nevertheless does happen. The gross violations of life integrity rights that prompted virtually no moral reflection at the time are now excused or condemned as the excesses of war. The universe of obligation is retroactively extended to include the civilian population of the former enemy country. Language changes, and the dehumanizing epithets that were routine fare in wartime are treated as inappropriate expressions of bigotry and hatred. With official encouragement, the boundaries of this universe of obligation can move in either direction—more gradually toward inclusion than exclusion—but still, it takes a matter of years rather than decades.

The limits of compliance. As Kelman and Hamilton (1989) emphasize, the processes of exclusion are collective: Authorization and dehumanization involve the actions of a political regime and its agents, and routinization involves a particular social organization of action. The reversal of these processes is equally collective. Individuals, however, must comply for the process to operate, and their compliance is typically problematic and incomplete.

Noncompliance with the exclusion demands of a regime is often widespread, even in situations where it is risky. The choices available to those who face a dilemma of compliance are much broader than simply to obey or disobey. Never underestimate the importance of evasion, what I have elsewhere called The Good Soldier Schweik strategy (Gamson, Fireman, and Rytina 1982:61). This is an individual strategy, not a collective one, in which the people do not openly disobey, but neither do they perform in the manner desired by authorities.

Kelman and Hamilton (1989) give an example of unsuccessful evasion from the My Lai incident, the authors' prototype of the sanctioned massacre. They relate how Lt. William L. Calley, Jr., a platoon leader, told PFC Paul Meadlo that "you know what to do with" a group of villagers Meadlo was guarding. But Meadlo did nothing until Calley returned 15 minutes later and said specifically, "I want them dead," and began shooting the villagers himself. Evasion for Meadlo was no longer possible, and he complied rather than pursuing other strategies, such as resistance. But observers testified that Meadlo, both during the episode and afterward, was sobbing and "all broke up." In spite of the processes of exclusion operating and his ultimate compliance, it would appear that for Meadlo, at least, the Vietnamese villagers were not outside his personal universe of obligation.

Surveillance is necessary to prevent widespread evasion of compliance, and it is frequently difficult, impossible, or excessively expensive to carry out. Authorities also run the risk that if they challenge evasion, the response will not be compliance, but openly rebellious behavior. From the standpoint of authorities, evasion has the special virtue of being an individual rather than a collective response, and hence, is less threatening.

The differences between individual and collective resistance to compliance are enormous. Resisting is a very different process if one is part of a Resistance. As a collective process, resistance is only a middle point in the options available for confronting an unacceptable demand for compliance—not the polar opposite of obedience. Rather than simply resisting authorities, one may take direct action against them, acknowledged or unacknowledged.

It is possible, then, to overrate the power of such processes as, authorization, routinization, and dehumanization, and to underrate the possibilities of counter processes that maintain inclusion in the universe of obligation. The survival of the Jewish population in countries under Nazi occupation often depended on the inclusion practices of local authorities. Fein (1979) emphasizes the resistance to exclusion of Jews by the government, church, resistance, and other national leaders in countries such as Denmark and Finland:
Where state authorities had resisted discrimination and/or church leaders vocally opposed any attempts to justify anti-Semitism or discrimination against Jews, resistance movements usually also identified with Jews. . . . [In such a situation,] leadership usually arose among Gentiles and Jews to avoid the isolation of the Jews, and finally countered the mobilization of the death machine with the mobilization of human lifelines enabling most Jews to evade capture. (Fein 1979:325)

The construction of the enemy in the Persian Gulf War. Similarly, it is not inevitable that mobilization for war will lead to the exclusion of the population of the enemy from the universe of obligation or even that official policy will encourage this exclusion process. Indeed, I argue that the demonization of enemy leaders can help limit the exclusion of an enemy society and nation. The Hitlerization of Saddam Hussein in the Persian Gulf War serves as my example.

The Hitler analogy began in the media even before the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. In early April 1990, Saddam Hussein made a widely reported speech in which he threatened to “scorch half of Israel” if it attacked Iraq. In the aftermath of this speech, various opinion columnists began comparing him to Hitler. In the U.S. Congress, several Senators used the analogy in debates over continuing economic credits to Iraq, mainly to criticize the Reagan and Bush Administrations’ policy toward Iraq as appeasement. As Dorman and Livingston (1994) conclude from their systematic examination of the Washington Post and the New York Times, “The Saddam-Hitler analogy was quite well established before the invasion of Kuwait” (p. 71).

After the August 2 invasion of Kuwait and through January 15, 1991, on the eve of the war, the Saddam-Hitler analogy was invoked in 228 stories, editorials, or columns on Iraq in the Washington Post (N = 121) and New York Times (N = 107) (Dorman and Livingston 1994). President George Bush was the chief instigator. “Invoking the image of Hitler quickly became a near daily occurrence for him,” note Dorman and Livingston (1994:71).

Let me confess that I find the analogy offensive and disturbing. In my personal pantheon of evil, Hitler occupies a unique niche that I dislike seeing cluttered with lesser evils. Nevertheless, the demonization of Saddam—including not only the Hitler analogy but such catch-phrases as the “beast of Baghdad” and the “butcher of Baghdad”—actually helped to prevent the exclusion of the Iraqi people from the universe of obligation.

To the extent that Saddam Hussein was mythologized as ruthless tyrant, the Iraqi people were, by implication, his innocent victims. “We have no argument with the people of Iraq. Indeed, for the innocents caught in this conflict, I pray for their safety,” said George Bush at the beginning of the war (New York Times, January 17, 1991: A6). “All life is precious, whether it’s the life of an American pilot or an Iraqi child,” said the President a week later (New York Times, January 24, 1991: A8). “At every opportunity I have said to the people of Iraq that our quarrel was not with them but instead with their leadership and above all with Saddam Hussein. This remains the case. You, the people of Iraq, are not our enemy. We do not seek your destruction,” said George Bush at the end of the war (Speech, February 27, 1991, reprinted in Sifry and Cerf 1991). Clearly, these words do not support the process of excluding a collective enemy from the universe of obligation.

Many have commented, generally with contempt, on the use of the euphemism “collateral damage” to describe the killing and maiming of civilians in the bombing of Iraq. “Calling it collateral damage serves to dehumanize the victims and make their deaths more acceptable,” Umberson and Henderson (1992:4) observe. But what really seems noteworthy here is not the use of a euphemism, but the fact that its use was deemed necessary. There were no comments by U.S. officials about “collateral damage” at Hiroshima.

There were no “free fire zones” or daily announcements of “body counts” in the Persian Gulf War. On the contrary, there were complaints about the lack of information about military and civilian casualties and about the hypocrisy and exaggeration of the precision of American bombing raids on Iraq. News management aimed at downplaying civilian casualties and keeping them as invisible as possible. Hence, the irritation of war supporters with Peter Arnett, whose
reports for CNN from Baghdad undermined these efforts. His detailed reports on the devastation in Iraqi cities were seen by critics as giving aid and comfort to the enemy. After the bombing of a Baghdad bunker in which hundreds of civilians were killed, Charles Krauthammer (Washington Post, February 14, 1991) felt the need to bolster squeamish Americans who might flinch at such loss of innocent lives:

It is because Iraq cannot undertake a moral critique of anyone that it needs the Western Press to do so for it. . . . What they need is for Iraq’s suffering to go out under a New Zealand accent and a CNN logo. . . . Civilian pain in a war is a horror beyond words. But when a war is just, it must be faced with a kind of nerve. . . . So long as we scrupulously attack what we reasonably believe to be military targets, the bombing of Baghdad is a cause for sorrow, not guilt. (Reprinted in Sifry and Cerf 1991:331–33)

Most U.S. media willingly cooperated with the government’s efforts to minimize the visibility of civilian casualties. Gerbner (1992) reports how NBC collected, but then did not broadcast, uncensored video footage of heavy civilian casualties after NBC President Michael Gartner vetoed it. The video was subsequently offered to CBS for its evening news show, but “the night before it was to air . . ., the show’s executive producer was fired and the report was canceled” (p. 253).

The point here is that suffering of Iraqi civilians during a war needed to be kept invisible. Such efforts only became necessary to the extent that Iraqi civilians, and even rank and file soldiers, continued to be included in the universe of obligation.

Finally, during the Gulf War there was no deliberate or official fanning of anti-Arab sentiment or employment of the dehumanizing stereotypes we are so familiar with from earlier wars. Obviously, given the nature of the anti-Iraq coalition with its central Arab participants, it would have been foolish and counter-productive to employ such stereo-

types. My point, though, is not to credit the Bush Administration for its restraint, but to establish that even in wartime there is nothing inevitable about creating an enemy society whose members are excluded from the universe of obligation.

No doubt it is cold comfort to those who were killed as “collateral damage” that they were not vilified as an enemy before their deaths. But one can be certain that had the exclusion from the universe of obligation been active and officially sanctioned, they would have been joined in death by many more friends and acquaintances. Similar constraints may have shortened the war when American bombing of the defeated and re-treating Iraqi army was halted along the “highway of death.” That authorities worried about the public’s opinion of slaughtering re-treating enemy soldiers is eloquent testimony to the soldiers’ continued inclusion in this universe of obligation, even in wartime.

Preventive Action

These characteristics of the exclusion process—the relative fluidity of the boundaries, the reversibility of the process in either direction, and the partial and problematic nature of compliance—have important implications for the prevention of genocide, sanctioned massacres, and the use of weapons of mass destruction in war. They point to the possibility of identifying early warning signals that such a process is in motion and of spotlighting such processes in the mass media.

Early warning, unfortunately, is necessary but not sufficient to produce effective intervention. Perpetrators of genocide and political murder are usually aware of the fickleness of the media spotlight and the short attention spans of would-be intervenors. They are aware of the conflicts of interest and purpose among other countries and the unwillingness to risk unpopular actions on humanitarian grounds when no material interests are threatened. Symbolic reassurances and delays by the perpetrators are often enough to stall any effective intervention.

The Bosnian example from the early 1990s is instructive. When the war began in April 1992, the Bosnian Serbs had the enormous military advantage of access to the weapon
stockpiles of the Yugoslavian National Army. Their well-armed militias and paramilitary gangs attacked the non-Serbian, predominantly Moslem population in the eastern part of the country. These attacks included repeated massacres, systematic rapes, and other gross violations of life integrity rights.

There can be no clearer case of early warning. Not only were the actions prominently reported in the United States and in the international media, but so was the perpetrator’s chilling label for it—“ethnic cleansing.” Fein, Ezell, and Spirer (1994) note that within four months of the reports of such actions, “a number of organizations publicly recognized that this pattern constituted genocide and called for action to stop it” (p. 3). These organizations included, among others, Helsinki Watch, the U. S. Holocaust Memorial Museum, and the Institute for the Study of Genocide.

Early warning did lead to a response, but many observers condemn it as totally ineffective. My own reading of the evidence is mixed, but there can be little doubt that it was difficult to translate early warnings into effective responses. The insufficiency of early warnings in stopping genocide stems from two central problems.

The first begins with the recognition that genocide is a social construction. GENOCIDE is one way to frame the events in Bosnia, but there is a powerful competitive frame: FEUDING NEIGHBORS. The Bosnian conflict, in this view, is a dirty little ethnic war, a re-emergence of ancient tribal feuds. As Secretary of State Warren Christopher expressed it on the CBS News program, “Face the Nation”:

It’s really a tragic problem. The hatred between all three groups—the Bosnians and the Serbs and the Croats—is almost unbelievable. It’s almost terrifying and it’s centuries old. . . . The United States simply doesn’t have the means to make people in that region of the world like each other. (March 28, 1993)

As Fein et al. (1994) point out, this framing of the Bosnian conflict resonates with a broader realpolitik. The United States and other countries must recognize the limits of their power and preserve it for the protection of vital national interests. If the war in Bosnia is a morass of deep hatred where atrocities occur on all sides, then there is no moral imperative for other countries to intervene. The FEUDING NEIGHBORS frame legitimates inaction and reinterprets the meaning of early warning signs.

Furthermore, the less one knows and understands about a given conflict, the more plausible and even-handed the FEUDING NEIGHBORS frame appears to be. The persuasive power of the GENOCIDE frame grows from a detailed understanding of the context and of specific events; but the FEUDING NEIGHBORS frame requires no exacting demands. This difference suggests that in the framing contest to define the conflict in Bosnia, the GENOCIDE frame will suffer a competitive disadvantage as a way to interpret the meaning of early warning signs.

The second obstacle to translating early warnings into effective intervention is the absence of established institutional means for such intervention. None of the central political and organizational problems for carrying out military intervention are anywhere close to being solved at this point. All of the current organizations for intervention—the United Nations, NATO, and national military forces—are difficult to deploy effectively in situations such as Bosnia. One may criticize the lack of political will of the Bush and Clinton Administrations or of various European governments, but surely the likely unpopularity of military intervention among their electorates is part of what undermines their will. Initial public support is not the calculus here; it is the future political vulnerability when casualties occur and pictures of dead soldiers begin to dominate the news. The impediments to action stem more from the responsiveness of democratic governments to popular opinion rather than their isolation from it.
In sum, awareness of events and early warning of efforts to deprive groups of life integrity rights is an important step in preventing and reversing a genocidal process. But the real problem is not in knowing what is happening early enough, but in knowing how to translate this knowledge into actions that can stop the perpetrators.

INVISIBILITY AND EXCLUSION

Active exclusion requires visibility. To remove individual members of a group from a universe of obligations extended to others one must be able to distinguish them from the others. Many Jews in Germany did not "look Jewish"; most homosexuals were in the closet and not easily identified. Hence, the invention of yellow stars, pink triangles, and identity papers to specify group membership.

This collective visibility contains within it an individual invisibility—a de-individuation of members of the category. In the most extreme version, individuals have their names, their hair, and other distinguishing characteristics taken from them as they are turned into a number. In the more subtle and indirect version, others do not see a person in their individuality, but see only a personification of some collective. This is the sense in which the late Ralph Ellison called his protagonist "The Invisible Man" and the reason why Waverly, in the conversation presented earlier, finds the phrase "you people" so offensive.

An emphasis on the person as an individual is central to what Carbaugh (1988) calls "talking American." His rich and subtle analysis of audience discussion on the popular television talk show, "Donahue," describes the equivocal enactment of individuality and community. Using the symbol of the person as an individual, speakers can transcend the differences implied when people are discussed as members of social groups—as men and women, Blacks and Whites, or other collective categories. One thus asserts that in being individuals we are simultaneously all alike and each unique—a definition of persons is constructed which enables meanings of both a common humanity and a separate humanness" (Carbaugh 1988:23).

This simultaneous enactment of uniqueness and common humanity has contradictory implications for the politics of exclusion. It is, on the one hand, a healthy antidote to the active exclusion of individuals from a universe of obligation. It argues for color blindness, for equal opportunity, and against discrimination—no "you people" allowed here. But in privileging the rights of individuals and the universality of our common humanity, this discourse makes the articulation of collective identity problematic. The assertion of injustices based on social inequalities, for example, must contend with a culturally normative response that asserts that we are all individuals, and that implicitly denies the relevance of social location and group differences in experience. This suppressing of collective identities and shared experiences can create its own subtle form of invisibility and exclusion.

Invisibility is silencing. Not seen means not heard. This politics of exclusion is captured perfectly by the "Don't ask, don't tell" policy of dealing with gays and lesbians in the military. The bargain offered is "We will not pursue active exclusion measures if you accept indirect exclusion by remaining silent and invisible." Exclusion through invisibility, then, requires the collusion of the excluded group.

Indirect exclusion through invisibility is clearly preferable to active exclusion. It is better not to be seen at all than to be beaten, raped, or killed. But one should hardly be surprised that members of an excluded group are often unwilling to collude in such a bargain or to feel gratitude to those who offer invisibility in exchange for relative safety. For a generation that experienced the brutality of active exclusion, invisibility may seem a small price for security. A less cowed younger generation may be less likely to accept exclusion through invisibility, believing that "Silence = Death."

The strategic problems of challenging active exclusion and indirect exclusion are quite different, and in discussing them I make a shift in viewpoint. Active exclusion from life integrity rights implies an enormous imbalance of power between perpetrator and victim. The perpetrator has available all the resources and repressive apparatus of a state or a state-like entity. Given this power
imbalance, a preventive viewpoint focuses on organized third parties who might potentially intervene, or on collective resistance by those asked to carry out crimes of obedience. Indirect exclusion, however, relies on collusion with the excluded, and the goal of the excluded is change rather than prevention. Hence, I shift my focus to the strategic problems and dilemmas of potential challengers to indirect exclusion.

Resistance to acts of genocide has the benefit of having a relatively clear target. Although some perpetrators employ covert agents, such as death squads, to provide some semblance of plausible deniability, they remain identifiable political actors. In contrast, indirect exclusion operates throughout a range of social institutions, practices, and cultural codes that are generally taken for granted. State policies may contribute to indirect exclusion, but the exclusion operates through the whole of civil society. Visibility is a condition, not only of the excluded, but of the excluder as well, and this creates its own set of strategic problems.7

In the remainder of this paper, I explore three central dilemmas experienced by potential challengers to indirect exclusion: (1) the dilemma of identity politics, (2) the dilemma of adversarial frames and (3) the dilemma of mass media standing. In some respects, these three dilemmas are experienced by every movement group, even if it is not making claims for inclusion, but I focus here on the particular form they take in the politics of exclusion.

The Dilemma of Identity Politics8

Potential challengers to indirect exclusion are faced with the daunting task of mobilizing resources to change the policies and practices of powerful, well-organized, and well-entrenched adversaries. Often these adversaries are ready and willing to retaliate against the

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7 J. Gamson (1989) develops this argument in his analysis of the dynamics and activities of the AIDS activist group, ACT-UP, and its struggle with the problem of the “invisible enemy.”

8 I am especially indebted to Sharon Kurtz, Cassie Schwerner, and Josh Gamson for many of the ideas in this section and for steering me to relevant literature that I might have otherwise missed.
potential galvanizing power of an identity politics that validates the multiple and interacting collective identities of its participants. The issue here is not political correctness, but organizational effectiveness.

The dilemma, then, is to find an alternative to lowest-common-denominator politics, one that allows participants to assert the full range of their relevant collective identities without having these identity assertions deteriorate into a faceless and divisive competition over who is the biggest victim. There must be ways of avoiding a false universality and a contest in which the winner is the one who can claim the deepest or greatest multiplicity of exclusion and oppression.

A number of feminist writers, many of them women of color, have offered a solution to this dilemma. As a substitute for "either/or" identity categories, Collins (1991) suggests "both/and." "Depending on the context," she writes, "an individual may be an oppressor, a member of an oppressed group, or simultaneously oppressor and oppressed" (pp. 225–26). Rather than a model in which each struggle is defined by a single identity, the problem is reframed as a generalized "matrix of domination" that makes certain dimensions relevant for particular individuals in particular struggles.

What is shared here is the challenge to systems of exclusion rather than to a single exclusion shared by all. To quote hooks (1989), "It's like a house. They share the foundation but the foundation is the ideological beliefs around which notions of domination are constructed" (p. 75). Unlike an identity in lowest-common-denominator politics, in which one is asked to accept a particular collective identity as primary, this alternative allows for the interaction of multiple systems of domination that may differ for participants with different backgrounds and experiences.

The practice of multi-identity politics has yet to clearly emerge. In contrast to being silent about identities that all members do not share, it calls for visibility and acknowledgment of members' differences. But awareness of difference is insufficient. How does one reconcile this with the fact that a given campaign often challenges exclusion on the basis of a particular identity? And how does one acknowledge that the "we" is diverse and has fuzzy boundaries while operating in a political opportunity structure that supports inclusion claims only when they are translated into a primary identity interest group or, better yet, as a distinct market. And how does one validate these multiple identities in practice without impaling oneself on the horn of divisive internal conflict and fragmentation?

Kurtz (1994) makes a promising beginning, offering the concept of a distinct set of "identity practices." These practices are a set of specific challenger behaviors and actions, many seemingly insignificant in their own right, that in aggregate construct the challenger's collective identity. These practices include:

1. **Framing of the issues and movement.** Here the question is the extent to which the demands of the struggle articulate only a single shared injustice or recognize other sources of injustice that are important to particular subgroups. How the struggle is named, how it is defined in campaign literature, speeches, signs, and chants are all framing practices that make various identity elements more or less visible.

2. **Outside support.** Here the question is which third parties initiate contact with the challenger or are approached for support. To the extent that these outside supporters are recognized as carriers of some collective identity, their support constitutes an identity practice.

3. **Internal culture.** Here the question is whether the music, food, language, and other aspects of participant culture reflect the multiplicity of identities of the constituents.

4. **Organizational structure and leadership.** Here the question is whether the practices by which the challengers conduct their affairs are congruent with the realities of members' lives or whether they (unintentionally) privilege a particular subgroup of members. The composition of leadership and the extent to which it reflects the multiplicity of identities among participants is itself a major identity practice.

Any of the above practices can reflect a lowest-common-denominator strategy or some version of the multiple-identity alternative. This discussion has emphasized the advantages of accepting diversity in facing this identity dilemma, but the risks and difficulties remain in practice. Kurtz (1994), em-
phasizing the tricky choreography, wistfully acknowledges that "there is no magic trick which banishes the dangers of multi-oppression politics" (p. 6).

**The Dilemma of Adversarial Frames**

*Even anger against injustice*

*Makes the voice grow harsh. Alas, we*

*Who wished to lay the foundations of kindness*

*Could not ourselves be kind.*

—Bertolt Brecht (1976)

The dilemma of identity politics focuses on the internal dynamics of mobilizing challengers, but a different dilemma arises in directing action against an external target. Students of social movements emphasize the importance of collective action frames in inspiring and legitimating actions and campaigns (Ryan 1991; Gamson 1992; Snow and Benford 1992). There is incomplete consensus on what the components of these frames are, but one element emphasized by many writers is an adversarial, or "we-they" component.

Adversarial frames are not the only alternative available. Some groups attempt to mobilize their constituents with an all-inclusive "we." We are the world, humankind, or, in the case of domestic issues, all good citizens. Such an aggregate frame turns the "we" into a pool of individuals rather than a potential collective actor. The call for action is personal—for example, to make peace, hunger, or the environment one's own responsibility.

These aggregate frames seem especially inappropriate for groups challenging exclusion. Exclusion implies an "other" who is included. Framing the target as an abstraction—hunger, pollution, war, poverty, disease—makes invisible both the "we" and the "they" involved. If pollution is the problem and we are all polluters, then "we" are "they," and neither agent nor target is a collective actor. In adversarial frames, in contrast, "we" and "they" are differentiated rather than conflated.

Students of social movements with a wide variety of orientations have emphasized a sense of injustice as part of the political consciousness that supports collective action (e.g., Moore 1978; McAdam 1982:51; Turner and Killian 1987:242). Adversarial frames have the advantage of dovetailing and reinforcing this injustice component of collective action frames.

Emotions other than indignation can be stimulated by perceived inequities—cynicism, bemused irony, or resignation, for example. Only an injustice frame, however, taps the righteous anger that puts fire in the belly and iron in the soul. It is what cognitive psychologists call a "hot cognition"—one laden with emotion (see Zajonc 1980).

An injustice frame calls attention to a group of motivated human actors who carry some of the onus for bringing about harm and suffering. By defining a "they" who are responsible and can change things, adversarial frames supply the target for indignation and action in a way that aggregate frames cannot. Vague and abstract definitions of the target diffuse indignation and make it seem foolish. An adversarial frame integrates the different components of collective action frames by supplying both a "we," who can act as an agent of change, and a "they" who are responsible for injustice and can be called to account.

For all their advantages, adversarial frames have a number of serious disadvantages and problems as well. The process of indirect exclusion is often maintained and reproduced by abstract sociocultural forces and carried out by agents without conscious awareness or intent to exclude. Alinsky (1972) pinpoints the problem for organizers:

> In a complex urban society, it becomes increasingly difficult to single out who is to blame for any particular evil. There is a constant, and somewhat legitimate, passing of the buck. . . . One big problem is a constant shifting of responsibility from one jurisdiction to another—individuals and bureaus one after another disclaim responsibility for particular conditions, attributing the authority for any change to some other force. (Pp. 130–31)

This problem of an elusive target is especially difficult for groups that challenge exclusion operating through cultural codes that seem natural and are taken-for-granted. If one is attacking the dominant cultural code about what is "normal" with respect to sexual orientation or gender relations in the workplace, for example, the decisions of govern-
ment authorities and powerful corporate actors may be secondary. In solidifying and specifying the target through an adversarial frame, there is a danger that challengers will miss the underlying structural conditions that produce the exclusion. They may exaggerate the role of human actors, fail to understand underlying structural causes, and misdirect their anger at easy and inappropriate targets. This is a path to ineffectiveness and frustration, or perhaps even worse.

Even if the target is appropriate, there is a danger inherent in the creation of an “other” against whom action is directed. Many collective actions involve doing something disruptive, embarrassing, or harmful to the target. To enable such action, one must remove this adversary, at a minimum, from the universe of obligation that extends to one’s supporters and neutral third parties. “They” have forfeited their right to dignity and respect—or sometimes even to life integrity rights—through their perpetration or complicity in injustice.

The exclusion processes that we examined earlier (especially authorization and dehumanization) become relevant in mobilizing participants to act against the “other.” The challenging group replaces the state as the agent of authorization and using dehumanizing language, such as calling the adversary “pigs,” can become acceptable or even fashionable among participants. Individuals come to be excluded by virtue of their membership in a collective adversary, independent of any specific actions on their part. Hence, it is quite possible for adversarial frames to create new victims in the name of overcoming past injustices.

The dilemma of adversarial frames is how to tap the mobilizing power of righteous indignation without directing it in ways that create a “they” who is outside the universe of obligation of life integrity rights. The most serious and sustained effort to deal with this dilemma is found in the Gandhian tradition of satyagraha and ahimsa. (For useful discussions of the ideology and practice of nonviolence see Gandhi 1951; Bondurant 1971; Sharp 1978; Merton 1980; Hanigan 1984; Holmes 1990; and Barash 1991.) There are clear opponents in this tradition, but the tradition requires an active commitment to and respect for the opponent’s humanity. Rather than viewing adversaries as an enemy to be overcome, the satyagrahi considers them potential participants in a search for a just solution.

Satyagraha attempts to tap the anger at injustice, directing it at the sin rather than the sinner. One hates the system that produces injustice, not its agents. It seeks not to purge anger, but to control and direct its energy in a way that transforms the adversary into an ally. In theory, then, it gains the advantages of an adversarial frame without ignoring the structural roots of the injustice or creating new injustices in a cycle of escalating hostility.

One can, in such an alternative frame, separate attributions of blame for the past from attributions of responsibility for the future. Directing attention at what “they” need to do to remedy an injustice rather than their responsibility for creating it is less likely to create an excluded “other.”

Although excluded groups in American society have often borrowed from the strategy and tactics of nonviolent action, satyagraha has not transferred easily to American culture as a philosophy or a way of life. Religious and spiritually inspired movements are an exception, but for many secular activists, it appears mushy and sentimental compared to in-your-face confrontation. For Martin Luther King, Jr., the nonviolent tactics of the civil rights movement were based on his commitment to a belief system of nonviolence. Many of his followers, however, embraced the tactics purely on instrumental grounds. Nonviolent actions, such as demonstrations, sit-ins, and boycotts, seemed to work well and produce positive results in particular contexts.

This pragmatic and utilitarian commitment to nonviolence is well represented in the work of Sharp (1978), whose arguments justify the strategy in the hard currency of costs and benefits to the participants who use it. “Both moral injunctions against violence and exhortations in favor of love and nonviolence,” he writes, “have made little or no contribution to ending war and major political violence.” Sharp’s efforts are directed at finding functional equivalents—that is, sanctions that make life miserable for the adversary without using violence.

It demands a great deal from the excluded to separate hatred of the offending system
from hatred of the system's willing agents. The utilitarian commitment to nonviolence does not require this distinction, and hence, it does not address the dilemma of adversarial frames as fundamentally as does satya-graha. If once powerful opponents become weak and vulnerable, the practical reasons for constraint disappear and erstwhile oppressors may find themselves targets of active exclusion measures.

But even nonviolence on purely instrumental grounds slows the exclusion process and makes it easier to reverse. Nonviolent sanctions, while they exclude the adversary from some of the normally extended obligations of respect, do not require the social psychological mechanisms necessary for withdrawing life integrity rights. Even if adopted purely on instrumental grounds, a commitment to nonviolence can keep in check the potential for active exclusion that is inherent in adversarial frames.

The Dilemma of Mass Media Standing

Cultural visibility in America means media visibility. The absence of a media voice is a primary measure of cultural exclusion, and hence, the inclusion process can be traced by examining the extent to which a group has gained media standing. The inclusion of a collective actor means that individual sources are quoted as its spokespersons or representatives.9

For a group challenging cultural codes, the relationship with the media is two-sided and fraught with peril. With an elusive target, like cultural codes, the mass media often become the central site of action. To the extent that they reflect the cultural code being challenged, they are necessarily an adversary. But because they also can amplify the challenge and expand its audience and can help it reach the many settings in which the cultural code operates, the media are necessarily a potential ally as well. Hence the characteristic love-hate approach so many challengers take toward the mass media.

Some media norms and practices can be exploited by challengers, but these opportunities often come with hidden strings attached.10 Challengers provide something of value to journalists—drama, conflict, action, colorful copy, and good photo opportunities. But they operate in a competitive environment with many rival event-providers and are only one source of news among many.

Furthermore, challengers operate at a competitive disadvantage. When reporters are given continuing assignments or beats, they are rarely assigned to cover challengers and are unlikely to establish routine relationships with their spokespersons. Challengers must not only compete with other sources of news for media attention, but they must compete against sources who have already established regular media access.

Officials are granted automatic media standing and can concentrate simply on the message they wish to convey. Challengers, however, must deal with a potential contradiction between what it takes to gain attention and the most effective way of getting their message across once they have been noticed. Members of the club can enter the media forum through the front door, are treated with respect, and are given the benefit of the doubt. Challengers, in contrast, often need to find a gimmick or an act of disorder to force the door open, and this is not always consistent with or helpful to the group's claim for inclusion. As Gamson and Wolfsfeld (1993) put it, "Those who dress up in costume to be admitted to the media's party will not be allowed to change before being photographed" (p. 122).

This dilemma is especially acute when the visibility offered by the media emphasizes entertainment over journalism and relies on brief visual images. The challengers may not be able to control whom the media selects as spokespersons; by emphasizing entertain-

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9 Note that politically or economically excluded groups may still be culturally visible and have spokespersons with standing in the media. Cultural inclusion does not necessarily imply inclusion in other ways; nor does cultural invisibility imply that members of the group are necessarily excluded in other ways:

ment, the media may influence internal leadership by recognizing some people or groups and ignoring others. Some media-designated leaders may have had few if any followers before their media anointment, but with their media-created celebrity, such "leaders" may acquire a following. Gitlin (1980) describes this effect for the American New Left movement of the 1960s: "The all-permeating spectacular culture insisted that the movement be identified through its celebrities; naturally, it attracted personalities who enjoyed performance, who knew how to flaunt some symbolic attribute, who spoke quotably" (p. 153).

This dilemma has an even more subtle and difficult aspect for those who challenge cultural exclusion. Media images can be treated as texts made up of visual images, sound, and language. The difficulties of tracking the messages in these texts are compounded by the problem of layers of meaning. Some part of the meaning is "naturalized"—that is, it comes to us as taken-for-granted assumptions and is uncontested. Social constructions in this realm of discourse appear as transparent descriptions of reality, not as interpretations, and are apparently devoid of political content. Journalists dealing with naturalized images feel no need to solicit different points of view for balance.

There is also a contested realm of discourse in which collective actors offer competing interpretations. It is a major achievement for challengers of cultural codes when they succeed in moving issues from the uncontested to the contested realm. Gamson and Wolfsfeld (1993) liken the cultural obstacle to achieving this to a conversation between a monolingual and bilingual speaker. The monolingual media speak only "mainstreamese, and movements are pushed to adopt this language to be heard since journalists are prone to misunderstand or never hear the alternative language and its underlying ideas" (p. 119). In adopting this strategy, challengers are likely to feel, with justification, that something has been lost in translation. For movements challenging cultural codes, this may feel like a surrender of some fundamental aspects of their raison d'être.

Does one, then, challenge cultural codes in fundamental ways, thus risking being denied media standing altogether or being branded as a dangerous threat to the social order? Or does one accept most of what is normally taken for granted, and cast the challenge in the most culturally acceptable way, risking being forced to settle for a few symbolic gestures that change little or nothing? Successful challengers must find a path between these two perils.

The first part of this dilemma—the problem of gaining attention through actions that discredit or compromise the challenger's desired message—can potentially be handled by a division of labor among challengers. Those who engage in the actions designed to gain standing do not also attempt to be the main carrier of the alternative framing message. Instead, they defer to comrades who do not carry the baggage of deviance and can also articulate the alternative frame.

There are times when such a division of labor appears to work, but success is not easily achieved. Internal rivalries between different movement actors can undermine a convenient division of labor. Differences in tactics can reflect how seriously a deeply ingrained cultural code is being challenged. Those whose actions open the door for others to gain media standing may often find that their preferred frame is poorly represented by those who have become spokespersons in the media.

To complicate matters further, these internal squabbles can easily become a central part of the media's story on the challengers. The pragmatic and cynical subculture of journalists does not articulate well with the more idealistic and righteous subculture of movement activists. Challengers seem to demand unreasonable and unrealistic changes and to have a self-righteousness that is unappealing to those who are living with the inevitable compromises of daily life. Social movements nag at people and call them to account. This means that conflicts and peccadillos within a movement organization will hold a special fascination for journalists, giving them an opportunity to even the score from their standpoint. To quote Gamson and Wolfsfeld (1993), "The fall of the righteous is a favored media story wherever it can be found and movements offer a happy hunting ground" (p. 12).

Even when a public squabble is avoided, the problem of using the media to challenge
taken-for-granted assumptions remains. In American political culture, a discourse on equal rights offers an established way of making inclusion claims. This discourse pushes the challenger to demonstrate similarity to the mainstream, accepting the basic premises of ethnic and interest-group politics. Inevitably, this mutes the challenge to cultural codes, focusing the struggle for inclusion on extending the existing rules to additional categories—Blacks, women, gays and lesbians, the handicapped.

Those among the challengers who would deconstruct the categories themselves or push for group autonomy rather than equal rights are not included in this discourse, even though their actions may have paved the way to media standing for their comrades. Hence, the division-of-labor strategy does not really solve the dilemma of gaining media standing, but instead pushes it back to the arena of internal identity politics.

CONCLUSION

I have explored the two poles of exclusion: one expressed in the systematic and active deprivation of life integrity rights and the other in the subtle and less acknowledged form of indirect exclusion. To compare is not to equate. The two kinds of exclusion remain a world apart with respect to both the moral responsibility of the excluder and the pain and suffering of the excluded. It is refreshing to have an African American woman remind us that “if I, a black women poet and writer, a professor of English at State University, if I am oppressed then we need another word to describe a woman in a refugee camp . . . or any counterpart in South Africa” (June Jordan, as quoted in Parmar 1987).

Granting the enormous difference between active exclusion and indirect exclusion, it ill behooves those of us who rarely experience the repeated stings of indirect exclusion to dismiss it because it is not “real” oppression. It is real enough to those who must deal with it, and it deserves to be taken seriously in its own right. I have tried to do this by addressing the dilemmas that confront those who are no longer willing to sit at the back of the bus, but instead challenge the institutions, practices, and cultural codes designed to keep them there. I have emphasized differences and discontinuities in these poles of exclusion. But lest the similarities be lost, let me highlight the generic properties that unite them. All exclusion processes depend on the creation of an “other” who is outside one or more universes of obligation. This other-creating process has certain tendencies and sub-processes that apply across the whole continuum. The underlying social psychological mechanisms involved, such as dehumanization and authorization, operate throughout. I have argued here that they can be controlled to some degree and are reversible by human agents, but this does not make them easy to control. The other-creating process sets in motion a set of forces that help keep it moving toward more direct and active forms of exclusion. Every group has grievances and miseries. In creating an other, then, one is creating a potential scapegoat that can be used to explain and excuse continuing or worsening problems. This onus, in turn, justifies adopting more active forms of exclusion as a punishment.

The consequences of these other-creating processes are much more lethal when the agents are despots who control the repressive apparatus of the state. But they operate as well in the other-creating processes of those who, to quote Brecht (1976) again, “wish to lay the foundations of kindness.” Tales of the formerly excluded who later act to exclude others are a familiar cultural theme for which we can all supply examples.

The continuities here are cultural as well as social psychological. Universes of obligation are culturally maintained, and changes in them represent cultural changes. While rules of exclusion are often codified in laws or regulations, many are informally maintained and visible primarily through changes in public discourse. The kind of naming and framing processes that signal and authorize changes in the boundaries of obligation operate across the continuum. An unwillingness to use gender-inclusive language sends the same underlying message to women in the 1990s as the sign “No Irish Need Apply” sent to Irish immigrants in the 1850s. Again, the consequences of exclusion may be quite different, but the cultural code of “otherness” remains the same.

My intent, of course, is not simply to gain a better understanding of processes of exclu-
sion, but also to suggest ways to prevent active exclusion and to challenge indirect exclusion. Like any sociological analysis with an action or policy agenda, I implicitly address the issues from the perspective of social actors who can influence social policy. My approach differs, however, in the particular actor perspective employed.

Policy analysis, including the sociological variety, often involves an implicit managerial perspective. The assumed social actors addressed are state and corporate managers who have the ability to make decisions that collectively produce public policy on the issue being analyzed. In contrast, the assumed social actors I have addressed in this paper are the targets of exclusion and the sympathetic third parties who could mobilize to intervene on their behalf.

Violations of life integrity rights necessarily depend on enormous power differentials. A group with the power to organize an effective defense against active forms of exclusion will use it; hence, the existence of a threat implies the necessity of mobilizing outside support from sympathetic third parties. The collective actors addressed here are coalitions of excluded groups and third-party allies—especially nongovernmental organizations and transnational social movements—who are attempting to mobilize preventive actions by states or international actors. What advice does this analysis suggest for these would-be agents trying to prevent genocide? I wish I could offer a convincing formula for overcoming the problems raised, but I must settle for offering a diagnosis.

First, early warning is insufficient. Broadcasting an early warning that a genocidal process is underway is useful and necessary, but more fundamental obstacles to preventing genocide arise from:

1. The inherent disadvantages of the GENOCIDE frame. The GENOCIDE frame suggests action and competes with an appealing alternative, FEUDING NEIGHBORS, which suggests inaction. Without a more effective strategy for winning this symbolic contest, early warning will be ignored again and again and inaction will win.

2. The absence of established institutional means for carrying out effective intervention. This is reflected especially in the reluctance of democratic governments to take actions that are likely to be unpopular in the future. The current electoral calculus of intervention to prevent genocide is one in which there is little or nothing to gain politically, and there is potentially much to lose. Under these circumstances, it seems likely that politicians in democratic countries will find face-saving ways to avoid real commitments, waiting until the media spotlight turns elsewhere allowing them to ignore the situation altogether.

Indirect exclusion through invisibility, in contrast to active exclusion, depends on the cooperation of the excluded to maintain it. While the exclusion is maintained by institutional and cultural practices they do not control, the excluded can themselves be effective challengers. What advice can I offer to targets of such cultural exclusion?

My advice is to make the devil's bargain with the mass media to gain the visibility you need, but be wary and vigilant. This particular devil does not require your soul as long as you give good spectacle. But be warned that the path is lined with hidden traps, and it is often uphill. Understanding the hidden traps can help you to negotiate it successfully.

Beware, also, of the dangers inherent in the other-creating process lest you and your comrades become oppressors yourselves. If possible, convert your adversaries rather than excluding them. Finally, recognize that the very same exclusion processes in the system you are challenging can operate internally. Do not exclude within your group in the name of overcoming exclusion outside it.

"Never again" may be an undeliverable promise, but it still remains a noble vision. If sociology can contribute to a clearer understanding of the politics of exclusion, relevant social actors will be better able to devise strategies for preventing and reversing processes of exclusion. I offer no clear action formulas, but highlighting dilemmas and potential problems is a necessary step in the effort to deliver on the promise of inclusion.

William A. Gamson is Professor of Sociology at Boston College and co-director of the Media Research and Action Project. His primary interest is in the media and public education strategies of social change organizations. His current research, in collaboration with other American and
German scholars, compares the construction of abortion discourse in Germany and the United States and the role of social movements in shaping this discourse.

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