Welcome to the Summer 2008 issue of Accounts!

From all of us on the editorial team, we hope you find a restful and productive summer. As always, we thank our contributors for their time and efforts. For this issue, we have chosen to publish pieces that address facets of ethics and the marketplace in order to spark debate and discussion on this important issue. First, we’ve chosen to reprint Viviana Zelizer’s recent article “Ethics in the Economy,” released in the Journal of Business, Economics, & Ethics (Zeitschrift für Wirtschafts- und Unternehmensethik) 2007, volume 1. We thank the editors for their kind permission to reprint (volume edited by Jens Beckert), and we would like to promote the journal’s web site, located at http://www.zfew.de. We would also like to point out that this particular issue, “Ethics in the Economy” includes two important responses, one by Diane Vaughan (titled “Organizations, Competition, and Ethics,” and one by Lynn Paine (titled “Putting Codes in Perspective”). While space limits our ability to publish all three pieces in this newsletter, we encourage you to view these pieces via your library, ProQuest (or other) database, or the journal web site.

We’ve centered our new book reviews on topics of interest to ethics in the marketplace, and we’ve included a guide to sessions of interest to economic sociologists for ASAs. This issue is the final issue from this editorial team. We wish to thank the membership for the opportunity and learning experience that is a part of delivering this newsletter. We wish the next editorial team well; see you at ASAs!

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“Ethics in the Economy”

Viviana Zelizer

Princeton University


In 2003, an ailing Boeing corporation brought back from retirement former president Harry Stonecipher to turn the company around. Amid a flurry of reforms, the now CEO Stonecipher installed a code of company ethics to publicize the firm’s new self-discipline. Only two years later, however, he fell afoul of his own reforms. One provision of the new ethics code stipulated that “employees will not engage in conduct or activity that may raise questions as to the company’s honesty, impartiality, or reputation or otherwise cause embarrassment to the company” (p. 5).

As newspapers around the U.S reported, Stonecipher did embarrass Boeing. He carried on an affair with a divorced female executive. After an anonymous informant within the company disclosed evidence of the relationship, including some steamy emails, to the heads of the company’s legal and ethical departments, Boeing’s board of directors decided that the 68-year old Stonecipher, long married and with grown children, had to go. Stonecipher had violated the very code of ethics the company had put in place on his arrival in office. As he said later: “We set – hell, I set – a higher standard here. I violated my own standards. I used poor judgment.”

The collapse of Enron and other 21st-century business scandals have kept violations of ethical codes in headlines.

Ethics and economic activity seem to be uneasy companions. If economic activity centers on the maximization of efficiency in production, consumption, distribution, and transfers of assets, what place can it allow for ethical concerns? Institutional economics offers a useful reply: among the institutions that stabilize economies, lower transaction costs, and assure commitments, formally enacted rules of good behavior play a significant part.

This paper pursues that insight by identifying a series of intersections between ethics and economic activity. Despite the frequency with which CEOs speak of ethics and business schools teach courses on the subject, researchers have so far produced no more than scattered findings on how ethical questions actually arise within economic life, how economic actors respond to them, and what effects those responses have on economic performances. The paper therefore concentrates on identifying salient research questions, then closes with concrete suggestions concerning the sort of inquiries that would produce better answers than are now available.

What do we mean by ethical questions? The Oxford English Dictionary defines ethics as “the science of morals: the department of study concerned with the principles of human duty.” In economic activity then ethics concerns the proper way of conducting production, consumption, distribution, and transfer of assets. For instance, ethical questions turn out in such varied forms as: is it right to pay women for their eggs? Is it wrong for a supervisor to make sexual advances to an employee? May a CEO legitimately issue public reports exaggerating a firm’s economic performance? Is it appropriate for company executives to use company jets for personal trips? More generally, is it feasible to set rules that eliminate conflicts of interest between a person’s corporate responsibility and private interests? May a lawyer appropriately use confidential information from a client to make profitable investments? May a psychiatrist who learns about a patient’s embezzlement on the job appropriately withhold that information from an employer or the police?

These are everyday questions in economic life. Within business circles people have had a field day with issues of ethics. In his introduction to a 2006/2007 annual collection on business ethics, John E. Richardson declares:

Recent events have brought ethics to the forefront as a topic of discussion throughout our nation. And, undoubtedly, the area of society that is getting the closest scrutiny regarding its ethical practices is the business sector . . . As corporate America struggles to find its ethical identity in a business environment that grows increasingly complex, managers are confronted with some poignant questions that have definite ethical ramifications. Does a company have any obligation to help solve social problems such as poverty, pollution, and urban decay? What ethical responsibilities should a multinational corporation assume in foreign countries? What obligation does a manufacturer have to the consumer with respect to product defects and safety? (Richardson 2007: iv).

Economic ethics have also preoccupied moral philosophers and feminist thinkers (e.g. Anderson 1993; Buchanan 1985;
Confronted with questions of this sort, both economists and economic sociologists often return to comforting dichotomies between the separate spheres of proper economic activity and proper normative behavior. On one side, a self-contained world of hard-nosed rationality; on the other, another self-contained world of sentiment and obligation. Mix the two, goes the reasoning, and both of them suffer (Zelizer 2005). As a consequence, economic analysts find it easier to ban ethical and normative questions from their own agendas as work for philosophers, theologians, and advocates.

Thomas Piper of Harvard Business School, a pioneer in development of ethics courses for MBAs, reports that he met considerable resistance from both sides. Quantitative economists voiced “real doubts about whether this was just philanthropy and foolishness.” Meanwhile ethicists were “troubled when economics was introduced into the conversation” (Rosenberg 2006: 49). Economist Julie Nelson explains:

“A particular belief about commerce and its relation to ethics is implicit in many contemporary discussions, both academic and popular. This is the belief that money, profits, markets, and corporations are parts of an “economic machine.” This machine operates in an automatic fashion, following inexorable and amoral “laws.” While the machine organizes provisioning for our bodies, it is itself soulless and inhuman . . . Ethical questions, on the other hand, concern the appropriate respect and care for other creatures that we – as living, social, and soulful beings – should demonstrate. Since machines are incapable of morality, thinking about economies as machines puts commerce firmly outside the ethical realm (Nelson 2006: 1-2).

Economic analysts’ banning of ethics oddly parallels the tendency of ethical critics to deal with unethical behavior by strict prohibition.

My own first book, in fact, took up closely related issues. *Morals and Markets* examined the transformation of life insurance from a stigmatized violation of ethical principles into a prudent and morally laudable economic investment in the future. In its early phases, critics of life insurance decried its insertion of crass commercialism and narrow self-interest into a zone of sacred commitments. They questioned: “Has a man the right to make the continuance of his life the basis of a bargain? Is it not turning a very solemn thing into a mere commercial transaction?” (*Our Mutual Friend* 1867 as cited in Zelizer 1979: 45-46) Insurance agents, in this view, were selling an unethical product and thereby undermining public morality. Only by invoking an alternative morality did advocates of life insurance succeed in making it first acceptable, and then even ethically desirable.

The early response to life insurance brings out a recurrent feature of ethical disputes at large. Critics of unethical behavior do not merely seek to stigmatize it or to make it less attractive. They regularly propose to ban specific elements: render them illegal, make them conditions for expulsion from an organization, organize attacks on perpetrators. Any economic sociologist who studies environmental pollution, automobile safety, or other presumed threats to human wellbeing regularly encounters calls for outright bans on this menace or that.

Economics and economic sociology, however, have no coherent body of description and explanation concerning ethical principles and their application. As Paul DiMaggio remarked when I told him my intention to write this paper: “yes, economic ethics is all about eliminating personal influence from organizations, while economic sociology is all about finding personal influence in organizations.” Max Weber lost to Joseph Schumpeter. On the whole, views of the economy as an autonomous, distinctive sphere of human activity organized around rationality and efficiency have impeded the serious consideration of morality’s place in economic life.

This preliminary survey does not take up every question of morality that comes up in economic activity. Instead, it closes in on one crucial junction between morality and economic life: the formation and operation of formal ethical codes within different sorts of economic activity. The paper identifies a series of questions about ethical codes that deserve serious theoretical and empirical attention from economic sociologists and illustrates the interest of those questions by referring to a variety of existing empirical analyses. By “formal ethical codes” I mean a codified set of rules for moral behavior applying to a specific population. In codes, according to Charles Tilly, “reasons given for actions cite their conformity to specialized sets of categories, procedures for ordering evidence, and rules of interpretation. Together, categories, procedures, and rules make up codes”
An impressive proportion of economic organizations adopt ethical codes labeled as such but also implementation in the form of grievance procedures and do-don’t statements of principle.

One further narrowing of our subject matter. Here we concentrate on codes adopted by economic organizations, including professional organizations such as medical societies. That narrowing ignores powerful codes enacted by legislatures and governmental agencies, not to mention codes promulgated by religious bodies, advocacy groups, and clusters of intellectuals. Such codes, as we will see, sometimes put pressure on economic organizations. To treat them all in detail here, however, would hinder the work of systematizing the place of ethics in economic activity.

As Lynn Paine says forcefully in her response to this paper, the presence and character of formal codes explain relatively little of the actual variation in ethical or unethical behavior from one firm to another. Nevertheless I stress codes here for three reasons. First, they provide evidence concerning the public stances of corporate managers when they must deal visibly with ethical violations. Second, the enactment and enforcement of codes provide evidence concerning variation in actual control problems from one type of firm to another. Third, the processes by which codes do or don’t have an impact on the extent and location of unethical behavior within firms offer insight into more general ethics-shaping processes. The study of codes, then, provides a small window into large questions about organizational ethics.

Ethical codes in economic organizations apply categories, procedures, and rules to some specific group of actors. For example, corporate codes of ethics typically identify categories of contested behavior and of persons at risk to those behaviors, procedures for identifying and handling violations, and rules for implementing these principles within the corporation. Stonecipher suffered the penalties prescribed by just such a code. Five questions call for attention:

1. what are the distinctive properties of ethical codes?
2. why do they arise?
3. how do they produce their effects?
4. what produces violations?
5. how do codes and responses affect economic activity?

These are both empirical and analytical questions. The paper takes up each in turn. **Distinctive Properties of Codes**

An impressive proportion of economic organizations adopt formal ethical codes. In their survey of 1,000 major US corporations, Gary R. Weaver, Linda Klebe Treviño, and Philip L. Cochran found that 98 percent claimed to address ethical issues in some formal document, 78 percent explicitly cited codes of ethics, 51 percent had telephone lines for reporting ethical concerns, and 30 percent had offices for dealing with ethics and legal compliance. Nearly two-thirds of these offices were created in the 1990s (Weaver, Treviño, and Cochran 1999). Indeed, in a 2005 *Business Ethics* article, James C. Hyatt, a freelance business writer notes:

A lot of companies are singing the compliance blues these days, as they struggle to cope with the complexities of Sarbanes-Oxley legislation, passed in 2002 in the wake of financial scandals. Corporations are rushing to learn ethics virtually overnight, and as they do so, a vast new industry of consultants and suppliers have emerged. The ethics industry has been born (Hyatt 2005).

Hyatt cites the rush to ethics by Goldman Sachs, Citigroup, and The New York Times Co. among many others. In fact, world standards are already emerging for corporate ethical codes. A Harvard Business School research team has created a so-called Global Business Standards Codex synthesizing the ethical principles and rules that recur in the most prestigious and influential codes (Paine, Deshpandé, Margolis, and Bettcher 2005). From those codes the team distills eight recurrent principles: fiduciary, property, reliability, transparency, dignity, fairness, citizenship, and responsiveness. Looked at more closely, the codes involved synthesize Tilly’s categories, procedures, and rules. Codes are in vogue.

Codes may conform to general moral principles such as “do no harm.” But, they often go beyond general principles by specifying a) categories of persons, activities, and sites of activity to which they apply, b) procedures for identifying instances of those categories, and c) rules distinguishing between required and banned activities in those circumstances. They sometimes also specify d) penalties for banned activities. Ethical codes governing sexual behavior within a corporation, for example, typically state to whom, what, and where they apply (do offsite liaisons matter?), who should report a violation and how (does every employee who learns of an illicit affair have an obligation to report it, and if so to whom?), exactly what counts as a violation (does recurrent flirting without further sexual relations transgress the code?), and what penalties transgressors should receive (does a violation lead to automatic firing?).

In addition to sexual behavior, ethical codes often govern other forms of intimacy. FedEx’s extensive “Code of Business Conduct & Ethics” of 2003, for example, illustrates its principles with this Q & A:

**Question:** I believe that I did not receive a promotion because my manager knows that I am attempting to become pregnant. I heard my manager say that when a
woman becomes pregnant, it inevitably interferes with job performance. Is there anything I can do?

Answer: Yes. All employment-related decisions at FedEx (e.g., promotion, remuneration, training, etc.) must be based on job-related criteria, skills, and performance. You should use the complaint processes within your operating company or report the situation to our human resources representative or to your company’s legal department. A report could also be made using the FedEx Alert Line (p. 4).4

As compared with the rules of thumb and matters of degree that most people adopt when facing everyday moral questions, codes describe sharp boundaries between acceptable and unacceptable behavior. In its 1989 company handbook, the giant retailer Wal-Mart, for example, forbade married employees (whether separated or not) from dating other employees of the firm. When a romantic couple fell under the ban and lost their Wal-Mart jobs, they sued. In a 1995 landmark case a New York court upheld the company’s ban.5 Later, however, Wal-Mart dropped that provision, restricting its prohibition to relationships between supervisors and employees (Sugarman 2003). The pertinent section of its 2005 “Statement of Ethics” reads:

You may not date or become romantically involved with another Associate if you can influence that Associate’s terms and conditions of employment or if that Associate can influence the terms and conditions of your employment (p. 16).6

Such regulations often fail outside the US. In 2005, for example, workers’ representatives from Wal-Mart’s 91 German stores successfully blocked in court the installation of a ban on inter-office dating.7

In 1998, Business Week reported a remarkable variant on codes governing office romance: the so-called “cupid contract. “A few months back,” reported the magazine:

Garry G. Mathiason, senior partner with Littler, Mendelson, Fastiff, Tichy & Mathiason, the nation’s largest employment law firm, got a call from a very sheepish general counsel for a major company. The president of the company, the counsel said, “is planning to have a consensual affair with one of his employees,” but before he does, “he wants to draft a written agreement” stating that the affair is voluntary – to reduce the chance that the woman might file a sexual-harassment suit if they broke up. “You won’t believe it,” Mathiason assured the nervous counsel. “But we’ve already drafted a standard form” for just such cases (Symonds et al 1998).

Legal scholar Vicki Schultz (2003) identifies such regulations as attempts to create a “sanitized workplace.” According to Schultz, codes and compacts of this sort not only stifle creative collaboration within economic organizations, but even more dangerously, they also distract the same organizations from more profound sources of gender inequality. Whether or not they produce such deleterious effects, codes regularly mark sharp boundaries which employees’ behavior must not transgress.

Ethical codes, furthermore, often attach penalties for infractions that bear little relationship to the economic organization’s loss from the infraction. The Johnson & Johnson corporation pioneered ethical codes during the 1940s. Researcher Michael Lindsay reports an interview with former Johnson & Johnson CEO Ralph Larsen, who made a striking comparison. As a young executive in the early 1960s, Larsen had made an egregious ordering error that cost the company $25,000, a very large sum for the time. The executive recalls his fear that his mistake would cost him his job.

Instead, Larsen recalls: “my boss called me in he said, you learn anything? He asked me what happened. And I says, yeah [I learned something]. He said, get out of here. That was the end of it.” About the same time, another Johnson & Johnson employee who walked out of the plant with two bottles of baby shampoo lost his job immediately: “Never saw him again. He was fired immediately. These were things, you know coming off the line in the thousands” (Lindsay 2006). The ethical boundary was sharp and the penalty immediate.

Why Do Ethical Codes Arise?

Three rather different circumstances promote the formation of ethical codes: external pressure, emulation, and internal crisis. First, external authorities sometimes insist on enacting internal codes as they enforce conformity to tax codes, professional standards, or licensing of specialized services. Second, prestigious organizations provide models of internal regulation that other organizations adopt readily as ways of demonstrating their own effectiveness and/or membership in an elite circle. Third, internal crises often generate new rules, and sometimes whole codes – especially if the crisis

5 State v. Wal Mart Stores, Inc. 621 N.Y.S. 2d. 158 (N.Y.A.D. 3 Dept, Jan 05, 1995)
7 http://www.germany.info/relaunch/info/publications/week/2 005/050617/economy1.html Viewed July 18, 2006. That court action was only one sign of Wal-Mart’s incompatibility with German corporate culture. In 2006, the big firm pulled out of Germany.
produces a moral debate within the organization or a scandal that tarnishes the organization’s public reputation (March, Schulz, and Zhou 2000). Family businesses appear to be somewhat less vulnerable to such pressures; at least they less frequently install formal codes of ethics (Adams, Taschian and Shore 1996).

Crisis have been generating codes for a long time. Paul Starr points out that the relatively weak 19th century American Medical Association adopted its code of ethics in response to a deep crisis: loss of protection against standard medicine’s rivals when a competition-loving New York State repealed its licensing statutes in 1844. In this crisis, according to Starr:

> The orthodox profession could no longer look to the state for protection against what it viewed as the degradation of its standards. This was the impetus for the AMA’s adoption of a code of professional ethics, with its concern for excluding sectarian and untrained practitioners (Starr 1982: 91).

Among other things, the new code barred patient stealing, free advice to affluent friends, and public airing of disagreements concerning the proper treatment of a given patient (Starr 1982: 94; Rothman 2002: 110). In short, the crisis caused orthodox physicians to close ranks in defense of a threatened monopoly.

Ethical codes have a long history in American business and professions (Abbott 1983). During the 1920s, Edgar L. Heermance published a compilation of codes of ethics and the American Academy of Political and Social Science produced a special issue on the subject (Heermance 1924; “The Ethics” 1922). When external pressures or internal crises built up, firms regularly defended themselves by enacting codes. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce ratified the principle by issuing a standard code in 1924 (The New York Times, April 21, 1924: 19. I am grateful to Gabriel Abend for this reference).

After the Watergate and SEC scandals of the 1970s, for example, many American corporations installed top-down ethical codes in which chief executives instructed their underlings on behavior that would avoid corporate disgrace. In an analysis of 119 conduct codes promulgated during the period, Donald Cressey and Charles Moore identified two spurs to production of new codes: defensive responses to the scandals themselves, and direct SEC pressure to eliminate false books as a device for concealing corporate misconduct (Cressey and Moore 1983: 56-7).

Top executives were not alone, however, in promoting ethical codes. In a comprehensive analysis of sexual harassment grievance procedures and anti-harassment training from 1977 to 1997, Frank Dobbin and Erin Kelly (forthcoming) show that personnel managers pushed the adoption of such practices over considerable resistance from company lawyers and substantial doubt that the practices reduced legal liability. The personnel experts – now relabeled Human Resources Management specialists – defended their turf against lawyers who had been taking over concerns with civil rights, employment discrimination, and related matters. In short, external pressures combine with internal struggles to generate more extensive and explicit ethical codes.

**How Do Ethical Codes Produce Their Effects?**

We must distinguish between two kinds of effects: display effects and enforcement effects. Enactment of a code always involves an element of display, advertising to people inside and outside the organization’s vigilance, uprightness, and/or membership in an organizational elite. Many a code adopted for display suitably impresses the naive, but leaves knowledgeable insiders smirking.

Enforcement effects concern direct influence over behavior within the organization. Leaving aside perverse effects such as sabotage and simple dissimulation, genuine enforcement effects for ethical codes operate through four clusters of causes:

1. Most obviously but not necessarily most effectively, rewards for good behavior and penalties for bad behavior, if actually delivered, deter banned activities and punishment for falsifying accounts. As little effect as pious exhortations from CEOs are likely to have, as workers teach themselves to handle the organization’s money.

2. As analysts of principal-agent relations regularly point out, selection eliminates candidates for ethically sensitive positions who lack credentials, previous records of reliability, or attributes employers associate with propensities for ethical uprightness. Potential cashiers generally undergo much more extensive screening for likely moral responsibility, say, than computer programmers do.

3. Socialization also makes a difference. Assimilation into an organization where everyone evinces horror – or fright – at the very idea of falsifying accounts reinforces the reluctance of new members to cheat in that way, almost regardless of the likelihood of detection and punishment for falsifying accounts. As little effect as pious exhortations from CEOs are likely to have, daily teaching from fellow workers increases the effectiveness of ethical codes.
4. More subtly, ethical behavior becomes part of the mutual expectations of organization members who are engaged in relations of reciprocity: my not breaking the rules increases the chances that in the future I will refrain from undercutting you as well as decreasing the likelihood that I will pull you down through guilt by association. Thus multiple developers of the same software come to owe each other protection of the software’s secrets from outside competitors.

To be sure, each of the four enforcement effects remains vulnerable to collusion by code violators within the organization: joint concealment of violations from sanctioning agents, recruitment of confederates, socialization into code-violating subcultures, and mutual protection among violators. Yet when organizations’ ethical codes do work, they do so through some combination of sanctions, selection, socialization, and mutual investment in interpersonal relations.

Visible sanctions get plenty of attention from corporate managers. In his 2005 best-seller *Winning*, famous manager Jack Welch speaks about “a culture of integrity”:

> In such cultures, there can be no head fakes or winks. People who break the rules do not leave the company for “personal reasons” or to “spend more time with their families.” They are hanged—publicly—and the reasons are made painfully clear to everyone.

> Perhaps the lawyers will warn you against saying too much. But if you’ve got the facts right, you should be comfortable laying out who broke the rules and how. There are enormous organizational benefits from making examples of people who have violated your policies (Welch 2005: 151).

Similarly, online giant Google has issued an elaborate code of conduct that includes many a thou shalt and thou shalt not, but warns unambiguously that violations will receive punishment. In the code’s 2004 version, fair employment practices, ban on harassment and discrimination, warnings against drugs, alcohol use, weapons use, and violence, exclusion of cats from company premises, controls over conflicts of interest, preservation of confidential information, maintaining accurate records, protecting company property, and obeying the law all find their way into the Google code. At the end, nevertheless, comes the sting:

> If you know of a situation or incident that you feel may violate this Code, please report it to your manager or to Human Resources. Your report will be reviewed and any Googler found to have violated any of the terms of this code will be subject to disciplinary action, that may include termination of employment. We’ll also take any appropriate steps to prevent any further violations (p. 11)\(^8\)

In code after code, the bottom line ends with dismissal. But curtailment of privileges, demotion, or even turnover for outside prosecution may also occur to wayward employees.

What happens, however, when malfeasance occurs at an organization’s top? At times, whistle blowers or conscientious professionals illustrate the combined effects of socialization and mutual investment. Robert Jackall identifies a fascinating variation on this theme: a British-trained chartered public accountant in a large American firm who discovered that the company’s top officers were bribing officials of foreign countries and fudging internal accounts including pension funds to their own financial advantage. After he had complained, Brady, the accountant, returned from a hospital stay to discover that the company had demoted and transferred him. Brady reported the problem to an influential friend within the corporation, who took the affair to the chair of the corporate board’s audit committee. The company immediately fired the friend and escorted him from the building with armed guards (Jackall 1988: 108). Clearly enforcement effects only work within limits set by the current structure of corporate power (see Morrill, Snyderman, Dawson 1997).

**What Produces Violations of Ethical Codes?**

Even well articulated ethical codes suffer violations. Failure of the main code-enforcing causes – sanctions, socialization, and mutual investment in interpersonal relations – makes violations possible, but does not cause them directly.

What does? Broadly speaking, we can distinguish among a) individual advantage, b) interpersonal loyalty, and c) unauthorized collective enterprises. In the presence of an ethical code, almost every organizational member has incentives to cheat at least now and then, if only to save effort. Those incentives become substantial when the member’s organizational position puts resources or information at the member’s disposition that, if used in violation of the code, would bring significant rewards outside the organization. But even in the absence of material rewards, abuse of job-related perquisites sometimes becomes the means of acquiring prestige, wielding influence, or receiving sexual favors.

Interpersonal loyalty figures in violations of ethical codes when the code requires reporting of unethical behavior,

\(^8\) [http://investor.google.com/conduct.html](http://investor.google.com/conduct.html) Viewed July 18, 2006
but mutual commitments within pairs or small clusters of co-workers inhibit that very reporting, because the likely damage to the violator would break bonds of loyalty. Whistle-blowers regularly face charges of disloyalty and self-aggrandizement.

Within economic organizations, workers often create unauthorized collective enterprises: organized factions and patron-client chains, systems of collaboration and job-trading, betting pools, gossip circuits, and more. Many of them do the organization no harm, and some even serve the organization by enhancing commitment or solving production problems (Granovetter 2007). To the extent that such enterprises develop their own internal solidarities and raisons d’être, nevertheless, chances increase that they will have three kinds of effects on organizational life: generating violations of ethical codes in pursuit of the collective enterprise, enabling participants to screen their collective activities from organizational monitoring, and inhibiting individual participants from reporting infractions to higher authorities. Powerful organizational subcultures form in the shadows.

Michel Antéby uses his detailed observations of a French aerospace factory to illustrate the general practice he calls poaching: “the use of company machines or material on company time to create artifacts for employees’ personal use” (Antéby 2003: 218). In the plant Antéby studied, workers regularly made parts for their own vehicles, barbecues, and domestic appliances. Strictly forbidden by the plant codes, these widespread practices depended on extensive collective enterprises. Bosses who learned about them, furthermore, often had little choice but to tolerate their subordinates’ departure from the rules. In fact, as Antéby documents in detail, such unauthorized collective enterprises recur in a wide range of manufacturing. Those workers who actually receive punishment for this sort of violation typically have operated outside the conspiracy, or have somehow fallen out with its participants.

Managers themselves sometimes collude in their subordinates’ evasion of well-defined ethical codes. Prohibitions on the exchange of gifts with outside contractors and officials typically raise dilemmas for sales personnel, so much so that corporate codes often exclude occasional exchanges of meals, entertainment, and symbolic objects from ban on gifts. Toys “R” Us’ 2003 ethics code, for example, declares:

The Company generally prohibits the acceptance from suppliers or customers of the Company of any gifts or gratuities, whether in the form of money, merchandise, services, meals, entertainment, travel or any other form. If permitted by applicable law, a gift may be accepted by an associate from a supplier or a customer if the gift is (i) a perishable item (for example, food) that has little or no resale value, (ii) any other noncash gift valued at less than $50 provided the gifts are not received on a regular or frequent basis, (iii) a meal or entertainment that is permitted by this paragraph, or (iv) approved by an Ombudsperson on the basis that acceptance of the particular gift serves a legitimate, business-related purpose (p. 5).9

Calvin Morrill tells the tale of a major toy company dealing with suppliers in Southeast Asia. During a business trip, two prominent company officials accepted the supplier’s gifts -- Rolex watches for themselves, jade jewelry for their wives -- on the belief that the gifts reinforced their company’s ties to the supplier. The senior vice president to whom they reported objected vigorously to this violation of the company code, ordering the officials to return the gifts.

Nevertheless, the vice president recognized the dilemma. He and the officials made the following arrangement: the vice president himself would travel to Asia for clarifying talks with the suppliers and until then the two men would accept no further gifts. Nor did anyone report the violation to the company’s ethics committee (Morrill 1995: 199). Thus, every code allows for nuances, exceptions, and minor subversions.

How Do Codes and Responses to Them Affect Economic Activity?

Even more so than in the case of the earlier questions, any prudent answer to this question runs like this: let us do a lot more systematic research, and then decide. So far, we have no systematic body of research and theory that allows us to pinpoint effects of organizations’ ethical codes and organization members’ responses to them. The closest we come is the recently superabundant discussion of corporate social responsibility (see e.g. Bartley 2005). But even there a comprehensive survey published in 2003 concludes that the widespread consensus on the positive effects of responsibility initiatives may result from an illusion (Margolis and Walsh 2003). Back to the drawing board! Throwing prudence to the winds, however, we can at least draw out the implications of my earlier arguments. If ethical codes, for example, substitute sharp yes-no boundaries for continua from unacceptable to meritorious behavior, we should expect two complementary effects to occur: concentration of organizational efforts at monitoring, control, and conformity itself precisely along that boundary, and displacement of dubious behavior into gray areas left gray.

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The sources of ethical codes should also make a difference. External pressure should, in principle, produce quasi-consor- cons of which an institution’s members (or at least its chief monitors) create collective performances that will satisfy external agencies without necessarily rectifying abuses in the areas under scrutiny. Emulation of prestigious organizations should produce an even greater fixation on labels and procedures, and even less internal monitoring of the code’s effects. Internal crisis, in contrast, most likely produces more extensive efforts to construct explanations of what went wrong, greater elaborations of prohibitions and penalties based on those explanations (however valid), broader internal monitoring, and serious im- impacts on employee behavior.

As for how codes produce their effects, the distinction between display effects and enforcement effects again clarifies the question. To the extent that displays respond to pressure from powerful external agencies, we can expect them to shift the organization’s visible performances in the directions demanded by those agencies. To the extent that the displays serve the purposes of advertising, executive self-esteem, or organizational self-image, however, we should expect relatively superficial effects on actual organ- izational performance as represented either by interactions among internal segments or by aggregate output in the form of efficiency, productivity, profitability, or quality of goods and services produced.

When it comes to enforcement effects, we enter a likely zone of fascinating but controversial results. Do clearly announced rewards and punishments for coded behavior, selection, deliberate socialization, or the integration of codes into interpersonal relations affect overall performance differently? For future investigation, I suggest the following hypotheses:

a. The four sorts of enforcement effects fall into an ascen- ding order of cost to managers, with selection generally easier to perform, new rewards and penalties relatively cheap to put into place (at least initially), interper- sonal relations costly to penetrate, and socializa- tion in between.

b. The extent of organizational transformation that re- sults from the four enforcement effects falls in pre- cisely the opposite order, with penetration of interper- sonal relations far more transformative than socializa- tion, selection, and, especially, generally applied re- wards and punishments.

c. Nevertheless, as before, the institution of ethical codes generally concentrates attention along the boundaries identified explicitly in the codes, and shifts dubious behavior toward unspecified gray areas.

d. Codes always become instruments of internal power struggles, and therefore vary greatly in their overall ef- fects depending on internal structures of, and struggles over, power.

These risky hypotheses follow more or less directly from my earlier arguments. That is, of course, no guarantee that they are correct. They call out for systematic research.

I also proposed earlier that violations of codes spring from three sources: individual advantage, interpersonal loyalty, and unauthorized collective enterprises. If so, we should discover distinctly different effects of ethical codes de- pending on which of the three prevails. We could reasona- bly expect codes entailing specific rewards and punish- ments for specific forms of behavior to shift individual advantage visibly and rapidly. Interpersonal loyalty is likely to resist the application of codes more tenaciously, but to be vulnerable to public disclosure.

Unauthorized collective enterprises offer the most interest- ing challenge both to codes and to analysts. Surely we would first have to know how much workers have in- vested in the enterprise: a betting pool disappears more easily than an internal system of job collaboration. But in general we should suppose that unauthorized collective enterprises lend their participants the capacity to preserve the enterprise while altering visible signs and behaviors enough to simulate conformity with publicly announced ethical codes.

**Economic Sociology and Ethics: Future Agenda**

For the purposes of this paper, I have narrowed the scope of ethics radically. Codes are crucial but they do not ex- haust the topic. Three agendas follow: first, we need to examine the relationship between general ethical contexts and the specific forms of code that organizations adopt. We might reasonably expect, for example, that national ethical traditions shape contrasting approaches to both the construction and the contents of formal ethical codes (see e.g. Langlois and Schlegelmilch 1990).

Second, we can appropriately ask how differently more general ethical principles such as ‘do no harm’, ‘render good for good’, and ‘act fairly’ operate as compared with the boundary defining codes we have reviewed here (Abend 2007). It could well be, for example, that general...
principles of this kind have stronger effects on organizational behavior than explicit codes to the extent that the principles involved belong to the cultural context and cover a wider range of behavior than economic activity within organizations.

Beyond these two relatively manageable agendas for economic sociology, looms a much larger set of questions that many economic sociologists might prefer to avoid. Critics of capitalism often complain that the system itself incorporates unethical principles, such as exploitation, profit-maximization, and neglect of the vulnerable. Advocates of what the French call “économie solidaire” and “commerce équitable” for example, do not merely propose building greater solidarity into existing economic relations but claim that such arrangements as microcredits, cooperatives, and alternative currencies (“monnaies sociales”) implement superior ethical principles (see e.g. Blanc, ed. 2006; Le Velly 2006; Mertz 2005; Servet and Guérin, eds. 2002).

Similarly, advocates of corporate responsibility, social democracy, welfare capitalism, and radical environmentalism claim superiority for their own ethical principles. Whether or not economic sociologists subscribe to such programs, they ought to consider whether capitalism and its alternatives spring from competing ethical principles, and if so, how.

References


Lindsay, Michael. Personal communication, 2006. Interview conducted by D. Michael Lindsay, Princeton University, with Ralph Larsen, former CEO of Johnson & Johnson on June 23, 2004, at Larsen's residence in Wycoff, New Jersey.


In recent communication with Lane Destro, Professor Viviana Zelizer provided some further thoughts and reflections on her past, present, and future work, as well as on the evolution of the study of morality in economic life.

For most of my career, I have been intrigued by how shared understandings and interpersonal relations infuse and shape the ostensibly impersonal worlds of production, consumption, and distribution. All along I have challenged traditional accounts that split the world of economics from the world of social relations. I have in particular contested standard views of market expansion and corrosion, but also tried to understand why these views are so powerful.

So in the spring of 2006 when Jens Beckert asked me to write an essay for a special issue on economic sociology and ethics, I was intrigued. It was a detour from what I was working on at the time but, as it often happens when you take detours, it turned out that it helped me identify crucial descriptive and explanatory issues that economic analysts had so far failed to engage and theorize coherently. I revised that version further for this newsletter.

I focused on codes of ethics not because I thought they were the perfect solution to ethical concerns of organizations, but, as I explain in the paper, these public documents serve as one small window into a variety of significant concerns. As just one example, they tell us which are some of the contested ethical issues in organizations and how they vary across organizations and over time.

In my earlier work, I had already examined the impact of ethical concerns on economic activity: for instance, in my dissertation (and then book), I traced how the life insurance industry coped with accusations that it corrupted life with economic considerations (Note the book’s title: Morals and Markets). My most recent book on intimacy also asked about prevalent concerns that money spoils intimacy. As I studied consumption, issues of ethics and economics loomed large. As Daniel Horowitz has shown in his book, The Morality of Spending, the US has a long history of concern over consumption’s threat to our moral worldview and ethical values, concerns that those values will be replaced with materialistic pursuits.

These are all important issues, people reasonably worry about a properly lived life and fear what I have called a “boundless market” that might threaten ethical principles and dissolve moral solidarities. Ethics and economic life, in this view, stand at opposing corners. Economic sociology has successfully debunked such standard views of the market by studying markets as created sets of meaningful social relations. In this view, there are many markets, each not simply influenced by, but constituted by, culture and social relations.

From this perspective, markets are also constituted by varying views of ethical behavior. So new questions emerge: rather than taking for granted the market as ethical menace, we can more fruitfully ask, which sorts of economic arrangements contribute to justice and inequality? How can we work towards ethical markets? And of course, how do we define ethical markets? Who defines them?

Take the case of consumption. Rather than fretting à la Benjamin Barber over moral deterioration, we can instead look for consumption programs that enhance collective well-being by increasing the richness and sustainability of intimate interpersonal relations such as friendship, kinship, neighborhood, and sexual bonding. We should of course worry about forms of consumption that exacerbate inequality, degrade the environment, or impoverish human life.

Fortunately, not only economic sociologists but other scholars, including economists, working at the frontier of economic and other social sciences are also providing fresh answers to these problems. In particular there have been a number of openings among people who previously thought of economic settings as focused so strongly on efficiency as a criterion and outcome that it always seemed
that the formation of meaningful interpersonal relations was a marginal phenomenon.

French scholars of economic life, as I mention in the paper, have been concerned for quite some time with issues of ethics and economic activity, with what they call commerce équitable and others call alternative economies.

We are catching up, and I am delighted to watch younger scholars paying attention to issues of morality in economic life; take for instance Marion Fourcade and Kieran Healey’s agenda-setting Annual Review essay on moral views of market society or Gabriel Abend’s work on the history of business ethics and, more broadly, on the sociology of morality. Others like Tim Bartley are working on corporate social responsibility. Some of the work deals with the morality of life insurance, such as Sara Quinn’s study of the recent markets involving viaticals and life settlements or Cheris Chan on cultural response to life insurance in China.

You ask about my current research plans: right now I am working on a paper for an ASA session organized by Leslie Salzinger on gender and economic sociology. The session is co-sponsored by the sections on sex and gender and economic sociology, reflecting greater interest in issues of gender as well as the growing number of women involved in the economic sociology section. I am also continuing work on intimacy within economic organizations, the provision of interpersonal care, and circuits of commerce. The latter is an attempt to study how people organize their economic lives from the ground up in ways that are not captured by standard thinking about economic structures. I look at arrangements such as local monies, migrant remittances, or micro-credits and show why the concepts of networks, markets, or firms don’t fully explain what is going on in these economic activities. I introduce the concept of circuits of commerce as an attempt to provide a better explanation.

In Predictably Irrational (2008), behavioral economist Dan Ariely (MIT and Duke University) argues against the idea that we are rational, profit-maximizing actors. Instead, we are often highly irrational, and in predictable ways. Based on articles published by Ariely and his colleagues during the last decade, this book covers a lot of ground. In his experiments – usually of college students, plus the occasional trick-or-treater – Ariely demonstrates our irrationality across a variety of situations, such as purchasing coffee and ordering books on Amazon, to treating headaches and recognizing sexual predilections. Often, we don’t know what we want unless we see it in context, and even environmental cues can lead us to make seemingly arbitrary decisions. We place too much emphasis on initial decisions and alternatives close at hand, fail to appreciate the influence of emotional states and social norms, and overestimate our abilities of self-control. Overall, a rather humbling portrait of our skills as decision-makers.

How likely, and in what contexts, are we to be dishonest, and what sorts of preventative steps or institutional controls can help curb unethical behavior? In a series of experiments described over two chapters, Ariely addresses the issue of dishonesty and shows how easily we can be manipulated to cheat. In one study, MIT students were given a test of math problems, and were told they would get 50 cents for each correct response. One group gave their test to an experimenter, who tallied their answers and gave them the reward. On average, this group had 3.5 correct responses. Another group was told to score their tests themselves and then report the number of correct responses in exchange for payment. This group claimed to have answered an average of 6.2 questions correctly (or cheated on 2.7 questions). A final group also self-scored their tests and reported their results to the experimenter. However, this group was then given a token for each question solved correctly, which the student then took across the room to exchange for cash. Switching from cash to a

New Books


Reviewed by Nathan Martin
Duke University

Sociology – and economic sociology in particular – has had a long and tenuous relationship with rational-choice theorizing and models of human behavior. On the one hand, assuming that individuals are rational decision-makers can provide a parsimonious description and useful heuristic. Even if actions are not perfectly rational at the level of individuals, these discrepancies likely cancel out in the aggregate. Further, few subscribe to strict methodological individualism or vigorously defend the most problematic assumptions, and most agree that we act with only bounded rationality. On the other hand, rational-choice models are instinctively unsettling to many sociologists, possibly nervous about Economics’ encroachment across disciplinary boundaries. Not only are these models imperfect representations of market behavior, but they fare even worse in describing other types of social action. Providing substance to these misgivings, a growing body of empirical research continues to highlight problems with the standard economic model of human behavior.
token, this group reported 9.4 correct answers. Conclusions: given the opportunity, many otherwise honest people will cheat, and we are especially prone to cheat when cash is a step removed.

In another experiment, students also took a short math test. Before taking the test, one group was asked to recall ten books they read in high school, while another group recalled the Ten Commandments. When given the opportunity to cheat, the group that recalled book titles reported solving 33 percent more questions correctly than the group who recalled the Ten Commandments (another experiment finds similar effects of signing a statement for a nonexistent university honor system). Implication: just invoking the idea of honesty at the moment of action can drastically reduce the likelihood of cheating.

Along with the description of the actual experiments and empirical findings, Ariely displays a gift as an excited storyteller, intertwining historical anecdotes and personal experiences with the presentation of study results. In the introduction, Ariely describes how, as an eighteen-year-old in Israel, an explosion of a large magnesium flare left him with third-degree burns across most of his body. During the painful recovery and treatments, Ariely develops an excitement about the scientific process that invigorates his research described in the chapters to follow. There is a very real cost to relying on unquestioned traditional models and techniques, especially as they are shown to have a growing disjuncture with reality. There is more to be gained, however, in understanding the predictable ways that we act irrationally and our decisions can be manipulated.

Overall, *Predictably Irrational* provides an engaging, highly accessible introduction to the field of behavior economics. Each chapter provides a novel insight through cleverly-designed experiments and often startling findings. Many of the suggestions that Ariely derives from the results of his experiments are quite practical. For example, Ariely describes presenting his idea for a “self control” credit card to a major bank which could be customized to meet an individual’s needs and restrict spending behavior (the bank never called back). On other issues – such as curbing corporate fraud or choosing dating partners – cultivating a greater awareness of the patterns that govern our irrationality seems to be an unsatisfactory solution, although concrete proposals are beyond the scope of this book. Ariely’s account is highly thought provoking and his enthusiasm is contagious. Upon finishing it, I was simultaneously inclined to notice the irrationality in others’ decisions and to feel insecure with my own.


Reviewed by Lijun Song
*Duke University*

During the 1990s, the United States witnessed a booming stock market. Stock investment became popular and involved more than half of American adults. A new investor class emerged, composed of amateurs belonging to investment clubs. Despite their nontrivial stock holdings, their disproportionately forceful impact on the market, and their great resemblance to professional investors, these amateurs have been marginalized by economists and financiers.

Harrington (2008) arms herself with sociological theories and methods, and takes the first step to “understand” (6) various aspects of investment clubs, including their historical backgrounds, investment process, performance, dynamics, and influences, and especially the sources of a “performance puzzle,” where mixed-gender clubs outperformed single-gender clubs. She uses a mixed method, including qualitative data from seven Silicon Valley investment clubs, twelve years of archival data from National Association of Investors Corporation (NAIC), and quantitative data from a national survey of 1,245 investment clubs.

Historical backgrounds of investment clubs, in comparison with previous popular finance movements, involve multiple contexts (chp. 1). Investment clubs became popular during the 1990s due to economic forces (i.e., declining wages, the bull market, lowered financial barriers by discount brokerage firms, lowered educational as well as financial barriers by voluntary associations of investors), legal forces (i.e., privatization of retirement savings, lowered tax upon investment income), technological forces (i.e., lowered barriers of information and execution by the world wide web) and social forces (i.e., imperative retirement planning of the baby boom generation, the participation of new investors from disadvantaged social groups like women and people of color).

The process of club investment relies on social factors, as qualitative data show (chp.2). Previous studies overlook and irrationalize amateurs. Instead amateurs, like professionals, invest with bounded rationality. In the face of innumerable choices but limited information, amateurs invest by constructing “mental maps” (39) of the stock market.
(i.e., reducing choices into controllable sets within which they make decisions). They create mental maps based on social interaction, social identity and ethics: 1) imitate others for social proof about stock values and risks; 2) “claim identities that preserve or enhance their social status” (46); 3) subjectively construct valid narratives of stock values and profits; 4) choose narratives compatible with individual and group identity; 5) invest to enact identity even when hard to make decisions; and 6) prefer stocks of ethical firms even at the cost of financial loss.

Interestingly, clubs’ performance varies with their gender composition (chp. 3). There is quantitative evidence of gender differences in investing (i.e., experience, sources of information, and attitude toward risk) due to occupational gender segregation and gender-related self-concept. There is also qualitative evidence of a gender-segregated stock market, where women reply more on consumer experience and prefer consumer products stocks while men count more on work experience and avoid investing in the consumer products sector. Quantitative data further show that all-male clubs have more diverse investment in terms of industry sector and market capitalization than all-female clubs. Harrington argues that the outperformance of mixed-gender clubs is due to information diversity. As quantitative data show, social category diversity (i.e., heterogeneity on sex and age) is significantly correlated with formation diversity, while informational diversity influences club performance (i.e., investment returns) in a positive direction, and social category diversity affects club performance (i.e., percentage of assets allocated to investment) in a negative way.

Clubs’ performance also depends on social networks, specifically their history and content (chp. 4). There is qualitative evidence that club members avoid interaction inconsistent with their relational history, and that clubs built upon affective ties perform worse. There is also quantitative evidence that the percentage of members with primarily instrumental ties with other members exerts a positive effect on club performance, while the percentage of members with primarily affective ties with other members exerts a negative effect. Qualitative data further suggest an explanation for the role of relational content that high-performance groups maintain dissent and spend more time on business, while low-performance clubs avoid disputes and take more time on sociality. Additionally, relational history also interplays with the gender factor, and there is qualitative evidence that clubs built upon affective ties were more likely to have gendered division of labor than those based on instrumental ties.

A follow-up study of participants in the qualitative sample shows how social factors shape dynamics of clubs (chp. 5). Out of those seven clubs, four survived while three dissolved. Club survival, however, is not closely related to club performance. Instead, a club’s survival is due to steady social networks and residential location, while a club’s disappearance due to work mobility. Also clubs especially low-performance clubs or same-gender clubs persist for members to claim their social identities and to get connected with social life though the “investing ritual” (169).

The above findings have important implications in four directions (chp. 6): political, social, economic, and sociological. First, policy makers should reevaluate their intention to privatize social security given clubs’ low performance. Second, investment clubs should merit attention for their strengthening civic society. Third, public traded firms should pay more attention to individual investors and their commitment to ethical company behavior. Finally, scientific understanding of economic phenomena should value the contribution of sociology due to its inductive method, focus on social factors, and concept of “multiple forms of rationality” (196).

Harrington pays timely attention to one of the most recent market populisms, and constructs a more persuasive and more complex narrative about stock investment clubs than economists and financiers. Stock investment clubs, from their emergence to their survival, are not simply driven by the maximization of economic profits, but also subject to social variables, such as social composition, social identity, social networks, and ethics. Therefore, rationality is not dichotomous but variable. This informative book represents a good example of systematic studies in terms of methods and theories. Methodologically, Harrington combines qualitative data and an inductive approach with quantitative data and a deductive approach. Theoretically, Harrington does not build up her narratives exclusively from an economic sociology perspective. Instead, she draws on scholarships from other sociological areas like social psychology, social stratification, social networks, sociology of knowledge, and other disciplines such as economics, psychology, philosophy, and public policy.

The primary limitation lies in the specific research period and data sources (145). This research proposes interesting sociological explanations based on its qualitative data, not all of which could be examined by its quantitative data. Therefore, this exploratory research opens promising directions for future studies. Among others, future studies need quantitative data in particular longitudinal data to verify the impact of social factors on club dynamics, the role of social status or power in clubs’ decision-making process, and the causal influence of relational content prior to clubs’ formation on clubs’ performance. In addition, in order to directly examine the performance puzzle, future studies should use more precise measurement of gender.
diversity instead of the general measurement of social category diversity, and employ more advanced quantitative methods such as path analysis to examine how informational diversity mediates the effect of gender composition on performance.


Reviewed by Ryan Denniston
Duke University

Many of the central tenants and hypotheses of rational choice economics have been challenged or contextualized in many agendas across the social sciences. For example, challenges to rational choice behavior are evident in works like Ariley’s book, reviewed for this volume, and network embeddedness at the micro level. This work often contains implications for the macro level, though institutional and other studies directly address the macro level by interrogating the origins of market structures. The recent interest in performativity raises the question of the self fulfilling prophecy; what influence does knowledge possess with respect to potentially consequent events? From this perspective, economics is not only description, but is social technology that, when adopted, shapes behavior. In turn, this possibility raises numerous questions, many familiar to the social sciences and especially to the sociology of knowledge.

Research on performativity is relatively recent, and this volume’s contributions are necessarily varied with respect to subject matter and to the conceptions of performativity employed. The editors are quick to point to the emergent nature of research and to the inconclusive resolutions of the debates within, and this is one of this volume’s most important draws. At risk of oversimplification, the contributions of the volume are generally centered on three major themes: the practice of research on performativity, the investigation of economics as applied to real world situations and the design of markets, and empirical investigation and testing of performativity.

Most of the contributions approach the subject of performativity through detailed studies of the evolution of single cases. Causality and intentionality is crucial; as stated by MacKenzie (59-60), multiple results emerge from implementation of economic theory and tools, and the single case approach is conducive to the assessment of causality. Implementation may affect behavior, but the stronger case for performativity lies in implementation that reshapes behavior to conform to theory. For example, Garcia-Parpet (ch.2) focuses on the process whereby a local market was constructed in France. This was a conscious and deliberate effort to redress the asymmetric relations between buyers and sellers that existed previously, and it exists in a constant state of evolution as relationships among buyers and sellers change. Similarly, Lépinay (ch. 4) examines the process whereby financial products are created and standardized through fieldwork inside an investment bank. His approach focuses on the processes of articulation and liquidity that exist within the bank, and he specifically focuses on the differences in how various actors, such as the traders and programmers, think and talk about financial products as the standardization process unfolds.

Several of the contributions directly address the intentional intervention of economics in real world situations, prime cases for the establishment of performativity. Guala (ch. 5) traces the development of experimental economics and its application to market design. Muniesa and Callon (ch. 6) also focus on experimental economics, but address the sites of intervention, the nature of interventions, and the results in order to advance a framework for meaningfully investigating the concept of performativity. Through an investigation of the economic, and crucial political and social, aspects of the FCC spectrum auction, Mirowski and Nik-Khah (ch. 7) exhibit criticism of existing conceptions of performativity and its overarching influence when economists actively intervene. In an especially clear example, MacKenzie (ch. 3) investigates the application of the Black-Scholes option pricing equation to the emergent US derivatives market, detailing the widespread adoption and the consequent reshaping of options prices and trader behavior toward conformity with predicted values.

Empirical observation of the presence of performativity necessarily involves both a conception of the topic and a conception of what constitutes evidence. All of the contributions make important inroads on these fronts, and the varied nature of research sites and conceptions employed defy brief summary. More than any specific finding, the most important contributions of the volume is this debate and the generally shared normative strength of economics. It is debatable how new the topic of performativity is, given its close relationships with other research programs in sociology, most especially the sociology of knowledge. But aside from the direct research interests and implications for economic sociology, performativity raises the issue of social science as technology, not just description and formalization. A reflexive perspective on social science raises ethics beyond the content and structure of markets to a level of interest to all of sociology, including public sociology. This volume is an especially important read for economic sociologists interested in the research of
performativity, but carries implications for sociologists interested in research sites other than economics.

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**ASA 2008: Sessions of Interest**

We’ve compiled a list of sessions of particular interest to economic sociologists, organized both by the Section on Economic Sociology and other Sections. Please refer to the ASA program for session locations. Apologies in advance for any omissions.

**Special Announcements:**

**Economic Sociology Section Business Meeting:** Friday, August 1, 10:30 – Hilton Boston Back Bay

**Economic Sociology Section Reception:** Friday, August 1, 6:30 – The Lir Irish Pub and Restaurant, 903 Boylston Street, (617) 778-0089.

**RS – Regular Session**

**PS – Paper Session**

**IS – Invited Session**

**Thursday, July 31**

**Opening Plenary Session - Future of the American Labor Movement (7-9pm, Marriott)**

Session Organizer: *Arne L. Kalleberg*, University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill
President: *Marshall Ganz*, Harvard University
Panel: *Steven Greenhouse*, The New York Times; *Sara Horowitz*, Freelancers Union; *Bruce Raynor*, Unite Here
Discussant: *Marshall Ganz*, Harvard University

**Friday August 1**

**Thematic Session - Gender and Work: Global, Local, and Transnational Perspectives (8:30am, Sheraton)**

Session Organizer and Presider: *Esther Ngan-ling Chow*, American University

The Gender Ideological Clash of Globalization: Women and Work in the Case of the Philippines. *Rhaael Saldazar Parrenas*, University of California-Davis

Organizing Domestic Work at the Local, National and Transnational Levels. *Evangelia Tastington*, Saint Mary’s University, Canada; *Laura Apricanti-Maraton*, National Centre for Social Research (EKKE)

Women’s Unpaid and Domestic Labor in Brazil: A Study in Inequality Between and Among Gender. *Solang de Deus Simoes*, Eastern Michigan University; *Neuma Aguiar*, Universidad Federal de Minas Gerais


**RS - Organizations: Networks and Status (8:30am, Marriott)**

Session Organizer and Presider: *Laurel Smith-Doerr*, Boston University


How Does Status Affect Performance? Evidence from the PGA and NASCAR. *Matthew S. Bobbin*, Young-Kyu Kim and *Edward Bishop Smith*, University of Chicago


**Regular Session - Gender and Work: The Impact of Organizational Practices on Gender Inequality (8:30am, Hilton)**

Session Organizer: *Louise Marie Rath*, University of Arizona

President: *Jessica Hamar Martinez*, University of Arizona


Instituting Change within the Institution: Cross-Gender Collaborations and the Blindness of Neutrality. *Anita Harker Armstrong*, Renda Roberts Callisto, and *Stephanie Malin*, Utah State University

I Really Didn’t Have Any Problems with the Male-female Thing Until …: Women in Information Technology (IT) Organizations. *Erin I. Demaiter*, University of Toronto; *Tracey Lynn Adams*, University of Western Ontario

Resurgence of the 'Separate Spheres' Arrangement? The Effect of Spousal Overwork on the Employment of Men and Women in Dual Earner Households. *Youngjoo Cha*, Cornell University

Discussant: *Patricia Vance Martin*, Florida State University

**IS - Networks and Institutions (8:30am, Hilton)**

Session Organizers: *Jason Owen-Smith*, University of Michigan; *Walter W. Powell*, Stanford University


Competing Logics and Elite Emergence: Microbes and Markets in Biotechnology. *Jason Owen-Smith*, University of Michigan; *Walter W. Powell*, Stanford University

Embracing Market Liberalism? Community Embeddedness, Associationalism and Mutual Savings and Loan Conversions to Stock Corporate Form. *Marc Schneider*, Reed College

Social Structural Freedom and the Emergence of The Jazz Canon: Global and Local Networks from 1897 to 1933. *Damon Jereny Phillips*, University of Chicago

Discussant: *Viviana A. Zelizer*, Princeton University

**Thematic Session - The World of Household Work (10:30am, Sheraton)**
Session Organizer: Judith Treas, University of California-Irvine
The Domestic Division of Labor and the Gender Wage Gap. Jonathan I. Gershuny, Oxford University
Welfare State Regimes and Household Work. Sonja Dröning, University of Hamburg
What Do Children Want? Cross-National Differences in the Construction of Motherhood and Childhood. Maria Charles, University of California-Santa Barbara; Erinn A. Cell, University of California-San Diego
Changing Contours of Inside Work in Post-Socialist China. Susan E. Shott, Brown University

RS - Consumers and Consumption (10:30am, Sheraton)
Session Organizer and President: Juliet Schor, Boston College
Social Dynamics of Moral Boundaries. Keith R. Brown, University of Pennsylvania
Ethical Consumerism in the Agro-Food Sector: Is There Evidence of Consumption-Based Social Movements? Michael A. Long, Colorado State University
Family and Social Reproduction within Families Practicing Voluntary Simplicity. Carol S. Walther, Indiana University Purdue University Fort Wayne; Jennifer A. Sandlin, Arizona State University
Yellow Peril Consumerism: China, North America, and an Era of Global Trade. Amy Hauser, University of British Columbia
Discussant: Craig Thompson, University of Wisconsin

PS - The Development and Transformation of Welfare Regimes in East Asia (10:30am, Hilton)
Session Organizer and President: Jonathan D. London, City University of Hong Kong
Belaboring Reform: States, Social Agendas and the Politics of Labor. Frederic Deyo, Binghamton University
The Neomercantilist Residual Welfare States in East Asia: Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore. Pil Ho Kim, University of Wisconsin-Madison
Welfare Regimes in the Wake of State-Socialism: the East Asian Experience. Jonathan D. London, City University of Hong Kong
Discussant: Jonathan D. London, City University of Hong Kong

Presidential Panel - Decent Work, Decent Jobs: Globalization and Employment Conditions around the World (2:30, Sheraton)
Session Organizer and President: Naomi Cassirer, International Labour Organization
Work, Families, and Development. Naomi Cassirer, International Labour Organization
Working Conditions Laws: Regulating for Decent Work. Deirdre McCann, International Labor Organization
Discussant: Lucio Baccaro, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Student Forum Paper Session - Work & Organizations (2:30, Sheraton)
Session Organizers: Catherine E. Connell, University of Texas-Austin; Audrey E. Devine-Eller, Rutgers University
Presider: Catherine E. Connell, University of Texas-Austin
Access to Flexible Work Schedules: Differences by Gender, Education Level, and Occupation. Katherine Elizabeth Spairs, University of Maryland
Shifting Spheres: Gender, Labor and National Identity in US World War II Propaganda. Alevra Irene Standles, Syracuse University
The Art museum as a Boundary Organization: The Case of the Tate Galleries. Joyce Liu, Harvard University
Discussant: Catherine E. Connell, University of Texas-Austin

RS - State Policies, Institutional Context and Economic Behavior (2:30, Hilton)
Session Organizer: Aya Gasseva, Boston University
President: Marc Schneberg, Reed College
A History of Quality: Did Political Shifts Produce Variations in the Kind or Quality of New Medicines? Peter Youngkin, University of California-Berkeley
Using Financial Innovation to Support Low-Income Savers: From Coercion to Excitement. Peter Tufano, Harvard University; Daniel J. Schneider, Princeton University
The Inequality of Fair Play. Lottery Gambling and Social Stratification. Jens Beckert and Mark Lutter, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies
Financial Fraud and the Small Investor: Micro-Social Responses to Macro-Economic Meltdown. Brooke Harrington, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies
Discussant: Marc Schneberg, Reed College

PS - The Sociology of Credit (2:30, Hilton)
Session Organizer and President: Akos Rona-Tas, University of California-San Diego
Formalization of the economy. From Face-to-face Credit to Automated Consumer Credit. Gilles Lagreta, INRA
Securitization and the State. Sarah Quinn, University of California-Berkeley

PS - Changing Labor Markets, Changing Strategies: Worker Organizing Outside of Traditional Collective Bargaining Frameworks (2:30, Sheraton)
Session Organizer: Daily Rooks, Rutgers University
Community Unionism in Japan: Similarities and Differences of Region-based Labor Movements between Japan and other Industrialized Countries. Akira Suzuki, Hosei University
From Economic to Political Mobilization: Working-Class Organizing Targets the State. Rachel Meyer, University of Michigan
From Shop Floor to Ethnic Group Organizing: The Pilipino Workers' Center. Nazgaal Ghandnoosh, University of California-Los Angeles
Of Catharsis and Community: Bicycle Messengers and Organizational Mise en Scène. Benjamin William Stewart, New York University

RS - Sociology of Work: New Forms of Work Organization (4:30, Marriott)
Session Organizer: Peter Meiksins, Cleveland State University
Presider: Denise Benoit Scott, State University of New York-Geneseo
The Temporal Order of the Labor Process in a Silicon Valley Software Startup. Linus Huang, University of California-Berkeley
The Accidental Organization: Power and Bureaucracy in a "New Culture" Firm. Gabrielle Raley, University of California-Los Angeles
Embedded in the Tax Code: The Ongoing Contest Over Contract Employment. George Gonsou, State University of New York-Potsdam; Debra J. Osnowitz, Brandeis University
Discussant: Michael J. Handel, Northeastern University

IV - Law Firms as Organizations (4:30, Hilton)
Session Organizer: Ryon Lancaster, University of Chicago
Hierarchical Rank and Women's Organizational Mobility: Glass Ceilings in Corporate Law Firms. Elizabeth H. Gorman, University of Virginia; Julie A. Kneec, Washington State University
Do Law Firms Have Personalities?: Firm and Lawyer Selection in the Large Firm Labor Market. Ronit Dinovitzer, University of Toronto
Discrimination Suits, Firm Financial Performance, and Sex and Race Equity. Elizabeth Hirs, Cornell University
Hospitals, HIPAA and the Politics of PARO: Modeling and Measuring Heterogeneous Organizational Postures Toward Legal Change. Mark C. Suchman and Matthew Dimick, University of Wisconsin-Madison; Ann Swidler, University of California-Berkeley
Organizational Commitment to Charitable Activities: Pro Bono Publico in Large Law Firms. Ryon Lancaster, University of Chicago; Tae-Hyun Kim and Brian Uzzi, Northwestern University
Discussant: Robert L. Nelson, Northwestern & American Bar Foundation

PS - Precarious Workers in Africa (4:30, Sheraton)
Session Organizer: Rina Agarwala, Johns Hopkins University
Wage Labor, Precarious Employment, and Social Inclusion in the Making of South Africa's Post-Apartheid Transition. Franco Baresi, Ohio State University
Discussants: Amy Hanser, University of British Columbia; Peter B. Evans, University of California-Berkeley

Saturday, August 2
Thematic Session - Labor Standards (8:30, Sheraton)
Session Organizer: Gary Gereffi, Duke University
Presider: Peter B. Evans, University of California-Berkeley
International Labor Standards and National Regulatory Agencies: US Influence, European Models, and Latin American Outcomes. Andrew Schrank, University of New Mexico; Michael J. Pior, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Discussant: Peter B. Evans, University of California-Berkeley

IS - Sociology and Economics in Boston (8:30, Hilton)
Session Organizers: Jason Beckfield, Harvard University; Roberto M. Fernandez, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
From Living an Ethic to Consuming It: Battle Creek and the Early Commercialization of Natural Foods. Laura J. Miller, Brandeis University
Sex-Typing of Jobs in Hiring: Evidence from Japan. Eunmi Mun, Harvard University
How Contacts Matter: Social Networks and Job Search in Urban China. Elena Obukhova, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Producing Inequality: Economic Sociology and Workplace Inequality. Donald Tomaskovic-Devey and Dustin Avent-Holt, University of Massachusetts-Amherst

Session Organizer: Magali Sarfatti-Larson, Temple University
Presider: Arne L. Kalleberg, University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill
Panel: Arlie Russell Hochschild, University of California-Berkeley
Richard Sennett, London School of Economics

Thematic Session - Comparative Perspectives on Work and Retirement (10:30, Sheraton)
Session Organizer and Presider: Angela M. O'Rand, Duke University
Late Careers and Career Exits Under Globalization: Becoming Retired in Times of Accelerating Social Change. Hans-Peter Blasfield, Dirk Hofacker, and Sandra Buchholz, University of Bamberg
An International Comparison of Aging and Employment Relations in Volatile Firms. Julie McMullin, University of Western Ontario; Victor W. Marshall, University of North Carolina
Employment at Older Ages and the Changing Nature of Work. Richard Johnson and Gordon Mermin, The Urban Institute; Matthew Resinger, Harvard University
The Implications of Changing Pension Structures Across Western Countries for Gender Inequality in Aging Populations. Kate Lin Issacs and Angela M. O'Rand, Duke University
Discussant: Karl Ulrich Mayer, Yale University

RS - Welfare State (10:30, Sheraton)
Session Organizer and Presider: Joan R. Acker, University of Oregon
Explaining the Recent Change in Parental Leave Policy in Germany: A German-Austrian Comparison. Natalie S. Nitsche, Yale University
One Welfare State Emerging? Convergence versus Divergence in 16 Western Countries. Peter Achterberg and Mara Verkes, Erasmus University Rotterdam

Tax Protest and Welfare States. Isaac W. Martin and Nadav Gabay, University of California-San Diego

Where Are All the Advocates?: Long-Term Care Reform and Political Opportunity in the Age of Market Fundamentalism. Sandra R. Levitsky, University of Michigan

Discussant: Arnud Lantea, University of Oslo

RS - Cognitive Institutionalism in the Construction of Markets (10:30, Marriott)

Session Organizer: Alya Guseva, Boston University

Presider: Richard Swedberg, Cornell University

Theorization of a New Construction Technology through Time: An Ideational Perspective on Market Creation. Eva Boexenbaum, Copenhagen Business School; Thibault Daudiges, EM Lyon, France

Markets as Simulations: Reflexive Markets in the Restructured Electricity Industry. Daniel Brezlan, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University


Trading Across Worlds: How Social Exchange Affects Firms’ Media Coverage and Competitive Advantage. Mark Thomas Kennedy, University of Southern California; Edward J. Zajac, Northwestern University

Institutional Voids and the Building of Markets: A Tale of Rural Bangladesh. Ignasi Marti, EM Lyon Business School; Johanna Main, IESE Business School; Matt J. Ventresca, University of Oxford

RS - Organizations: Institutional Change (10:30, Marriott)

Session Organizer: Laurel Smith-Doras, Boston University

Presider: Tim Bartley, Indiana University

From Communal to Market Organization: The Case of the Kibbutz. Raymond Russell, Robert Alan Hanneman and Shlomo Getz, University of California-Riverside

Changing Institutional Logics in Academic Science: The Role of the State in Introducing a Market-Oriented Logic to the University. Elizabeth Popp-Berman, State University of New York-Albany

Manufacturing Saints. Institutional Change and Organizational Stability. Paolo Parisi, Columbia University

Wall-Street Meets Wagner: Formation and Impact of a Multiplex Institutional Logic. Styan V. Sgroore, ESSEC - Paris

Discussant: Tim Bartley, Indiana University

Thematic Session - Globalization and its Consequences (12:30, Sheraton)

Session Organizer and Presider: Saskia Sassen, Columbia University

Possibility or Probability? Alternative Futures for the Ethics of Globalization. Arjun Appadurai, New School for Social Research

Neo-isms: What’s New about Ideology in the Global Age? Manfred B. Steger, Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology

Neither Global nor National: The World’s Third Spaces. Saskia Sassen, Columbia University

Skill is Local, Not Global. Richard Sennett, London School of Economics

Discussant: Patricia Fernandez-Kelly, Princeton University

Thematic Session - Production and Consumption, Workers and Consumers: Rethinking Their Relationships (12:30, Sheraton)

Session Organizer and Presider: George Ritzer, University of Maryland

Panel: Daniel B. Cornfield, Vanderbilt University; Kevin T. Leicht, University of Iowa; Juliet Schor, Boston College; Barry Smart, University of Portsmouth

Discussant: Randy Hudson, Ohio State University

RS - Global Economic Processes, Varieties of Capitalism (12:30, Hilton)

Session Organizer: Alya Guseva, Boston University

Presider: Nisan Choror, Brown University


Regional Trade Agreements and the Pursuit of State Interests: Institutional Perspectives from NAFTA and Mercosur. Francesco Giovanni Dinina and Jason Beschaum, Bates College

The Social Origins of Coordinated Market Economies: Getting Back to Business. Alexander Hicks, Emory University

Varieties of Flexible Labor Market Regimes in European Advanced Economies: Factors of Variability in National Paths over Labor Market Reforms. Russella Ciccia, University of Rome La Sapienza

Codes, Culture, and Coercion: Explaining Adoption of Labor Self-regulation in the Global Apparel Industry. Anna Maria Vetterberg, University of California-Berkeley

Discussant: Nisan Choror, Brown University

RS - Jobs, Occupations, and Work: New Approaches to Understanding Work & Work Environments (12:30, Marriott)

Session Organizer: Sheryl L. Skaggs, University of Texas-Dallas

Presider: Lindsay Blair Trimble, Washington State University

An Opportunity to Give Something Back to the Industry: Business Associations as Occupational Communities. Lynette Spillman, University of Notre Dame

Lawyers, State Officials, and Significant Others: An Ecological Analysis of the Chinese Legal Services Market. Sida Lin, University of Chicago

Occupational Development on the Service Frontier: The Rise of Personal Training and Life Coaching. Molly George, University of California-Santa Barbara

Contingent Work and its Contradictions: Insecurity and the Vicious Cycle of Thinning Relations. Sharon Bolton, Strathclyde University; Maree Hudson, University College Dublin

Discussant: Aleksandra Kules, University of Arizona


Session Organizer and Presider: Alison Davis-Blake, University of Minnesota

Panel: Joseph P. Broschak, University of Arizona; Susan Houseman, W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research; Vicki Smith, University of California-Davis

Discussant: Rosemary Batt, Cornell University
Thematic Session - Policy Regimes and Gendered Labor Markets (2:30, Sheraton)
Session Organizer and Presider: Joya Misra, University of Massachusetts
Configurations of Inequality: Understanding Cross-national Differences in Gender Economic Inequality. Hadass Mandel, Tel Aviv University
Reproducing Occupational Inequality: Marriage, Parenthood and the Gender Divide in Occupations. Jennifer L. Hook, Pennsylvania State University; Becky Pettit, University of Washington
Policy Regime Structuring of Class vs. Gender Equality in Australia, Great Britain and the US. Lynn Prince Cooke, University of Kent; Liana C. Sayer, Ohio State University
Leave Policy in the Nordic Countries: A 'Recipe' for High Employment/High Fertility? Anne Lisa Ellingsaeter, University of Oslo
Discussant: Joya Misra, University of Massachusetts

RS - Development (2:30, Marriott)
Session Organizer and Presider: John D. Stephens, University of North Carolina
Did the Financial Crisis Transform the East Asian Developmental State?: Focused on the Public Fund in Korea. Seok Choon Lew and Hye Suk Wang, Yonsei University
The State Power and Development: The Korean Case Reconsidered. Michelle Fei-ya Hsieh, Academia Sinica
Trade Associations as Active Agents in Fostering Embeddedness: An Analysis of NASSCOM's role in India's IT Service Industry. Eric Richard Eide, University of Michigan-Ann Arbor
Discussant: Peter B. Evans, University of California-Berkeley

RS - Consumers and Consumption II (2:30, Marriott)
Session Organizer and Presider: Juliet Schor, Boston College
Semantic Provisioning of Children's Food: Meaning, Commerce and Maternal Practice. Daniel Thomas Cook, Rutgers University
The Mediation of Loyalty Consumption and Social Class: Mapping Brands and Consumers as Brands Together. Jason Pridmore, Queen's University
Really Amusing Ourselves to Death: Manufacturing the Spectacle in the American Funeral Industry. George Sanders, Vanderbilt University
The Changing American Consumer: Structure, Distinction, Inequality and Social Class since the 1960s. Iretiyo Dimitrov Peter, Stanford University
Discussant: Douglas B. Holt, Pennsylvania State University

RS - Jobs, Occupations, and Work in the Medical and Service Industries (2:30, Marriott)
Session Organizer and Presider: Sheryl L. Skaggs, University of Texas-Dallas
High-Touch and Here-to-Stay: Future Skills Demands in Low Wage Service Occupations. Mary Gatta and Eileen Appelbaum, Rutgers University; Heather Boushey, Center for Economic and Policy Research
Good Work: Emergency Medical Technicians in the Public and Private Sectors. Dana Hayser de Bernardo, University of Massachusetts-Amherst
Contemporary Issues in Medical Transcription. Gary C. David, Bentley College

Discussant: Elizabeth Hirsh, Cornell University

RS - Labor Market Session Theme: Nonstandard Workers, Nonstandard Careers (2:30, Sheraton)
Sheraton Boston
Session Organizer: Kenneth Hudson, University of South Alabama
Presider: Michael E. Wallace, University of Connecticut
Contracting and Careers: Determinants of Decision to Work as Independent Contractors among Information Technology Workers. Matthew James Bidwell, INSEAD Business School; Forrest S Briscoe, Pennsylvania State University
Unemployment, Income, and Subjective Well-Being: Non-Pecuniary Costs of Unemployment. Cristobal Young, Princeton University
Low Pay for Unauthorized Immigrants: "Superexploitation" or Employers' Risk of Sanctions? Peter Brownell, University of California-Berkeley
Discussant: Michael E. Wallace, University of Connecticut

Sunday, August 3

Student Forum Paper Session - Culture & Consumption (8:30, Marriott)
Session Organizers: Catherine E. Connell, University of Texas-Austin; Audrey E. Divino-Eller, Rutgers University
Presider: Daina Cheyenne Harvey, Rutgers University
Emergence and Change of Consumption Classes: An Examination of Douglas's and Isherwood's Consumption Patterns Model. Sharon Kaz, University of Washington & University of Haifa
Holding Out for a Hero: A Duel Method Analysis of the Damsel in Distress in Harlequin Presents. Kelly Turpin, Ohio State University
The Unequal Equalizer: Blue Jeans as a Marker of Social Status among College Women. Lisel Alice Murdock, Dartmouth College
Discussant: Daina Cheyenne Harvey, Rutgers University

RS - Social Categories, Market Identities (8:30, Sheraton)
Session Organizer: Alya Gaseva, Boston University
Presider: Ezra W. Zuckerman, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
A Social Epistemic Theory of Categorization: Justification and Structure. Steven Kahl, University of Chicago
The "Independent Investigator": Resource Dependence Dilemmas in University-Industry Agricultural Biotechnology Research Collaborations. Dina Biscotti and William B. Lacy, University of California-Davis; Leland Glenna, Penn State University; Rick Welsh, Clarkson University
Great, Madame Butterfly Again! How Robust Market Identity Shapes Opera Repertoires. Michael Jensen and Bo Kyung Kim, University of Michigan

Markets from Personas: Selling Financial Products by Matching Profile with Person. Zsuzsanetta Vargha, Columbia University

Discussant: Ezra W. Zuckerman, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

PS - Agency, Structure and Meaning in Organizational Life (8:30, Sheraton)

Session Organizers: Kevin T. Leicht, University of Iowa; Leslie McCall, Northwestern University

Presider: Mindy L. Fried, Arbor Consulting Partners

Institutional Entrepreneurship and the Emergence of Hedge Funds: The Rich Historical Case. Justin I. Miller, New York University/Stern


Metastructuring Moves: Synthesizing Deliberate and Emergent Organizational Change. Jason Jesurum Jay, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Paradigms of Self-Fulfillment in the Narratives of American and Norwegian Professional Men. Jeremy Markham Schulz, University of California-Berkeley

Discussant: Mindy L. Fried, Arbor Consulting Partners

PS - The Comparative Political Sociology of Welfare States (8:30, Sheraton)

Session Organizer: Thomas Edward Janaki, University of Kentucky


Population Heterogeneity and Public Support for the Welfare State: Analysis and Evidence for 17 Capitalist Democracies. Sébastien St-Arnaud, University of Toronto


Unintended Consequences? How Policymakers Do Gender in Germany, Sweden and the United States. Catherine I. Bolzendahl, University of California-Irvine

Discussant: Josh Whitford, Columbia University

PS - New Directions in Political Economy (co-sponsored with the Section on Comparative & Historical Sociology) (10:30, Sheraton)

Session Organizers: Greta R. Krippner, University of Michigan; Isaac W. Martin, University of California-San Diego

Presider: Greta R. Krippner, University of Michigan

States, Money and the Reputational Work of Elites. Simone Polillo, University of Pennsylvania


The Non-History of National Sales Tax in America: Contingency and Critical Junctures. Monica Prasad, Northwestern University


Discussant: Mark S. Mizruchi, University of Michigan

PS - Gendering Economic Sociology: Expanding the Field's Scope and Analytical Frameworks (co-sponsored with the Section on Economic Sociology) (10:30, Sheraton)

Session Organizer: Leslie Salzinger, Boston College

Sociology, Economics, and Gender: Can Knowledge of the Past Contribute to a Better Future? Julie A. Nelson, Tufts University

Gendering Economic Man: Integrating the Public Marketplace and the Private Household through an Ethnography of Grocery Shopping. Shelley L. Koch, University of Kansas

Women, Networks, and Economic Circuits. Viviana A. Zelizer, Princeton University

Plenary Session - Globalization and Work: Challenges and Responsibilities (11:30, Marriott)

Session Organizer: Arne L. Kalleberg, University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill

Presider: Michael J. Piore, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Panel: Rosalind Mass Kanter, Harvard University Erik Olin Wright, University of Wisconsin

Presidential Panel - From "Industrial Sociology" to "Sociology of Work"? (2:30, Sheraton)

Session Organizer: Jennifer Platt, University of Sussex

Presider: Michael Burawoy, University of California-Berkeley

Neglected Classics in the Sociology of Work. Michael Rose, University of Bath

Feminist Questions and the Sociology of Work. Jennifer L. Pierce, University of Minnesota

Ethnography of Work and the Work of Ethnography: Hodson's Sample and the Discipline. Jennifer Platt, University of Sussex; Charles Crothers, Auckland University of Technology; Meryn Patrick Hargan, York University

Thematic Session - "Wal-mart" Effect (2:30, Marriott)

Session Organizer and Presider: Jennifer L. Bair, Yale University

Panel: Ellen I. Rasen, Brandeis University Chris Tilly, University of Massachusetts-Lowell

José Luis Álvarez Galván, London School of Economics
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**RS - The Social Origins and Consequences of International Economic Integration (2:30, Marriott)**
Session Organizer: **Andrew Schrank**, University of New Mexico
Presider: **Chen-Sung Lee**, University of Chicago
IMF Programs and Tuberculosis Outcomes in Post-Communist European Countries. **Lawrence Peter King**, University of Cambridge

Integrating or Fragmenting: Gravity in Global Trade, 1950-2000. **Min Zhou**, Harvard University
The Creation of Neoliberal Economic Globalization in Latin America. **Alexander Hicks** and **Diogo Pinheiro**, Emory University

**PS - New Technology and Innovation in Organizations and Markets (2:30, Sheraton)**
Session Organizers: **Kevin T. Leicht**, University of Iowa; **Leslie McCall**, Northwestern University
Presider: **Fiona E. Murray**, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
From Community to Market: The Institutionalization of Technology in a New Media Firm. **Ryan C. Sperry**, Columbia University
Organizational Evolution in a Fuzzy Technological Environment: Tape Drive Producers in the World Market, 1951-1998*. **Glenn Carroll, Mi Feng** and **Gael Le Mens**, Stanford University; **David C. Mckendrick**, Durham University
Finding the Place of Technology in Medical Transcription. **Gary C. David**, Bentley College
Information Technology as a Threat to Organizational Control in a Total Institution. **Christine M. Beckman**, University of California-Irvine; **Taryn Stanko**, University of Oregon
Discussant: **Fiona E. Murray**, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

**Thematic Session - Neoliberalism, Labor, and Labor Markets (4:30, Sheraton)**
Session Organizer: **John L. Campbell**, Dartmouth College
Presider: **Fred Block**, University of California-Davis
How Trade Openness Impacts Union Density in American Industries in the Age of Globalization. **Judith Stacey-Norris**, University of California-Irvine; **Caleb Southworth**, University of Oregon
Inequality among American Families, 1975 to 2005. **Bruce Western**, Harvard University

**PS - Neoliberalism, Social Movements and the Corporation (4:30, Marriott)**
Session Organizer: **Brayden King**, Northwestern University
Shifting Axes of Mobilization: Civil Rights Organizations and Conditions of Employment. **Sean C. Safford**, University of Chicago
From Streets to Suites: How the Anti-biotech Movement Penetrated German Pharmaceutical Firms. **Klaus Weber**, Northwestern University, L.C. Thomas, Emory University, Hayagreeva Rao, Stanford University
The Effects of Social Movement Pressure on ‘Corporate Social Responsibility’ in the Apparel Industry. **Tim Bartley**, Indiana University, **Curtis Child**, Indiana University
Discussant: **Mayer Zald**, University of Michigan

**Monday, August 4**

**Thematic Session - Entrepreneurship in Comparative Context (8:30, Sheraton)**
Session Organizer and Presider: **Howard E. Aldrich**, University of North Carolina
Panel: **Anna Lee Saxenian**, University of California-Berkeley; **Alejandro Portes**, Princeton University; **Martin Raeb**, Princeton University; **David Stark**, Columbia University

**Thematic Session - Work and Inequality in Contemporary China (8:30, Marriott)**
Session Organizer and Presider: **George W. Bohrnstedt**, American Institutes for Research
The Effect of Internal Migration in China on Socioeconomic Outcomes and the Level of Living. **Donald J. Treiman, Perry Peifong Hu, Yao Lu, William M. Mason** and **Yaqiang Qi**, University of California-Los Angeles
Danwei Profitability and Earnings Inequality in Urban China. **Yu Xie**, University of Michigan; **Xiaogong Wu**, Hong Kong University
Gender Inequality in Contemporary China. **Emily Hannum**, University of Pennsylvania
Educational Inequality. **Xiaogong Wu**, Hong Kong University
Discussant: **Wang Feng**, University of California-Irvine

**PS - Organizational Change: Contexts, Embeddedness and Incentives (8:30, Sheraton)**
Session Organizers: **Kevin T. Leicht**, University of Iowa; **Leslie McCall**, Northwestern University
Business Group Activity and Performance: The Role of Embeddedness and Incentives. **Dahlia Mani**, Carlson School of Management
How Cognitive Embedding Affects Market Dynamics. **Mark Thomas Kennedy**, University of Southern California
Discussant: **Christopher G. Marquis**, Harvard University

**Virginia Parks**, University of Chicago
**Dorian Warren**, Columbia University
Discussant: **Jennifer L. Bair**, Yale University
PS - Comparative Perspectives on Embeddedness, Employment Regimes, and Organizational Change (10:30, Sheraton)

Session Organizers: Kevin T. Leicht, University of Iowa; Leslie McCall, Northwestern University
Presider: Kevin T. Leicht, University of Iowa

New Patterns of Social Inequality in the State-Sponsored Capitalism during China's Market Transition. Wei Zhao, University of North Carolina-Charlotte; Xinguang Zhou, Stanford University

Competition and Integration in Organizational Change. Hans J. Pongratz, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universite (LMU) Munich

Which Type of Job Mobility Makes People Happy? A Comparative Analysis of European Welfare Regimes. Anette E. Fasang, Sara Izabella Geerdes and Klaus Schömann, Jacobs University Bremen

Discussant: Kevin T. Leicht, University of Iowa

Thematic Session - Industry Studies and the Ever Changing World of Work (12:30, Sheraton)

Session Organizer: Dan Breznitz, Georgia Institute of Technology
Presider: Walter W. Powell, Stanford University
Panel: Dan Breznitz, Georgia Institute of Technology Andrew Schrank, University of New Mexico Josh Whitford, Columbia University

Thematic Session - Technology and the Transformation of Work (12:30, Sheraton)

Session Organizer and Presider: Beth A. Bechky, University of California-Davis

The Rhetorical History of Telecommuting: Why We Continue to Talk about That which We Don't Do. Stephen R. Barley, Stanford University

Sociomateriality: Exploring Technology at Work. Wanda Orlikowski, Massachusetts Institute of Technology


Discussant: Steven Vallas, George Mason University

Thematic Session - Upgrading Low Wage Work (12:30, Sheraton)

Session Organizer: Christine L. Williams, University of Texas-Austin
Panel: Pierrette Hondagneu-Sotelo, University of Southern California Hernan Ramirez, University of Southern California Chris Tilly, University of Massachusetts-Lowell Alford A. Young, Jr., University of Michigan

PS - Emerging Peripheries: Brazil, Russia, India and China (12:30, Sheraton)

Session Organizer and Presider: Paul K. Gellert, University of Tennessee

Brazilian Iron, Russian Oil, and Chinese Factories: Emerging Peripheries Fundamentally Restructuring the Capitalist World-Economy? Paul S. Ciccantell, Western Michigan University

The New Surgical Colonialism: China, Africa, and Oil. Albert J. Bergesen, University of Arizona

Sweatshops in China and the "Race to the Bottom" in Global Labor Standards. Robert J.S. Ross, Clark University

Can China Survive Success? The Political Sociology of a Developmental Miracle. Ho-Fung Hung, Indiana University-Bloomington

Thematic Session - How Organizations Affect Society (2:30, Sheraton)

Session Organizer and Presider: Stephen R. Barley, Stanford University
Panel: Gerald F. Davis, University of Michigan Joel A.C. Baum, University of Toronto Walter W. Powell, Stanford University

Discussant: Stephen R. Barley, Stanford University

Thematic Session - Worlds of Work and Welfare in Europe (2:30, Sheraton)

Session Organizer: Duncan Gallie, University of Oxford

Welfare Regimes, Employment Systems and the Quality of Work. Duncan Gallie, University of Oxford

Welfare Regimes, Women's Employment and Work-Life Balance. Sonja Drobnic, University of Hamburg

Flexibility and the European Employment Strategy. Per Konshoj Madsen, University of Aalborg

Discussant: John D. Stephens, University of North Carolina