“Michelle Obama is a Militant Anti-American Hating Bitch” by Sarah Sobieraj, Tufts University

I watched the Inauguration Ceremony over lunch in a pub outside of Boston. The place was packed. Patrons attended to the large television screens, made toasts, and applauded. Some hugged. I saw one woman wipe away a stay tear, and others who were misty from the profundity of the moment. I watched the ceremony, ate lunch, and returned to work with a vaguely patriotic sense of connectedness to strangers that reminded me of the way I felt in the immediate aftermath of 9/11. It was as though we shared something, and we were all going to be okay.

With this warm contentedness, I returned to my desk to continue a pretest for my current research on political discourse (Sobieraj and Berry, in progress). I was listening to Alan Colmes’ syndicated radio program. The very first caller said -- not one solid hour into the Obama presidency -- that Laura Bush had been a perfect example of beautiful motherhood and now she had been Continued on p.9

“Neoliberal Capitalism and the Death of Politics in Africa” by Ron Aminzade, University of Minnesota

During the 1980s and 1990s, much of the “developing world” embraced liberal democracy as part of what some analysts labeled a global third wave of democracy (Huntington 1991; Markoff 1996). By 1995, the vast majority of African states had embraced liberal democracy, holding competitive elections involving opposition parties (Wiseman 1995). Despite the emergence of a multiparty political system and greater freedom of assembly, association, the press, and speech, some analysts have argued that neoliberalism has led to a “death of politics” and triumph of technocratic rule in Africa. Jean and John Comaroff (2001) argue that “there is a strong argument to be made that neoliberal capitalism, in its millennial moment, portends the death of politics by hiding its own ideological underpinnings in the dictates of economic efficiency: in the fetishism of the free market, in the inexorable, expanding ‘needs’ of business, in the imperatives of science and technology….” Echoing this “death of politics” theme, Jeremy Gould and Julia Ojanen (2005) argue that Tanzanian politics are marked by “a profound disjunction between what is conceived as ‘policy’ and what takes place Continued on p.3
AUTHOR MEETS CRITICS DISCUSSION: WHY WELFARE STATES PERSIST by Clem Brooks and Jeff Manza (University of Chicago Press, 2007)

"Whose Welfare State Persists?" by Jonathan Cutler, Wesleyan University

Clem Brooks and Jeff Manza (hereafter B&M) begin with what a simple but significant question: why do welfare states persist? The question itself requires B&M to confirm that "welfare states" do persist and then to provide a plausible model for explaining that persistence. Although most of the energy and innovation in the book is devoted to the latter task, the value of even the most sophisticated explanatory model melts into air if it seeks to explain a falsely specified outcome.

What is the definition of welfare state persistence? In the third chapter of the book, "Retrenchment, Restructuring, Persistence," B&M reference numerous studies documenting declines in specific programs such as unemployment and sickness benefits and "a new willingness on the part of government officials to contain costs, establish work requirements, or impose longer waiting periods on individual's access to cash benefits" (63). B&M acknowledge some "tension" between such evidence and the overarching claim of welfare state persistence. The tension is "resolved" insofar as "cuts in one type of program may be offset by expansion in other social programs" (63; emphasis added). B&M identify one key "type" of program—"cash benefits" or "replacement income" (which "replace" income otherwise derived from work)—as showing "greater likelihood of retrenchment" (70).

Welfare state scholars like Piven and Cloward (1993) usually identified such programs with the history of so-called "outdoor" relief—programs that "remove millions of people from the labor market, and protect millions of others from the ravages of unemployment. The consequence is to tighten labor markets and reduce fear among those still in the market, and thus to strengthen workers in bargaining with employers over wages and working conditions. Not surprisingly, programs with such potentially large effects generate conflict," especially on the part of employers eager to promote labor force participation and "restore labor discipline."

B&M seem to agree. They acknowledge serious "political and economic pressures" on what might be called the "old" welfare state and concede that challenges "to specific programs… have grown" (63). They describe persistence in the face of negative pressures (21). Such negative pressures are surely what make persistence so interesting or puzzling. For political sociologists, the persistence of the old welfare state amidst widespread employer resistance would, indeed, constitute a remarkable achievement, worthy of serious investigation and careful explanation. It would represent a triumphant victory of popular will—what B&M, following Korni's formulation, call the "democratic class struggle" (19)—over the objections of employers and business elites.

But B&M do not actually seek to explain the persistence of the old welfare state. Instead, they point to evidence of a "new" welfare state, especially "social policy innovation in the form of jobs training programs and generous child-care provisions [that] can have positive effects on citizens' productivity and labor-force attachments" (62). It is not difficult to detect, in this new type of program and its insistence on the urgency of work, echoes of a logic strikingly similar to that of the old "workhouse," identified by Piven and Cloward as the employer-preferred remedy for the evils of outdoor relief.

Does the emergence of a "new" welfare state represent a similar triumph of the democratic class struggle over the objections of employers and business elites? Given what B&M seem to suggest about the objective merits of new welfare state policies for productivity and labor-force attachment, it is far from clear why employers and business elites would resist such policies. It may be no accident, then, that B&M construct an elaborate model to explain the persistence of the "new" welfare state that includes no measures for (or even reference to) employer preferences. The twin issues of labor supply and labor discipline have always been central to what Piven and Cloward called "a class analysis of welfare." "Business advisors seem to understand this," they argued, "even if the Left does not."

Insofar as the policies of work introduce a dramatic discontinuity between "old" and "new" welfare states, does it make sense to endorse B&M's assertions regarding continuity and "persistence"? B&M certainly think so, arguing that "measures of replacement income within specific policy domains… are limited, even potentially biased, as measures of the overall output of welfare states" (38). Such an overall measure would include government support for health services. The focus on overall output (the ratio of total social spending to gross domestic product), rather than the type of policy effort, is justified, they argue, by "an impressive body of empirical evidence that demonstrates how spending influences levels of poverty and inequality in the developed democracies" (38).

If, however, the type of policy effort is really as insignificant as B&M and the "new wave of scholarship" [3] on government spending and inequality) seem to suggest, why do these scholars regularly limit the dependent variable to "welfare state" or so-called "social" spending (38)? If aggregate spending (relative to per capita GDP) is the issue and policy type doesn't matter, then why not a dependent variable that includes government expenditures on the military and prison system—both of which surely represent government "services" and could easily influence inequality and poverty?

My emphasis on the discontinuity between old and new type welfare state policies relies on a "normative" concern about the politics of work. B&M appear to have no such concern. Is there, however, some normative—if unspoken—concern that leads B&M to blur the distinction between old and new welfare state policies but maintain a sharp analytic distinction between new welfare state "social" spending and less ostensibly "philanthropic" state expenditures?

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as a permanent feature of neoliberalism (Aminzade Forthcoming). Those who proclaim the “death of politics” identify an important trend in Tanzanian politics during the 1990s, but they overstate the degree of marginalization of elected officials and party leaders and fail to adequately analyze the shifting role of political parties in the policy process and the continually shifting balance of power between the government and political parties. In my forthcoming book, I trace the history of this conflict between government officials and party leaders from the dawn of independence to the present. Building on the insight of James O’Connor’s analysis of the fiscal crisis of the welfare state, I argue that the conflict is rooted in a contradiction between capital accumulation and political legitimation and the different priorities that government officials and party leaders placed on these goals. Political parties have not been entirely supplanted by government technocrats and their foreign allies in the formation of development policies and they continue to play an agenda-setting role in the policy arena. Although some components of the Tanzanian state have become denationalized and subject to external control, others remain national or are inhabited by politicians and interest groups advocating nationalism and “self-reliant” economic development. Despite weak opposition parties, a winner-take-all rather than proportional representation system, and the absence of strong competition in many districts, party competition and elections have helped to shape the agenda of public policy, by highlighting a variety of important issues, such as foreign domination of the economy and corporate tax evasion by foreign mining companies. Although the government would have preferred to avoid these issues, they were forced to address them and to implement new policies, including a short-lived indigenization policy granting preferential treatment to citizens in 1999, a policy restricting the activities of foreigners in the coffee industry in 2001, the renegotiation of mining contacts with foreign multinationals after the 2005 election, and the arrest of many of the country’s wealthiest and most prominent businessmen and several high-ranking former government officials in 2008 in response to popular anger and parliamentary inquiries over corruption scandals involving the Bank of Tanzania, whose director, a former World Bank official, fled the country to avoid prosecution.

The portrayal of a vast gulf between politics and policymaking and of a state dominated by insulated technocratic elites in the executive branch and their foreign allies alongside a weak and ineffective parliament offers a more accurate picture of Tanzanian politics of the 1990s than of the first decade of the 21st century. The ruling party and its elected representatives in parliament lost power during the 1990s, as key economic policy decisions were made by the government-based technocratic policy elite and their transnational allies. Agreements with international financial institutions and foreign investors did not receive intense scrutiny from the Tanzanian parliament, which, unlike in Uganda, is not involved in prioritizing public expenditure during the preparatory stages of the budget and does not have the power to initiate bills with financial implications. When members of parliament sought parliamentary oversight or challenged the technocratic domination of policy making by development professionals and asked for more transparency in the process by which contracts with foreign investors were made, they were rebuffed by the Prime Minister for their lack of expertise in such technical matters. The executive branch reply to dissident legislators was to scold them on their lack of technical knowledge and suggest that they take a seminar on the intricacies of contract law. However, after the election of Jakaya Kikwete in 2005, parliamentarians and party leaders became emboldened by new high-level corruption scandals involving the government technocrats responsible for implementing neo-liberal economic policies and foreign investors. They became much less willing to defer to technical and administrative expertise and forced the government to back down on a number of neo-liberal policies concerning foreign investments and privatization.

The corruption scandals facing the current Kikwete regime weakened the power of the alliance of government technocrats and their foreign allies and strengthened the role of parliament within the state, providing a rare opportunity for opposition and ruling party parliamentarians to join in battle against the executive branch. By 2008, parliament was no longer a rubber stamp for policies dictated by technocrats in the executive branch but a more independent body that did not hesitate to criticize government policies and expose corruption and financial scandals implicating members of the executive branch. Ruling and opposition party parliamentarians called for the resignation of all senior government officials involved in a power-generating scandal, which was exposed by a parliamentary committee investigation, and for a thorough review of contracts with foreign investors. A stronger and more vocal parliament, in which ruling party and opposition elected officials were willing to join forces to confront the government, meant a greater likelihood of effective challenges to state policies on a variety of issues, including neo-liberal economic policies regarding foreign capital. The corruption scandals uncovered by parliament led to an unprecedented dismissal of the Prime Minister and his entire Cabinet in 2008. In the wake of the scandals, the government also expressed a greater reluctance to rapidly privatize government owned enterprises, such as the electricity and water utility companies, a tendency to take a more aggressive stance in

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negotiating contracts with foreign investors, especially in the mining sector, and a willingness to consider the implementation of a
new leadership code to restrict the private wealth accumulation activities of public officials.

The political resilience of the Tanzanian ruling party, and the ongoing struggle of its leaders, and of opposition party leaders,
to challenge the technocratic rule of government officials, suggest that claims concerning the “death of politics” during the neo-liberal
era are exaggerated. They also suggest that the role of electoral politics in the process of economic policymaking is a product of
ongoing political contestation rather than the inevitable outcome of a neo-liberal logic of development. Despite the triumph of
technocratic rule during the 1990s, by the end of the first decade of the 21st century, the advent of multiparty democracy made it
possible for ordinary Tanzanians to demand a more accountable and transparent government, to publicly voice their concerns on
major policy issues, and to shape the direction of public policy. Intense political conflict over neo-liberal economic policies suggests
that the neo-liberal state is a contested terrain and that liberal democracy and economic neo-liberalism are contradictory rather than
complementary. This contradiction, which is manifest in different ways across time and space, helps to account for the vitality of
African politics during the neo-liberal era.

“The Worth of Democracy” by Kathleen Fallon, McGill University

What is the future of democracy in sub-Saharan Africa? One might even ask, is democracy worth it? It was this very
question that a Ghanaian man asked a colleague of mine, and with reason. With Mugabe holding on to power in Zimbabwe while
simultaneously destroying his country, with the eruption of civil strife in Kenya during the last presidential election, or with the
acknowledgement by the Nigerian government that the previous presidential election was flawed, the question seems relevant. For
those living in relatively new democracies, the prospect of political change carries with it instability and unclear outcomes. Even
more established democracies have their problems. For example, Ghana must contend with political corruption and a drug trade that
has recently taken hold. Much of this leads to disillusionment, and ultimately to questioning democracy’s worth.

Democracy certainly has its flaws. We don’t have to look much further than the United States to see this - from slavery to
segregation, or the more recent passage of the Patriot Bill. If we look north to our Canadian neighbors, we similarly see how the
Prime Minister used autocratic powers to shut down parliament – similar tactics often used in authoritarian regimes. Democracy is
not perfect, and at times, is outright oppressive.

Despite its flaws, though, democracy still offers possibilities for change, as demonstrated by the civil rights era. Change can
be created through the passage of new laws, through public protests of decisions, or through the simple act of electing new politicians
into office. I would further guess that most individuals prefer a democratic state, with all of its flaws, to civil strife or dictatorships
often accompanied with bouts of violence. Many Ghanaians have in fact demonstrated their commitment to preserving Ghana’s
democratic status.

When Ghanaians recognized that the recent presidential elections in December 2008 would be close, and could possibly lead
to violence, organizations, such as the Center for Democratic Development, began a campaign months before the actual election to
emphasize peace and unity. Their efforts paid off. Despite a run-off that led to an opposition win by less than 1 percentage point,
Ghanaians accepted the outcome without disastrous consequences. Sure, the incoming government still needs to address issues of
corruption and the drug trade, along with a myriad of additional problems. Yet, this is where the work comes in.

Ghanaians have demonstrated that democracy is worth it, but they should not stop there. Citizens need to demand a change
in policies, laws, and priorities, along with a change in democratic structures. One democratic structure does not fit all. Questions
still need to be asked. For example, are there systems that are indigenously based that may be more suitable within sub-Saharan
Africa? Does the existing structure benefit everyone? In order to find a system that works best, citizens must be willing to embrace
change and engage in negotiations. This is the only way to transform systems from within.

Clearly the existing political structure has allowed for relative stability in Ghana, as has the existence of two dominant
political parties -- the National Democratic Congress (NDC) and the New Patriotic Party (NPP) — both holding power under
democratic rule. However, one glaring problem that remains is the absence of women. Women’s legislative representation within
Ghana has remained remarkably low since the initial transition to democracy in 1992, at 8%, with its peak at 11% in 2004, and back
down to 8% in 2008. This is despite the fact that women’s organizations have mobilized around the issue, supported female political
candidates, and advocated for increased legislative representation. This lack of representation leads to one conclusion and one
question. The reason for women’s absence appears to be primarily structural. Which leads to the question, and simultaneously brings
us back to the issue of democracy, does Ghana have a true democracy when over half of its population is NOT represented
politically?

The democratic countries of sub-Saharan Africa that do have fairly high female legislative representations (at least 20% or
more, and many over 30%) have either transformed government structures, or have instituted quotas via the constitution or political
parties. For example, members of the Southern African Development Community, which now advocates for 50% (up from 30%)
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female representation, tend to have the highest numbers of women: Mozambique at 34.8%, South Africa at 33%, Tanzania at 30.4%, Namibia at 26.9%, Lesotho at 25%, and the Seychelles at 23.5%. Only three democratic members fall below 20%: Zambia at 15%, Malawi at 13%, and Botswana and 11.1%. The successful countries demonstrate that change is possible and that women’s legislative representation can effectively be increased. Although the vast majority of the countries listed above achieved their high numbers through political party quotas within proportional representational systems, this is not the only method available. For example, quotas may be instituted geographically, such that, in addition to its “regular” representation, each region is allotted a specified number of additional political seats that are reserved explicitly for women. There are numerous ways to transform systems to allow for women’s increased participation within legislative bodies.

Given this information, how might citizens of Ghana move forward? From previous elections, it appears as if citizens have embraced democracy, and would positively support the argument that democracy is worthwhile. Yet, accepting democracy should not mean complacency with existing structures. Citizens need to continue to push forward. They need to continue to question the small numbers of women within national parliament. They must ask themselves if they are ready to confront their weaknesses and liabilities.

While Ghanaians should certainly be proud of their success in relation to previous democratic regimes, this should not lead to the mere acceptance of current practices. Rather, the struggle for democracy should be continued from within.

“Governing Africa’s Cities” by Brian Dill, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

As we approach this year’s Annual Meeting, the theme of which is “The New Politics of Community,” we would be remiss if we did not take time to consider the urban spaces that have undergone the most profound demographic and political changes in recent years: Africa’s cities. With the highest rate of annual urban growth – i.e., nearly 5 percent on aggregate – Africa is on the crest of a wave of global urbanization that, for the first time in human history, finds half of the world’s population living in cities. The burgeoning urban populations of the world’s second largest continent coincide with the emergence, proliferation and encouragement of new arrangements of governing which reveal the tension between the promise of liberal democracy and the exigencies of neoliberal capitalism.

The ongoing transformation of Africa’s cities presents those of us who identify as political sociologists with an opportunity to extend our understanding of the relationship between politics and society. At a minimum, the African context, which is deeply affected by both the colonial past and the globalized present, challenges the models we have developed to explain the exercise and institutionalization of power in the global North. At best, scholarship on Africa, in particular its cities, should provide deep historical and political explanations of why there is a yawning gap not only between the supply and demand of public goods, but also between the legal and technical apparatus created to institutionalize participation and the continued exclusion of the most vulnerable and marginalized residents (Cornwall and Coelho 2007; Dill Forthcoming). In this brief essay, I will highlight some of the challenges confronting Africa’s urban communities and review recent efforts to govern these new sites of political engagement and contestation.

In terms of the challenge of governing Africa’s cities, perhaps more striking than the aforementioned high growth rate is the prediction that the continent’s urban population, which is already larger than North America’s, will more than double between 2000 and 2030, increasing from 294 million to 742 million (UNFPA 2007: 8). Given that Africans must already exhibit considerable resilience and resourcefulness to survive in cities characterized by scant public services, limited employment opportunities and rapidly degrading environments, one need not revert to Afro-pessimism to note that such prognoses are cause for concern. For example, one prominent observer has recently estimated that 75 percent of basic needs – i.e., water, health, employment, housing – are provided informally in the majority of African cities (Simone 2005: 3). More critical is the finding that access to clean water in urban areas actually declined during the 1990s, as the population increased faster than the expansion of safe water supply systems (United Nations 2002: 21). In short, meeting the increasing demand for public goods with scant resources will be a chronic challenge in Africa’s urban communities.

In Africa’s cities, as well as those found elsewhere across the global South, decentralized government has been championed as a panacea for a remarkable range of political and social ills. The underlying assumption is that, because decentralization by definition involves bringing government closer to the people, the resulting municipal authorities should be more knowledgeable about and responsive to the needs of those governed, and thus more efficient. Moreover, the creation and empowerment of local government has been justified on the grounds of encouraging participation, nurturing civic virtue, increasing transparency, and making it easier for citizens to hold their elected representatives accountable. While decentralization has largely been catalyzed and supported by external actors over the past two decades, it is not without precedent in the African context. During the colonial era, the authorities employed “indirect rule,” namely the creation and/or strengthening of sub-national (indigenous) units, as a means of extending control (Mamdani 1996; Mawhood 1993). But whereas indirect rule was impelled by a desire to balance efficiency and legitimacy, the current institutional arrangements in Africa’s cities tend to reflect an overarching concern for efficiency.

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PRACTICES OF GOVERNING AFRICAN URBAN COMMUNITIES ALSO OCCUR BEYOND THE DECENTRALIZED STATE BY INVOLVING A RANGE OF NON-STATE ACTORS (LINDELL 2008). THAT IS, THE TREND OF DECENTRALIZING GOVERNMENT IN AN EFFORT TO BE MORE RESPONSIVE TO LOCAL NEEDS HAS BEEN REINFORCED BY THE MOVE TO INVOLVE FIRST, THE PRIVATE SECTOR, AND MORE RECENTLY, VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATIONS OF VARIOUS STRIPES. IN WHAT HAS BEEN REFERRED TO AS “GOVERNANCE-BEYOND-THE-STATE,” ECONOMIC AND CIVIC ACTORS PLAY A MUCH GREATER ROLE IN POLICY-MAKING, ADMINISTRATION, IMPLEMENTATION AND SERVICE DELIVERY THAN THEY DID PRIOR TO LIBERALIZATION (SWYNGEDOUW 2005). THE PARTICIPATION OF THOSE PREVIOUSLY EXCLUDED IS, TO A CERTAIN EXTENT, UNDERPINNED BY THE PLURALIST ASSUMPTION THAT INVOLVING CITIZENS MORE DIRECTLY IN PROCESSES OF GOVERNANCE PRODUCES BETTER CITIZENS, DECISIONS AND GOVERNMENT. AND YET, IT TOO IS MOTIVATED BY THE DESIRE TO BE EFFICIENT; TAPPING COMMUNITY RESOURCES AND ENERGIES, AS WELL AS TO ESTABLISHING PARTNERSHIPS IN AN EFFORT TO EASE THE BURDEN OF THE STATE. IN SHORT, THERE IS A TENSION BETWEEN THE LIBERAL COMMITMENT TO EXTEND PARTICIPATION AND THE NEOLIBERAL IMPULSE TO SHRINK THE STATE.


THE PROLIFERATION OF NON-STATE ACTORS THAT OCCUPY THE NEW SPACES FOR PARTICIPATION AND POLITICAL ACTION ALSO REVEAL SHORTCOMINGS. RATHER THAN MAKE DEMANDS ON A RESPONSIVE LOCAL GOVERNMENT, VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATIONS IN PARTICULAR HAVE OFTEN FOUND THEMSELVES IN THE UNENVIABLE ROLE OF SELF-PROVIDERS AND CONSUMERS OF SERVICES FORMERLY THE BAUAMANN OF THE STATE. THE CLAIMS THEY MAKE MORE OFTEN THAN NOT FALL ON DEAF EARS, BECAUSE THE “EXCLUSIONARY DEMOCRACIES” THAT ARE CHARACTERISTIC OF AFRICA’S CITIES “ALLOW FOR POLITICAL COMPETITION BUT CANNOT INCORPORATE OR RESPOND TO THE DEMANDS OF THE MAJORITY IN ANY MEANINGFUL WAY” (ABRAHAMSSEN 2000: XIV). THE RECONFIGURATION OF POLITICAL STRUCTURES IN AFRICA’S CITIES, BOTH THROUGH DECENTRALIZATION AND EFFORTS TO “GOVERN-BEYOND-THE-STATE” HAS, IN SHORT, NEITHER MADE GOVERNMENT MORE RESPONSIVE OR ACCOUNTABLE TO CITIZENS, NOR WEAKENED THE POWER OF THE STATE.


AS WE EASE INTO THE 21ST CENTURY, THE COMBINATION OF THE UNCHECKED GROWTH OF AFRICAN CITIES WITH NEW ARRANGEMENTS FOR GOVERNING THEM PRESENTS US WITH COMPELLING CASES FOR RESEARCH. TO BE SURE, THE GLOBAL FOCUS OF THOSE ADHERING TO A WORLD-SYSTEMS PERSPECTIVE IS INDEED WARRANTED. BUT THERE IS ALSO AN OPPORTUNITY FOR POLITICAL SOCIOLOGISTS TO DEVELOP MESO-LEVEL THEORIES FOR UNDERSTANDING POLITICAL PROCESSES AND MECHANISMS THAT ARE SENSITIVE TO THE HISTORICAL AND INSTITUTIONAL PARTICULARITY OF THE WORLD’S SECOND LARGEST CONTINENT.

“After the Fall: South Africa After the Global Financial Meltdown” by Gay Seidman, University of Wisconsin-Madison

What is the likely impact of the global financial crisis on developing regions? When Dave asked me to contribute to this symposium, I expected to discuss my recent research on labor rights in Lesotho. But the global collapse has raised more pressing questions: how will the crisis affect resource-rich countries like South Africa, and what might it mean for politics in the region?

Perhaps the most unchanged legacy of colonialism has been Africa’s persistent dependence on exporting raw materials: from Angola to Zambia, minerals and agricultural goods still make up the bulk of most countries’ exports. Only a year ago, export-led growth seemed viable, even for commodity-dependent economies: prices for food, platinum and gold rose rapidly, prompting talk of global shortages. Mineral-rich countries across Africa hoped to parley the commodity boom into new wealth, and began to hope, as China began to buy more raw materials for expanding industrial production, that competition would strengthen their hand in global negotiations.

But in recent months, that sellers’ market has collapsed: global prices for food and minerals have dropped to 1995 levels, and the IMF predicts that prices will stagnate for the next few years. The crisis is making itself felt across the region, from Angola (dependent on oil sales), to Zimbabwe (where the global collapse will exacerbate an ongoing political crisis). In places where people Continued on p.7
already struggle and where safety-nets are non-existent, governments and households across the region face rising unemployment and shrinking budgets.

**Figure 4. Real Commodity Prices**

$(1995 = 100)$

![Real Commodity Prices Chart](source: IMF staff estimates)


Even for relatively well-off South Africa, the consequences of the global collapse are scary. Since Mandela’s election in 1994, South Africa has tried hard to diversify its economic base, making concerted efforts to attract investments into industry and export-oriented agriculture. But like most developing countries in the post-WTO era, South Africa’s new government has emphasized growth through trade – a strategy that almost inevitably meant continued reliance on commodities. In 2008, nearly 60 percent of South Africa’s exports came from minerals. As manufacturing plants around the world have cut production, South Africa’s sales have plummeted: exports in January 2009 were 25 percent below those of the previous month, and its economy shrank by an annualized rate of 2 percent in January. South Africa is still looking desperately to its usual trading partners (including China, which may help explain South Africa’s scandalous decision to deny a visa to the Dalai Lama); but for the moment, forecasts are unambiguously grim.

South African policy-makers are reeling. Unemployment, already estimated above 20 percent, is rising, as mines, farms and factories cut back production. Foreign investment and tourism, two sources of growth in the past decade, are drying up at least for now, while a devaluing rand further erodes local purchasing power. The impact will be felt in households far beyond South Africa’s borders, as Africans from as far away as Somalia and Nigeria have moved to South Africa looking for work and opportunity. Last year, riots involving attacks on immigrants in South Africa’s townships, as well as widely-publicized refugee flows from a disintegrating Zimbabwe, underscored the reality of regional interdependence: South Africa’s recession will reverberate through the continent.

How will South Africa respond? Post-apartheid South Africa has been marked by stark inequalities, and the crisis is likely to exacerbate internal tensions. The ANC came to power when the 'Washington Consensus' shaped the limits of the possible. Seeking transformation, ANC leaders adopted a version of affirmative action which concentrated change at the top. Once the civil service had been integrated -- by hiring new staff and by bringing homeland officials into the national civil service -- Mbeki turned to the private sector, linking government contracts to black participation in the boardroom. Ten years of 'black economic empowerment' policies have created a visible black middle class: the clientele at Johannesburg's top restaurants is generally much more mixed than it was, and the owner of a BMW in the crowded parking lots of its upscale malls may now be a young African. Members of South Africa’s new elite are often just a few paychecks away from poverty, but for many poor South Africans -- for those who live in the sprawling slums that surround South Africa’s city centers, or in rural communities still scarred by apartheid’s legacies – the new government’s successes have been even more limited.

Since the fall of apartheid, the government has expanded services, providing roads, electricity, water, and housing in many poor areas. Even more important, perhaps, the ANC greatly expanded needs-tested welfare programs, providing small payments to Continued on p.8
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poor households with children, the elderly, and those who are disabled or ill with HIV/AIDS. These social grants loom large in the government’s budget, rising to 12 percent of government expenditures in 2009. Nevertheless, for most South Africans, new services and payments have not translated into new opportunities: jobs and education are still hard to come by, and many South Africans still feel denied a share in the country’s wealth.

Many ANC policy-makers have raised concerns about persistent inequality, but the party has been plagued by leadership quarrels, along with corruption charges often linked to government contracts and patronage networks. In 2007, Thabo Mbeki, Nelson Mandela’s anointed heir, lost his position as ANC head; Mbeki had become deeply unpopular, as much for his refusal to acknowledge the depth of South Africa’s AIDS crisis as for his failure to address the needs of his country’s poor majority. Mbeki resigned as the country’s president, leaving a caretaker to hold the office until national elections could be held in 2009.

Current ANC president Jacob Zuma is an obviously tainted figure who labors under long-standing rape and corruption charges, but he appeals forcefully to those who feel excluded. A man with little formal education and a long history in the ANC’s guerrilla wing, Zuma is generally viewed as a man of the people: although he offers no concrete policy proposals, his populist rhetoric obviously appeals to poor ANC supporters. Some leading ANC activists have left the party in protest over his rise to power, but Zuma counts on strong support from the wings of the nationalist movement which claim to speak for the poor -- the ANC Youth Wing, the South African Communist Party, and South Africa’s largest labor federation. Zuma is widely distrusted by the business community, and even by many ANC stalwarts, who consider him more interested in power and patronage than in restructuring an unequal society, and who fear that his followers show worrisome tendencies to restrict democratic debate and ignore due process. Nevertheless, the ANC maintains its hold on voters, and if Zuma’s candidacy is permitted by the courts, he will almost certainly be elected South Africa’s next president – probably coming to power just as the recession takes hold.

Even if Zuma does not take office, the crisis is likely to provoke a sharp tilt toward state-led development, and toward a new emphasis on programs aimed at redistributing South Africa’s wealth beyond the urban middle class. For the past decade, economic policy has focused on attracting foreign manufacturers and expanding exports; in the next decade, by contrast, we are likely to see the emergence of a new ‘developmental state’, with greater emphasis on job creation, small business development, and local initiatives. And we may see more immediate programs to create survival strategies for the poor households hit hardest by the collapse: perhaps, now, policy-makers will turn to land reform and other programs involving real redistribution. Probably, we will also see more protectionism, and less acquiescence to global rules that limit state support for local industries: where once ANC policy-makers sought to fully open their economy in the effort to attract foreign investors, the economic crisis may encourage efforts to protect citizens’ well-being first.

In South Africa, as in most of the developing world, policy shifts along these lines will prompt vociferous opposition from the international business community, and in Southern Africa, comparisons to neighboring Zimbabwe might speed up emigration by nervous whites. Corruption and patronage will hardly disappear: South Africa’s new elite depends on government positions and contracts for their status, and there is no reason to be sanguine about how increased insecurity in the downturn will play out. But it is worth remembering, when the criticisms start flowing, that the ANC came to power promising to improve the lives of most South Africans – and the present crisis is likely to make those efforts more urgent.

But the biggest question-marks revolve around what kinds of social movements might emerge during the recession. Many of the groups that were most active in the anti-apartheid movement – unions, civic organizations, women’s groups – have been more-or-less demobilized, but a recent undercurrent of low-level, localized township protests against poor services and poverty has begun rise into a new wave of protest. Will popular mobilization promote new, more inclusive alternatives for growth? Or, more ominously, can the ANC prevent local demands from creating ethnic and regional divisions in a country battling with severe economic contraction? It would be foolish to predict what kinds of movement might emerge in South Africa today, as mines close and factories are shuttered; but it is definitely worth paying attention.
replaced by Michelle Obama, “a militant, anti-American hating bitch.” I felt like he slapped me.

Looking back on the caller’s assertion now, several of the essayists from the last issue of this newsletter come to mind. Roxanna Harlow and Catherine Bolzendahl directly addressed the dynamics of race and gender in the election, David Tope pointed to the way that campaign rhetoric so frequently “othered” Barack Obama, and Tom Medvetz reflected upon the insipid realities of political discourse. All four pieces are evoked by this one fleeting, belligerent rant.

Three months later, my collaborators and I are knee deep in data collection, mapping the political speech found on talk radio, political blogs, cable news programs, and the like, so hearing someone spit obscenities and accusations doesn’t phase me, but it does concern me.

It concerns me because indicators suggest that while newspaper readership is in freefall, the audience for outrage swells. The top political blogs have incredible traffic rankings (consider Daily Kos, with an average of nearly a million hits a day). Whether liberal or conservative, top blogs (e.g., Hot Air, Talking Points Memo, Crooks and Liars, Michelle Malkin) aren’t afraid to deploy name-calling, character assassination, ridicule, or obscurity, and each have hundreds of thousands of daily visitors (see www.truthlaidbare.com). Combining ratings for The O’Reilly Factor and Countdown with Keith Olbermann yields a nightly audience of roughly 5 million viewers, a number that does not lag far behind the CBS Evening News (see www.tvbythenumbers.com). And Rush Limbaugh is aired on more than 600 radio stations nationally, with an estimated 14.25 to 25 million listeners weekly (Farhi 2009). For a weekly comparison, consider the Sunday New York Times, once an institution, which has seen circulation diminish to 1.4 million (see www.nyto.com/investors/financials/nyt-circulation.html). Yes, I realize that many people go uncounted when they read the paper online, but people listen to Limbaugh online as well and they aren’t counted either. This is not some quirky outpost of our political culture; it is becoming the epicenter.

The arena of political media is changing dramatically. Ideologues have deep audiences, and their voices are further amplified through intertextual ping pong. Talk radio hosts use newspapers and broadcast news stories as raw material from which to construct scandal or as evidence that the slide down the slippery slope has begun (again), all the while fuming at the “liberal media” or the “corporate media” (politics depending) as if somehow they were not part of the family. What happens on cable news, talk radio, and political blogs gets extra mileage as inflammatory claims are recycled by supporters and critics: edited, excerpted, remixed, and reframed in yet more outrage. Daily Kos takes jobs at Ann Coulter. Bill O’Reilly and Keith Olbermann are inextricably codependent on one another for material. And increasingly, we see these rants treated as legitimate stories back in traditional news venues, as the recent tumult between Rush Limbaugh and RNC Chairman Michael Steele evinces.

But political discourse isn’t only about emphasis; it’s also about omission. Having researched voluntary association activity around the 2000 and 2004 nominating conventions and debates, I was extremely interested in what was transpiring in Denver and Minneapolis in 2008. I followed the protests closely, or at least I tried. In spite of fairly substantial mobilizations in both cities, there was a dearth of information about what was happening in mainstream news venues. I ultimately found the amateur videos posted on YouTube to be the best source of information about what was going on outside the convention halls. They underscored what I found in the previous campaigns: a broad array of formal and informal voluntary associations organized around diverse political issues working to press their focal issues into mainstream political discourse via the news media and failing. When their efforts were covered at all, they were in stories that focused on the logical details: how many people were there, what they were wearing, and whether there were arrests, while omitting their political motivations (Sobieraj, under review).

And this should not be surprising given the way that the mainstream news regularly covers elected officials and political parties: as contestants in a fascinating strategic war. Consider President Obama’s first Address to the Joint Session of Congress in February. CNN devoted far more attention to Governor Jindal’s disastrous response than to the nuts and bolts of President Obama’s policy proposals. Someone should really go back and attempt to weigh the amount of discussion about renewable energy against the amount of discussion about Michelle Obama’s bare arms, just for fun. This criticism is tired only because it has become truism, and that is precisely the point. This is routine political reportage.

During my campaign research, a well-known political journalist for a liberal publication told me that while he sympathized with activists, he didn’t consider their efforts newsworthy because, in his words, “I think of the protesters the same way I think about retarded children. They are nice, you feel for them, they mean well, but they’ll never fully integrate.” They were, for him and many other journalists, not legitimate political actors with voices that belong in mainstream political discourse. In the current media climate, what seems most fringe about the activists to which he was referring (an environmental group) was their determination to talk policy. It certainly isn’t their place on the ideological continuum (left, but not radically so) or their mode of communication, which is undeniably tame alongside someone calling the newly anointed first lady a bitch.

We need more research to assess the impact that scream politics has on the public, but there is some evidence to suggest that it may erode political trust (Mutz and Reeves 2005). How might these issues of emphasis and omission impact lawmakers’ ability to gauge public opinion? How might outrage shape the way we perceive those whose political views differ from our own? How might this climate shape the way we understand and articulate our own political preferences, or whether we feel comfortable doing so? In a mass media dominated public sphere that is layered with theatrics, how does one carve out space for reasoned discussion about
complex issues? It doesn’t take much creativity to imagine some potentially disturbing byproducts of all this flame throwing and fear mongering. On the bright side, there is also some evidence that far from being alienating, scream politics may increase our political engagement (Brooks and Greer 2007). Is this a benefit? I guess it depends what we have to engage with when we are so inspired.

“Did the Democrats Win the White Working Class?” by David Brady, Duke University and Benjamin Sosnaud, Harvard University

2008 was the year of the White working class. Among Republicans, there was Mike Huckabee’s populist rhetoric and a vice-presidential pick explicitly chosen because of her appeal to working-class voters. Sarah Palin even uttered the ordinarily forbidden words “working class” in her debate with Joe Biden and made much of her husband’s union membership and snowmobiling. The Republicans ended the campaign lionizing working-class heroes like “Joe the Plumber” and “Tito the Builder.” The Democrats, for their part, vigorously debated whether Hillary Clinton or Barack Obama better represented the views of this constituency.

For Democrats like us, this increased emphasis on the working class would seem to be good news. What’s more, recent research suggests that the decline in working class support for Democrats described by Thomas Frank and others has been greatly exaggerated. In his celebrated 2008 book, Unequal Democracy, political scientist Larry Bartels concluded that the White working class has remained reliably Democratic over the years. Nothing challenges their loyalty, and supposedly, the only region where the White working class might vote Republican is the South. Bartels’ book received much praise; it has been written up in the New York Times an amazing seven times (including plugs by Bartels’ Princeton colleagues Paul Krugman and Alan Blinder, and listings in “economics books of the year” and “the year in ideas”). It has even been reported that Obama and Bill Clinton read the book.

But is the Democrats’ new confidence justified? Our research suggests not.

Bartels reaches his conclusions by using an invalid definition of the working class, namely, the bottom third of the income distribution. This, of course, includes the poor and the unemployed as part of the working class, something virtually no scholar of class accepts. Since the poor and unemployed make up nearly 20% of the population, and tend to be Democrats, Bartels provides an inaccurate portrait of White working-class voters.

Of course, sociologists have long focused on determining the best way to measure social class. Our recent article in the journal Social Science Research (with Steven Frenk) uses state-of-the-art sociology to analyze the same dataset (the National Elections Studies) as Bartels. We define social classes not by income but as groupings of occupations with similar “life chances,” authority, skills and status. We then sort people into classes such as unskilled manual laborers, routine white collar workers, and professionals. Over the years, sociologists have proven that this definition of class provides a better measure of life chances than income alone. This technique is also less sensitive to regional differences in the cost of living, and more effectively predicts “permanent” income – a person’s average income over the course of their entire life.

What do we find when we measure the White working class properly? From 1972 to 1992, the White working class voted like everybody else. They were slightly more supportive of Nixon in ’72, Carter in ’76, and Reagan in ’84. But in general, working class Whites voted with the majority.

Beginning in 1996, however, a split emerged within this group. White working class men began to support Republicans very strongly, while White working class women leaned Democratic. In 1996, about 45% of White working class men voted Democratic. By 2000, almost two-thirds of White working class men voted Republican, a rate that was repeated in 2004. To put this astonishing figure in context, consider that this level of Republican support is similar to that of Evangelical Protestants. That this decisive shift began in 1996 leads to one of the biggest ironies of the story. It was Hillary Clinton who declared herself the champion of the White working class in the Democratic primaries, and yet it was during her husband’s presidency that Democrats lost the support of White working class men.

We also find that there is no simple answer for this increased support for Republicans among White working class men. Some argue that “wedge issues” like abortion and school prayer pulled the White working class to the Republicans and that the Democratic Party’s neglect of economics pushed them away. Bartels asserts that only Southern White working-class voters support Republicans, thanks largely to racial divisions.

Our analysis suggests that White working-class men favor the death penalty and restrictions on abortion, oppose government assistance for African-Americans, and are more likely to be Evangelical Protestants (all factors that predict Republican voting). They also went for the GOP nationwide, not merely in the South. With the exception of abortion attitudes however, White working-class women have similar views and haven’t gone decisively Republican.

Unfortunately, occupation-based data are not yet available for the 2008 election. However, in 2006, Bartels employed a different measure of the working class: those without a college degree. How did Whites without college degrees vote in 2008? According to CNN exit polls, 58% chose John McCain and only 40% voted for Obama.

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For social science to inform the public, it must use the best measures. Bartels, however, ignores the vast sociological literature on class voting. When we measure class validly, we uncover a good deal of support for the picture sketched by Thomas Frank in his 2004 book, *What’s the Matter with Kansas*, which described the desertion of the Democrats by the White working class. Although Bartels provides a reassuring story for Democrats, the reality is much closer to Frank’s Kansas.

**DISSERTATION ABSTRACTS**

*Joanna Jasiewicz, PhD Candidate, University of Barcelona, “The Mobilization of Ethnic and National Minorities in Poland in the context of European Integration”*

Since 1989, one observes a rapid increase in legislation that refers to the protection of minorities’ rights in Poland and simultaneously a rising presence of minorities in the public sphere. In my dissertation project, I aim at explaining the above-mentioned increase assuming that the anti-discrimination prescriptions created in the framework of supranational institutions, by influencing domestic law, modified the structure of political opportunity at the national level. Given this change in the domestic political structure, I seek to examine whether minorities’ members seize it and challenge the nation-state by referring to the supranational legislation on minority protection. One would have expected that after accession to the European Union, all disadvantaged minority groups in Poland would have equally mobilized and strived for objectives recognized as legitimate in the framework of the EU. However, my analysis demonstrates that there have been significant differences in the ethnic organizations’ levels of mobilization. In order to solve this puzzle, I rely on the “claims-making analysis” method. On a theoretical level, I draw on the new institutionalism premise that political structures, in this case the EU and the domestic setting, shape political results, that is, the political activism of minority groups. The new institutionalist perspective has its limits, however. That is, it provides explanations for the broad increase in minority demands, but it cannot account for the variation in ethnic mobilization. My inquiry reveals the importance of an intervening factor – participation in transnational networks. In my project, I call attention to the fact that transnational networks open up access to different sorts of capital otherwise unavailable to ethnic groups and thus empower them to set free from the limits established by the nation-state.

*Robert S. Jansen, Ph.D., University of California Los Angeles, “Populist Mobilization: Peru in Historical and Comparative Perspective.”*

While populism has long been a prominent feature of the Latin American political landscape, it remains poorly understood. This dissertation argues that populism is most productively treated as a particular type of political mobilization—as a means that challengers and incumbents alike can employ in pursuit of a wide range of social, political, and economic agendas. The first part of the dissertation explains the historical emergence of populist mobilization in Latin America. Through a comparative analysis of Latin American countries during the first half of the twentieth century, it identifies populist mobilization’s historical preconditions. It then draws on archival data from a strategically selected case—Peru’s 1931 presidential election—to identify the paths by which two politicians of very different ideological orientations came to undertake this particular line of political practice. The second part of the dissertation illuminates the practical organization of populist mobilization, demonstrating that it is far from the disorganized, demagogical sleight of hand implied by the existing literature. It does this by analyzing two common populist tactics—grassroots incorporative organizing and the staging of mass rallies—as they were undertaken by the competing populists of Peru’s 1931 election. The dissertation concludes by suggesting that the practice of populist mobilization might itself have important consequences—social polarization in the short term and political instability in the long term—that are, at least to a certain extent, independent of the ends toward which it is directed.


In this dissertation I examine the state’s privatization of the use of military force. Beginning in the early 1990s, governments turned to private military corporations (PMCs) to carry out many aspects of military policy, from basic logistics to developing strategy to carrying out missions. This type of privatization raises key questions for sociologists. Max Weber (1964) famously defined the modern state as possessing a monopoly over the legitimate use of force. What happens to that monopoly and that legitimacy—and to the state—when the use of force is privatized? In order to answer this question, I build on Avant (2005) to distinguish three critical dimensions of the monopoly over force: functional control, political control, and social control. My data include over 70 in-depth, semi-structured interviews with leaders of the PMC industry, PMC employees and managers, government officials, journalists, activists, and UN investigators. My results suggest that the rise of a private military industry does not, in most cases, weaken states’ functional control over violence. On the other hand, we do see changes in how this control is exercised. Military privatization has led to what I call the “militarization” of civilian branches of government. Most critically, it appears that the use of PMCs has the potential to greatly reduce social control over official violence, as it can be nearly impossible for citizens to know who is being hired to fight on their behalf. As a result, while there is no evidence that military privatization threatens the primacy of the modern state, it does appear to weaken social and democratic controls over the use of violence. In other words, while PMCs do not undo the state’s monopoly over the legitimate use of force, they do substantially alter our notions of what counts as a “legitimate” use of force in the first place.
AUTHORS MEET CRITICS...

Setting aside, for the moment, these larger issues—which B&M consider long-settled in favor of their own operating assumptions—it is also worth commenting on several significant features of the explanatory model B&M elaborate to explain welfare state persistence. As the subtitle of the book makes clear, B&M emphasize the importance of public opinion in the persistence of welfare state. They are careful to acknowledge, however, that "an account of welfare emergence" and "development" that emphasizes the role of "class forces… has much to recommend it" even as persistence may require nothing more than public opinion preferences (21, see also 64). This nod toward "class forces" may temper the objections of those who would tend to see public opinion as correlated with but not determinate of welfare state formations and who would explain welfare state persistence (such as it is) and maybe even public preferences as an artifact of "path dependency" related to the history of prior struggles.

The careful nod toward "class forces" and welfare state development is not sustained within the book. Indeed, B&M make a significantly more strident assertion regarding the "powerful and strategic implications" of their research on public opinion and the welfare state. "Future efforts to alter policy preferences among citizens could," they argue, "readily induce a shift in overall welfare output within democracies" (55). B&M use their model to simulate the predicted direct influence that a change in popular policy preferences would have on welfare state effort. "For instance, a movement in the United States toward the Norwegian level of policy preferences is, by itself, predicted as adding a sizable six percentage points to the American level of welfare effort during the 1990s" (81). This would appear to mark a radical departure from any pretense to careful consideration of the path dependency of contemporary welfare state formations.

The model elaborated does not rely exclusively on measures of public opinion. There are also interesting independent variables used to measure political party control and the political structures and institutions that mediate the responsiveness of "policy output" in relation to popular preferences. B&M find considerable variation in levels of responsiveness, although it might be useful to unbundle some of the scales used to identify mechanisms of political accountability (40, table 2.2).

Finally, B&M do not include in their explanatory model any measure of extra-parliamentary "agitation" or social movement mobilization. This may be pragmatically justified by the limits of existing data. But B&M also appear to exclude such measures on principle because "the relative size of the working class and the organizational strength of labor unions have tended to decline in all capitalist democracies" (22). Nobody is going to argue that the years under investigation marked a highpoint for labor agitation and extra-parliamentary mass mobilization, but the patterns are probably more uneven and the volatile spikes in action more significant than a narrative of simple, smooth "decline" would indicate.

“Do People Live With the Level of Inequality They Prefer?” Timothy Patrick Moran, SUNY – Stony Brook

If there are two robust empirical findings in the comparative welfare state and political economy literatures, they are: 1) political institutions persistently shape the aggregate distributions of income within countries; and 2) high levels of welfare spending reduce both inequality and poverty in society. Together, these two generalities form a consensus that inequality is as political as it is an economic outcome, and that the magnitude of the welfare state influences both how much of societal income is redistributed and, perhaps more importantly, how this income is redistributed.

When analyzing the links between political processes and the distribution of income, scholars have overwhelmingly focused on either electoral systems (proportional representation, majoritarian, etc.) or the ideological composition of governments and policy (or “government partisanship”). In Why Welfare States Persist, Clem Brooks and Jeff Manza seek to move beyond such emphasis to argue that the key explanatory link connecting inequality to democratic representation is the policy preferences of the citizens themselves. That, even when holding the partisan control of government constant, it is the policy preferences of the citizens – in the aggregate – that explains both the existence of different types of welfare states, and their endurance over time.

An important premise in the book is that tremendous variation exists in both democratic polities (in terms of what people want) and welfare state regimes (in terms of its size and generosity). Let’s look closer at this premise, first in terms of how the authors operationalize these concepts to make cross-national comparisons, and then in terms of what these comparisons imply to democracy and inequality on a broader scale.

Finding Variation

The analysis – and nearly every important empirical conclusion in the book – is built on the relationship between two key variables. The privileged dependent variable seeks to measure welfare state generosity using a measure of spending relative to the size of the economy. Researchers rely on spending data because they are available, appear directly comparable, and vary across countries and time. But, to what extent do other factors distort the degree to which given spending ratios translate into different real levels of disposable income for welfare state citizens?

A problem with such measures is that they do not account for the size of the dependent population, even though this is critical in determining the generosity of any spending level (or ratio). So, spending ratios can go up even in a situation where benefit entitlements to individuals are being restricted or removed. Esping-Anderson in Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism showed this to be exactly the case regarding unemployment expenditure in the UK in the 1980s – as unemployment rates rose faster than benefits were

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being cut, spending increased along with retrenchment. Spending ratios also reflect large scale demographic trends, such as the unemployment rate, the size of the retiree population, and, as in the case of the US in years to come, the number of military veterans, changes that do not relate to programmatic expansion or retrenchment. For example, if observed declines in spending in a certain area are more than compensated by a decline of the “needy” population in that area, “generosity” could rise considerably.

Isn’t the real question the number of people with insurance, not the size of the claims of people who do? The institutions of the welfare state, and more importantly who is included (and to what extent) and who is not, characterize its size and strength. Don’t the conditions stipulated in national insurance programs better encompass the extent of welfare state generosity? Welfare state regimes are in essentials different sets of commitments that extend beyond the actual number of claims being paid at any given time. The issue then becomes, should we use institutional commitments or monetary outlays in testing models of welfare state programs?

Such a measurement shift would still yield differences across countries. But the variance might be substantially reduced, and more importantly the relevant comparisons recast. Take three of the “Liberal” welfare state regime types (in the “Social,” “Christian,” and “Liberal” Democracy typology). The US is not committed to universal health care, but the UK and Canada are – so are the latter two much more different than Denmark (“Social”) or Germany (“Christian”) in this regard?

The second key variable is the “policy preference” score used to explain welfare state spending. Here, the authors construct a continuous scale that integrates survey responses to two questions: 1) should government provide a job to everyone who wants one? And 2) should government reduce income differences between rich and poor? The reader is provided precious little explanation on how this scale is constructed, what the descriptive statistics look like cross-nationally, or how to interpret the magnitude of the statistic’s metric. From a table, we know that in 1996 the figure for Liberal Democracies is -1.0, for Christian Democracies is 0.8, and for Social Democracies is 0.4.

Since the book’s arguments are almost entirely based on assigning importance to differences in this measure, more convincing is needed that scores on this scale represent significant cross-national difference in aggregate policy preference. While most would agree that sizeable difference exists at the extremes – US citizens (Liberal) certainly believe much less in government redistribution than Swedes (Social) – but one wonders about the extent of variation in the middle. Do Danes (Social) prefer significantly different social policy than Germans (Christian) or the Dutch (Christian) or even the Irish (Liberal)? For sure the authors have the data to answer “yes,” but a fuller elaboration on this important question would assuage doubt on the extent and significance of policy preference variation across the rich democracies.

Interpreting Variation (a less fair critique)

Let’s concede that the authors’ are more than right, and their analysis illustrates significant difference in both welfare generosity and mass public opinion (distinct from the United States as outlier) across the world(s) of welfare capitalism. But the authors have a more ambitious agenda. They aim to disentangle the mechanisms through which public policy preferences of citizens result in actual public policy. The policy preference scale not only explains the various shapes welfare state regimes take cross-nationally, they argue, it also more broadly captures international difference in public opinion on social rights. If the authors are right, then, democratic citizens live with the level of inequality they prefer.

Summary measures of inequality like the Gini index are often analyzed to make similar points about cross-national difference. Significant cross-country variation in how people evaluate inequality (good or bad), or see levels of social mobility (available or not), the story goes, is matched by variation in inequality itself. Table 1 presents Gini coefficients and welfare state regime type in 2000 for the countries that make up the cross-national sample in the book.

As indicated in the table, when sorted from most egalitarian to least, inequality levels in the democracies of the rich world tend to follow the Social-Christian-Liberal regime typology. And analyzing and explaining these differences (where the US is seen as having the highest levels of inequality) occupies the bulk of intellectual output on stratification and inequality in the social sciences.

But if the differences in inequality expressed in Table 1 are interpreted to be large, as they usually are, how would shifting our gaze to the world as a whole change this perception? Figure 1 depicts an original cross-national dataset of comparable Gini coefficients for the world as a whole (at least 96 of its countries), plotted against the log of national income, in 2000. First, notice that the y-axis scale must be significantly expanded to incorporate the various levels of inequality seen around the world. The “high” level of inequality in the US is considerably lower than other democracies such as those in Latin America or India. Second, see how levels of income and inequality in the rich countries that constitute Table 1 – enclosed in the circle – represent a fairly homogenous group where the variance within appears much smaller than usually assumed. The US is still clearly the most unequal of this group, but the extent of the variation within this cluster is dramatically recast when seen from a “world scale.”

The point here is not to hassle the authors for failing to incorporate every democratic regime into their study. (There are many non- or barely functioning democracies in Figure 1. Plus, the authors are clear they are comparing the democracies of the rich world, so any criticism here is quite unfair). Instead, the intent is to think more broadly about the relationship between democracy and inequality. In Latin America, for example, recent scholarship suggests that excessive inequalities attack the foundation of

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democratic political regimes as opposed to reflect the preference of its citizens. If, as implied by the book’s arguments, the French have policy preferences for levels of inequality in the mid- to upper-.200’s of the Gini index, do Brazilians “prefer” levels of inequality of almost triple magnitude? Did Argentines “prefer” the slashing of social spending that accompanied neo-liberal policy? Or, are the democratic processes illustrated in *Why Welfare States Persist* somehow confined to operate only in the developed world?

Table 1. Inequality Levels in Rich Democracies, 2000
(Korzeniewicz and Moran 2009)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gini Index</th>
<th>Regime Type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>Social</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>Christian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>Social</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>Social</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>Social</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>Christian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Christian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>Christian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>Christian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>European Union (15)</em></td>
<td>0.290</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>Christian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>Liberal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>Liberal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>Liberal</td>
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<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Christian</td>
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<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Christian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>Liberal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>0.347</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>0.368</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Brooks and Manza wrote a rich and compelling book, such that interesting thought questions like these can be raised. And in the end, there is an all too rare feeling of comfort in their analysis. After all, if we as democratic (small d) citizens truly determine social policy, this one is a happy story… provided you live where more people agree with your predilections than not.

![Figure 1. Income and Inequality: Global Cross-Section 2000](image)


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“Why Public Opinion?” Clem Brooks, Indiana University and Jeff Manza, New York University

We began the project culminating in our book, *Why Welfare States Persist*, to answer two questions. For some time now a number of political scientists have argued that public policy is highly responsive to public opinion in the United States, but little comparative work had been done. Second, given growing evidence that public opinion matters at least for some types of public policy, we wanted to examine how political sociologists might incorporate mass opinion into theory and research. High-quality comparative data and three generations of rich scholarship on comparative welfare states provided the ideal context to consider the policy responsiveness question cross-nationally, and to develop a constructive engagement with existing theories in our field.

Why public opinion? The question is important because it gets to the empirical foundations of contemporary democracies: do citizens get what they want? Our analyses found evidence for the influence of mass public opinion on social policymaking across the developed democracies we examined. This conclusion holds when controlling for factors established as sources of welfare state development. These findings may be surprising to some: policy responsiveness to public opinion is not unique to the American context (or to other polities characterized by majoritarianism); and our evidence suggests that the actual preferences of citizens have operated as a bulwark against welfare state retrenchment in many West European countries.

In the course of probing connections between our findings and existing welfare state theories, we became convinced that a number of bridges, some implicit, were possible. For example, we argue that public opinion can operate as a key source of “policy feedback” within historical institutionalist models. Public opinion can also be seen as a critical source of citizens’ power in power resource models, at times even operating independently of the effect of voters’ preferences on elections. This suggests a complementary relationship between established welfare state scholarship and new models of policy responsiveness. That is the central theme of our book.

The thoughtful comments by Jonathan Cutler and Timothy Moran provide an opportunity to clarify some questions our work raises, and to address some common objections. Our focus on “rich democracies” made sense in light of the existence of high-quality comparative data going back a couple of decades, as well as the fact that many debates about welfare-state policymaking have centered on that part of the world. Moran’s call to go beyond this by developing a global focus is well-put; we would readily agree that questions about opinion/policy linkages in the developing world merit scrutiny. For example, innovative and important work on the political left has been to convince citizens to robustly support large social welfare programs (varying, of course, across countries).

Why should we best conceptualize welfare states, and why do our own analyses primarily employ spending measures as their dependent variable (what we and others call “welfare state effort”)? Cutler raises an objection that cuts in cash benefits (in comparison to health and other social service programs) signal “real” retrenchment that may be missed by broad spending measures that include service spending. While it is clear that many welfare states are shifting the relative balance of spending between cash and services away from cash benefits, we would disagree that cash transfers are by themselves the holy grail, or most important, measure of social policy outputs. For one thing, there appears consensus among researchers that it is the overall level of welfare spending or provision that reduces relative poverty and inequality, not the size of cash benefits by itself. Further, the most generous welfare states in Northern Europe spend heavily on services to produce more egalitarian type of capitalist societies.

The point is that replacement income and other cash benefits are not exhaustive of policy interventions in markets. Cross-national and over-time variability in the provision, for instance, of health services, child care, jobs training, and public education together contribute to how welfare states vary and influence stratification. As a number of political theorists have argued, egalitarian forms of society tend to require more not less service provision; even the Nordic social democracies have perhaps stalled by not further addressing through service (and cash) provisions a fuller range of global and life course risks affecting citizens.

What of the influence of employer pressures and class struggles more broadly? That question has been central to classic work on the welfare state by power resources scholars Kornai and Esping-Andersen, and more recently in the scholarship of Hicks and Huber and Stephens. The power resources argument was particularly successful in demonstrating the historical legacies of class struggles by focusing attention on the politics of partisan governance (and the role of left parties and electoral competition in promoting welfare state expansion).

But the changing context of welfare states and the global economy have pushed scholars to think about how social and political change have combined to create new sources of constraints. For example, with union density declining to an average of approximately 31 percent in West European countries outside the Ghent system, and to 13 percent in the United States, few analysts would now want to attribute the persistence of large welfare states to class pressures from below. Our own contribution is to argue it is mass opinion – and in particular, popular support for social programs – that has become a key source of pressure on governments. The hidden victory of the political left has been to convince citizens to robustly support large social welfare programs (varying, of course, across countries).

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In his comments, Moran raises an interesting issue about whether the existence of opinion/policy linkages means that citizens are necessarily satisfied with existing levels of inequality in a given country. This is not a question we explore in the book; formally speaking, welfare state institutions and inequality levels are analytically distinct, and they have overlapping but non-identical causes. No theory of which we are aware of would classify welfare states and inequality level as a single dimension or attribute of the same underlying mechanism.

But the question is important because if the influence of mass opinion on inequality operates primarily through social policy processes, we would expect little direct linkage between opinion and inequality. Further, if the contemporaneous influence between welfare states and inequality flows mainly from social policy, then the total association between mass opinion and inequality will necessarily be lower than the relationship between mass opinion and welfare states. Our theoretical argument is in keeping with, but does not require, the latter scenario. Either way, we think the contours of mass opinion on inequality merit further scrutiny, and fuller investigations by scholars such as McCall and Kenworthy are underway.

The conceptualization and measurement of mass opinion raise questions for both commentators. In *Why Welfare States Persist*, we have sought to make the most of the International Social Survey Program (ISSP) data by using a pair of items offered in five different surveys. Prior analysis of these items and the larger battery from which they are drawn (and available in a smaller number of surveys) provides evidence that the two items we use capture much of the systematic component behind responses.

In this context, it may be useful to note a possible misunderstanding when it comes to the concept of mass opinion itself. Could it be that mass preferences are essentially a fiction, that attitude surveys measure at best little more than weakly-held views? We do not think so, especially when it comes to aggregate (as opposed to individual) opinion. The breakthrough work of Page and Shapiro in the early 1990s showed that aggregation in survey measurement filters out non-attitudes and random measurement error in survey research. Perhaps more importantly, it is precisely how policy officials and governments encounter mass attitudes, that is, as a summary of preferences. Put another way, we would not have much reason to expect policy influence among individual citizens *per se*. But the aggregate is a different matter.

When it comes to citizens’ policy preferences concerning welfare states, our work has sought to extend what is now a fairly deep understanding of these attitudes. Preferences on such matters as pensions, unemployment insurance, family services, and the role of government versus markets tend to be characterized by high levels of salience, perceptions of group interests, and extensive network and social environments in which preferences get formed and at times transformed. This contrasts with arenas in which public attitudes are close to nonexistent or simply of highly malleable in character, as regards say, Pluto’s standing as a planetary body, or whether James Fenimore Cooper and Danielle Steele are properly considered canonical figures in American literary. It is a different ballgame when we are looking at mass opinion on pensions or health insurance.

Finally, a couple of comments about future work. We think a number of lines of important inquiry remain. First, consider the results of a series of recent studies of other dimensions of the policy process. Here we might single out recent work by Amenta and colleagues on U.S. social security conflicts, Chen on racial politics and antidiscrimination policy, McAdam and Su on anti-Vietnam war protests, Soule and colleagues’ on the defeat of the U.S. Equal Rights Amendment, and Wlezien and Soroka on budgetary policy dynamics in the U.S., Canada and the United Kingdom. Many of these studies did not seek to apply a positive theory of democratic responsiveness. Yet by including measures of public opinion alongside other factors, they effectively show that mass preferences can in some contexts operate in tandem with such forces as political institutional structures and social movement mobilization.

This work also raises intriguing questions about public beliefs and expectations before and during the current era of global economic uncertainty, one characterized by considerable national differences and historical legacies. While serious work on citizens’ responses to uncertainty is just beginning, much interesting scholarship awaits. Questions about mass opinion and tools drawn from recent work on policy and political responsiveness can usefully complement established political-sociological approaches.
Amsterdam's more welcoming multicultural policies help immigrant community groups attain a level of political clout that similar


The rise of rightwing populism has brought into question prevailing assumptions in social science about multicultural Europe. In this compelling study of populist politics, Mabel Berezin argues that the emergence of the movement in the 1990s was a historical surprise rather than an expected event. She questions whether rightwing populism would exist in the absence of the Maastricht Treaty and the subsequent intensification of cultural and economic Europeanization. Using an innovative methodology, Berezin analyzes the French National Front in relation to the broader context of Europeanization and globalization. She unpacks the political and cultural processes that evoke the thin commitments characterizing citizen support, and shows that we cannot make sense of rightwing populism without considering the historical legacies and practices, both national and international, within which it arises. This book makes a novel argument about the relationship between democracy and political and social security.


What is the key to the longevity of the Ottoman Empire and similar political formations? This book is a comparative study of imperial organization and longevity that assesses Ottoman successes as well as failures against those of other empires with similar characteristics. In contrast to a Gibsonian concern with imperial rise and decline, a common feature of conventional analyses, this book demonstrates that the flexible techniques by which the Ottomans maintained their legitimacy, the cooperation of their diverse elites both at the center and in the provinces, as well as the control over the economic and human resources were responsible for the longevity of this particular “negotiated empire.” No matter how strong an empire is, it has to work with peripheries, local elites and frontier groups to maintain compliance, resources, tribute and military cooperation and ensure political coherence and stability. Barkey carries out a study of the Ottoman Empire’s social organization and mechanisms of rule at selected moments of its history, emergence, imperial institutionalization, remodeling and transition to nation-state. She analyzes intermediary processes such as the multiplicities of flexible arrangements, networked structures, the institutional mixes, the layering of old and new, winners and losers in the governance structures, the negotiated arrangements in different domains and structural and symbolic sites of agreement and contention. The lesson of imperial longevity comes from this intermediary level of negotiations.


Are all immigrants from the same home country best understood as a homogeneous group of foreign-born? Or do they differ in their adaptation and transnational ties depending on when they emigrated and with what lived experiences? Between Castro’s rise to power in 1959 and the early twenty-first century more than a million Cubans immigrated to the United States. While it is widely known that Cuban émigrés have exerted a strong hold on Washington policy toward their homeland, Eckstein uncovers a fascinating paradox: the recent arrivals, although poor and politically weak, have done more to transform their homeland than the influential and prosperous early exiles who have tried for half a century to bring the Castro regime to heel. The impact of the so-called New Cubans is an unintended consequence of the personal ties they maintain with family in Cuba, ties the first arrivals oppose. This historically-grounded, nuanced book offers a rare in-depth analysis of Cuban immigrants’ social, cultural, economic, and political adaptation, their transformation of Miami into the “northern most Latin American city,” and their cross-border engagement and homeland impact. Eckstein accordingly provides new insight into the lives of Cuban immigrants, into Cuba in the post Soviet era, and how Washington’s failed Cuba policy might be improved. She also posits a new theory to deepen the understanding not merely of Cuban but of other immigrant group adaptation.


This book is a compilation of previously published studies on the role of culture and language in political violence and terrorism. These studies have contributed to a paradigmatic shift in sociological thinking about language and culture in politics, particularly in regard to the genesis and dynamics of violence and terrorism. Blending ideas derived from Michel Foucault and Kenneth Burke, this book is unique in its range of focus from detailed studies of specific cases of violence and terrorism to peace movements in resistance of violence, war, and terrorism.


In this book, experts from a wide range of disciplines explore the way civic groups across the country and around the world are shaping immigrants’ quest for political effectiveness. This book shows that while immigrant organizations play an important role in the lives of members, their impact is often compromised by political marginalization and a severe lack of resources. Ramakrishnan and Bloemraad examine community organizations in six cities in California and find that even in areas with high rates of immigrant organizing, policymakers remain unaware of local ethnic organizations. Looking at new immigrant destinations, Andersen finds that community organizations often serve as the primary vehicle for political incorporation—a role once played by the major political parties. Vermeulen and Berger show how policies in two European cities lead to very different outcomes for ethnic organizations. Amsterdam’s more welcoming multicultural policies help immigrant community groups attain a level of political clout that similar Continued on p.18
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organizations in Berlin lack. Wong, Rim, and Perez report on a study of Latino and Asian American evangelical churches. While the church shapes members’ political views on issues such as abortion and same-sex marriage, church members may also question the evangelical movement’s position on such issues as civil rights and immigration. Els de Graauw finds that many non-profit organizations without explicitly political agendas nonetheless play a crucial role in advancing the political interests of their immigrant members. Recent cuts in funding for such organizations, she argues, block not only the provision of key social services, but also an important avenue for political voice. Looking at community organizing in a suburban community, Aptekar finds that even when immigrant organizations have considerable resources and highly educated members, they tend to be excluded from town politics.


How do people become activists for causes they care deeply about? Many people with similar backgrounds, for instance, fervently believe that abortion should be illegal, but only some of them join the pro-life movement. By delving into the lives and beliefs of activists and nonactivists alike, Ziad W. Munson is able to lucidly examine the differences between them. Through extensive interviews and detailed studies of pro-life organizations across the nation, Munson makes the startling discovery that many activists join up before they develop strong beliefs about abortion— in fact, some are even pro-choice prior to their mobilization. Therefore, Munson concludes, commitment to an issue is often a consequence rather than a cause of activism. The Making of Pro-Life Activists provides a compelling new model of how people become activists, while also offering a penetrating analysis of the complex relationship between religion, politics, and the pro-life movement. Policy makers, activists on both sides of the issue, and anyone seeking to understand how social movements take shape will find this book essential.


This book is conceived as a simultaneous examination of the structural/subjective and discursive issues allowing Mexican social movements to use human rights discourse for the construction of joint agendas and organization of collective action against free trade. It considers both the construction of human rights discourse and its use for framing demands in the social field. The simultaneous application of a genealogical examination and a more language-centered discourse analysis suggests that this book addresses two complementary issues: the emergence and development of human rights discourse and how human rights discourses are employed in current struggles against free trade. These issues are dealt with in the book’s two parts. Part one addresses the emergence and development of human rights as an insurrectionary practice in anti-free trade struggles. Part two of the book discusses how human rights are employed as an insurrectionary practice in anti-free trade struggles, that is, how they are used by social agents to construct human rights understandings that bring them together to form a common agenda against free trade. This part examines in detail the empirical differences between social subjects and how they construct worldviews, subject positions and agendas.

CITED REFERENCES FROM ALL ARTICLES


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REFERENCES CONTINUED...


Sobieraj, Sarah and Jeffrey Berry. (work in progress). “Mapping The Outrage Industry.”


EDITOR’S NOTES

I am sorry to say that this Summer’s issue will be my last as editor of the newsletter. After two years in the position, I am looking forward to passing the job on to another member of our rich section. As noted below, the section officers will be looking for a new editor. I encourage each of you to consider the position. It has been a highly rewarding experience and although it keeps you busy at times, it is certainly something one can fit in with one’s normal work. I’ve found my colleagues in the section to be generous in writing for the newsletter. Really, all this job takes are a few ideas and time to write emails to ask others to do the real work.

Thanks to all the contributors to this issue. During my tenure as editor, we’ve been able to publish dozens of dissertation and book abstracts. Please continue to send these in.

Finally, please feel encouraged to contribute anything you have to say to the section on politics, political sociology or sociology in general. I’d like the newsletter to be a home for your provocative and interesting debate on a host of issues. If you have a letter to write in response to something in the newsletter, I’ll publish that as well. Submissions should be sent to my email below.

Best regards,

Dave Brady
brady@soc.duke.edu

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NEW EDITOR OF POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY NEWSLETTER NEEDED

Please contact Gay Seidman if you have an interest in the position (seidman@ssc.wisc.edu). Also, please feel free to contact David Brady if you are curious about what the job entails. The editor usually publishes 3 issues each year, and has complete freedom to choose content, invite contributions, and take the newsletter in whatever direction s/he chooses.

CORRECTION!

The Fall issue incorrectly listed the winners of the section’s graduate student paper awards. The correct listing is that there were two equal winners of the award. One winner was Liza Weinstein for “Mumbai’s Development Mafias: Globalization, Organized Crime and Land Development.” *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* (March 2008). The other winner was Djordje Stefanovic for “The Path to Weimar Serbia? Explaining the Resurgence of the Serbian Far Right after the Fall of Milosevic.” *Ethnic and Racial Studies* (October 2008). Congratulations to both winners! The editor sincerely apologizes for the mistake.