Going Underground: The Origins of Divergent Forms of Labor Parties in Recently Democratized Countries

Cheol-Sung Lee

Abstract
This study explores how different forms of civic solidarity emerge during authoritarian eras and how they evolve into diverse labor-based political institutions after transitions to democracy. I initially explore the modes of choices that radical intellectuals make—go underground or cooperate—in their responses to coercion and co-optation by authoritarian elites. Based on comparative historical evidence of institutionalization processes of labor-based politics in four recently democratized developing countries, I identify three types of solidarity and one absence case, each reflecting a different combination of strengths and divisions in the informal civil society of its respective nation: participatory solidarity, top-down solidarity, clique-based solidarity, and co-optation (no solidarity). This study shows that radical intellectuals' early actions play critical roles in the evolution or devolution of institutionalization of different forms of labor politics during the democratic consolidation.

Keywords
going-underground, labor party institutionalization, embeddedness, informal civil society, state repression

Labor parties in recently democratized countries have shown widely different degrees of successes in not only their electoral outcomes but also their influences on the state institutions and civil society organizations. Why do some labor-based parties develop durable solidarity between the party leadership and the local social base while others fail to do so? Why do political elites of reformist politics in some countries succeed in expanding their organizational networks and influences beyond their conventional bases of social classes while others have been confined to their old constituents?

Especially in recently democratized developing societies, institutionalization processes and outcomes of labor and social movements after transitions to democracies differ widely. For instance, in Brazil, mobilization of the popular sector and new labor movements led by

1University of Chicago, Chicago, IL, USA

Corresponding Author:
Cheol-Sung Lee, University of Chicago, 1126 E. 59th St. Chicago, IL 60637, USA.
Email: chslee@uchicago.edu
the PT (the Workers’ Party) led not only to a successful transition to democracy but also to an emergence of well-institutionalized, cohesive labor-based party and participatory governance. However, in South Korea, strong labor movements and leftist cooperatives’ well-connected networks failed to achieve such a strong institutionalization of the programmatic reformist labor party during the democratic consolidation, eventually being split into smaller intellectuals’ circles with little social base. In Argentina, Peronists’ return to the formal electoral process after democratization led to their successful electoral successes, but Argentine parties and governments still suffer from weak institutionalization of partisan politics resulting from continuous transformation of party leaders regarding their platforms and identities. Taiwanese labor activists, however, even after democratization, have never emerged as influential, independent political players, instead being co-opted into corporatist structures under the existing moderate conservative and liberal parties. What factor accounts for these markedly different trajectories of labor-based politics in these mid- or upper-middle-income new democracies?

A conventional response to this question is to explain the variations with the presence or the absence of proportional representation system (PR), which has been known to produce stronger leftist politics (Persson and Tabellini 2003). It is true that two Latin American countries have (list) PR systems, while two East Asian countries have parallel systems, in which only a smaller portion of seats are filled based on PR system (18 percent in South Korea and 30 percent in Taiwan). Although the electoral system variable (and its redistributive impacts) effectively accounts for variations between two continents, it is not such a useful factor in explaining differences within each continent. Differences between Argentine and Brazilian labor parties as well as those between South Korean and Taiwanese labor politics are gigantic: a mass-bureaucratic participatory party (Brazil) versus a weakly institutionalized clientelistic patronage machine (Argentina) and an undisciplined, ideologically factionalized party (South Korea) versus a co-opted corporatistic element within a mainstream centrist party (Taiwan).

In order to account for these unexplained variations, this study explores an unlikely time and space by working back to the politics under earlier authoritarian regimes, which may have shaped social and political cleavages for the past several decades in these countries. Under authoritarian rule, social movements, especially democratization movements, aim to reshape the institutional rule of the regimes’ formation, change, and functions by making conscious efforts to mobilize marginalized populations (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001) and drawing concessions from the incumbent (authoritarian) elites for the inclusion of the larger constituents for procedural democratic political processes (Ruschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens 1992; Tilly 2004). I aim to show that the types and structures of alliances formed by intellectuals and other social forces during the authoritarian rule will have lasting impacts on the later development of labor-based parties. I make two specific propositions: First, the choices made by radical intellectuals during the authoritarian rule critically matter. Specifically, I propose that informal institution-shaping processes during the “critical junctures” (Collier and Collier 1991) of democratization movements affect the ensuing trajectories of partisan politics by projecting new configurations of political networks and identities. Divergent interactions between opposition movements’ mobilization strategies and the authoritarian block’s co-optation or repression strategies at this historical turning point constitute distinctive country-specific associational structures and relevant political identities. Second, the preexisting strengths and divisions of informal civil society in a Tocquevillian sense matters too. I argue that the strength and division of informal civil society will differentiate and constrain oppositional intellectuals’ roles in local communities. I propose four modes of interactions between the authoritarian state and opposition movements depending on the
types and strengths of informal civil society and in turn discuss how the specific contents of associational networks and political identities are shaped under each mode of interaction. These different modes of associational networks and identities persist as “sticky” (Hacker 2002; Mahoney and Thelen 2010) institutions that will continue to shape and reinforce distinctive forms of partisan identities across these newly democratized developing countries.2

This study defines institutionalization as a simultaneous process of both network and identity formation in which movement actors’ practices are “routinized” as specific patterns, rules, and conventions (DiMaggio and Powell 1991; Jepperson 1991; Meyer and Tarrow 1998; W. R. Scott 2008) under evolving party structures. By focusing on the historical trajectories of network and identity formation, I attempt to open a new way of approaching “social embeddedness” (Granovetter 1985).3 Rather than treating social embeddedness as an exogenous causal force, I juxtapose it with identity formation processes (White 1992).4 I highlight the moments and patterns of interaction between the state and oppositional intellectuals as well as between intellectuals and informal civil society under authoritarian rulers. Depending on the different composition of individual and organizational networks during such interactions, radically different institutionalization processes of partisan identities will emerge across four societies.

I focus my attention to a very peculiar moment and space under harsh authoritarian rule in which only the state and informal civil society exist but oppositional forces explore new opportunities of empowerment in local informal societies. I underscore the importance of the dynamics of such “going underground” or “going local” movements in some developing societies during such gestation periods, which is referred to as movements in “submerged networks,” “sequestered social sites,” or “free spaces” in social movement literature (Melucci 1989; Polletta 1999; J. C. Scott 1990). I further theorize the mechanism in which newly emerging or reemerging networks and identities in informal, local civic communities shape or institutionalize the features of the political parties in later times. Overall, by turning my attention to “the historical dimension” (Panebianco 1988) of party formation, I claim that importing social movement perspectives into conventional organizational analysis of political parties will open a new path toward theorizing divergent party formation processes.

In the following, construction of a theoretical model of institutionalization of partisan networks and identities, I ultimately claim that depending on the preexisting relationships between the state and oppositional elites, radical intellectuals’ early strategies—go underground or cooperate—will reconfigure the structure of associational networks, projecting novel political identities, and eventually shape the divergent trajectories of institutionalization processes of labor politics.

In the next several sections of (preliminary) theoretical discussion, I identify the variations in the oppositional elites’ actions in their responses to coercion and co-optation by authoritarian elites. Then, four subsequent case studies delve into the specific historical periods and spaces in Brazil, South Korea, Argentina, and Taiwan in order to constitute four different modes of interactions between the authoritarian states and oppositional movements. In the final two sections, I propose and discuss my ultimate theoretical model that explains how interactions between going underground strategy and the modes of informal civil society formulate divergent mechanisms of institutionalization of partisan politics in these four countries.5

INITIAL MOVE: STATE REPRESSION AND GOING UNDERGROUND

I assume that authoritarian state elites have two strategies to maintain their status quo: repression and co-optation. As these two strategies are compatible, state elites typically
employ both strategies simultaneously. On one hand, they attempt to attract more moderate segments of oppositional forces as partners at negotiating tables or as a part of dominant blocks. On the other hand, ruling elites rely on coercive state apparatuses to repress more radical elements of oppositional forces, such as radical student activists and leaders of mili
tant labor movements. I contend that depending on the capacity of informal civil society,6 which is equivalent to the Tocquevillian concept of civic community (Putnam 1993, 2000), oppositional intellectuals respond to the state elites’ dual strategies in divergent ways.

When the ruling elites determine to use coercive status apparatuses for more radical ele-
ments of oppositional forces, a sort of subterranean, unconventional form of solidarity may be formulated within informal civic community. Oppositional leaders and members, who cannot promote their oppositional activities, may withdraw from formal political spaces under severe repression and then attempt to find new spaces for political action in local communities, as illustrated in Figure 1.

Churches are the single most important local institutions in which receded activists interact with religious leaders and adherents. Universities and surrounding intellectual communities are another reservoir in which retreated activists develop different tactics of mobilization and reproduction of movement resources. Less often, more radical groups of oppositional forces, especially leftist segments of opposition movements, choose to find their new political space in local factories. The first case could be found in Brazil during the most repressive period of the military regime (1968–1974), while the third case applies to South Korean intellectuals during the 1980s. The second case can be found in most authori-
tarian regimes. In Brazil, during the most repressive period of the authoritarian rule, 1968–
1974, many radical student activists and intellectuals joined church-linked local

Figure 1. Illustration of retreatment of opposition movement leaders into informal civic communities.
and students decided to become workers in local factories in the 1970s not only to diffuse gospel but also to help workers enhance their working conditions. In the early and mid-1980s, thousands of students became workers after dropping out of college or graduation to help workers organize unions.

Opposition movement leaders’ decision to go underground, however, leads to an unexpected, ironic consequence—a marriage between oppositional activists from the central political arenas and workers and residents from grassroot local communities, or in other words, a formulation of solidarity networks with a strong bottom-up mobilization capacity. I label this phenomenon during the authoritarian repression as an evolution of solidarity under repression. This type of solidarity is organizationally pure or autonomous in the sense that it is completely independent of the formal political center dominated by the ruling elites’ influences (Figure 2).

Under this marriage, or in such a pure space free of co-optation or coercion, the retreat of activists creates new opportunities by which opposition political forces from the center build contacts with local associational leaders and members. Through direct contacts with activists of opposition movements, local communities get access to political networks that will evolve into formal interest and agenda channeling mechanisms in the future (in a fully consolidated democracy). Opposition movements build not only material but also “emotional” trust (Goodwin, Jasper, and Polletta 2001) and “communicative ethics” (Habermas 1984, 1987) with local communities. Through these contacts, they initiate diverse ranges of communal activities such as study groups for social reforms, informal teachings of formal educational contents, councils for solving local issues, and so on. For instance, in South Korea, during the authoritarian regime in the early 1980s, a generation of students and workers were mingled together under harsh authoritarian repression by employers and the state. “Composed

![Figure 2. Segregated development of two associational networks.](image-url)
of seven to twelve workers, these small groups met regularly to discuss labor-management issues and study labor history, labor laws, and the logistics of organizing a union” (Koo 2001:106).

This development of solidarity networks in local informal communities bears fruit when authoritarian elites start opening the formal political space to oppositional forces. Being fortified by grassroots-level material and ethical supports, former movement activists gradually enter into the formal political space through various routes: existing or new political parties and civic associations, as illustrated by solid arrows from informal civic associations to formal civic sector in Figure 3. Under the opening of new political opportunities, it is groups of opposition movements that submerged into local communities who benefit most from the opening of procedural political processes. Thanks to the development of dense networks and trust with local leaders and supporters, former movement leaders will build stable supply systems of members and supporters through their prolonged solidarity with local communities. They are therefore more likely to occupy the center stage of electoral competitions in fully developed associational communities in consolidated democracy.

Overall, the creation of a new “moral economy” (Thompson 1964) at community level in the harsh repressive eras of authoritarian regimes will become valuable political assets for movement leaders in the future. This will be the very moment when “class happens when some men feel and articulate the identity of their interests as between themselves” (Thompson 1964:9). Here class could be either popular sector class or factory-based working class. An important point is that specific modes of collective identities and related communication structures emerge during authoritarian eras as a process of interactions not only between intellectuals and workers but also among intellectuals in different communities and factories. With different elements of social forces being connected to each other, a new “insurgent group identity” emerges as a form of cross-class or cross-community solidarity, which Gould...
observed in his study of the Paris Commune. Obviously, some of these consequences of going underground strategies are intended, but others are unintended. A crucial point is that with the presence of the strong informal civil society, oppositional elites can configure an alternative vision that stretches toward an indefinite future, which helps them choose not to cooperate with the state elites for a short-term, incomplete progress.

**THE DYNAMICS OF GOING UNDERGROUND**

The authoritarian state’s use of strong repressive strategies may lead opposition movement leaders and members to go underground. Under severe repression, core elements of oppositional political forces will hide into informal civic communities, forging new network ties within and between those informal civic associations. Without access to formal organizational ranks and resources, these movement leaders and members often find new jobs and roles in local communities and build new networks. In more extreme cases of repressions, they disguise their identities for new roles in communities and factories.

The characteristics of these new networks under repression are dualistic or dual-structured, as illustrated in Figure 4. Even if activists forge new network ties in local communities, they also maintain their ties with leaders and members of the former movement organizations. The movement infrastructure at the central political space appears destroyed by the state’s dominant coercive apparatuses, but submerged network structures are not entirely destroyed (so represented as dashed lines in Figure 5). For instance, in the most repressive authoritarian eras in South Korea (1980–1986) and Brazil (1968–1974), student movement organizations were severely crushed by the state repression, but their organizational networks survived. Although the former movement organizations are inactive due to the freeze of formal political spheres, submerged activists’ networks operated without the formal organizations in both South Korea and Brazil (also in Argentine Peronist networks). In other words, movement organizations persisted only as dormant networks among members during those periods in these countries.

As the opposition movement networks that once operated at the political center are no longer active (even if dormant), each element of oppositional sects should choose among three choices: quit, surrender, or go underground. A group of vanguard activists who choose to go underground to forge new ties at local communities may initially operate with the

**Figure 4.** Evolution of (top-down) solidarity networks between local community and political center. An intellectual’s network when he or she stays at the political center.
resources and ideas from the former networks but not necessarily over the long term. As some activists are temporarily (although indefinitely, in their perceptions) disconnected from the former movement center, initial resources and ideas they held tend to dissipate. Then, as oppositional activists become new members of a local community and transform their initial agendas and identities in the process of “going native,” they increasingly draw their resources and ideas from the local communities. The formerly isolated activists find new nests of opposition movements in the already thick and rich local popular sectors, which will grow as activists and local leaders keep building new joint ventures of associational activities. It is only after activists return to the central political arenas with all the newly created organizational assets from the local communities that they witness themselves embedded in “inter-cohesive groups” (Vedres and Stark 2010) as shown in Figure 6. With the linkages to the base communities, an intellectual returning to the political center after transition to democracy will be increasingly popular among peer activists, politicians, and party professionals, playing the role of “bridging activists” (Mische 2008; Robnett 1996) between the local communities and the political center. As a result, thanks to the activist with underground experiences, the “alternative democratic network” (Rossi and della Porta 2015:18) at the political center will be densely formulated and emerge around the returned intellectuals.

At the larger macro-historical level, this “solidarity under repression” appears to be invisible, inactive, and marginalized from the political center or formal political space, which is fairly akin to “abeyance structure” (Crossley and Taylor 2015; Mizruchi 1983; Taylor 1989) in social movements. Solidarity under repression shares all the dimensions of abeyance structures pointed out by Taylor (1989): Members are willing to sacrifice their time and resources for movement goals (democratization or revolution), and opposition movement organizations maintain their stability and coordination such as existing repertoires of goals and tactics for survival.

Social movement scholarship’s focus on “free spaces” (Evans and Boyte 1986), “sequestered social sites” (Polletta 1999; J. C. Scott 1990), or “movement halfway houses” (Morris...
Also coincides with this notion of solidarity under repression. All these concepts highlight the institutional or noninstitutional spaces isolated from reigning power and its influences and the development of “counter-hegemonic ideas and oppositional identities” (Polletta and Jasper 2001:288). While abeyance structure focuses on the maintenance and survival of its organizational core under the crisis of increasing marginalization and isolation, both free spaces/havens and solidarity under repression emphasize the galvanization of new mobilization opportunities at the local community level. In the latter two, free spaces and solidarity under repression, the maintenance of opposition movement organizations may be secondary. The focus is on creating a new realm of popular resistance. Polletta (1999) rightfully pointed out that it is not only the isolated nature of havens but the network ties between locals and outsiders (also unrelated to the repressive structure) that played crucial roles in enhancing the mobilizing capacities of the free spaces. Ironically, this dramatic grassroots-level marriage in free spaces between vanguard movement elements and local community is partially attributable to the closing of the formal political space and the ensuing harsh censorship by the authoritarian elites. This unintended consequence is partly due to the elites’ underestimation of the capacity of informal civic sectors and their inability to penetrate informal communities.

THE STRENGTH OF INFORMAL CIVIC COMMUNITIES AND DIVERGENT TRAJECTORIES

Vanguard intellectuals’ going underground strategy features widely different variants. Oppositional forces’ underground activities may be further classified into more specific actions according to two variables: the strength of informal civil society and the presence of division within informal civil society. The strength of informal civil society provides oppositional intellectuals with widely different opportunity structures in local communities, while the presence of division in formal sector and informal civil society significantly limits the content and scope of vanguard intellectuals’ crusade. First, when existing informal civil society is strong and rich, the strategy of the going underground activities will be to penetrate the existing community organizations, build new relationships and trust, and then mobilize and politicize existing resources against the authoritarian state repression. The preexistence of strong Catholic religious communities, the subsequent radicalization of the Catholic sector, and its transformation into the popular sector with the joining of radical intellectuals in Brazil under the authoritarian regime illustrate this first scenario.

Second, when existing informal civil society is weak, the going underground strategy will be to create new organizations and identities through pedagogical education of potential leaders and members of new (civic) associations in local civil society. In this type of top-down solidarity creation, members of opposition movements become increasingly involved in the routines of local communities by increasing their contacts with potential movement supporters and converting them into advocates of movement goals. This type of solidarity, primarily led by leftist radicals from the movement center, attempts to mobilize local community groups such as students, peasants, or factory workers. They assume that the lower class does not currently have institutional channels to express their discontents regarding their livelihood issues but with an appropriate leadership fueled from external vanguard intellectuals, their “class consciousness” will be aroused and eventually play decisive roles in transforming capitalist economy as well as the authoritarian regime. The aforementioned South Korean labor activists who went underground mainly into factories to organize unions during the period of harsh authoritarian repression illustrate this route.
The presence of divisions that cut across informal civil society limits the role and effects of going underground practices. In case informal civil society is already deeply divided by preexisting cleavages that crosscut conventional boundaries of social classes, oppositional elites’ go underground strategy does not necessarily lead to “cross-class coalitions” but simply locks in the existing social or ideological cleavage. In this case, facing harsh authoritarian repression, oppositional forces will retreat to the social organizations on which they have previously relied rather than explore new opportunities of mobilization. Argentine Peronists’ clandestine maintenance of their organizational ties in informal civic spaces, such as soccer clubs and disguised informal gatherings during the era of harsh military repression, is the best example of this retreat to the clique.

Finally, when existing informal civil society is extremely weak and political society was not completely shut down by the authoritarian regime, the state elites’ combinational utilization of repression and co-optation has two consequences. More radical and militant elements of oppositional forces will fade away as there is little room for informal civil society to harbor them. Or, without durable linkages with informal civil society and therefore without reasonable expectations to develop stronger opposition movements in the future, they more willingly transform their movement platforms from revolutionary strategies to more moderate strategies. In this circumstance, the bulk of radical elements of oppositional forces, without appropriate associational or nonassociational local communities, are content to build a reformist segment within the moderate opposition party, as such in the Taiwanese case.

Then, how do these divergent routes of solidarity under repression shape different partisan political institutions—especially labor-based parties—after transition to democracy? In the remaining sections, I attempt to link radical intellectuals’ community level going underground activities to very macro, institutional-level outcomes, to which conventional social movement scholarship has rarely paid attention: bottom-up party-building processes. The following case studies of four recently democratized developing societies exemplify how these four different modes of interactions among the state, radical intellectuals, and informal civil society have been gradually institutionalized into distinctive forms of partisan identities and networks during the transition to democracy. In the final two sections of this article, I propose a theoretical model (and its implications) projecting divergent forms of labor parties based on the previous discussion and the following case studies.

Case Study 1: Participatory Solidarity in Brazil

Participatory solidarity is based on the balance of power between the community-based popular sector and external agents, intellectuals. In this type of solidarity, it is local community groups who have hegemony rather than oppositional intellectuals from the movement center. When local community groups hold moral hegemony based on their communal leaderships, intellectuals’ penetration into local youth and worker groups with their radical ideologies is initially blocked and filtered by this local leaders’ moral hegemony. Local leaders’ primary concerns are typically limited to local community livelihood issues and related local governance. Therefore, radical intellectuals or political entrepreneurs from the movement center need some levels of compromise with these local leaderships to realize their goals of regime-level institutional changes.

The Brazilian popular sector underpinned by the Catholic Church is the best example of this participatory solidarity. With the advent of the military rule in 1964, the Catholic Church, as the only autonomous institution against the authoritarian state in terms of financial independence as well as ideological purity, continued to expand its pedagogical works in local communities. With the support of reform-oriented bishops in the CNBB, the Ecclesiastical
Base Communities (CEBs), were created to promote the social involvement of local lay Catholics. The CEBs played a decisive role in harboring and fostering radical, popular social movement elements under the military regimes’ repression. The military regime perceived the CEBs-based opposition as a threat to its authoritarian rule and often took repressive measures (Lernoux 1982; Neuhouser 1989), but coercive apparatuses could not effectively reach prayer-based informal gatherings by laity in local churches. Therefore, even when radical student organizations and unions were crushed by state coercion, the CEBs-based activities remained alive and continued to expand their influence on local politics.

An important difference between Brazilian local neighborhood movements and those of other countries was their leadership by poor peasants and workers supported by reform-oriented bishops and priests. Deeply influenced by Christian (Catholic) liberation theology, these poor peasants and workers recognized their worth and rights as human beings through religious questions. During the most repressive period of the authoritarian rule, 1968–1974, many radical student activists and intellectuals joined church-linked local neighborhood associations. This amalgamation of the progressive church with oppositional intellectuals in local neighborhood politics represented a condition for Brazilian civil society that is rare in most developing countries. As a result, the popular classes consisting of peasants, urban poor and intellectuals, and rural and industrial workers were armored with egalitarian progressive Christian pedagogy through small group discussions such as Bible groups, in which “the people must be the subject of their own liberation” (Mainwaring 1984:101) and were thereby educated to act for their own needs from their self-discovery.

Leninist intellectuals were initially critical of the anti-elitism prevalent in the local Catholic-based church communities, contending that the role of vanguard party organization would be essential for fundamental social and institutional changes in Brazil. Church leaders, however, initially suspected that leftist vanguards had attempted to infiltrate the youth groups in the church communities for recruitments and therefore played critical roles not only in steering the local-level church-based groups in less partisan directions but also in seeking faith-based critical reflection beyond ideology (Mische 2008). Eventually, when the PT was formed, many leaders of the Brazilian Catholic Church retreated to its nonpartisan position (Houtzager 2001), and even within the local PT organizations, intellectuals’ joining with the local communities didn’t change the basic tenets of the popular church, the self-determination of the people.

The earlier setting of the party characteristics of the PT during the authoritarian era has had profound, lingering effects on the subsequent development of the party. The PT initially emerged as a social movement party that sought the participation of “popular classes” originating from grassroots civil society in institutional politics. The party stipulated its ethical codes and organizational rules very strictly but did not specify any “pre-molded formulas” of traditional leftist agendas (Miguel 2006:123). For instance, its strongly centralized bureaucracy is based on electoral mobilization processes of higher committees from the local municipal level to the national level. The PT also limited the entitlement of the party candidates to those who meet at least one of three requirements: “participation in the labor movement, activism in a grassroots movement associated with the party, or involvement in the founding of the party” (Hunter 2010:23).

However, despite these strict entitlement criteria based on social movements and progressive local civic communities, the PT did not impose ideological and organizational predominance of the working class in the party agendas. This unusual feature of a labor-based party, as described, stems from its communal origin of multi-force alliance. Thanks to the plural social bases, the party was not only full of diverse opinions but also unafraid of democratic deliberation and coordination of factional struggles. This study attributes these unusually
pluralistic but cohesive party characteristics to its embeddedness in communal religious associations. Even if the party bureaucracy was filled with union leaders, many of them were also jointly affiliated with the CEBs (Keck 1992). The embeddedness of the union/party leaders in the CEBs and neighborhood associations played decisive roles in the unlikely coexistence of plurality and cohesion in the later party development. As the union/party leaders were well acquainted with leaders of neighborhood associations and community action groups, they were able to build positive feedback loops of trust building from the democratization movements during the authoritarian repression. The PT was founded by organized labor, but it was rarely constrained by the unilateral organized labor’s interests, thanks to its embeddedness in wider civic communities from its origin.

In solving community-oriented issues, the union/party leaders became aware of the importance of livelihood issues in poor neighborhoods and actively incorporated their representatives in the party bureaucracy and agendas. Therefore, in local municipal elections and participatory budgeting (Avritzer 2009), the poor and the working classes had ample room to represent their needs and demands. The most important characteristic of this embeddedness during the course of party institutionalization was that the linkages between the union/party leaders and communities were not clientelistic in their nature, which plagued all the other Brazilian political parties for decades. This study also attributes this non-clientelistic embeddedness of the PT to its linkages to local religious societies.

At the local municipal level, the participatory nature of solidarity among workers, leftist intellectuals, and community-oriented religious leaders has blossomed into participatory budgeting or more broadly “participatory administration” (Baiocchi, Heller, and Silva 2011). In this institutional participation movement, community leaders of poor neighborhoods are able to take part in framing local government budgets and monitor their implementation processes. They get access to necessary information on why some components of government matters including budgets are necessary and how they are institutionalized into citizens’ everyday lives and if necessary, have a voice to reorient them in renewed directions. At the local governance level, the PT was able to maintain its central feature, its connections with social movements and their activists and leaders. In short, the PT’s participatory solidarity model, despite the gradual professionalization and the latest havoc of the PT center (due to the corruption scandals of the top leadership under the Dilma regime), has survived throughout several electoral cycles under democratization and turbulent economic crises. It has slowly moved toward center-left to embrace more voters, but its pedagogical approach of emphasizing people’s own participation in local institutional politics and experiences of coordination has been remarkably successful.

Case Study 2: Top-down Solidarity in South Korea

The most exemplary case of the type of top-down solidarity can be found in the aforementioned South Korean student and labor movements during the authoritarian military regime in the 1980s. Thousands of students decided to leave college and become workers in local factories during the authoritarian regimes in the 1980s. This trend started from the mid-1970s, after a 22-year-old textile worker named Tae-il Chun immolated himself in 1970, agitating for better labor conditions. The going underground strategy later became an important option for more serious student activists as the entire oppositional forces were radicalized with the Kwang-Joo uprising in 1980. Witnessing the brutal massacre of citizens in Kwang-Joo (in the southwestern part of Korea) by the newly emerging segment of military force and the continuing elimination of formal political space by the martial law, many leaders and members of opposition movements went underground not only to hide from the
intelligence agencies but also to cultivate new revolutionary resources in grassroots communities and workplaces (Chang and Shin 2011; Shin and Hwang 2003).

Several hundreds of students a year became workers after dropping out of college or graduation in the early and mid-1980s (Koo 2001), when hundreds of riot police squads resided on major college campuses to prevent student demonstrations. They collectively received trainings of how to get a job, how to get acquainted with workers in their clubs or everyday cultural activities, how to behave as a trusted coworker, what kind of languages to use (or not to use), what kind of clothes to wear, and so on (N. Lee 2007). As disguised workers, they were willing to bear the burden of the cost of organizing strikes, often leading not only to losing their jobs but also to being handed over to the police (which meant being tortured or imprisoned). They felt obliged to provide workers with necessary legal information to form unions and bargain with employers as well as with intellectual tools to interpret the principles of a larger capitalist society. They were eager to endow workers with belief that workers could constitute a strong political force that might be able to redress the deep contradiction of the capitalist economy. They attempted to agitate workers to go on strike, utilizing diverse tactics such as sit-ins, demonstrations, and occupation of factories and indeed greatly contributed to the uprisings of thousands of strikes during the democratization period in the late 1980s.

Many activists, however, did not stay long in factories. Many eventually left the factories, but many others “instead became labor counselors, organizers of study groups outside factories, night school teachers, and staff members of labor organizations” (N. Lee 2007:262). Overall, the top-down solidarity initiated by vanguard intellectuals in South Korea was short-lived. Although their participation in local workers’ workplaces and their communities had deep and fundamental influences on union movements in the 1980s, their involvement didn’t evolve into local governance of labor politics, as in Brazil.

Intellectuals who left their workplaces in the early 1990s found their new careers as founders of a new union confederation and a new labor-based party. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, many student-turned-labor-activists relinquished their revolutionary strategies and determined to pursue a moderate, reform-oriented path within procedural representative democracy. Former revolutionaries poured into arenas of formal electoral politics. Some converted their ideological faith and became the members of existing conservative or reformist centrist parties, but others went on to create a labor party (Democratic Labor Party, DLP) in 2000, seeking a social democratic reform path. As many union leaders in the local and central offices in the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions (KCTU) participated in building the DLP, it was very natural for union leaders to lend unilateral support to the DLP from the day of party foundation. They provided not only resources for electoral competitions but also votes and political guides on the party platform regarding major policies in the founding years. Some union leaders directly joined the efforts as key officials of DLP through co-affiliations, while other unions (and their members) sponsored DLP candidates’ political campaigns either by contributing or volunteering.

However, South Korean leftist intellectuals’ pursuit of a mass bureaucratic labor party began to crumble when it reached its most promising moment. The DLP was split into two parties in 2008, just after it had achieved the most remarkable electoral success in 2004. After the split, both parties had to witness striking shrinkages of both their party bases and popular electoral supports.

How could such an impressive emergence of South Korean labor movements turn into a sudden demise in the 2000s and after? One important diagnosis is that the embeddedness created via going underground activities was too short-lived and therefore “thin.” This thin nature
of embeddedness is partly attributable to the low density of civil society associations that were concentrated in Seoul and surrounding metropolitan areas but ultimately due to their abrupt collective departures from local factories during the early 1990s before they were fully embedded in local unions and their surrounding communities. I label this departure as an effort to build a labor-based party with shallow embeddedness (in contrast to building political channels without embeddedness in the Taiwanese case as well as community-oriented deep embeddedness in the Brazilian case). Shallow embeddedness implies that first, radical activists, during their going underground era in the 1980s, rarely cultivated their contacts with local civic associations and their leaders, especially those of religious and cultural institutions that were already operating in urban factory-concentrated areas since the 1970s. In a sense, in order to hold hegemony through revolutionary discourse, they ousted activists of urban church missionary background who contributed to early union movements in the 1970s.8

As a consequence, religious activists mostly withdrew from factories and workers’ communities during the 1980s and therefore, the chance to develop a Brazilian type of urban church-intellectual-worker’s solidarity was completely gone during the authoritarian regime in the 1980s. Throughout the 1990s, new union leaders and intellectuals poured all their energies in building highly bureaucratic union confederations and labor-based parties at the political center while ignoring developing local community-oriented solidarity that centers on workers and their families’ health, education, and cultural lives.

These features of shallow embeddedness and their consequences fundamentally originate from top-down solidarity forged by radical intellectuals in the 1980s. One distinctive (negative) phenomenon of this top-down solidarity is that intellectuals’ ideological views of the world were directly passed down to workers, which has had lingering influence on labor-based politics since then. Intellectuals’ embedding practices during the 1980s were based on their ideological factions, of which understandings of Korean capitalism and strategies for revolutionary changes were markedly different. The shallow embeddedness was therefore inherently constructed by deeply divided ideological factions. Such a thin and fragmented nature of embeddedness shaped during the authoritarian and democratic transition eras influenced the fundamental features of the relationships between unions and labor-based parties later in the 2000s—continuous, hostile struggles between ideological factions within labor movements and labor-based parties, which were only to witness their own demise in later periods.

The problems of this thin/shallow embeddedness started to emerge when the KCTU activists ventured into local communities as candidates of the DLP from the mid-2000s. They were incapable of penetrating and exploring local communities and drawing from them supporters and resources for electoral politics. Relatedly, many labor leaders have not had sufficient opportunities to participate in policy-crafting processes at the municipal level regarding community-level education, health, environment, and other basic quality of life-related issues. As the KCTU national center was filled with officials who had little experience with such local policy-crafting at the community level, they were unable to appreciate the importance of grassroots efforts to be engaged in community-level solidarity and activism.

The problem of such shallow embeddedness, here limited to solidarity with high-profile civic associations and their leaders, was not particular to union organizations. The DLP, built on the KCTU networks, faced exactly the same problem. While the DLP succeeded in entering the National Assembly thanks to the partial proportional representation system, it lacked embedded ties that could bring it close to local citizens’ everyday lives.9 Unfortunately, the DLP did not exist until many labor activists recognized these limitations. The split of the party then severely affected the local progressive networks: As the party was divided along
factional lines, so too were local party activists who, in many cases, stopped collaborating with each other. In both factory-level unions and local party branches, activists were split along factional lines and solidarity networks were destroyed.

At the local level, firm-based unions had not built electoral mobilization and policy deliberation networks with their local DLP organizations, albeit with a few exceptions in some areas. Additionally, firm-level unions had developed few solidarity networks with local associations and informal networks; therefore, these young party activists of the DLP had few allies to rely on for their electoral campaigns. It is not surprising at all, therefore, to witness extremely poor performances of progressive parties’ candidates at the local level since 2004 (the first electoral campaign of the DLP).

Case Study 3: Clique-based Solidarity in Argentina

The influence of Peronism is deep, pervasive, and lingering in Argentine society. This preexisting division in Argentine society overlapped considerably with the industrial cleavage between capital and labor, as Peron resorted to industrial working classes for populist mobilization in his early presidency. This Peronist versus non-Peronist division in Argentine society is no less profound than racial, ethnic, or religious divisions in other societies. As scholarship of Argentine politics repeatedly emphasizes, it is impossible to understand Argentine society and politics without Peronism (James 1988; Levitsky 2003; McGuire 1997).

The most important role of Peronism regarding going-underground movements is that clandestine activities by Peronists during the harsh military repression of 1976–1983 greatly reinforced the division between Peronists and non-Peronists. The military regime’s “dirty war” was executed primarily on leftist Peronist elements that were connected to unions. During this period, “at least 8,960 people had disappeared and thousands of others had been killed” (McGuire 1997:170). As did the military regimes in other countries, the regime banned any political party activities, student political activity in universities, and union activity in factories. However, as Peronists (both intellectuals and union members) used to be involved in many underground activities against the government and security forces since the 1950s, they did not have much difficulty finding protection from their former allies. Many activists went into Peronist union organizations disguised as union officials. They also created numerous study groups and disguised them as neighborhood-based clubs and cooperatives (Levitsky 2003).

These Peronists’ clandestine organizations reemerged as strong social bases when formal democracy was restored in 1982. Although the Peronist candidate lost to Alfonsin in the ensuing presidential election, the numerous Peronist informal groups that anchored at the neighborhood level served as important electoral bases for Menem’s PJ (the Judicialist Party) in the 1990s.

Despite these heroic going underground activities by Peronists in Argentina, their struggles under the authoritarian military regime have important differences from the other solidarity routes described previously. First of all, the Peronists’ going underground did not lead to the new embeddedness of these radical intellectuals but rather to the “reembeddedness” or “overembeddedness” (Uzzi 1997) of Peronists into existing Peronist local bases. In other words, such clandestine activities contributed to the strengthening of bonds among members in each existing Peronist clique.10

The reinforced Peronist patronage machine began to exert its influence after democratization. The notorious but efficient clientelistic machine mobilized urban poor around the PJ through pork barrel–style politics. Peronist local brokers had access to jobs and state benefits such as cash transfers and food stamps, and their local clientelistic networks effectively
infiltrated poor neighborhoods. The local brokers have built deep personal, emotional, and material attachment to the local poor; solved their livelihood issues and problems; and received votes (Auyero 1999, 2000). Often, union leaders were involved in distributing the benefits to their local neighborhoods to recruit votes for the PJ candidates. Importantly, in distinct contrast to the Brazilian popular sector and PT movements, Catholic priests, many of whom were supportive of “the dirty war” as bystanders during the authoritarian rule (Mignone 1988), did not contribute to reforming ethical standards of Peronism at all. Therefore, after democratization, Peronists simply repeated their clientelistic patronage politics. This study attributes this clientelistic nature of party-union linkage and the party’s narrow social base to Peronists’ clique-based solidarity practice during the period of authoritarian repression. Peronists’ reembedding into preexisting cliques among their insiders created numerous informal, clandestine social gatherings and meetings at local neighborhood levels, but it did not lead to the embeddedness of Peronist organizations in wider middle-class civic communities, which resulted in consequential narrowness of the social base in later electoral politics.

After losing two presidential elections in the 1980s, Menem purported to dismantle the traditional PJ coalition based on import substitution industrialization (ISI) and unions and radically to reorient the entire Argentine economy toward liberal market principles. This surprisingly convenient transformism by the PJ leaders was repeated in 2003 but in an opposite direction, when the Kirchners came back to power as more leftist Peronist candidates. They restored the PJ-union linkages by reestablishing the national pension and collective wage bargaining systems and resorted to neighborhood-level Peronist patronage machines to court votes from lower classes. In short, Peronists’ patronage-based electoral politics even under democracy originates from or were at least greatly reinforced during the authoritarian era. The efficient clientelistic vote buying machines are still the nuts and bolts of Argentine electoral politics (see Calvo and Murillo 2004), and the populist mobilization based on such machines has been electorally successful until now, as were Peron’s old campaigns.

Case Study 4: No Going Underground and Co-optation in Taiwan

During their subjection to authoritarian rule, Taiwanese oppositional intellectuals have rarely attempted to go underground. First, as the KMT (Kuomintang, the Chinese nationalist party) allowed opposition forces to participate in local municipal-level elections, while maintaining its own authoritarian rule at the center, many moderate oppositional elements accepted this docile role in a limited political space. More importantly, the ruling authoritarian elites’ aggressive co-optation strategy has also contributed to the nonexistence of underground cross-class alliances. The authoritarian KMT, from its inception, has built electoral support from diverse socioeconomic forces with patronage and pork barrel projects. One prominent co-optation strategy employed by the KMT was to recruit talented youth, including native Taiwanese, into the party with financial support for their continuing education. This co-optation of potential dissident elements into the party has contributed to extending the party base to local Taiwanese. The other co-option strategy was to penetrate into central and local unions and patronize them through financial assistance and positions within the KMT (staffs or legislators). Finally, in contrast to South Korea and the two other Latin American countries, Brazil and Argentina, Taiwanese intellectuals did not have local church institutions to help them engage in going underground activities by which they could get acquainted with local elites, youth, and workers—at least during the transition to and consolidation of democracy. Under this state-led corporatism and the near absence of local informal civil society, alternative political space, identities, and political center-local community networks were not formed during authoritarian repression in Taiwan. Most
intellectuals therefore remained outside the boundaries of labor unions, although content with assisting labor leaders as legal and policy advisors, similar to what Taiwanese Labor Front (TLF) intellectuals have done with labor unions. They neither attempted to penetrate deeply into local workers’ communities by means of their religious messages and institutions nor did they aim to establish socialist rules, as the Brazilian PT activists and South Korean radical students and workers initially envisioned. Without either participatory or top-down solidarity, labor movements developed in moderate forms. Their movement goals were limited to enhancing labor rights such as better working conditions, higher wages, and higher-level organizations for stronger bargaining power. Therefore, after democratization, they did not collectively aim to establish a labor party that could primarily champion workers’ interests in a representative democracy (with the exception of a small group of intellectuals who attempted to create a labor party and then a workers’ party in the late 1980s and recently). Instead, most Taiwanese labor leaders were content to collaborate with the newly emerging Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), which they expected would better support growing workers’ interests in bread-and-butter issues than would the KMT.

With the eruption of the democratization movement in the 1980s and independent unionization efforts throughout the 2000s, a considerable number of workers became disenchanted with the KMT. Many labor leaders who were sickened by the KMT-led state corporatism refused to remain within the only labor confederation, the Chinese Federation of Labor (CFL) and created a new labor confederation, the Taiwan Confederation of Trade Unions (TCTU), at the local municipal level, mainly governed by the DPP. New militant labor activists under TCTU were rapidly absorbed into the DPP electoral machine. Its alignment with the DPP allowed labor to be actively engaged in policy enactment and implementation processes (Y. Lee 2011), but simultaneously, the incorporation of labor activists into the DPP electoral machine during the critical time of labor movements left grassroots union organizations uncultivated or deserted. In this sense, the TCTU leaders were depicted by grassroots workers as “careerists” who were more interested in developing their own political ambitions (Ho 2006:125). In short, as the CFL had operated as a branch organization of the KMT, the TCTU also increasingly became a subsidiary of the DPP.

THE DEGREE OF EMBEDDEDNESS OF POLITICAL ELITES AND TRAJECTORIES OF PARTY FORMATIONS UNDER DEMOCRACY

Figure 7 summarizes how oppositional elites’ strategies responding to three factors (the degree of repression, the strength of informal civil society, and the presence of preexisting ideological/political division) shape different modes of partisan identities under consolidated democracy. Authoritarian states have two choices to manage oppositional forces in civil society, exclusion-centered coercion and incorporation-centered cooptation. In response to state actions, radical intellectuals also have two choices: to go underground (resist) or accept/conform to the status quo (cooperate). Under harsh repression, radical intellectuals in Brazil, South Korea, and Argentina all made the same choice, going underground, while under a more open political system and the incentives of co-optation, Taiwanese intellectuals did not choose to go underground.

However, depending on the existing configuration of civil society, radical intellectuals’ moves generated widely different institutional outcomes, as illustrated in the last row of the diagram. Under the “harsh repression–going underground–strong, undivided civil society” path, Brazilian intellectuals successfully waged bottom-up mobilization, which led to participatory governance movement by the PT. Under the “harsh repression–going underground–weak, undivided civil society” path, South Korean radicals created top-down
solidarity through their crusades into local factories, which later evolved into a labor-based mass bureaucratic party. However, the party was highly factionalized and eventually split into smaller, electorally insignificant parties. Under the “harsh repression–going underground–weak, divided civil society” path, Argentine Peronist intellectuals reembedded (or overembedded) themselves into existing Peronist cliques, which later featured a highly ideological (under Peronism) and uninstitutionalized (therefore flexible) but extremely clientelistic electoral machine. Finally, under the “less harsh repression/co-optation–weak informal civil society” path, Taiwanese intellectuals gradually participated in local elections. Some of them were co-opted by the KMT and eventually built a liberal oppositional, catch-all party embracing wide ranges of social forces in a corporatistic way, in which progressive union organizations were incorporated into the DPP as subsidiaries.12

Table 1 summarizes four case studies, utilizing variable-oriented languages in order to specify my causal arguments in a lucid way. I contrast their trajectories with several
Table 1. Labor Party Models after Democratizations and Institutional Outcomes.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of solidarity</th>
<th>Path of (Cross-class) Embeddedness</th>
<th>Path of Disembeddedness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Participatory solidarity</td>
<td>Top-down solidarity</td>
<td>Clique-based solidarity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community-based local</td>
<td>Radical intellectuals who</td>
<td>Reembedding Peronist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>religious leaders and</td>
<td>went underground and returned to</td>
<td>party leaders/brokers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>workers</td>
<td>the center</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Top-down solidarity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clique-based solidarity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main oppositional actors</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(with intellectual and</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>moral hegemony)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participatory solidarity</td>
<td>Top-down solidarity</td>
<td>Clique-based solidarity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community-based local</td>
<td>Radical intellectuals who</td>
<td>Reembedding Peronist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>religious leaders and</td>
<td>went underground and returned to</td>
<td>party leaders/brokers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>workers</td>
<td>the center</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participatory solidarity</td>
<td>Top-down solidarity</td>
<td>Clique-based solidarity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community-based local</td>
<td>Radical intellectuals who</td>
<td>Reembedding Peronist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>religious leaders and</td>
<td>went underground and returned to</td>
<td>party leaders/brokers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>workers</td>
<td>the center</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clique-based solidarity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reembedding Peronist</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>party leaders/brokers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Causal conditions

| State repression during authoritarian regimes | High | High | High | Low |
| Radicals’ going underground                   | Yes  | Yes  | Yes  | No  |
| Condition of informal civil society I (strength) | Strong | Weak | Weak |     |
| Condition of informal civil society II (unity) | Undivided | Undivided | Divided\(^a\) | Divided\(^b\) |

Institutional outcomes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Representative labor parties</th>
<th>The Workers’ Party in Brazil</th>
<th>The Democratic Labor Party in South Korea</th>
<th>The Judicialist Party in Argentina</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Main institutional mobilization mechanism of labor parties after transition to democracy</td>
<td>Bottom-up participatory solidarity → inclusive programmatic party</td>
<td>Top-down solidarity → factionalized programmatic party</td>
<td>Clique-based solidarity → clientelistic patronage party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extensiveness and durability of labor-based solidarity</td>
<td>High (high extensiveness and high durability)</td>
<td>Medium (high extensiveness and low durability)</td>
<td>Medium (low extensiveness and high durability)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No labor-based party</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Divided along preexisting ideological clique (Peronism).*

*Divided along preexisting ethnic clique (Islanders vs. migrants from Main Land China).*
components: main actors, causal conditions, and outcomes of institutionalization such as main institutional mobilization mechanisms and extensiveness/intensity of labor-based solidarity. I classify Brazil and South Korea under the “path of (wide, cross-class) embeddedness” while putting Argentina and Taiwan under the “path of dis-embeddedness.”

First, the origins of Brazilian and South Korean cross-class alliances share one distinctive difference from the other two cases: newly formed intellectuals-workers’ solidarity in covert local communities or factories during the most repressive era of authoritarian regimes. The two strongest cases of labor movements (in the 1990s and the 2000s) in the non-Western world share this simple component of underground activities. These activities could be considered as the most critical actions at critical junctures in both countries as those cross-class alliances permanently changed the terrains of political and economic structures in both countries by setting the cornerstones of noncorporatist, noncompromising, labor-based political forces.

However, two cases differ in their key characteristics in terms of their modes of solidarity. In Brazil, cross-class alliances evolved from the very grassroots level of the neighborhood, primarily led by progressive church leaders (the CEBs) and local union leaders. Although intellectuals of middle-class origins such as leftist professionals also joined the construction of the PT movements and built strong linkages with both union leaders and community religious leaders, their roles in the PT were initially limited (although expanded later because of the higher demands for professional candidates to attract the middle-class voters in close-call electoral competitions). Diverse origins of neighborhood activists and religious leaders (of the CEBs) participated in the local leadership of the PT, which has played a decisive role in developing participatory governance practices and programmatic policies at local municipal governments.

However, in South Korea, cross-class alliances were formulated by radical intellectuals’ top-down crusades into factories and their militant organizing efforts. Therefore, in contrast to Brazilian community-based participatory solidarity, South Korean top-down solidarity was short-lived or temporary, failing to generate a labor-based party deeply entrenched in local workers’ communities. Their conscious engagement in union organizing, if short-lived, resulted in a strong solidarity between intellectuals and workers, but a Brazilian-style three-party alliance (community religious elites/union workers/intellectuals) was not formed in South Korea due to the absence of strong local religious leaders’ participation. As a result, in contrast to the Brazilian PT, South Korean DLP was unable to stand its own ideological factionalism inherited from the top-down solidarity during the authoritarian era and eventually split into pieces in the late 2000s.

The case of Argentine Peronism is very different from the previous two solidarity cases. As I discussed, Peronists were also engaged in clandestine organizational activities during the authoritarian era. However, Peronist intellectuals chose to repatriate to their own cliques rather than to initiate novel, unprecedented contacts with social forces not belonging to Peronist cliques. I consider this failure to formulate cross-class alliance through going underground strategies—which could have transcended differences based on existing social cleavages such as classes, religions, or ethnicity—as the key difference between the Argentine case and those of the rest of the countries that experienced democratization about the same time in the late twentieth country. Peronists’ reembedding underground activities were far from creating a turning point such as the ones by which the majority of other societies achieved new modes of social interactions—democratic channeling and the reconfiguration of opinions, interests, and resources. Instead, Argentine society, under the influence of Peronism, largely remained organized along the previous cleavage—Peronists versus non-Peronists—via procedural electoral competitions. Institutional legacies based on clientelistic
machine politics reemerged and dominated electoral processes (Calvo and Murillo 2004; Szwarcberg 2015).

The Taiwanese case represents the negative case (the absence of cross-class solidarity) in which oppositional intellectuals were either co-opted by the authoritarian state or did not choose to go underground due to the limited but still operating formal political spaces provided by local-level municipal elections. A few moves to build a labor party by progressive intellectuals within the DPP collapsed and disappeared eventually. As they did not have any social base or supporting forces either in unions or communities outside the DPP, their moves drew little attention. As a result, Taiwanese partisan competitions have occurred between two major parties—a moderate conservative party, the KMT, and a moderate center party, the DPP—and except for the independence issue, the two parties largely converged toward each other in their social and economic policies. Without a third party representing the working classes and the lower classes, competitions between a center-right and a center-left party increasingly led the two parties to copy or preempt each other’s stance. Therefore, all the divergent alliance mechanisms among leftist intellectuals, community leaders, union leaders, and other civic associations observed in other countries have simply been absent in Taiwan. The formal organizations of civil society has been virtually absorbed and incorporated into two dominant party organizations without having had opportunities to develop their independent social bases.13

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

In this partially deductive but primarily inductive theory-building exercise based on four case studies, I have explored how radical intellectuals construct their organizational and partisan identities over time. This study initially focused on the “gestation periods” (Aldrich and Ruef 2006) of democratization in developing countries under the authoritarian rule in which historical processes of institutionalization of social movements and partisan politics are not readily observable but in which the most critical initial contacts among different social classes and groups first occur. I initially set up modes of choices in which the authoritarian state and oppositional elites consciously configure their action sets, based on their coercive resources (the state) or potential supporters in informal civil society (oppositional elites). Then, I delved into historical identity and network-formation processes of each pathway. For the solidarity path, this study underscored the emergence of three different types of solidarity between radical intellectuals and local communities during harsh authoritarian suppression: top-down solidarity, participatory solidarity, and clique-based solidarity. For no solidarity path, I described how oppositional elites chose not to go underground under the authoritarian rule when they were exposed to co-optation. Eventually, I provided early embryonic forms of solidarity, which later evolve into different forms of labor-based parties as results of initial state-oppositional force interactions and consequential oppositional elite-informal community interactions before democratization.

Ultimately, through this comparative-historical theory-building exercise of the emergence and formation of different identities of labor-based parties, I have hoped to answer the questions I raised earlier: Why do some labor-based parties develop durable solidarity between the party leadership and the local social base but others increasingly distance its traditional base? To answer this question, I highlighted and theorized the role of going underground activities: When a labor-based party has grown from a history of underground solidarity between oppositional elites and local communities or workers, such partisan identities are more likely to develop a self-enforcing, conventional social-democratic mass party or programmatic party structure deeply embedded in informal civic communities and
workplaces, which is less likely to betray its traditional party base (Brazil). However, when a labor party lacks such embeddedness or fails to develop such feature in transition to democracy, its leaders may be unable to sustain internal factionalism (South Korea) or easily able to reconfigure their platforms in response to external shocks (economic crises), thereby betraying their party base in order to adapt to changing occupational and industrial structures (Argentina).

I have paid attention to the different reactions of oppositional elites to similar repression by the authoritarian state—a combinational strategy of coercion and co-optation: Oppositional elites were co-opted and incorporated into the ruling block in societies without rich informal local communities while they built strong underground solidarity in societies with such strong local communities. In this formulation, I obviously employed the Tocquevillian notion of social capital, which emphasizes the role of civic efficacy in informal civic communities in building democracy and good governance (Knack and Keefer 1997; Paxton 2002; Putnam 1993).

However, in contrast to static comparisons that can be typically found in the social capital approach, I have initially highlighted the oppositional elites’ choices and actions under different associational environments. I have placed my focus not only on the structural conditions given to the actors but also on actors’ actions and their consequences under the given conditions. In such a way, on one hand, I have been able to divulge how a distinctive historical solidarity featured by cross-class alliance between intellectuals and working class or between intellectuals and local communities, which Gramscians may label organicity (Karabel 1996; Kurzman and Owens 2002), evolves under the authoritarian rule and the transition to democracy.

This dynamic historical approach, on the other hand, also led us to reveal how oppositional elites’ dramatic creation of their electoral base can occur at specific historical junctures. I presumed that one of the most important moments of civil society growth would be the instant when political entrepreneurs of the middle-class origins develop contacts with lower, disadvantaged classes (Fishman 2004). I did not agree with the conventional assumption that these contacts have preexisted over a long time horizon but have highlighted the fact that they were newly created during the democratization movements through conscious efforts by emerging political entrepreneurs. Those radical intellectuals’ collective journeys eventually led to the formulation of distinctive network structures over time that link movement center and distant local communities or social groups, which became institutionalized as unique partisan identities in different societies.

This dynamic approach is also of critical importance in opening a third way of understanding democratization and governance. Although this study has explored the embeddedness of partisan (especially leftist) elites in larger civil society and the institutionalization of party—social base relationships as primary outcomes, I may be able to conceive these outcomes as more differentiated outcomes of democratic consolidation after transition to at least a minimalist definition of democracy (Dahl 1971; Linz 1978) in a deeper sense. This third way incorporates two contending previous theories of democratization and regime changes into a single framework: structuralist and voluntarist approaches (Mahoney 2003). On one hand, the structuralist tradition represented by Barrington Moore’s (1966) work, an ensuing work by Ruschemeyer et al. (1992), and another work by Collier (1999) all highlight the strength of the bourgeoisie (Moore 1966) or the working class (Collier 1999; Ruschemeyer et al. 1992) in its relationship to other actors such as landed aristocracy/landlords and of the state in accounting for variations in transition to democracy or authoritarianism. On the other hand, the voluntarist tradition puts more focus on elites’ strategic decisions in uncertain circumstances. Linz (1978), O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986), and subsequent works using game
theoretical models (Geddes 1999; Przeworski 1991) belong to this tradition. My model started from the voluntarist tradition in that I initially focused on the state and oppositional elites’ action profiles and argued that oppositional elites’ responses to the state elites’ actions would depend on the composition of repression and co-optation by the elites.

I, however, was not entirely satisfied with this voluntarist framework, and thus delved into other aspects: identity and network formation processes of oppositional intellectuals especially within informal civil society. I have highlighted that the strength of informal civil society provides oppositional elites with an alternative formula of action when they choose not to cooperate with the state elites. Then, I have also classified the four cases based on the other criteria—the presence of a preexisting ideological cleavage cemented with political mobilization (Peronism). I thought that this early institutionalization process of interactions between oppositional elites and community-oriented actors in informal civil society is a decisive “antecedent” moment (Slater and Simmons 2010) in understanding the different forms of partisan identities after democratization. Although I did not follow the Barrington Moore tradition in which relative class strength at macro-structural level is highlighted, I have imported one path Moore employed in his class-coalition framework: namely, the alliance between city radicals and peasant organizations in the communist revolution path in Russia and China (Moore 1966). I find that compared to other paths of democratization, this communist path is ironically indeed the most useful model for contemporary democratization in developing countries. I replaced Moore’s peasant organizations with the community-oriented popular sector in Brazil, workers in South Korea, and Peronist cliques in Argentina and revived his attention to class coalition rather than to the relative strength of bourgeoisie. While the former—state-intellectual interactions—involves actors’ choices in uncertain environments, the latter—intellectual-informal civil society interactions—involves actors’ cultivation of its spaces and resources in historically given structural conditions.

In such a way, this study has been able to combine Linz’s voluntarist model and Moore’s coalition model (rather than structuralist model) with historical institutionalism (Hall and Taylor 1996; Mahoney and Thelen 2010; Thelen 1999). Oppositional elites’ choices under given constraints at critical junctures establish the early elements of civic or non-civic solidarity, and those elements slowly evolve into distinctive partisan identities over time in combination with other country-specific conditions. I find that this approach provides a fruitful explanation for divergent governance models in the era of deeply consolidated democratization in developing countries.

Then, I turn the question of historicity of civil society into a spatial one: Where did such unlikely contacts occur? Why and how did it matter? I have given my special attention to a covert space, which existed during harsh authoritarian rules but not in an open, legal manner. I have hypothesized that secretly organized contacts in the peculiar underground space might be a germination of strong civil society that later brought in democracy and partisan politics of social policies in developing countries. My logic has been that in societies with historically rich informal civic communities, radical leftist intellectuals are more likely to opt to politicize (formerly) ideologically neutral and interest-free informal civic spheres. From such unlikely contacts and interactions in unusual spaces, a novel form of cross-class alliance has emerged in newly democratized developing countries. In a sense, Habermasian ([1962] 1991) “café politics” as an origin of public sphere in western democracies or Thompson’s (1971) “moral economy” was reborn in such covert spaces such as workers’ shabby basement rooms or church facilities in Seoul or Sao Paulo under harsh authoritarian rules. One striking, unintended consequence of such spatial segregation to avoid repressive state coercion has been the birth of “alternative belief structures” in these covert spaces (Dixon, Roscigno, and Hodson 2004; Fantasia 1988; Roscigno and Danaher 2001). Those radical intellectuals
Lee typically criticized the bureaucratic authoritarian development model from the far left, with their socialist utopia in mind. Polletta (1999:23) labeled them as “weak-tied outsiders,” who may have contributed to shaking formerly persistent community-wide silence and eventually leading community leaders to resist authority. Gould (1995) also emphasized the importance of cross-community network structure and interactions between communities in increasing mobilization capacities of those communities. In this study, I have argued that although intellectuals had to adjust their radicalism to survive in fierce electoral competitions in political center, their strong beliefs in the necessity of workers’ own political party and their common experiences in such covert urban communes kept their solidarity alive as a form of identity in one sense and as a form of networks in another sense. While Gould and Polletta focus on short-term, contentious mobilization mechanisms in the communities of their interests, I have paid attention to relatively long-term political institution building efforts by those intellectuals who were once engaged in such clandestine activities in “the havens.” In Brazil and Argentina, the community structures formed during the authoritarian repression have persisted throughout the democratization era, evolving into participatory governance in one country and clientelistic machine in the other country. In South Korea, the short-lived worker-intellectual solidarity disappeared after massive strike activities in the late 1980s, but the networks formed in the spaces developed into densely linked, if ideologically factionalized, civic-political institutions in the next several decades. In this sense, “the free spaces” that once existed in these developing countries have survived beyond the period of democratization movements in the forms of partisan networks and identities.

The moments of democratization in many developing countries in the 1980s and 1990s are often referred as “critical junctures” (Collier and Collier 1991), in which “the balances of power among social forces” (Ruschemeyer et al. 1992) are fundamentally reconfigured and reshaped. I do not highlight the going underground movements as the sole, the most decisive, causal factor for the democratization (and consolidation) of the entire political institutions in these countries, but the shaping of the Brazilian PT and the South Korean leftist networks through underground activities during the most repressive era of the authoritarian regime are at least one of those important components or events that have jointly shaped subsequent trajectories of political development in these countries. Among those components, economic crises, the internal conflicts of the dominant political forces, and the rise of the middle and working classes are significant exogenous factors that underlie the tides of democratization and the institutionalization of such movements in these countries. However, without “a realignment of political forces substantial enough to overcome” (Hacker 2002:59) existing status quo, external shocks by themselves or structural conditions do not automatically lead to relatively long-term, path-dependent processes of institutionalization of labor-oriented or labor-based interest channeling from civil to political societies. Democratic consolidation, as an instance of slow “institutional change” (Mahoney and Thelen 2010), needs changes in political context and characteristics of institution that may lead to slow reconfigurations of agents’ incentive structures over time. I have argued in this study that such realignments of political forces have occurred in Brazil and partially in South Korea during the authoritarian regimes, thanks to those engaged in such underground activities. I believe that this exploration of underground activities and cross-class solidarity and their long-term effects on institutionalization of partisan politics will contribute to scholarly efforts to explain the emergence of democratic institutions and their variations.

FUNDING

The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: The research of this paper is supported by the National Science Foundation, NSF.
NOTES

1. This study, based on Lipset (1960), initially defines intellectuals as those who can wield “cultural” or “social power” via discursive influence based on their unique positions in social space, independent of economic political elites. This study, however, employs a more social movement-oriented definition of intellectuals with the following notion of radical intellectuals: those who relinquish their positions and future opportunities guaranteed under the existing system in order to practically engage in forging and shaping new, alternative visions of economic and political systems. This definition of radical intellectuals, in contrast to the previous one, focuses more on the dynamic aspects of intellectuals-making processes in which occupationally undetermined and marginalized but highly committed intellectuals are active in prolonged engagements in alternative institution building. By this definition, it does not hastily lead to the Weberian conclusion that intellectuals’ alleged goals (universal rights for subordinate classes) and their realized interests (strengthened and concentrated power around intellectuals) do not match usually (Michels 1915). Rather, it could be much closer to Brym (1980) and Karabel’s (1996) Gramscian, “class-bound approach” (Kurzman and Owens 2002) that explores the conditions under which intellectuals “rebel” and build “organicity” with subordinate classes. However, the current study is also distinguished from this Gramscian approach in that it highlights the combinational outcomes of divergent modes of going underground strategy and the strengths of existing Tocquevillian informal communities.

2. This study defines collective identity as (a group of) individuals’ “cognitive, moral, and emotional connection(s) with a broader community” (Polletta and Jasper 2001). “A collective identity formation process” implies a historical construction process of perception system among (a group of) individuals sharing “common interests, experiences, and solidarity” (Taylor 1989). Therefore, a partisan identity is a group of individuals’ (or larger social groups) shared, solidaristic perception system of party boundaries, norms, and goals, based on common partisan interests and experience. In a sense, a collective identity or a partisan identity may be merely equivalent to a cultural system of strong, solidaristic ties that collectively inform each member of “who you are” based on shared meanings and interests (Laitin 1998). Hereafter, (types of) partisan identities and (modes of) partisan solidarities will be used interchangeably.

3. Focusing on the notion of embeddedness as a historical identity formation process (Clemens 2007; Somers 1994), I aim to go beyond “structure-driven” explanation inherent in conventional network analysis. In other words, while previous studies (primarily in the fields of economic sociology and organizational sociology) interpreted embeddedness primarily as an abstract conceptualization of social relations through network ties or the structural features of them, this study claims that our understanding of social embeddedness should embrace this larger and deeper process of identity formation (Emirbayer and Goodwin 1994; Laitin 1998; White 1992), which simultaneously occurs with the structuration of social networks.

4. Note that this effort to divulge the early “institutionalization process” of labor parties and its consequences is not entirely consistent with the strong version of “new institutionalism” (DiMaggio and Powell 1991:9) prevalent in organizational sociology. Sociologically oriented institutionalism down-plays actors’ conscious choices and their intended consequences while highlighting “the persistence of practices in both their taken-for-granted quality and their reproduction in (self-sustaining) structures.” On one hand, my approach differs from this static view of institutions focusing on organizational sustenance and reproduction. Instead, I pay attention to “radical intellectuals” as “conscious rule breakers” who ventured to break away from existing political arrangements and norms. On the other hand, I share a core assumption of sociological institutionalism: Such purposive going underground activities by radicals did not necessarily lead to the outcomes that they initially envisioned but often ended up with unintended consequences due to the (uninformed or imperfectly informed) constraints they confront in their interactions with the state and informal civil societies. Such constraints range from limited information on local resources to poor coordination and misjudgment of their own capacities.

5. I justify my case selection as follows: First, these four cases share some similar conditions such as medium (Argentina and Brazil) to upper-middle (South Korea and Taiwan) levels of economic...
development and democratic consolidation in the 1980s and 1990s. I expect that such similarities enable us to guard against alternative explanations based on potential third variables such as economic, political, and structural factors. I also selected two countries from each region with comparable cultural and geopolitical histories, which would allow us to take into account region-specific factors. Second, despite the similarities, these four countries have striking differences in their trajectories of labor (or working class)-based politics. Through comparative-historical case studies based on local literature, documents, and interviews of key labor activists, I expect to reveal and explain variations in the institutionalization of labor politics. My analytical strategies are largely in line with those elaborated by Mahoney and Rueschemeyer (2003:13–14) in their influential work on comparative historical analysis in that I seek “analytic interest in causal analysis” and “contextualized comparisons” of a few important cases with a deep understanding of them that enables “a higher level of conceptual and measurement validity.” Please refer to my book (C-S. Lee 2016), titled *When Solidarity Works: Labor-civic Networks and Welfare States in the Market Reform Era*, which provides a more detailed description of the case selection (for the same four countries), even though the book deals with a somewhat different topic from the one in this study—the role of labor-civic solidarity in shaping the welfare states in the four developing countries.

6. Informal civil society (or informal civic associations or community) is composed of numerous non-formal organizations such as churches and diverse cultural activity groups such as singing groups, book clubs, and sports clubs. In contrast to formal organizations such as political parties and trade unions, the informal civic community is not directly involved in formal interest-bargaining and policy-channeling procedures between the state and formal civic organizations. This space is akin to what Habermas (1984, 1987) defined as “lifeworld” or “milieu” in which basic communicative reasons and ethics evolve independent of “the system.”

7. The Democratic Labor Party (DLP) indeed was a labor-based but programmatic progressive party that embraces diverse marginalized and socially disadvantaged groups as well as well-organized workers by unions. The party also covered diverse social issues ranging from not only pro-labor issues such as labor market and welfare policies but also reunification and environmental issues. With the launch of the DLP, formerly unorganized interests and social cleavages were rapidly mobilized, rearranged, and transformed into institutional policy-crafting mechanisms under the DLP.

8. Many young Protestant missionaries joined the underground activities in the 1970s in South Korea, initially setting grounds for student-worker alliance through the Christian faith-group works. However, most of them withdrew from workplaces in the early 1980s, criticizing the leftist turn of union movements. They could not coexist with new waves of radicalized leftist student activists who were not only armored with Leninist revolutionary ideals but also antagonistic to religion-based missionary works. Therefore, young Protestant activists had no choice but to yield movement hegemony to the influx of new generation of radicals (and many of them turned into the base of conservative civil society in the 1990s and the 2000s).

9. A Korean Confederation of Trade Unions (KCTU) and DLP officer at a regional branch laments that “in order to draw supports from them, we should’ve served for several local associations such as representatives of an apartment building, small local neighborhood civic associations, and local welfare organizations. When you work in those grassroots-level networks, they can be mobilized at a decisive electoral moment. I have realized this truth only after I have worked at this regional party organization for 10 years, having done so many different things and learned by trial and errors.”

10. A renowned union leader recalls, “we (unionists) had a soccer field and every Sunday, at seven in the evening . . . play ball, jump, run, everything based on friendship, sharing our thing . . . I believe that there, one started to feel solidarity . . . not only in my family, but in all of them.” Many General Confederation of Labor (Confederación General del Trabajo de la República Argentina) and Judicialist Party (PJ) local, clandestine gatherings were organized around soccer tournaments.

11. More than 90 percent of the Taiwanese population believe in a combination of traditional Chinese religions such as Buddhism, Confucianism, and Taoism, none of which has played a significant role in organizing and mobilizing citizens on an institutional basis, while less than 4 percent are adherents of Christianity (2.6 percent for Protestantism and 1.3 percent for Catholic; *CIA World Factbook* 2014).

12. Obviously, these four trajectories and corresponding cases do not exhaustively account for all paths of state-society interactions mediated by (radical) intellectuals: First, as the study focuses on the “state repression–going underground” path (Brazil, South Korea, Argentina), while utilizing only one other
path, the “state cooptation–no going underground” path (Taiwan), as a negative case, the framework naturally lacks appropriate cases for other paths (“the state repression–not to go underground” path and “the state co-optation–go underground” path). In particular, for the “cooperate” path, there exist wide variations depending on intellectuals’ ideological positions. Some radical intellectuals fail to build strong internal leadership structures in their movement organizations, which may lead them to seek individual survival. Often, some moderate oppositional intellectuals are neither co-opted by the ruling elites nor involved in clandestine underground activities, maintaining dubious positions between the ruling elites and a weak civil society. I did not delve into these paths in this study, but it is important to acknowledge them as intellectuals’ actions (toward going underground) should not be depicted as a necessary, inevitable path driven by structural factors.

13. One (a reviewer) may argue that the primary difference in labor politics between South Korea and Taiwan originates from an economic factor: The former had more big corporations such as Chaebols relying on its own brands, while the latter had more small-size family-oriented businesses engaged in original equipment manufacturing with American firms. The former therefore faced more intense labor relations along with the 1997 financial crisis, while the latter didn’t have to confront such militant labor movements under decent economic growth—thanks to the booming U.S. economy. I largely agree with this structural difference between the two economies but also disagree with its relevance to my framework in several aspects: First, the most militant labor movements emerged in both countries during economic booms in the late 1980s. It is hard to conceive that a good economy leads to a weaker labor movement while an economic crisis results in a stronger labor movement—at least in these democratized developing countries. In both countries, major organizational efforts to build new independent centralized union confederations were completed before the 1997 financial crisis. Second, Taiwan had much stronger union membership (union density) records than South Korea (35.9 percent vs. 13.8 percent in 1995 and 29.4 percent vs. 10 percent in 2013) and a bigger share of proportional representation system favorable to leftist politics. Therefore, economic and political conditions for labor politics are actually in a sense more favorable in Taiwan than in South Korea. Finally, a given structure may offer an opportunity for the growth of (any) movements, but without taking into account actors’ prolonged coordinated efforts (resources and strategies), it is hard to explain where differences in partisan identities and political institutions come from. Therefore, the current claim of this article still has validity, if not completely guarding against the structural approach.

REFERENCES


Cheol-Sung Lee is associate professor of sociology at the University of Chicago. His research interests lie in comparative welfare states and politics of inequality. His recent research has focused on the evolution and transformation of modern welfare states, especially how they are shaped by social forces and how they shape stratification outcomes. He has been publishing his works in *American Sociological Review, Social Forces, World Politics,* and *Comparative Political Studies* and his book titled *When Solidarity Works: Labor-civic Networks and Welfare States in the Market Reform Era* (Cambridge University Press).