SOCIETY AND THE WORLD CRISIS*

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My choice, six months ago, of the subject of this address involved a definite risk. Events might have robbed it of most of its pertinence. I am not implying that the outbreak of a third world war would render sociology powerless to make vital contributions to the planning and development of a world order, but only that the situation would then be so changed as to call for contributions of a different kind. It is almost certain that at the end of a third global conflict either the Cominform group of nations or the North Atlantic group would emerge with world power firmly in its grasp. The problem then would be to foster accommodative processes both among the various peoples subject to the world authority and within the structure of that authority itself. Only thus could sanguine rebellions be avoided.

The problem that has to be faced in the present circumstances is quite different. There is no effective world authority. The real foci of power are national states clustered into two blocs. They are jockeying for advantage by political and military means. If this jockeying is not to lead to a global war or at least to a "cold war" lasting for generations—and I assume that none of us wants either of these—another course of action must be charted. Certainly a great deal of political wisdom and the contributions of other social sciences must go into the charting of this course, but I hope that it is not merely a professional predilection that makes me believe that sociology has a focal role to play. The path to peace that is chosen must be both sociologically possible and sociologically efficient. To judge what is possible we need to marshal present theory and knowledge; to determine what lines of action would be efficient we need the guidance that can come from new research findings. It will be my aim to deal provisionally with both of these questions.

As a basic assumption, and I think there is much evidence of its validity, I am going to suggest the theory, formulated many years ago by Charles Horton Cooley, that all social structure develops according to a tentative process. You will recall that he believed selective adaptation is everywhere at work. He saw social units, whether persons, groups or institutions, sending out feelers into the environing world, like the tentacles of a grape-vine. Those that catch on or "work" are followed up by development; those that do not, wither and die. Since forms are in constant interaction with

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one another, the process of development is at the same time a process of organization. The participants may or may not be conscious of what is taking place. With respect to the evolution of their language they are not, but in the case of a revolutionary party they are.

The tentative process gives us, I think, a useful conception for exploring what is today possible, and what will be efficient, in the promotion of international peace. An appraisal of the solidity and tendencies of existing social forms will give us a clue to the possible; research on the success of developments now being tried out will give rational guidance for the future.

An historical circumstance of great significance is that the nation-state is a stubborn fact. We may dream about the abolition of nationalism and the substitution of internationalism, but at present this is sheer fantasy. Peace will have to be achieved through nations, not in by-passing them. National power is today so great that its subversion everywhere in the cause of worldwide revolution is unthinkable. The hope lies in modifying the nationalistic spirit so that peaceful coexistence is possible.

A second condition that must influence our thought about the kind of peace that is feasible is the resistance of national social structures to radical change. Peoples relinquish cherished customs and values with the greatest reluctance. It will therefore be prudent to envisage an organization of the world in which the necessary meshing of national social structures will entail the absolute minimum of internal reorganization. So far as possible the international structure should be projected on existing national foundations.

Even though the power and universality of the United Nations are today in doubt, we must accept the existence of that body as a third condition. Before the Korean war, it might have been argued that peaceful relations could best be institutionalized in some other way. Since the successful repulse of aggression there, however, we must expect that the United Nations will continue to carry the hopes of the world in the struggle for lasting peace. Unless its effective operation becomes impossible through the use of the veto, it will almost certainly play a dominant role in the near future. Even if it fails, the United Nations will remain something to be reckoned with. A new and different type of organization would certainly try to salvage as many of the programs of the United Nations and its Specialized Agencies as have proved their worth in furthering cooperation among nations.

The peace-that-is-possible, then, must be one that reconciles, through a supranational body, nations having great dissimilarities. It would be reassuring indeed if we could look forward to a quick convergence of cultures sufficient to afford the base for the erection of a monolithic world state. But this would be wishful thinking of the most unmitigated kind. We know too much about the processes of social evolution to entertain any such hope. If convergence does occur, it will be the result of long and broad interaction among the peoples of the globe. In the meantime the world will have to get along with some kind of federation that, in spite of cultural diversity, can wield effective power. What further specification can we give to this immediate goal?

Though the distinction cannot be sharply drawn, there are two types of social norms that concern world peace—those that cover relations among men within nations, and those that cover relations among men who interact as representatives, official or unofficial, of their several states. Although norms of the former type might seem to have only an internal significance to each state, they do in fact play a great role in international affairs. Religious, economic or political systems different from those of one's own culture arouse suspicion, fear, and hostility. Quite apart from any proselytizing or imperialistic activities, there is a sense of threat. Alien norms, even when operative in distant countries upon their own peoples, breed international distrust.

Norms regulating the relations among nations are of course embryonic as yet. It is to develop and enforce them that a supranational organization is so essential in the
modern world. Their number, however, need not be large. There are two broad areas of interaction that must be covered. One comprises relations involved in the movement of goods and persons from one country to another. International finance, trade, and migration must be carried on in terms of agreed rules or standards. The other comprises power relations among states. Countries must have confidence that they will not be subject to military attack or exploitative pressures from abroad. The resistance of the United Nations to the North Korean aggression is vitally important just because it has set a precedent for the enforcement of international norms in such cases.

Although the two types of norms might seem quite unrelated, in fact they are not. The sense of threat which is occasioned by the existence in foreign lands of alien religious, economic and political practices would be largely obviated if all peoples in the world were sure that any breach of international law would be quickly and effectively countered by punitive measures. We would all be much more likely to tolerate the strange ways of other cultures if we felt that there was no danger of their being imposed on us.

This essentially negative approach to tolerance is, however, not enough. It is one thing to accept our neighbor’s strange behavior because we know the policeman will keep him from making us do likewise, but it is another to respect that behavior as the prerogative of a human being with just as much right as ourselves to self-determination. Live-and-let-live must become a positive policy. Mutual respect must itself become a norm for the relations among nations.

These considerations lead me to suggest that the short-run objective for those who want peace must be the dual one of developing an effectively enforced international law and of institutionalizing tolerance of the cultural differences among nations. In future generations men may set their goal higher, but the present generation at least will be lucky if it achieves this one.

Before passing to the question of means, we need to say a word about general strategy. At the moment it seems almost inconceivable that the Soviet Union and the United States could accept a common supranational authority of any kind. Obviously the situation demands a plan for action by peace-lovers over a considerable period of time. Columnists, military strategists and statesmen are constantly putting forward their prescriptions. Has a sociological point of view anything original to offer? In my attempt to show that it has, I will be as objective as possible, but I should frankly admit that the type of federation proposed would be much more acceptable to the North Atlantic bloc than to the Cominform bloc. In that sense, I think the task is one of maintaining our position in its essentials while persuading the Soviet Union and its satellites to accept an institutionalization of tolerance.

The greatest single contribution sociology has to make to this question of strategy is, I believe, to emphasize the close tie between function and social structure. A group is not an aggregate of people that can do anything; it has its particular job to perform. It has worked out relationships, both external and internal, that are appropriate to that performance. Moreover, this functional aspect of social units becomes associated with symbols that have emotional weight. The Star Spangled Banner reinforces our will to cultivate and defend our national way of life.

As applied to the international problem of the immediate future, this insight makes us wary of expecting that a body set up for one purpose will be able rapidly to shift to another. Specifically, I have in mind that it is futile to believe that defensive bodies, like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, can gradually expand outward, including more and more of the nations of the world until even the Iron Curtain is penetrated. In-groups do not expand by peaceful progress to absorb out-groups. The coalescence of in-group and out-group occurs either through conquest or through the development of organization at an emergent level. Absorption by military threat, which is what
many Americans seem to have in mind vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, even if possible, would leave us sitting on a perpetual powder keg.

Since the United Nations is already in existence and has shown itself capable of action in the Korean crisis, it would appear that the policy of the United States must be to work in two directions with two pieces of social machinery at the same time. We must defend ourselves against the Soviet threat by leaguing with us others that are in danger. But we must also try to quicken the life process of the universal body that includes both in-group and out-group. Since it is unlikely that we can soon cooperate effectively within the United Nations with the Cominform countries, it is essential that we show our breadth of purpose by working closely with other nations that are outside the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The more we can make these countries appreciate our willingness to support a true world federation that is both strong and internally tolerant, the sooner can it be realized.

One of the aspects of the positive statesmanship that is required is to estimate accurately at each point in the United Nations' development the degree of conflict with which it can cope. It appears that it can now survive a rather extensive "police action." On the other hand, it is certain that it could not now successfully discipline one of the Great Powers. For a considerable period it will be necessary for the West to protect itself through such bodies as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. But we would make a serious mistake if we did not plan to transfer to the United Nations the function of keeping peace between the two blocs at the earliest possible moment. Unless we assume that the strands that tie the nations together within that organization are going to thicken, and unless we plan to let it gradually deal with more and more weighty problems, it will bog down into ineffectiveness. If we have confidence and emphasize the positive role of cooperation within the United Nations, our orientation will tend to self-fulfillment.

So much for an attempt to chart the course that is sociologically possible. I now turn to the question of what will be sociologically effective. How do we best get from where we are to where we want to be?

It seems to me clear that there is not now sufficient evidence for a sound answer to this question. We need research specifically designed to throw light upon it. For the choice of exact areas of investigation there is again guidance in Cooley's theory of the tentative process. Since interaction among nations has been going on for centuries, one can assume that the ultimately successful links or bridges between them already exist in some embryonic form. What is needed is an intelligent process of selection so as to maintain and multiply the links that are holding fast and to eliminate those that cannot support the burden. The role of the sociologist, then, is to speed up a process that would involve us in needless travail if left to crude trial and error.

This view of our role assumes that the life process itself makes the necessary social inventions. It is for sociological research to determine which are fit to survive. In the field of international relations this gives us a tremendous job. There are today innumerable activities and programs involving people of different nations. Almost nothing is known about their effectiveness in furthering peaceful co-existence. If we could measure the degree of their success, internationally oriented leaders would know where to focus their energies.

The line of research here proposed differs considerably from that envisaged in the UNESCO Project on Tensions Affecting International Understanding. In that case, the prime need was judged to be the diagnosis of tensions that threaten the peace. The assumption was that when causes are discovered, steps can and will be taken to remove them. This may be a valid assumption for tensions internal to a nation that are displaced outward upon other countries, but I believe it invalid for tensions arising from incompatibilities between national cultures and social structures. These latter are very deep-seated and will not be easily or quickly eradicated. I think that the very forces most
likely to eradicate them are the bridging or linking activities between peoples that have already begun to develop. Rather than studying the conditions that produce such frictions and conflicts, we will get ahead faster, I believe, if we evaluate the relationships that may be reducing them. I suspect, for instance, that participation of American citizens in international groups is a prime reason for the betterment of race relations in this country, relations that have been a serious cause of hostility toward the United States.

In measuring the success of linking activities, it is not enough to determine their rate of growth; we must learn whether they are developing norms conducive to the peaceful coexistence of nations, or at least creating an atmosphere in which such norms can develop. This is the kind of fitness that would be selected in a long-run process of trial and error. I have suggested earlier that the growth of a world federation requires that problems of international trade, finance, and migration be handled in terms of world moral norms, that the United Nations become the accepted instrument for resolving power conflicts among nations, and that tolerance be institutionalized as a positive norm in international relations. The first of these tasks is well along. International trade and finance especially are today conducted largely in terms of an accepted code. It is the other two needs that should serve as the principal criteria in evaluating the success of bridging activities. The research task in each case, then, is to determine whether or not the activity under scrutiny increases respect for, participation in, and utilization of the United Nations as an arbiter of conflicts, and whether or not it tends to the growth of tolerance as a cross-cultural principle.

Evaluative research might be done upon the whole range of relationships across national boundaries, from symbolic contacts to the functioning of the Security Council itself. I shall pick out five salient research areas: education, mass communication, exchange of persons, international non-governmental organizations, and the United Nations system. For the sake of brevity the criteria suggested will be assumed throughout the discussion. I shall not specify further what constitutes success in each type of activity.

Although education in its broadest sense may be thought to heighten friendly feeling by increasing the human stature of the person, it is only programs of education aimed directly at increasing international tolerance, and loyalty to the United Nations that are in question here. There has been considerable emphasis upon such programs since World War II. Some are worked into the teaching of geography, history and civics at elementary and secondary school levels, some are embodied in special courses in intercultural relations or on the United Nations at both high school and college levels. Numerous other projects like summer seminars and workshops have been tried.

A tremendous amount of international good-will has gone into these enterprises, and many of them have been very intelligently conceived. Little is known, however, about their success in achieving the objective. Sociological research should be able to throw a great deal of light on the matter. The obvious design is to set up matched groups, some of which receive education of this type, others of which do not. No two groups could be drawn from the same school because of the danger of "contamination." In addition to the usual attitude tests administered before the experimental period and at certain intervals after it, I would favor the use of behavioral indexes of international orientation. Group affiliations, reading interests, attendance at different types of lectures, and school courses elected in subsequent semesters might be considered.

In these educational studies, as in the other types we will consider, it is of great importance that evaluations be made in a number of countries. As sociologists, we would assume that the same type of program will not succeed best everywhere. On the other hand, I would hope that the programs would not have to be tailored to each individual case. It would be my expectation that certain broad types of national cultures could be identified, for each of which there would be a particularly effective kind of edu-
cational program. Once the internationally oriented leaders of a particular nation are given research results of this kind, they can organize a vigorous campaign for the proper type of program.

Mass communication media span national boundaries as well as reach native audiences. In either case they can be employed by leaders for the furtherance of international cooperation. But it is difficult to present press, film, radio, or television material so that their success is susceptible of testing by a rigorous research design. Hovland and his associates, during World War II, were fortunate enough to be able to use captive military audiences under conditions of control for testing the effect of propaganda films.\(^2\) Such opportunities rarely occur except in regimented societies. Usually the publics of newspapers and films, of radio and television programs, are self-selecting. There is no way that one can set up in advance experimental and control groups that are matched. A radio series on the ways of life of other peoples or on the machinery of the United Nations would be listened to by a very atypical audience. Under these circumstances the most feasible procedure appears to be to make periodic surveys of a panel of persons constituting a random sample of the population in the city or region served by the mass medium in question. Between surveys the special programs would be presented. Their success could be tentatively determined by comparing the attitude shifts of those to whom the programs had been communicated with the shifts of a matched set of panel members who had not been exposed. Although there would still be the possibility that differentials were due to the effects of other factors such as world events, to which the receivers were more sensitive than the non-receivers, the evidence would be conclusive if the differentials were large.

It will perhaps be more difficult to obtain the application of research findings on the mass media than of those concerning educa-

where the general climate of opinion was changing in favor of the host country because of world developments.

Perhaps more important would be to study the effectiveness of various types of program within a given country. Comparisons could be made of the changes in attitudes during the exchange period of properly matched groups that had been in various types of schools and in various types of living relations to natives. It might well be determined that the optimum program varied by the nationality of the visitors.

A type of organization of great sociological significance, but which has attracted little popular or scientific attention, is the international non-government organization. The number of these is legion. Examples come to mind immediately—churches, scientific and professional societies, federations of labor unions, the cooperative movement, sports organizations, to name only a few. Since it is widely believed and partially demonstrated that the most direct way to mutual respect and cooperation is participation, it is surprising that there has not been more study to determine the contribution of these organizations to international peace.

As in all cases of links between nations, the design of the research on non-governmental organizations is a thorny problem. We particularly want to know what kinds of activities by what kinds of bodies help to knit together the peoples of different nations. It would be necessary to conduct research in a number of countries in order to discover how widely a particular organizational program is successful to this end. But this is not the most difficult problem. The real enigma is how to control in the research design the membership selectiveness of international organizations. Very probably the people who are members of them were already predisposed toward international cooperation before joining. It would appear practically impossible to find a perfectly matched group of non-members, as was suggested for exchange-of-persons research. Two possibilities occur to me. One is to compare the shifts in international attitudes among members of these organizations through time with the shifts of nearly similar persons who are not members. If the members have shifted toward internationalism more than the non-members, the difference might be reasonably attributed to the influence of the organization. This research idea could be carried out most easily by matching new members with those who joined five or more years earlier on such factors as sex, age at time of joining, ethnic stock and education, and treating the average difference as the shift through time. Then both old and new members would have to be matched with non-members taken at random in the same communities, forming two control groups. The average difference in attitude between the members of these control groups would constitute the baseline against which the shift of member attitudes could be measured for significance.

The other possibility is to compare the programs and membership attitudes of international organizations in the same general field. For instance, an international association of physicists could be compared with one of chemists. If they conducted their work and their conferences differently one could perhaps draw conclusions about programs effective for international cooperation by testing the international-mindedness of the members, country by country.

I am greatly impressed by the potential value of such studies. It seems to me that men of good will are trying to promote international integration by joining organizations of this kind. But for the most part they do not know whether or not they are accomplishing anything. Research results could serve to channel these aspirations and energies into the most fruitful types of activity. Here indeed we could step up the efficiency of the tentative method.

Finally we come to the research on the effectiveness of the United Nations and its various satellite agencies. At first one might think that such research is unnecessary, since whether they are successful or not might

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appear to be measured by the degree of peaceful cooperation among nations. This is not true, however, because their effectiveness may show itself in increased tolerance and cooperation among the peoples of the world long before it becomes evident in the policy of governments.

In so far as the United Nations secretariat or the secretariats of the Specialized Agencies carry out programs intended to influence the attitudes of national populations, these can be evaluated according to the techniques already discussed for educational and mass communication programs. The United Nations Technical Assistance projects for underdeveloped countries will afford opportunities for comparative studies of a slightly different kind. In these one would not be concerned with the prime objective, technological development, but with a by-product, the development of loyalty to the United Nations.

To the extent, however, that U.N. activities concern relations among the states themselves, these techniques are not applicable. Control by matching groups is impossible. One cannot compare the success of the United Nations system with anything else simply because there is no matching group of states that are non-members. Under these conditions the best way to proceed seems to be to break down the United Nations activities into units of similar sort that can be compared with one another. Take international conferences, for instance, many of which are held every year. As has been appreciated by UNESCO, these afford an excellent opportunity for research. By comparing procedures used in similar types of conferences with their success as measured by accomplishment and by the friendliness of the delegates at the end, we can perhaps learn how to organize them efficiently.

Though it would appear difficult to do, it may be possible to study political negotiations in the same way. Nothing would be more valuable for world leaders than to have at their disposal an analysis of the strengths and weaknesses in the procedures used in dealing with various types of political questions in the United Nations.

Another illustration of the same general approach would be to study international secretariats comparatively. The World Health Organization might be found to have developed a more satisfactory structure at some points, and the Food and Agricultural Organization at others. These findings would obviously be of value not only to each of these bodies but to all other international agencies that are seeking to link nations together.

The suggestions I have made for sociological research on the effectiveness of the existing bridges among the peoples of the world by no means constitute a catalog of what might be done. Others could readily be added to the list. But perhaps enough has been said to make it apparent what a large and challenging field lies before us. It is not my purpose here to enter into questions of support and administration. I would merely point out that such research, by the very fact that it is international in character, will have to be organized on a large scale if it is to be effective. Perhaps pilot projects can be done by individual investigators or small groups, but the definitive studies will require large staffs, often working in several countries at once. Undertakings of this kind are beyond the financial means of most universities. Foundation, government, or United Nations funds will have to be obtained.

In closing I would like to pose a question without making any attempt to answer it. Is it fruitful at this stage to work on the development of a theory of international integration? Until now sociologists have theorized about small groups or local communities or national societies. Quite properly they have tried to systematize our knowledge of such organized wholes. There are few data on the embryonic world society. A theory of it cannot have a solid empirical base at this time. Would it be wise to try extrapolating from our knowledge of national social systems? Would this be likely to lead to crucially important hypotheses about international life, or to sterile ones? More generally, the problem is this: At what stage in the development of a new type of
social system has enough knowledge of its functioning accumulated to make it worthwhile to project a theory of it?

I am leaving you with a riddle because this is symbolic of the whole field of international sociology. Almost all the important questions are unanswered. And they are not questions merely of theoretical interest to a handful of academicians. They are questions that concern the destiny of common people around the globe. It is deplorable that relatively few sociologists have appreciated this enormous challenge and that even fewer have done anything about it. It is my conviction that we must repair this negligence. We must awaken to our responsibilities. In these fateful times there are few groups that have so much to offer the world. Neither those that come after us in sociology, nor our fellow citizens of the present, will forgive us if we fail to make our best contribution to the creation of a world society.

COMMUNICATION IN THE SOVIETIZED STATE, AS DEMONSTRATED IN KOREA*

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WHEN the Iron Curtain was rolled back from Korea in 1950, the free world was presented an opportunity to test long-held beliefs and suppositions about the communication system of the sovietized state. Korea was a good place to observe this system because it illustrated the sovietized state in its early stages (the 90-day Communist occupation of South Korea) and in a much later stage of development in North Korea (which had been five years under Communist control). It was quickly apparent to observers that the sovietization of South Korea had proceeded from the same blueprint which had been used in North Korea, and that the North Korean blueprint in turn bore enough resemblance to the patterns in other satellite states to permit a considerable degree of generalization from what was seen in Korea.

The sovietized state as seen in Korea is, of course, an oligarchy that calls itself a people's democracy. Its effectiveness depends has declassified. Sources of this material were approximately 75 intensive unstructured interviews with officials in the ministries who had remained in Seoul during the Communist occupation and had been able expertly to watch events in their field; approximately 200 structured interviews with representative citizens of North and South Korea; about 1300 interviews with prisoners of war; about 1400 interviews with refugees; captured documents; and published personal narratives by Koreans who had lived under Communism. Some of these personal narratives may be found in the book by these same authors, The Reds Take a City, Rutgers University Press, 1951. Other related material from the Korean assignment has appeared in an article entitled "Flight from Communism: a Report on Korean Refugees," Public Opinion Quarterly, summer, 1951.

*In November, 1950 the Human Resources Research Institute of the Air University, under the direction of Dr. Raymond V. Bowers, sent a team of social scientists to Korea to study certain psychological warfare problems. The authors of this article were members of that team. Other members who were especially helpful in the gathering of material and the discussions from which this article grew include Dr. Frederick W. Williams, chief of the psychological warfare division of the Human Resources Research Institute, and Dr. John C. Pelzel, of Harvard. The contribution of 25 Korean social scientists who served as interviewers and interpreters should also be noted.

This article makes use of material, gathered during the Korean assignment, which the Air Force