MESSAGE FROM THE CHAIR, NANCY DITOMASO
Accounts, Economic Sociology Newsletter, Volume 16, Issue 1, Fall 2016

I appreciate the opportunity to serve as Chair for the Economic Sociology Section for the 2016-2017 academic year. I want to thank Alya Guseva for her leadership over the past year and to all of the Section Officers and Council members (see list at end of this newsletter). A special thanks go to those who have ended their terms, including Delia Baldassarri, from NYU, who served as Treasurer for the Section and Jennifer Bair, from the University of Virginia, who served on the Economic Sociology Council and as a member of the Membership Committee. Another previous Council member, Fred Wherry, is continuing on as Chair-Elect of the Section, so he is just moving from one form of participation to another. We also want to welcome our new Treasurer, Rachel Dwyer, from Ohio State University, and new Council members, Nitsan Chorev from Brown University, and Emily Erikson, from Yale. We also added a new student representative, Kelly Russell, from the University of Michigan. See bios for the new Officers and Council members in this issue. Thankfully Dustin Stoltz, from Notre Dame University, has agreed to continue as our webmaster.

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After heroic efforts by Simone Polillo, from the University of Virginia, who is heading the Membership Committee, we ended up with just a few members short of the 800 that would have enabled us to have an additional session at the 2017 ASA meetings in Montreal. Our final count on September 30, which is the date that ASA uses to determine program slots, was 783. We will continue our efforts to encourage new members and ask that you do the same. Remember that you can purchase gift memberships for graduate students or even colleagues (which at this point will be for 2017). Memberships in ASA are for the calendar year, so we hope that all of you will renew for 2017 and that we will expand membership to the magical 800 number or beyond. Please renew your membership earlier instead of later. In this issue, we include information on the open submission sessions and roundtable sessions being offered for the Montreal ASA meetings.

This issue of Accounts also provides the membership and deadlines for the three award committees offered by the Economic Sociology Section: The Zelizer Committee for the Best Book in Economic Sociology, the Granovetter Committee for the Best Article in Economic Sociology, and the Burt Committee for the Best Student Paper in Economic Sociology. See information included here.

I am delighted to introduce to you the new co-editors of Accounts: Dilara Demir, Alexandra (Lexi) Gervis (Managing Editor), Kendall Park, Ryan Parsons, Hanna Waight, and Kasey Zapatka. Their bios and pictures are included in this newsletter. As I am sure you will be able to see from the outset, they have already done a marvelous job of seeking out and gathering together interesting content for the newsletter that should be of interest to the members and that also highlights their research interests and skills. There is much more planned for the Spring and Summer issues as well, and we are excited about bringing it to you.

In anticipation of the U.S. election this fall, we have sought interviews with a number of leading researchers who have meaningful things to say about the election in the context of their own research. Each interview was conducted by one of the members of the new co-editing team. We have interviews with Larry Bartels, from the Political Science Department at Vanderbilt, who has a new book with Christopher Achen from Princeton, called *Democracy for Realists: Why Elections Do Not Produce Responsive Government*. We also have an interview with Jeff Manza, from the NYU Sociology Department, who along with his long-time co-author Clem Brooks, from Indiana University, has a 2013 book, *Whose Rights? Counterterrorism and the Dark Side of American Public Opinion*. Manza provides an analysis of political support for Donald Trump. We have an interview with Paul Starr, from Princeton University, about the updated version of his book, *Remedy and Reaction: The Peculiar American Struggle Over Health Care Reform*, which is a key area of contention in the current election and sure to be of continuing policy concern. We also have an interview with Richard Alba, from CUNY Graduate Center, who has a new book with Nancy Foner, also from the Graduate Center and Hunter College, called *Strangers No More: Immigration and the Challenges of Integration in North America and Western Europe*, addressing another important policy issue that has had a major effect in this election. I also asked Ryan Parsons to provide a brief description of my favorite site for election information, the Princeton Election Consortium. That is included in this issue of Accounts as well.
This issue also has a special segment on the Brexit vote, drawing from a “pop-up” session that took place at the June meetings of the Society for the Advancement of Socio-economics (SASE), with short summaries provided by Jacqueline O’Reilly from University of Brighton, of the discussions about Brexit offered at the SASE meetings, separate statements by Andrew Morton, from the University of Leeds, and Robert Boyer, from the Institute of the Americas, and including as well commentary by Neil Fligstein from Berkeley, and by Fred Block, from UC Davis, who put the Brexit vote into context.

There are many more segments planned for future issues of Accounts, which I think you will find as engaging and interesting as those for this initial 2016-2017 issue.

Also in the works for this coming year is a Miniconference, which we hope to organize just before the ASA meetings in Montreal. The Miniconference will be held at McGill University on Friday, August 11. Professors Elena Obukhova, Lisa Cohen, and Matissa Hollister are taking responsibility for the local organizing and much more. We are in the midst of discussing the theme and getting committees together to do the work that is involved in making such an endeavor successful. I will be reaching out to a number of you to help with this and other committees.

Finally, I am also excited about a new effort by the Section. Led by our two doctoral student representatives on Council, Angelina Grigoryeva, from Princeton, and Kelly Russell, from the University of Michigan, a number of other volunteers are working on a set of efforts on behalf of the Section to meet the needs of doctoral students. We hope to have a number of Professional Development options available at the ASA meetings and otherwise. The other members of this new Committee are Danny Alvord from the University of Kansas, Lindsay Bayham, from UC Berkeley, Mehmet Cansory, from Boston College, Alaz Kilicasian, from Boston University, Camilio Leslie, from the University of Michigan, Alexander Roehrkasse, from UC Berkeley, Kara Takasaki, from the University of Texas, and Emanuel Ubert from the University of Wisconsin, Madison. Thanks to all for the contributions we know that you will be making.

Enjoy this Fall issue of Accounts. Help us make future issues of value to all of you by providing us with information about your new books or other noteworthy publications, information about those of you on the job market, about new assistant professors, about conferences that you have attended that you think would be of special interest to the Economic Sociology membership, and other contributions you think should be included in the Section newsletter. Please feel free to get in touch with me about your ideas: Nancy DiTomaso, ditomaso@business.rutgers.edu.
Meet the New Accounts Co-editing Team

Dilara Demir

Dilara Demir's interests are in globalization, economic sociology, sociology of expertise and science, technology and society. She focuses on the interactions between international, regional and "national" organizations struggling and negotiating to frame intellectual property after the emergence of the World Trade Organization, 1995 in Turkey. Right now, Dilara is doing research on medical diplomacy between Cuba and the United States.

Alexandra (Lexi) Gervis, Managing Editor

Alexandra Gervis is a third year graduate student at Rutgers University. Born in South Africa, raised in Florida, schooled in Atlanta with a stint in Argentina, Alexandra is now enjoying getting to know New Jersey. She received her BA from Emory University in 2008 with a major in sociology; her honors thesis explored the role of parental cultural capital on students' college application processes. After graduating, Alexandra continued to conduct research in a private sector market research agency before returning to school to pursue her doctorate. Her current research interests lie in wealth and income inequality, racial inequality, organizations, and philanthropy.

Kendall Park

Kendall Park is a fifth year Ph.D. candidate at Princeton University. She received a B.A. in Sociology and Psychology from Vanderbilt University in 2011. While at Vanderbilt, Kendall worked in a Neuroscience and Psychology lab, and her honors thesis examined gendered images of mental illness in the media. After graduation, her work focused on cultural institutions and policy. Her current research interests include economic sociology, consumption, organizational sociology, and the sociology of culture. More specifically, her dissertation focuses on social enterprise and certification systems.
Ryan Parsons

Ryan Parsons is a Mississippi native with experience living and working in China and the United Kingdom. After finishing his undergraduate degree, he worked with US ROTC students in Beijing before beginning a graduate program in international development. Ryan holds undergraduate degrees in International Studies and Chinese from the University of Mississippi. He received a Master of Philosophy degree in Development Studies from the University of Cambridge, where he was a member of Darwin College, the Centre of Development Studies, and the Cambridge Centre for Climate Change Mitigation Research. Before Princeton, Ryan worked at the McLean Institute for Public Service and Community Engagement at the University of Mississippi.

Hannah Waight

Hannah Waight is a third year graduate student in the sociology department at Princeton. Her research interests span economic sociology, gender, inequality, and social theory. She is in the early stages of a dissertation project looking at the transformation of household economies under post-socialist transition, especially mainland China. She is also pursuing collaborative projects on propaganda in China and American pragmatism and social science.

Kasey Zapatka

Currently, Kasey is a first year PhD student in Sociology at The City University of New York, The Graduate Center. He studies neighborhood inequality and is specifically interested in issues of gentrification and the intersection of race and class as they are manifested in the financial, housing, and job markets within neighborhoods.

Outside of school, Kasey works as a part-time research associate at New York City Labor Market Services (NYCLMIS) at the Center for Urban Research within CUNY. He supports multiple projects by performing both qualitative and quantitative research, analyzing labor market information, summarizing research findings, and contributing to final reports.

He received his MA in Sociology from Fordham University in 2014 and a BA in Spanish Language and Literature from the Point Loma Nazarene University in 2010. He is a member of Phi Kappa Phi Honor Society and the American Sociological Association.
Meet the Section Officers, Council Members, and Volunteers

Emily Barman

Emily Barman is an Associate Professor of Sociology at Boston University. Her research interests include organizational theory, economic sociology, and nonprofit studies. Her recent book, *Caring Capitalism: The Meaning and Measure of Social Value* (Cambridge University Press 2016), examines the consequences of the emergence of market-based solutions to social problems, such as social enterprises, corporate social responsibility, and impact investing, for the definition and measurement of social value. Other publications include the award-winning *Contesting Communities: The Transformation of Workplace Charity* (Stanford University Press 2006) and articles in *American Journal of Sociology, Journal of Management Studies, Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, Social Forces*, and *Social Science History*, among others.

Nitsan Chorev

Nitsan Chorev is Professor of Sociology and International & Public Affairs at Brown University. Mostly interested in global political-economic issues, she is currently working on a book project on the pharmaceutical market in East Africa. Her research is concerned both with the political economy of imported medicines - today, these medicines come mostly from India - and with the political economy of local manufacturing of medicines. She is particularly interested in identifying the transnational conditions leading to local pharmaceutical production in Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania. Her previous publications include *The World Health Organization between North and South* (Cornell University Press, 2012), and *Remaking U.S. Trade Policy: From Protectionism to Globalization* (Cornell University Press, 2007). She is also the co-editor of *The Globalization and Development Reader* (Wiley-Blackwell, 2014, with J. Timmons Roberts and Amy Bellone Hite). At the ASA, in addition to the Economic Sociology Section, she is also actively involved in the Global and Transnational Sociology Section and the Comparative-Historical Sociology Section.

Rachel E. Dwyer

Rachel E. Dwyer is Associate Professor of Sociology and Faculty Affiliate in the Institute for Population Research at Ohio State University. She has published widely on rising economic inequality in the United States. In recent years, she has focused increasingly on issues of credit and inequality and is especially interested in the consequences of debt-financed higher education for social inequality and mobility. Her published work has appeared in top academic outlets including the *American Sociological Review, Social*
Emily Erikson

Emily Erikson is associate professor of sociology at Yale University (effective July 2016) working on the role of social networks in the development and emergence of the institutions of capitalism. Her book, *Between Monopoly and Free Trade: The English East India Company* (Princeton University Press, 2014), won the Allan Sharlin Memorial Award, the Ralph Gomory Prize, the Gaddis Smith International Book Prize, and the James Coleman Award for Outstanding Publication. She has published on economic development, social networks and relational sociology in the *American Journal of Sociology, Sociology Theory, Political Power and Social Theory, Social Science History*, and *Contemporary Sociology*.

Kelly Russell

Kelly Russell is a doctoral candidate in Sociology at the University of Michigan. Her research concerns the American political economy, with a special focus on state-market relationships in welfare provision. She has written on tax expenditures and the politics of policy change, and she is currently developing a dissertation on social impact bonds as novel market-based funding tools for public programs.

Dustin S. Stoltz

Dustin S. Stoltz is a PhD student in sociology at the University of Notre Dame and is a Doctoral Student Affiliate of the Kellogg Institute for International Studies. His primary interest is economic sociology, as well as cultural sociology, organizational studies, and cognitive social science. Theoretically, his work attempts to bridge the cognitive sciences and sociology to better understand how culture influences economic discourse and decision-making. His dissertation substantively advances the sociology of elite advising through an empirical exploration of management consulting practices in an international context, and also explores the implications of the transnational advising industry on human development broadly considered.
Accounts Dialogue: Interview with Larry Bartels


KP: In your most recent book, Democracy for Realists, you critique two versions of democratic theory. The first is folk theory, the idea that people have preferences, choose candidates that best represent their preferences, and vote them into office. The second is the theory of retrospective voting, the idea that voters judge politicians not on their policies, but on the results of their policies – on their perception of changes in their own welfare. You argue that both of these theories are wrong, because they rely on the assumptions that voters know their own preferences and the positions of candidates or that voters have a good grasp of the outcomes of various administrations. You argue that neither assumption is empirically supported. Most citizens are uninterested, poorly informed, and unwilling to convey their policy preferences. In fact, for many issues, voters have no preferences whatsoever, and instead they tend to adopt the positions of the candidate they already prefer. Furthermore, voters can’t even distinguish an incumbent’s performance from good or bad luck. For example, voters punish incumbents for events entirely out of their control, like shark attacks and droughts.

You and Achen find that voters react solely to the few months leading up to an election. What are the implications of this finding for politicians’ behavior?

LB: There are at least two important implications. One is that politicians have an incentive to pursue policies with visible short-term benefits and hidden long-term costs—as the political economist Edward Tufte put it decades ago, “myopic policies for myopic voters.” The other is that the overall electoral incentive to produce good policies is eroded by the randomness of voters’ responses. Income growth in the months leading up to an election is affected to some extent by the incumbent’s policies, but much more by random fluctuations in economic conditions. If reelection is
going to be a crapshoot anyway, the temptation increases to pursue ideological goals rather than broad-based posterity and just hope for the best on Election Day.

KP: In a recent symposium for The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, you outline the catch-all nature of Trump’s appeal. Whereas Sanders’ supporters ranked the highest in anti-elitism, Cruz’s supporters were mistrustful of experts, and Rubio’s supporters were strongly nationalistic, Trump’s supporters ranked high in all three measures of populism. Viewed through the “folk theory” lens, this might suggest that Trump has tapped into a newly potent political ideology. I suspect that you have an alternative theory. How can we explain the rise and popularity of Donald Trump?

LB: That analysis of support for Trump (in an essay by Eric Oliver and Wendy Rahn on “The Rise of the Trumpenvolk”) focused on views about how the world works rather than policy preferences. I suppose those views could be said to add up to a “political ideology” of sorts, but they are not the sort of specific issue positions that political scientists have tended to focus on in understanding voting behavior and election outcomes. Achen and I argue in our book that people’s partisan loyalties do inspire them to adopt a variety of consonant issue positions, values, and worldviews (more or less, depending on how engaged they are with politics), but that the issue positions, values, and worldviews are mostly consequences of more fundamental attachments grounded in social identities and group loyalties and antipathies. So we’d think of Trump’s support as stemming primarily from white identity rather than from any coherent political ideology.

KP: Hillary Clinton implicitly quotes you every time she insists that everyone does better when Democrats are in the White House. Do you stand by your findings on this, given recent work by Martin Gilens and Benjamin Page demonstrating that the policy that gets passed reflects the preferences of elites?

LB: When Bill Clinton spoke at the 2012 Democratic convention, one political scientist tweeted, “Bill Clinton = Elvis Presley + Larry Bartels,” which inspired someone else to photoshop me into a white rhinestone-encrusted jacket. Hillary and others have adopted this same talking point, and with good reason. The 2nd edition of Unequal Democracy, slated for publication in early October, updates that analysis and finds a similarly strong pattern of partisan differences in income growth. (Middle-class and poor people have done miserably under Obama, but they also did miserably under George W. Bush, even before the Wall Street meltdown.) Over the whole postwar era, working poor families have seen ten times as much real income growth under Democratic presidents as under Republicans; middle-class families have seen more than twice as much real income growth. But I don’t see any contradiction—or even tension—between that result and Gilens’ (or, for that matter, my own in other parts of the book) that politicians pay little attention to the preferences of middle-class and poor people. In my interpretation, Democrats pursue policies that are good for middle-class and poor people out of ideological conviction, not because they are forced to be responsive to citizens’ views.

KP: In Democracy for Realists, you propose a “third model of democracy,” called “group theory,” which considers citizens first and foremost as members
of social groups. Voters’ party preferences shape their policy views and perceptions of parties’ policy. For example, even though Bill Clinton cut the deficit in half during his first term, Republicans believed he increased it. Essentially, group and partisan loyalties are far more important than policy preferences or political ideology in democratic elections. Can you give an example of group theory at work in the recent primaries?

**LB:** Achen and I did an op-ed piece for the *New York Times* noting that the division between Clinton and Sanders in the Democratic primaries seemed to have much more to do with group loyalties and antipathies than with issues or ideology. For example, Sanders did just nine points better, on average, among liberals than among moderates—but 18 points worse among non-whites than among whites, and 28 points worse among Democratic identifiers than among independents. In effect, he was the candidate of people who lacked strong group attachments to Clinton. We got some remarkable hate mail from Sanders’ supporters who wanted us to know that they were motivated purely by issues and ideology. As we say in our book, “the more information the voter has, often the better able she is to bolster her identities with rational-sounding reasons. All the appropriate partisan chimes will be rung, and the voter may sound quite impressive. ... it will feel like she’s thinking.”

**KP:** Does the upcoming election offer any opportunities or inspiration for empirical analysis? More specifically, is there anything in this current election that would cause you to ask new questions about how the economy affects elections?

**LB:** Analyses of the impact of economic factors in presidential elections are invariably based on an uncomfortably thin base of evidence—the 16 or 17 elections of the post-World War II era. Given significant changes in the structure of the economy and society over that period, there is plenty of reason to be on the lookout for shifts in voters’ responses to economic conditions. If we are now in a new era of persistent slow growth, will voters take that into account and “grade incumbents on a curve,” or will they simply express chronic frustration with Republicans and Democrats in turn? I’d guess the latter, which would imply bad news for the incumbent party—if it weren’t for Trump.
Accounts Dialogue: Interview with Jeff Manza


RP: Given your extensive research over the last several decades on voting behavior and politics, we would welcome your commentary on the current election, and, particularly, on the rise of Donald Trump.

JM: I am now working on a project that attempts to situate the 2016 election, and more specifically the rise (and fall?) of Donald Trump in the context of some long-standing debates in political sociology. Trump broke every rule in the nomination process play-book: he raised and spent little money, he had virtually no endorsements among influential party leaders, and he had virtually no campaign field operation during the primary season. So his breakthrough is a genuine puzzle for existing theories of how national-level politics happen.

Many commentators have seen Trump’s rise as reflecting a high-level of dissatisfaction among working class voters, and that Trump’s major proposals – sharp limits on immigration, anti-free trade, “America first”, and so forth, combined with a kind of “dog whistle” to white voters that he favors a return to an America that pre-dates the social and political rights revolutions from the 1960s onward. These themes resonate with the classical “working class authoritarianism” model that S.M. Lipset identified in the late 1950s as the key to understanding the appeal of authoritarian political movements on both the right and left.

We largely dissent from this approach. Working with my graduate student Ned Crowley, we find that Trump’s early appeal in the Republican primaries was not strongly rooted in less-educated and working class voters, but rather among concentrated among whites of all classes and education levels who have higher levels of racial resentment and stronger concerns about immigration than other Republican voters. The model we propose, building on the work of political scientists such as Michael Tesler and Marisa Abrajano and Zoltan Hajnal is that racially resentful whites, once found in both of the two major
parties, are now overwhelmingly (and in the Obama era, even more so) in the Republican Party. The foundation for Trump's breakthrough, we argue, lies in this critical shift. A significant minority of Republican primary voters were primed for a candidate like Trump to aggressively articulate these themes, and this, we think, is the key to understanding Trump's rise. The large field of contenders sharpened Trump's ability to translate a seemingly low ceiling into the seizure of the nomination.

Once Trump became the Republican nominee, the general election campaign has mostly served to confirm the power of contemporary partisanship: in spite of Trump's evident unpopularity as a candidate, most Republican identifiers are going to vote for him and along with more modest support from racially resentful independents he has been able to keep the election close. There has, of course, been a lot of noise and surprises along the way, but the basic patterning of support has been clear since the summer.

What this means for the future is less clear, and is an interesting and important question. Trumpism without Trump is possible in the short-run, if other right-wing entrepreneurs can package similar appeals. But Trump has not to date sought to do anything to build a more lasting movement, and the existing organizational forces on the right (the national tea party groups, the Koch network, the Freedom Caucus in the House) have largely resisted close identification with Trump. Further, his unique ability to command massive media attention in a way that is highly unusual in presidential nominating campaigns, a huge and surprising asset that no conventional politician is likely to command in the future.

Further, with the ongoing demographic shift in the electorate, which is getting less white at every cycle, the longer-range prospects for Trumpism are probably bleak. But that does not mean that over the next few election cycles we will not see GOP opposing immigration reform and fighting a rear-guard action to hold on to a base that, as Trump has shown, is not necessarily favorably inclined to endorse the standard free-market agenda of the GOP mainstream.
Accounts Dialogue: Interview with Paul Starr


**KP:** *Remedy and Reaction* is a powerful analysis of the historical and institutional constraints on political debates and policy decisions. It offers insight into the missed opportunities, partisanship, and tradeoffs framing the current healthcare system. What made you want to revisit health care, years after *The Social Transformation of American Medicine*, your 1982 award-winner book?

**PS:** It's true that I moved on to other subjects after publishing *Social Transformation* (1982), but I came back to the subject in *The Logic of Health Care Reform* (1992), worked as a senior adviser on health policy in the Clinton White House in 1993, and wrote about those issues during the debate over the Affordable Care Act. So, after the ACA was enacted, I decided to write a concise, analytical account of how health care policy and politics had developed from the early 20th century to that point. Now, at the instigation of my publisher, I've written a long epilogue to *Social Transformation*, bringing that book up to date in what are really three additional chapters on the changes in the structure of the health-care system since the early 1980s. The new edition will come out in 2017. I can't seem to quit health care, though I am mostly working on other subjects.

**KP:** We know that policy debates play out on a landscape shaped by prior debates and decisions. In *Remedy and Reaction*, you describe this landscape as a “policy trap.” What do you mean by that?

**PS:** Policies sometimes get locked in despite producing widely recognized, deep, and persistent problems. The forces that maintain that pattern and make it hard to undo are what I mean by a policy trap. Although the causal mechanisms are different, the concept is analogous to “lock in” of suboptimal technologies (as in the work of Brian Arthur and others). In the case of health policy, a series of non-decisions and decisions in the mid-20th century—the failure to pass national health insurance; the adoption of the tax exclusion of employer health insurance contributions; the enactment of Medicare and Medicaid—created not just a powerful industry with interests in the status
quo, but a “protected public” consisting of employees with good benefits, seniors, veterans and others who are reasonably satisfied and do not experience the full costs of the system. Many of them believe that they have earned their health care, so why should they have to pay for other people who haven’t earned theirs? The moral and ideological aspects of the system are just as important as the economic ones. A policy trap isn’t impossible to escape, but when a window of opportunity appears, it sharply constrains the alternatives that can squeeze through—as was the case when Obama and the Democrats were finally able to pass major reform legislation in 2010.

KP: How has this landscape changed in the last decade? How do you see it changing in the next few years?

PS: Let’s talk about the changing “landscape” of the health-care system. At the end of *Social Transformation*, I wrote about the “waning of professional sovereignty” and the “coming of the corporation.” The corporation isn’t coming to health care any more—it’s arrived. Moreover, there are strong tendencies toward monopoly power in much of the industry. In many urban areas, one or two dominant hospital systems now control an overwhelming share of the market not just in hospital care, but in other services as well—and are paid by private insurers at much higher rates than other providers. These developments have transformed the hierarchies of payment and power in health care—they’re part of what I’ve written about in the new epilogue to *Social Transformation*. They’re also complicated in interesting ways. Individual physicians no longer have the kind of clinical autonomy doctors used to have, and collectively the profession no longer has the veto-power over policy that it used to hold. But physicians remain the central decision-makers in the care of patients, and they continue to enjoy much higher earnings than other professionals with similar education, experience, and demographic characteristics.

I’ve also come back recently to more general questions about professionalism and expertise—the subject of a conference I’ve organized in Princeton this December. The expectations about the professions that many sociologists had in the mid-20th century haven’t worked out. Why things have developed differently poses some important sociological questions.

KP: Health care has been central to debates during this presidential primary. Donald Trump promises to repeal the Affordable Care Act, while Hillary Clinton wants to build upon it. How feasible are these proposals, given the historical context you’ve outlined?

PS: The proposals from both candidates are *feasible*. Trump’s proposals would take health insurance away from about 20 million people. He would also turn Medicaid into a block grant, which would eliminate the rights to health care that low-income people have under federal law. And he’d allow insurance to be sold across state lines, which would effectively nullify state insurance regulation. All of these are bad ideas that are entirely feasible. Clinton has a series of proposals to deal with shortcomings in the ACA, including the creation of a public option in the insurance exchanges. That’s feasible too and highly desirable, but it’s unlikely to pass Congress if Republicans control one or both houses. At this point, I don’t see a politically feasible path to a good outcome on the exchanges.
KP: In reading *Remedy and Reaction*, I couldn't help but draw links to other American welfare policy debates. Medicare and tax exclusions for employer-sponsored health insurance removed the elderly and employed populations from the uninsured. This effectively eliminated the impetus for universal healthcare, but it also supported the idea that health care benefits are earned. The protected public largely ignores the fact that they receive government assistance, distancing themselves from others who want help from the government. This draws boundaries between the worthy and the unworthy, just as the government, media, and citizens have made distinctions between the deserving and undeserving poor in countless welfare debates throughout the last century. What can we learn about other types of welfare policies from the history of American health care?

PS: Although the parallels between health care and welfare are clear, there are differences. The hostility to giving basic health care to the undeserving is not as great as the hostility to giving cash to the undeserving. Medicaid was built on top of welfare and for a long time carried the same stigma. But beginning in the 1980s, Congress extended eligibility for Medicaid more widely, gradually converting it into a general health-care program for low-income Americans. The ACA took that process further. Of course, it would have been better never to have had a separate health-care program for the poor. But at least the Medicaid-welfare link has been broken. In that sense, Medicaid's history is more encouraging than the history of welfare.

KP: What can economic sociologists learn from political sociologists? And how can they build upon your work?

PS: Economic and political sociology can't be cleanly separated. The economy rests on legal and institutional foundations that are derived from politics. Politics develop within institutional constraints partly set by the economy. We haven't discussed my 2004 book *The Creation of the Media: Political Origins of Modern Communications*, but that's all about those interconnections between politics and economics. One of the themes of that book is the political underpinning of American comparative advantage: how political choices from the founding of the Republic about free communication, intellectual property, the post office, and telecommunications were sources of comparative advantage in American economic development and specifically fostered innovation in media-related industries in the 19th and 20th centuries.

My main preoccupation now is a book about what I'm calling “entrenchment,” the general, covering term I use for hard-to-reverse changes in constitutive aspects of society and politics. The book draws not just on the historical work I've done on different institutional fields, but also on a lot of new work on such things as inheritance laws, electoral systems, tax regimes, constitutional courts, technological change, and systems of racial categorization. So there's both economic and political sociology in the book, and a lot else.
Accounts Dialogue: Interview with Richard Alba


AG: In your book, you take a trans-national, comparative approach to examine the nature of immigration in North America and Western Europe. What are your key takeaways? What did you uncover that surprised you the most?

RA: I think a comparative approach now is really the frontier of immigration research. If we want to understand the kind of institutional forces that affect immigrant group immigration, we have to use comparisons. When we look at a single society, the institutions do not vary, so we cannot get a feel for how they might be retarding or promoting the integration of immigrants and their children.

I think the biggest surprise of the book overall is that the United States does not look that good compared to other countries. I do not mean that there are not some ways in which the US is exceptional – there are. For example, we are very ready to call other people Americans; we are good at extending the national identity to immigrants and their children. But, when we look at things like how are immigrants doing economically, or how are their children doing in school, the US is – at best – in the middle of the pack. And, in some cases, it’s really near the bottom. I think that Americans are overconfident about our incorporation ethos because of the way we think about our history as one of incorporating ever new waves of immigration – and, it just may not be true. It could be that we could learn something by looking at how other countries are faring and thinking about what features of their institutions may be helping immigrants or their children. So, that was the motivation for the book.

AG: You argue that institutional factors – that are context-dependent – are key to understanding how immigration works. Within these institutional factors, what role does the labor market tend to play? In the US specifically?

RA: Obviously the labor market is very important. It provides the most significant domain of integration for immigrants, because how they do in the labor
market is going to determine where their families live and a lot of the experiences that they and their families will be exposed to. We started from a very common idea in the immigration literature that there are these overarching, macro-level institutional factors that drive integration (i.e. is it a social welfare society, is it a liberal market economy?). But, in our opinion, they don't work very well. We found that they didn't really coincide or correspond with the economic integration of immigrants, particularly those who come with low levels of human capital. We focus on these immigrants partly because we wanted to take into account the differences between countries in the sources of their immigration. For example, Canada, because of its point system, has a very highly skilled immigration, making it different from the others. But, we also wanted to look specifically at the big groups that seemed very problematic in their integration, like North Africans in France, Turks in Germany, Mexicans in the US – and these tend to be low status groups. For the low status groups, labor market mechanisms are tremendously important in terms of their initial positioning in the society. We found again that when you look at income, the US is not doing terribly well. The income of low status immigrants is at a greater distance from the national norm than is the case in the other societies. And there is also a very high rate of poverty among low status immigrants, rivaled only by the odd case of France (among the other countries we looked at). I think the weak economic positioning of immigrants in the US – of course, many of them are unauthorized, and that's a difference from other countries – has an important impact on how immigrant groups are able to integrate.

AG: You close the book with the policy implications of your findings, evaluating current policy solutions and contributing your own. What do you believe are the most crucial policy levers to better integration?

RA: In the United States, there is no question but that the issue of legal status looms enormously large. The undocumented appear to be a larger share of all immigrants in the United States: there are about 40+ million immigrants, of which 11 million are unauthorized, so that means 1 in 4 has an unauthorized status. And, of course, it's higher if we just restrict ourselves to immigrants coming from Latin America. So, that has a tremendous impact because the ability of these immigrants both to earn substantial money and to move residentially is very limited. Because of their limited residential mobility, these immigrant families often are restricted to barrio areas where there are often poor services, high crime, weak schools, etc. This has an impact then on the second generation, even when the children of these immigrants are US-born.

Outside of legal status, I think that the American school system is a particularly weak vehicle for second-generation mobility. Two school systems stood out as creating disadvantage for the children of immigrants: Germany and the United States. I think we can see these two cases in terms of two important dimensions of school systems. One is the dimension of stratification – the extent to which there are internal differentiations within a school system that lead to different educational outcomes and occupational futures. Germany ranks very high on the dimension of stratification, it has a three-tiered educational system and students are tracked in most German states at the end of the
fourth grade, which is very early. The other
dimension is standardization – the extent to which
students in the system are provided with the same
education uniformly. The United States is
particularly weak in terms of standardization, not
just because curricula vary by state, but also
because there is a great deal of inequality among
American schools. The financing is tied to local
factors, such as the amount of property in the
jurisdiction, and there is a lot of evidence that the
financing inequalities among schools are correlated
with, on the one hand, big differences in things like
resources, teacher qualifications and so forth, and
on the other hand, with the social origins of
students. I think the US school system could be
made more equal in various ways. In addition, by
looking at the experiences of other countries, we
could find ways of giving more assistance to the
children of low status immigrants, like the co-ethnic
mentoring programs that are used in the
Netherlands.

AG: With Trump's proposals to build a wall and ban
practicing Muslims, immigration is clearly a key
issue in this election. What is your perspective on
the relationship between immigration and current
politics? In your opinion, how did we get here?

RA: The Europeans are actually now chortling at us
and saying, “See! You are developing the same kind
of xenophobic nationalism that we've had in our
politics for a while.” If you look at European politics,
like the Netherlands, their anti-immigrant parties
have made for a couple of decades a political hay
out of immigration and have tried to limit
immigration and limit the rights of some
immigrants, like Muslims. Now we have the same
thing developing in the United States. What I'm
going to say I don't think is particularly innovative,
but I agree with a lot of the commentators who
think this is driven by two kinds of forces that are
intertwined. One is the economic struggles of a lot
of lower middle and middle class white Americans.
We see their lack of economic gains over the past
several decades and the limited opportunities now
even for the younger members of some white
communities to get ahead, signaled by things like
rising drug use, increasing mortality in the middle
ages, and so forth. That's on the one hand.

On the other hand, I think that fused with this, in
the Trump campaign, is white nationalism. This is
very much a response to changes that are
perceived as taking place in American society, and
immigration is a part of those changes. I think there
is a segment of white America – particularly middle
aged people, people who do not experience much
diversity and are fearful of it, people who perceive
themselves as economically stagnating – that is
reacting very strongly against what they see as the
demographic changes taking place in the United
States that make it into a country where whites are
no longer clearly the dominant group. We'll have to
see if this persists beyond Trump. Trump has very
successfully articulated these things and
established himself as the voice of this part of the
population.

There's an irony here because I think that, in a way,
liberal social science has maybe contributed a bit to
this. For example, the census data exaggerate, in
my opinion, the decline of the white population, so
they convey to some white Americans a kind of
rapidity of diversity that actually isn't really true.
This happens because the census handles very
badly the growing number of young people that
come from mixed ethno-racial backgrounds, the
great majority of whom have a white parent and a
non-white parent. By and large, these individuals
are classified as members of minorities, which, in
my opinion, does not make sense. I'm not saying they are whites necessarily, but to call them minorities doesn't reflect their family experiences, nor does it reflect their position in American society. I think a lot of us take for granted that we are soon going to be a majority minority country. And, I think we shouldn't. We don't know that really, because we don't know how the many young people of mixed backgrounds are going to ultimately position themselves in our society. We should keep more of an open mind about the changes that are taking place. Both on the right and on the left, there is a strong belief in a demographic transformation of our country into a majority minority society. On the left, that is greeted with some appreciation, if not applause. On the right, it is being greeted with horror and despair, and a sense that the society has changed in ways that make people extremely uncomfortable. In my opinion, we really need to step back a bit and ask more profoundly, what kinds of changes are taking place, how do they relate to the changes we know have taken place in the past, and what might we learn by looking at them from this historical perspective?

I don't think Trump will win, but I think the themes that he has based his campaign on could well outlive him, and they definitely involve immigration, as well as the kind of population change that is associated with immigration. I think this is going to continue to be an important theme in our political life and in our public life.
Introducing the Princeton Election Consortium

Prepared by Ryan Parsons, Princeton University

Former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has a 96% chance of winning the 2016 Presidential Election as of mid-October, according to Sam Wang’s Princeton Election Consortium (her chances reach 98% in the model’s Bayesian predictor). The Consortium was one of the first websites to tackle US Presidential elections using aggregation of state polling data. Unlike similar models produced by the New York Times and Nate Silver’s FiveThirtyEight blog, the Princeton Election Consortium only uses polling data at the state level to predict election outcomes and does not adjust for economic or other macro-level variables. The exclusion of these external variables differentiates Wang’s analysis from standard approaches used by pundits and other non-scientific practices.

The website has enjoyed considerable success since its first predictions in 2004. The original predictions matched the electoral vote breakdown between President George Bush and Senator John Kerry exactly and predicted the outcome of the 2008 election within one electoral vote. PEC achieved similar results in 2012 and also predicted the popular vote breakdown and the outcome of ten close Senate races. For the 2016 election, the website currently projects a 332-206 electoral vote breakdown with a 4.8% popular vote advantage for Secretary Clinton. The model predicts a 66% chance for Democratic control of the Senate.

The Princeton Election Consortium also provides analysis of election-related issues in the months leading up to the election. This analysis tackles the institutional and political questions that perennially occupy national attention during election season. Why do the supporters of projected losers start to doubt polls? How do projections about the presidential election affect down ballot races? Can we leverage “big data” to understand gerrymandering? The interdisciplinary nature of the blog’s content encourages conversations across conventional disciplinary and professional boundaries. A central goal of the PEC, according to Professor Wang, is to use best practices from other disciplines and empower citizens to better use their resources.

Sam Wang is a professor of molecular biology and neuroscience at Princeton University. His work with his lab and the Princeton Neuroscience Institute focuses on the neurobiology of learning and cognitive and social thought processes. Wang, who received his Ph.D. from Stanford University School of Medicine, has been a member of the Princeton faculty since 2000. The Princeton Election Consortium’s projections and commentary are online at election.princeton.edu.
The Brexit Vote: Commentary and Analyses

Prepared by Kasey Zapatka, the Graduate Center, City University of New York (CUNY)

During the annual meetings of the Society for the Advancement of Socio-economics (SASE), which were held in Berkeley, California, in June of 2016, the referendum, nicknamed Brexit, was held in the UK to decide whether to leave the European Union. The vote was characterized as those who wanted to “Remain” in the European Union and those who wanted to “Leave” the European Union. In response to the surprise outcome of the election in which the Leave vote won, SASE organized a “Pop-up Session” to discuss the Brexit vote.

In this segment of Accounts, a summary of the Pop-up Session is provided by Jacqueline O’Reilly, from the University of Brighton, who organized and moderated the session at SASE, with separate statements from session participants, Robert Boyer, from the Institute of the Americas, and from Andrew Morton, doctoral student from the University of Leeds. In addition, we have invited Neil Fligstein, from the University of California at Berkeley to provide some context to the Brexit vote, and Fred Block, from the University of California at Davis to analyze the Brexit vote from a Polanyian perspective. A more extended analysis of the SASE Pop-up Session will be published subsequently in Socio-economic Review, the official SASE journal. For more information on SASE, see https://sase.org. The next annual meetings of SASE will be held June 29-July 1, 2017 in Lyon, France, at Université Claude Bernard, with the theme, What’s Next? Disruptive/Collaborative Economy or Business as Usual?

A Primer on the British Decision to Leave the European Union (Brexit)

Neil Fligstein, University of California at Berkeley

On June 23, Great Britain voted to leave the European Union. This event is just the latest crisis of the European Union. In the past 8 years, the European Union has faced down the financial crisis and the ongoing slow economic recovery of the Eurozone. In the past year, the European Union has been in constant crisis mode with the possibility of a Greek exit from both the Euro and the European Union, the onslaught of immigrants escaping from war torn Syria, and the terrorist attacks on Paris and Brussels. Somehow, the European Union has managed to muddle through each of these crises. But the Brexit may finally be the straw that breaks the back of the nearly 60 years’ experiment in supranational governance.

So, why are the British leaving the European Union? One can observe in Great Britain a microcosm of the populist politics that are sweeping across the advanced industrial democracies. At its core, the British public is experiencing a rebirth of nationalism on a level that probably has not been seen in the country since before World War I. Polls show that British national identity has been rising since the turn of the 21st century and has intensified in the wake of the financial crisis. Just like in America (and in other parts of Europe), a large number of citizens have become convinced...
that their governments have done too much to help immigrants and not enough to help the “nation.” In response, they want to take back their nation and have their government produce higher levels of border controls.

European politics have played some role in this process. In the face of slow economic growth, citizens across Europe saw that the European Union was not going to be a vehicle to support a strong economic recovery. Indeed, citizens in Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece, and Spain (called the “PIIGS”) were forced to accept economic policies dictated by the German government and their northern European supporters. In the eastern part of the European Union, the financial crisis hit hard as well and citizens across that region began to rethink their commitments to the European project. In all of these countries, the idea of European solidarity was found to be wanting and citizens have responded by turning back to their national governments for protection. As a result, a populist based Nationalism is on the rise.

The British, who were already skeptical about the idea of European solidarity in the first place, accepted extreme austerity as economic medicine for the financial crisis. But the dose they got was delivered by their own government, which promised to deliver them from the bad economic times. As the British economy has slowly recovered, the sense that Britain could go it alone has only intensified. In the last two elections, the UK Independent Party pushed a political agenda with one item: leave the European Union. David Cameron promised that if voters re-elected his Conservative Party, he would hold a referendum on the issue.

In the next six months, the British are likely to begin negotiations over the terms of their divorce from the EU. There are two scenarios. The “soft” Brexit will have Britain decide to opt in to being a member of the European Free Trade Area that now includes Switzerland, Norway, Liechtenstein, and Iceland. That means they retain access to the European single market, but must still obey European rules in trade. Ironically, the main effect of this will be to reduce the British voice in those rules and will continue to contribute to the EU budget. Whoever said that voters were rational? The crisis will be weathered by the rest of the member states of the European Union, many of whom will be glad to have the British leave.

But “hard” Brexit is the most likely. The current Conservative Party government has given signals it intends not to allow continued European migration into Britain. This will be a deal breaker for the rest of the EU. If this scenario comes to pass, the real unravelling of the EU and Britain’s economy will begin in earnest. First, the Scots are likely to want to stay in the European Union and will revisit their vote to leave Great Britain. Second, firms that are now using Great Britain as a platform to trade with the rest of Europe will choose to relocate in Ireland (and Scotland if they leave) where people speak English and that will create a job drain. Third, the City of London will experience a similar decline as financial centers in Frankfurt and Paris vie for the financial trading that involves European banks and firms.

But the most negative consequences could be to set the European Union adrift and push each of the countries who are involved to rethink their commitments to free trade, open borders, and maintaining a peaceful Europe. If it starts to break
apart, then the underlying fabric of the postwar alliance that withstood the challenge of the Soviet Union and the current crises presented by the ongoing struggles in the Middle East starts to unravel. The nationalism of the British will produce more such responses across Europe. The idea that history will rear its ugly head again should make all of us nervous. While the odds of this happening may not seem large now, the Brexit is one more ominous sign that the liberal democratic capitalist project is under siege.

Anarchy in the UK: Brexit style
Pop Up Salon at SASE Conference at the University of California at Berkeley
Summary Provided by Jacqueline O'Reilly, University of Brighton

Anarchy in the UK broke out in the middle of the SASE conference at Berkeley. The aftermath of the Brexit referendum resulted in political and economic disarray: the Prime Minister resigned, the Shadow Cabinet imploded, and sterling plummeted. The Bank of England injected £3.1bn into UK banks, standing at the ready to provide an additional £250 billion to backstop markets. The causes of the referendum, aimed at subduing the right wing margins of the Conservative Party and stemming the rising tide of the “peoples army” of UKIP (the UK Independence Party), ended with major international repercussions, going well beyond the borders of the UK. Overall international reaction was one of shock. And it was one we needed to discuss.

Why did the Brexit result catch so many people by surprise? Should we have seen it coming? These were some of the questions we set out to discuss with a spontaneously organised pop up salon on the 25th June in the middle of the SASE conference.

Jacqueline O’Reilly, Research Director of CROME at the University of Brighton in the UK initiated and moderated the event briefly outlining the results. (http://lordashcroftpolls.com/2016/06/how-the-united-kingdom-voted-and-why)

Scotland voted “Remain;” Northern Ireland was divided; most of Wales and the rest of England voted “Leave.” Support for “Remain” was strongest in the major cities of England, but “Leave” had secured a majority across the rest of the country. (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-36616028)

The electoral maps illustrated a very disunited kingdom, fractured along class, age and ethnic divisions. Some of the strongest support for “Leave” had been in traditional, disaffected and deindustrialised Labour heartlands amongst the manual working classes; but nearly half of the white-collar middle classes had also voted “Leave.” A majority of the professional classes had voted “Remain.” Those in work and those with a university education voted “Remain;” most of those not working and those who had left school at 18 or younger voted “Leave.” “Leave” voters represented a broad coalition of disparate communities that did not cut neatly across class lines.

Young people (18-24) had overwhelmingly voted “Remain” but only 40% had turned out; older voters had turned out, and they voted “Leave.” Black and Asian voters were more likely than whites to vote “Remain.”
Voters were segregated between regions, cities and provinces, across generations, classes and ethnic groups, as well as divided within families.

Looking for concepts to help us analyse this historically momentous decision, comparisons were made with the financial crisis of 2008. Concepts like deeply embedded fault lines, the impact of contagion, and the Polanyian idea of a double movement were discussed at the SASE conference and will be published in a Discussion Forum of the Socio-Economic Review in the autumn. But at the pop up salon we sought to capture immediate reaction from a number of international members of the SASE community. They provided a short initial reactions and interpretations.

Alexander Kentikelenis, a Junior Research Fellow in sociology and politics at the University of Oxford and participant at the SASE Early Career workshop, talked about the consequences for Greece and the prospects for young career researchers thinking of establishing a career in the UK.

Brian Nolan, economist, Professor of Social Policy and Director of the Programme Employment, Equity and Growth at the Institute for New Economic Thinking at the University of Oxford, raised three issues. First, why had so many supposedly well-informed people been caught off guard – what does that tell us about cleavages? What will the consequences be for Northern Ireland, where despite the success of the peace process the political situation remains fragile? And, as the video interviews we watched from “Leave” voters illustrated, this was not a rational economic decision, emotions played a major role. Little effort was made to engage voters with a positive narrative about the EU, but that is genuinely difficult in the context of austerity and the failure to enhance the social dimension of the European project.

Chris Warhurst, Director of the Institute for Employment Research at the University of Warwick and former Labour Party candidate in Scotland spoke about the disarray it raised for UK Universities trying to work out what it would mean for their students and research projects. He also pointed to the massive divide between the different worlds of those who had voted “Leave” and “Remain,” and what needed to be done to reconnect them.

Bea Cantillion, Professor of Social Policy at the University of Antwerp in Belgium, questioned why such a poor system of decision-making on such an important and complex issue had been used. It would be inconceivable in other European countries. A short discussion about the unique unwritten features of the British Constitution, the advisory role of referenda and the sovereignty of the House of Commons was followed with interventions from the floor.

Ewan McGaughey, Lecturer in Law from King’s College London argued that a second referendum and the separation of Scotland were unlikely.

Akos Rona-Tas, Professor at the University of California, San Diego, argued that there were some significant implications for Eastern Europe where right wing parties were becoming increasingly well established in the democratic system.
Nancy DiTomaso, Distinguished Professor of Management and Global Business at Rutgers Business School, in response to comments about whether such votes represent expressions of democracy (including a comment in the session that perhaps there should be a referendum that included all of Europe), drew attention to a recent book by political scientists, Christopher Achen and Larry Bartels [see this issue’s interview with Larry Bartels]. They argue that there is no evidence over the last century across a number of countries for either a populist theory of democracy (that people vote for candidates that match their policy positions and represent “the will of the people”), or for retrospective voting (that voters assess the performance of current leaders and vote based on their approval or disapproval). Rather they argue people vote based on social identities and group attachments. In other words, there is no evidence of a rational voter in the sense of “informed and engaged citizens.” Achen and Bartels also note that referenda are not a solution for the problems of democracy, because they primarily benefit wealthy elites, and when not, can be “distinctly counterproductive.”

Patrick Le Gales, Dean of the Urban School at Sciences Po, provided an incisive account of the political turmoil that had surrounded European politics for a long time – according to him Brexit was not such a surprise.

Robert Boyer, economist at the Institut des Ameriques, Paris, was also not at all surprised by the result as he had predicted it all along. [See Boyer’s analysis separately in this issue.]

An intensive discussion followed with a number of contributors from the US and Europe. The high turnout and lively debate inspired us to think about a fast and open process for organizing a Discussion Forum for Socio-Economic Review, where contributions will be published in the autumn.

Jacqueline O’Reilly: “The Brexit vote revealed deep, long-term fractures in support for international political and economic institutions. It marks a break with the status quo and provides a unique opportunity to examine the forces and theoretical accounts of institutional continuity and change on a grand scale. The irony of a vote to ‘take back control’ is likely to increase the UK’s economic vulnerability. But if the sky doesn’t fall in and the British economy manages to swerve out of an Armageddon prognosis, aided by a ‘Weimaresque’ abandon of providing cheap money through quantitative easing (QE) and reducing interest rates, the result will be bad for the rest of Europe. If the predictions are correct and the economy suffers, the results will also be bad both for the UK and European exporters. Ultimately there are likely to be few winners, other than the lawyers employed to re-write the new treaties to establish what exactly Brexit is going to mean.”

**Brexit: A Social Total Event, A Trump For Socio-Economics**

Robert Boyer (Institute of the Americas)

For some observers, the outcome of the British referendum (Brexit) was a total surprise. It is not necessarily so for the researchers that have been analyzing the transformations of contemporary society during the last two decades (Boyer, 2000, 2013, 2016). Brexit is relevant to a whole spectrum of social sciences: sociology of finance, heterodox political science, sociology of globalization, history
of European integration, and finally political economy.

**Illusion of finance and political myopia.** A typical pattern of economic crises exhibits a brutal adjustment for the people involved. Such a process was observed as soon as the Brexit was announced to have won: complete disarray of the government, the City, business and citizens, including those who had voted for the Brexit. During the referendum campaign, the proponents of Brexit had painted a quite rosy picture for the welfare of citizens without necessarily believing that their arguments were true. By contrast the Remain camp was unable to build a convincing story showing that belonging to the EU was attractive and beneficial. The day after, British citizens woke up out of a nightmare: fall of the pound, halt in the decisions to invest in UK, resignation of the Prime Minister, refusal by Brexit proponents to assume their responsibility in forming a new government. This is the charm of narratives and simultaneously their limits.

**A dangerous Machiavellian political game.** This is quite enlightening concerning Prime Minister David Cameron's decision to organize a referendum on the belonging of the UK to the European Union: clearly it was thought as a clever device in order to discipline a fraction of dissident members of parliament within the conservative party. Few observers really took into account the fact that this political bet could be lost, implying an effective Brexit. What was supposed to be a Machiavellian game turned sour: the government had to assume the economic, financial and social consequences of the referendum. It was thus especially risky to decide of such an important issue by a referendum, relatively disconnected from the Westminster style of debate and the intensive deliberation typical of a political system that gives the primacy to the Parliament (Binzer Hobolt, 2009; Société de Législation comparée, 2011).

**The great social divide: more globalization than Europeanization.** The extreme polarization of votes manifests the structural transformations of society. Young people and the highly educated fraction of the population who live in large cities, especially in London, voted in favor of Remain. By contrast, older people with low education, welfare dependent, and modest workers and employees living in Northern England in small cities favored Brexit (Lord Ashcroft, 2016).

This is the long term consequence of the internationalization of the British economy and not so much of its Europeanization. The successive governments have been very clever in negotiating and obtaining many opt-out clauses: social charter, no adhesion to the Euro, reduced participation to the European budget, rejection of Schengen Treaty about internal mobility. Nevertheless, the popular press has been attributing to Brussels regulations and directives, many if not all, the domestic problems. This alliance between the media and nationalistic politicians (for example via the political party UKIP) builds a discourse that blames the European Union for transformations that have been caused by the internationalization of the British economy and its excessive reliance upon its financial sector.

**A long-awaited crisis.** During the 2000s, the high degree of international liquidity and easy access to credit for individuals and States have been hiding the deflationary bias of the Lisbon Treaty, but after the Lehman Brothers collapse and its conversion into a Euro crisis, this structural property of the
European policy mix manifests itself and it sharpens the division between losers and winners, in the context of widening inequalities.

Nevertheless, if it was relatively easy to remove trade barriers linked to tariffs, the strengthening in competition has made more and more difficult the extension of welfare at the domestic level and the diversity of national configurations has blocked the constitution of a coherent European welfare.

**The crisis of the British hegemonic bloc.** Traditionally the political spectrum opposes a liberal right to an interventionist left, but the polls about the reason of the vote on Brexit show that the opposition between inward looking individuals and internationalists has probably become more important (Ashcroft, 2016). The UK is only one extreme configuration but in Greece (for evident reasons) and France (the economy the most destabilized by the internationalization and financial globalization) a majority thinks that the EU has had unfavorable outcomes (The Economist, 2016).

**The difficult search for an alternative engine of growth.** The impact of China should be taken into account in line with the previous strategy to attract foreign direct investment and develop joint ventures: will the new jobs created compensate the inflow of low price imports from China? The jury is still out and many other economic scenarios are possible. Could England become a tax haven at the margins of the EU? Would the secession of Scotland imply a disintegration of UK?

**Is an isolationist narrative convincing?** This analysis stresses the importance of narratives that are necessary to sustain an existing or an emerging growth regime. The politicians in favor of Remain were unable to work out an attractive future, compared with the nirvana promised by the Brexeters. Are there convincing discourses able to correct the misrepresentations that have been so efficient in attracting the votes of the losers of globalization? A prospective about the future of London stresses how difficult this exercise is (Leadbeater, 2016). A complete isolation from the world economy would transform London into a modern Petra. This trajectory would be more imposed from outside than chosen by British citizens. According to a second possibility, London could become a national and no more a global capital and this assumes the victory of nationalist, if not xenophile discourses. A third scenario would transform London into the equivalent of Hong-Kong or Shenzhen, i.e. a special European economic zone. This would mean the deconstruction of the national state, with recurring conflicts with the hinterland, a quite difficult transition indeed.

This implies a chaotic and long transformation toward a still unknown socioeconomic regime. Understanding how social transformations, economic restructuring and political discourses interact could define the agenda of research for the present generation of socio-economists.

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**Socio-Economics Meets Complex Political Geography: Economic Inequality As Pre-Condition For Brexit**

Andrew Morton, PhD Candidate, The University of Leeds, the United Kingdom

There is no single political decision that post-War Britain could make that could simultaneously inspire such economic uncertainty, social unrest, political upheaval and disturb its international relations (especially with Europe) in the way its “in-out” referendum has. The extent to which those at the poorer end of British society were galvanised to vote “leave” is an important question for economic sociology as well as political science. It was clear from surveys prior to the referendum date that the poorer a Briton was, the more likely he or she was to vote for Brexit. A study in the summer months hence, done by the Joseph Rowntree Foundation, affirmed this ex *post facto*. The results also reinforced the findings of a recent study in the *Socio-Economic Review* (Kuhn et al 2016). This demonstrated a positive relationship in Europe between economic inequality (and lower education levels) and rising anti-EU sentiment (Euroscepticism) among voters. OECD and EU data have demonstrated Britain’s severe economic inequality record (in terms of total population, gender inequality, low
pay and wage inequality). If the connection between this and rising EU-sceptic sentiment was correct, then a high turnout among these voters was likely to be important to the referendum outcome.

There is an important wrinkle to the above concerning political geography. With Scotland becoming a very de-Anglicised place in party political terms, and voting overwhelmingly “to remain,” the focus on England points to some very interesting conclusions that other EU countries would be wise to take note. Much like the rest of Europe, England has seen the emergence of a nationalist populist party (the UK Independence Party (UKIP)). The anti-EU centred UKIP had enjoyed big gains in a number of ex-industrial areas in the English North and the Midlands in recent elections. These regions are among many to have felt the harsh winds post-industrial economic neglect. Northern metropolitan cities Liverpool and Manchester, where post-industrial economic development had been stronger, followed London in voting firmly “to remain.” Swathes of other cities did not. Birmingham, Leeds, Sheffield and Newcastle were essentially split 50/50 as the poorer areas of the cities came out in force to “vote leave.” The questions about economic development, or lack thereof, in these places instead gave way to social discussions of migration. Other cities like Sunderland in the Northeast and Portsmouth and Southampton in the South voted much more clearly “to leave,” despite being among those English cities that rely on overseas trade. The socio-economic divide in England may have been clear, but the political geography of how this broke down is not.

There are a number of lessons for other EU member states – even if they do not have the more distant, “awkward partner” relationship with the EU that Britain always has and even if a country’s economic inequality isn’t, in measurable terms, as bad as Britain’s. Rising economic inequality combined with nationalist EU-scepticism, as is happening in many EU countries, points to any number of social, political and economic upheavals. Even if an outright Fraxit, Swexit, Nexit or Grexit (terminology to refer to the possibility of France, Sweden, the Netherlands, or Greece leaving the EU) is not the result, this is now Europe’s biggest problem.

Brexit Through a Polanyian Lens
Fred Block, Research Professor, University of California at Davis

Karl Polanyi’s concept of the double movement is useful for analyzing the Brexit vote. On the one side, there is the movement for laissez-faire that seeks to expand the influence of markets on social life and on the other, there is a counter-movement that seeks to protect society from markets through a range of policy instruments that include tariffs, regulations, social insurance measures, and other redistributive schemes. In Polanyi’s view, the movement for laissez-faire’s misguided effort to restore the international gold standard after World War I led directly to the Great Depression. The Depression, in turn, generated powerful movements of social protection that became sharply polarized between left-wing and fascist movements.

Recent events in Europe and the U.S. are following a similar pattern. Forty years of institutional changes pushed by market fundamentalists have significantly increased the exposure of most people to market processes, resulting in unstable incomes, precarious employment, dramatic increases in
economic inequality, and finally the Global Financial Crisis. During the painfully slow process of recovery from that crisis, movements for social protection have grown stronger both in mass protest efforts such as Occupy Wall Street in the U.S. and in expanded electoral support for anti-establishment political parties or political leaders in many countries.

As in the 1930's, these protective movements take both a left-wing and a right-wing form. In the U.S. in the 2016 Presidential primaries, it was easy to see a shared critique of free market globalization in the rhetoric of Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders, but the ardent supporters of each of these anti-establishment candidates despised the backers of the other. England’s political polarization is similar; left-wing supporters of Labour leader Jeremy Corbin have no love lost for the anti-immigrant United Kingdom Independence Party and vice versa. However, the vote on whether the U.K. should remain in the European Community created a unique circumstance in which left-wing and right-wing opponents of free market globalization could cast identical votes while also being joined by some fed up centrist voters. But this fleeting agreement exists alongside of radically divergent visions for the U.K.’s future.
Announcements

Academy Of Management, Organization and Management Theory Division Invites Membership from Economic Sociologists

The Organization and Management Theory (OMT) Division of the Academy of Management would like to invite all Economic Sociology members to consider getting more involved with the OMT Division. This past year OMT added the topic keyword, "Economic Sociology" to our keyword choices and we had 181 reviewers sign-up choosing it, as well as 49 paper submissions for the same phrase. We would love to grow both of those numbers and build a closer relationship with all interested members. The 2017 conference will be held in Atlanta, Georgia in August with a submission deadline to be announced this Winter. We look forward to you all joining us as reviewers, submitters, and conference attendees. Please do not hesitate to contact me, or any of the other OMT executives if you have any questions about the OMT division via our website (http://omtweb.org/) or by e-mail.

Marc-David L. Seidel
Academy of Management
OMT Division Chair-Elect 2017
omt@sauder.ubc.ca
Call for Papers for 2017 ASA Economic Sociology Section Panels

Based on our membership as of October 1, 2016, the Economic Sociology Section will have 4 panels for the ASA meetings in Montreal, plus a roundtable session and the business meeting. All panels will be “Open submission” so that all Section members have an opportunity to have their work considered. Each is organized around a broad theme that should provide some sense of coherence and yet be open enough to allow for the work of many Section members to be relevant. Here are the sessions that are planned for Montreal, August 12-15. The ASA submission system opens November 1, 2016 and closes January 11, 2017.

All submissions need to be made through the ASA website. Those whose papers are accepted for each session will need to be ASA members for 2017.

**Economic Sociology and Public Policy**  
Session Organizer, Donald Light, Rowan University, lightdo@rowan.edu

This session aims to showcase academic or applied work in economic sociology on issues in public policy. We invite papers on the application of theory and methods, both qualitative and quantitative, to such issues as health care, housing, employment, markets, climate change, or other areas of public policy with an eye to greater social justice and fairness.

**Culture and the Economy**  
Session Organizer, Michael Lounsbury, University of Alberta, ml37@ualberta.ca

Recent work has shown how economic activity and behavior is fundamentally constituted and shaped by cultural processes and mechanisms. This session invites papers that consider how our understanding of economy and economic practice can be enhanced by more focused attention to empirical and theoretical research that captures cultural processes, for example in the areas of institutional logics, social movements, and categorization, among others. We are especially interested in efforts to advance our understanding of how cultural processes interact with core economic sociology concerns related to the distribution of power, resources, and inequality in ways that could expand the scope and consequences of economic sociology teaching and research.

**Economic Sociology and Inequality**  
Session Organizer, Rachel Dwyer, Ohio State University, dwyer.46@osu.edu

Economic sociologists increasingly engage questions of inequality and power. The economic sociology of inequality pursues themes both timely and evergreen, returning to some of the central questions of classical theorists, while also responding to concerns over rising income, wealth, and consumption inequalities in the US and around the world. This session invites papers on the whole range of questions about how economic markets, organizations, and institutions intersect structures of inequality, poverty, and privilege.
Markets, Finance, Credit, and Money
Session Organizer, Simone Polillo, University of Virginia, sp4ft@eservices.virginia.edu

Financial markets, the banking system, and the monetary and financial instruments they make possible are as old as capitalism itself. But we are yet to fully understand the implications for the economy and society at large of the new prominence that financial markets have achieved over the last few decades. From the everyday and taken-for granted life of finance (involving pension funds, mortgages, and small investment portfolios) to its more episodic and sensational moments (from sovereign debt defaults to global financial crisis), economic sociologists are faced with the difficult task of making sense of broad and far-ranging transformations in the economic process, especially with respect to the creation, management, and distribution of risk, the promotion of innovation and sustainable growth as opposed to speculative investment, and the amelioration rather than worsening of economic inequality. This session invites papers discussing markets, finance, credit and money in historical and/or comparative perspective, with a preference for global analyses that are attentive to the ways finance and the banking system work and impact the economy as a whole.

Economic Sociology Roundtables
Session Organizers, Alison Gerber, Uppsala University, Alison.gerber@kultgeog.uu.se and Emily Barman, Boston University, eabarman@bu.edu
Economic Sociology Award Committees for 2017

Zelizer Award for Best Book*
Deadline for submission: March 1, 2017 (no late entries will be considered)

Martin Ruef, Duke University, Chair
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*Committee members would like to receive both hard copies and electronic copies of the nominated books

Granovetter Award for Best Article
Deadline for submission: March 1, 2017

Timothy Bartley, Chair, bartley.83@osu.edu
Dustin Avent-Holt, daventho@gru.edu
Isabel Fernandez-Mateo, ifernandezmateo@london.edu

Burt Best Student Paper Award
Deadline for submission: March 1, 2017

Klaus Weber, Chair, klausweber@northwestern.edu
Amy Singer, amy.singer@fandm.edu
Daniel Beunza, d.beunza@lse.ac.uk
Recent Member Publications


Book Announcements


Why do some labor movements successfully defend the welfare state even under the pressures of neo-liberal market reform? Why do some unions (and their allied parties and civic associations) succeed in building more universal and comprehensive social policy regimes, while others fail to do so? In this innovative work, Cheol-Sung Lee explores these conundrums through a comparative historical analysis of four countries: Argentina, Brazil, South Korea and Taiwan. He introduces the notion of ‘embedded cohesiveness’ in order to develop an explanatory model in which labor-civic solidarity and union-political party alliance jointly account for outcomes of welfare state retrenchment as well as welfare state expansion. Lee’s exploration of the critical roles of civil society and social movement processes in shaping democratic governance and public policies make this ideal for academic researchers and graduate students in comparative politics, political sociology and network analysis.
There's no question that Americans are bitterly divided by politics. But in Partisans and Partners, Josh Pacewicz finds that our traditional understanding of red/blue, right/left, urban/rural division is too simplistic.

Wheels-down in Iowa—that most important of primary states—Pacewicz looks to two cities, one traditionally Democratic, the other traditionally Republican, and finds that younger voters are rejecting older-timers' strict political affiliations. A paradox is emerging—as the dividing lines between America's political parties have sharpened, Americans are at the same time growing distrustful of traditional party politics in favor of becoming apolitical or embracing outside-the-beltway candidates. Pacewicz sees this change coming not from politicians and voters, but from the fundamental reorganization of the community institutions in which political parties have traditionally been rooted. Weaving together major themes in American political history—including globalization, the decline of organized labor, loss of locally owned industries, uneven economic development, and the emergence of grassroots populist movements—Partisans and Partners is a timely and comprehensive analysis of American politics as it happens on the ground.
Job Announcements

Ohio State University

Department: Center for Human Resources Research
Position: PI of the 1979 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY79)
Rank: Associate/Full Professor or Research Scientist

Description:

The Center for Human Resource Research (CHRR) in the College of Arts and Sciences at The Ohio State University invites applications for the position of Principal Investigator of the 1979 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY79). This position may be either as a tenured (associate or full) professor within the College of Social and Behavioral Sciences (SBS), or as a research scientist at CHRR. Candidates should have a strong ongoing record of scholarly research, and should be interested in taking the lead scientific role in shaping the NLSY79. As Principal Investigator (PI) of the NLSY79, the candidate will provide scientific leadership for all aspects of the survey, including questionnaire design and seeking outside funding. Interests in retirement and/or health preferred. Expertise in survey research is desired but not required. The most important qualification for the PI position is willingness to develop and implement a vision for the future of the survey, in collaboration with the Bureau of Labor Statistics as the funding agency, team members at both CHRR and NORC at the University of Chicago, and the user community.

If applying as a faculty member, the successful candidate will be housed in an SBS department in the area of economics, sociology or survey methodology. The individual will be expected to contribute to their department by maintaining a productive research program, teaching and advising PhD students, and providing service to the department and university. The successful candidate's academic tenure home will be in an SBS Department, and the allocation of his or her time and effort between the department and CHRR will be governed by a memorandum of understanding.

If applying as a Research Scientist, the position will be fully funded for the first 3 years. During this time period the candidate will be expected to pursue additional grant opportunities.

Qualifications:

The candidate we seek will have an established, active and ongoing record of scholarship at the highest level. He or she will have an international reputation in research. A doctoral degree in a relevant social science discipline is required at the time of application. Appointment is contingent on the university's verification of credentials and other information required by law and/or university policies, including but not limited to a criminal background check.

The Ohio State University campus is located in Columbus, the capital city of Ohio. Columbus is the center of a rapidly growing and diverse metropolitan area with a population of over 1.5 million. The area offers a wide
range of affordable housing, many cultural and recreational opportunities, excellent schools, and a strong economy based on government as well as service, transportation and technology industries (see http://liveworkplaycolumbus.com/). Columbus has consistently been rated as one of the Top U.S. cities for quality of life, and was selected as one of the Top 10 cities for African Americans to live, work, and play by Black Enterprise magazine. Additional information about the Columbus area is available at http://www.columbus.org.

Application Instructions:

Apply to Academic Jobs Online at: https://academicjobsonline.org/ajo/jobs/8174. A complete application consists of a cover letter, curriculum vitae, research and teaching statements, a sample of recent publications or working papers and three letters of reference. Applications will be accepted until the position is filled, but those received prior to October 31, 2016 will receive priority consideration. Inquiries may be directed to Professor Elizabeth Cooksey at Cooksey.1@osu.edu.

The Ohio State University is committed to establishing a culturally and intellectually diverse environment, encouraging all members of our learning community to reach their full potential. We are responsive to dual-career families and strongly promote work-life balance to support our community members through a suite of institutionalized policies. We are an NSF Advance Institution and a member of the Ohio/Western Pennsylvania/West Virginia Higher Education Recruitment Consortium (HERC).

The Ohio State University is an equal opportunity employer. All qualified applicants will receive consideration for employment without regard to race, color, religion, sex, sexual orientation or identity, national origin, disability status, or protected veteran status.
Economic Sociology Section Officers and Council

Officers
Chair: Nancy DiTomaso, Rutgers University 2017
Section Secretary/Treasurer: Rachel E. Dwyer, The Ohio State University 2019
Past Chair: Alya Guseva, Boston University 2017
Chair-Elect: Frederick F. Wherry, Yale University 2017
Student Representative: Angelina Grigoryeva, Princeton University 2017
Student Representative: Kelly Russell, University of Michigan 2018

Section Council
Marc J. Ventresca, University of Oxford 2017
Nitsan Chorev, Brown University 2019
Emily A. Barman, Boston University 2017
Emily Anne Erikson, Yale University 2019
Simone Polillo, University of Virginia 2018
Lauren Rivera, Northwestern University 2018