I write at a time when calls for “global” and “transnational” social science surround me. ASA Presidents like Michael Burawoy (2008) and European theorists like Ulrich Beck (2006) are calling for sociologies that are more global in scope, method, and conceptual orientation. A new ASA section is called “Global and Transnational Sociology.” And our colleagues in history have already been enacting “global history” and “transnational history” for some time now. But comparative-historical sociology, traditionally wedded to methodological nationalism, has been comparably less vocal. While there is now an emerging strand of the “third wave” of historical sociology that has 

1Thanks to Julia Adams and Nicholas Hoover Wilson for feedback on this piece.
globalized its focus, and while this work is promising, much more needs to be done (Adams, Clemens, and Orloff 2005). This brief note is meant to encourage forward movement. It does so partly by looking backwards.

First and foremost, to be clear: the issue is not that comparative historical sociology has narrowed its lens to Europe or the United States. As past Chair James Mahoney has pointed out in these pages, there are many of us researching non-European parts of the world (Mahoney 2011). Nor is it a question of looking at “inter-national” issues. We have already studied the international system, along with the world-system, both of which are taken as consisting mainly of national states. The issue is that, for too long, comparative historical sociology has failed to look beyond, through, or across national processes and international systems to explore transnational and global dynamics: that is, connections, relations, and processes that traverse conventional state boundaries. Note the main themes of the “second wave” of historical sociology: class-formation, revolution, political regimes, the welfare state and state-formation, collective action, etc. These were all about national states or processes within national states. They also sometimes assumed, implicitly or explicitly, that the state and the social aligned. And while the “international” sometimes appeared onto the second wave’s analytic radar, it did so fleetingly at best. Even then, the key dynamics and dimensions of the global were not adequately theorized. Instead second-wavers tended to offer only an impoverished conception of the “international” (Hobden 1999)

What happened? We could probably think of many good reasons for the occlusion of the transnational and global in conventional studies. But here let me propose just one: “the iron cage of Westphalia,” or rather, the “analytic bifurcations” of comparative historical sociology (Go 2012). By this I mean the analytic abstraction or separation of our social objects from their wider constitutive relations. Of course, any social scientific conceptualization entails some form of separation. The problem is mistaking the conceptual abstraction for a real abstraction. In historical sociology, a particular pernicious version is the analytic bifurcation between “Europe” and the “Rest” – or variants thereof, such as the “inside” as opposed to the “outside” of nations; or “the domestic” from the “foreign.” This type of bifurcation is a partner to methodological nationalism. It is one legacy among others of the Westphalia myth which many International Relations scholars have criticized – viz., the myth that the Westphalian system of states was and has been a reality rather than what it actually was and remains today: an idealized model.

The second wave of comparative-historical sociology best exemplifies this tendency. So take one example, consider Tilly’s magisterial Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1992 (1990). This is an exemplary work for it seeks, as the best historical sociology does, to explain key aspects of modernity; in this case, the formation of the nation-state or, as he calls them “national states,” and their rise to dominance. We would think that this book makes transnational and global relations a key part of the analysis. After all, the book seeks to explain the national-state form rather than take it for granted. Furthermore, when we think about European states from AD 990-1992, surely European empires would come to the foreground; and empires were transnational phenomena through and through. Not only did they expand globally and interact on a global stage, they were themselves complex transnational formations that bled over, and across, expansive social space.

Indeed, empires should be central to Tilly’s analysis. The book’s entire point is to explain how the national state (defined on p. 2 as “states governing contiguous regions and their cities by means of centralized, differentiated, and autonomous structures”) came to become the dominant form over other possible sociopolitical forms, including city-states and – yes indeed – empires!

We might expect Tilly, therefore, to tell us how around the mid-twentieth century, national states in Europe emerged from the ashes of European empire. Why? For most of the historical period Tilly covers, European states like Britain and France – which Tilly refers to as exemplary of national states – were not coercion-wielding organizations “governing contiguous regions and their cities by
means of centralized, differentiated and autonomous structures.” They were empire-states; coercion wielding organizations governing expansive regions and cities with a hierarchy of citizen/subject at the core of the system. In the 1920s and 1930s, the British empire-state was at its territorial highpoint, encompassing more than 33 million miles of territory around the world, structured by various hierarchical political divisions and fragmented sovereignties. The French empire encompassed over 12 million miles around the same time. These states only became truly national states later, after World War II.

Yet this is not Tilly’s story. Tilly instead sees the “national state” winning out over “city-states, empires, theocracies, and many other forms of government” a century earlier, in the nineteenth century. “Full-fledged empires flourished into the seventeenth century, and the last zones of fragmented sovereignty only consolidated into national states late in the nineteenth” (23). How can this be? The problem lies in the bifurcation effected by Tilly’s conceptualization of the state. He notes, for instance, that just as national states in Europe were emerging, they were also “creating empires beyond Europe, in the Americas, Africa, Asia and the Pacific.” He refers to these as “external empires” (167). In other words, Tilly’s theory posits a national state “inside” Europe and an “external” empire “outside Europe.” In Tilly’s model, there is a “European” national state and then there is imperialism and an overseas “empire”; there is a national state in Europe, exerting sovereignty over parts of Europe, and then there is, over there, an “empire”; as if the latter were an appendage irrelevant to the constitution of the former, as if the model of sovereignty had not been already forged in and by interactions with the periphery out there; as if there could realistically be such an easy distinct between “inside” and “outside.”

The problem is that national states did not develop their ideas and practices about sovereignty first in Europe and then transpose them outward; they developed first amidst sixteenth century colonial claims and disputes between empires about overseas territory. And the so-called “external” colonies of Britain were not “outside” Britain: they were British. They were declared subject to the sovereignty of Britain, just as France’s so-called “external” colonies were subject to the sovereignty of France – hence fully inside it. This is why the English crown fought, so hard and so often, to keep colonies within itself, suppressing the American revolution in the 1770s or, for that matter, violently suppressing the Mau-Mau rebellion in the 1950s. And France’s colonies likewise were not “outside” of France: they were French. Hence France fought the bloody Algerian war in the 1950s to “keep Algeria French.” That was the mantra after all.

This is what I mean by analytic bifurcation: Tilly’s model separates into distinct domains the “national state” and “empire” – ‘internal’ and ‘external’, ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ – that were never really separated in practice.

The point is not to disparage Tilly’s fantastic work, which I have long admired and which got me interested in comparative-historical sociology in the first place. The point is that, if we want comparative-historical sociology to address transnational and global concerns, we need to think beyond the Westphalian system of states. Consider all the things that we miss when we fall prey to analytic bifurcation. Comparative-historical sociology might be known for its insights on racial and ethnic group formation in South Africa or the US but not for work on historical patterns of migration, the dynamics of diasporas or the transatlantic slave trade. We are known for our meticulous research on welfare states or security state apparatuses but not for studies of the transnational circulation of welfare experts or security personnel. Comparative-historical sociology rightly studies colonial policies but rarely the social interactions, collaborations or conflicts between and among colonial officials and colonized elites or subaltern populations. We are known for brilliant studies of the French revolution but not for illuminating how the temporal and ideological dynamics of the French revolution were tied to the rhythms and resistances of the slave revolt in Saint Domingue. We are known for researching the emergence of the Civil Rights movements in the US but not for tracing the circuits of emulation, exchange and alliance-making across national boundaries that animated the contemporaneous global wave of decolonization. Our work is respected for studying the dynamics of war-making and state-making but not for studies of the formation of the global humanitarian regime, illicit trade networks, piracy,
transnational religious movements, or empire-states.

Skeptics might respond by saying this injunction to think transnationally and globally is just a bunch of “globaloney.” They might say that we should address matters of real concern, like the historical processes of class-formation in nineteenth century England or, for that matter, the politics and outcomes of economic recession and state austerity programs in Europe or the U.S. or Latin America. I would agree. But I would not agree with the often-taken-for-granted premise that class-formation in nineteenth century England was disconnected from capital accumulation in England’s colonies or did not occur in a discursive context that included images and portrayals of England’s colonial subjects overseas. Nor would I agree that economic recession and state austerity programs in Europe are disconnected from economic processes and policy patterns elsewhere in the world (not least in the Global South where austerity regimes were first tested out, both ideologically and practically). Put simply, there are complex transnational and indeed global connections and circuits that need to be explored. Their forms, emergence, dissolution, and transformations are worthy of sustained investigation and theorization.

The good news is that there are signs of change. Colleagues and students forming the third wave have become increasingly interested in issues that are global and transnational. Some have begun to incorporate those issues into their theory and research, either by rescaling their objects of analysis or thinking harder about the wider global context in which processes unfold.  

But more is needed. We need, for instance, a distinct research program. What exactly about transnational and global processes are we going to examine? Which transnational and global processes do we puzzle over? We also need adequate theories and conceptual frameworks. The second-wave gave us novel theories of states, social revolutions, and class-formation. We need similar theories regarding transnational and global processes and forms. This is a pressing task. If most of our theories are tied to national processes, should we not consider other frameworks or theories more adequate for capturing global and transnational processes? Don’t we need entirely new theories? Or would it be sufficient to just rescale the old ones? Perhaps even we might mine our colleagues’ work in related subfields and by that token engage in productive dialogue with them. For instance, there are sociologists of religion, of immigration and migration, of policy networks, commodity and value chains, cultural globalization, and other transnational matters whose concepts, theories, and research we might engage to the benefit of all involved. Why not expand our intellectual and social base along with our expanding our scales of analysis?

Comparative-historical sociologists have been innovative for thinking about the temporal dimensions of social life. We should also think harder about the spatial dimensions too.

References

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3 See footnote 1 above. Also note various sessions on “Global Sociology” held at the Social Science History Association Meetings in 2011 and 2012.
Inspired by the events in the Arab World in 2011, we convened the panel “Revolutions, Old and New” at the ASA meeting of August 2012 to identify the ways in which comparative-historical sociology could build on the area’s expertise in revolutions to contextualize current events and suggest new directions for the field. The variety and richness in the presentations and the enthusiasm of the audience made clear to us the strong interest in rethinking paradigms and in pursuing new directions in this area.

A theme present in most of the papers was the urgent need for more comparative work on revolutions combined with an effort to go beyond the state as the primary unit of analysis and to consider sub-state or supra-state processes. This direction takes its impetus from previous developments in comparative-historical sociology with its focus on the contextualization of a country’s events in global processes, such as colonialism or globalization (to name only two examples). The theme of different units of analysis was present to a greater or lesser degree in all of the papers. In addition, most of the papers sought to move the field forward by bringing novel theory or methods to bear on their topics. They identify new concepts or new approaches.

Elizabeth Young (University of Michigan) explores a form of protest that requires more attention: a secessionist movement based on what she calls “civic” reasons, rather than the more common ethnic, religious, or linguistic reasons for secession. Colin J. Beck (Pomona College) advances a meta-framework for studying revolutionary waves, one that transcends the focus on revolution in a single country and emphasizes world cultural models. Considering China in the 19th century, Yang Zhang (University of Chicago) brings an ecological approach to the study of social movements that explains the dynamics of the Taiping Rebellion in relation to the other protest movements taking place at the same time in China. Finally, Pavel Osinsky (Appalachian State University) refines the discussion of revolution success or failure by looking at the specific dynamics that contribute to the strength of the state.

In “Civic Secession: Framing in Yemen’s Southern Mobility Movement,” Young focuses on secessionist movements such as those that have been a driving factor for new state formation in the

Panel Review

Revolutions, Old and New: Rethinking Paradigms

Mounira Maya Charrad
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21st century, as evinced by the recent creation of South Sudan and Kosovo. Most secessionist movement participants justify their cause on the basis of ethnic, religious, or linguistic identities that are distinct from that of the state from which they are trying to secede. Far less common are secessionist movements in which these “essentialized” identities are absent or play a secondary role. In this type of secessionist movement, which Young terms civic secession, the justifications for secession are based on shared socio-political marginalization or shared non-essentialized identities, such as regional identities. Such cases include the South during the U.S. Civil War, Western Australia, Western Canada, Nevis, and Tobago. While the literature on secessionism acknowledges the existence of both types of secessionist movements, the majority of both theoretical and case studies focuses on the mechanics of secessionist movements in which shared identities are essentialized by their participants. Because of this focus and the dearth of civic secession case studies, it remains unclear if civil secessionist movements differ significantly from ethnic secessionist movements with respect to framing and mobilization, and whether they should be theorized separately. How do civic secessionist movements frame their grievances to successfully mobilize supporters? What are the strategies that they use to negotiate other identities, including ethnic and religious ones that they may share with the state from which they are trying to secede?

In addressing these questions, Young considers the ongoing secessionist movement occurring in Yemen, the Southern Mobility Movement, which is distinct from, and originated prior to, the Arab Spring uprising that ousted Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh. The Southern Mobility Movement has attracted hundreds of thousands of supporters who faced arrest or death at the hands of government security forces. The paper examines the tactics and press statements the Southern Mobility Movement leaders have used to achieve such high levels of mass mobilization and participant commitment in the absence of clear, distinguishing identity markers that separate them from the existing state. Her analysis of the Southern Mobility Movement leads Young to conclude that civic secessionist movements face additional hurdles related to inter-group homogeneity and intra-group heterogeneity that ethnic secessionist movements may not face. Additionally, the relative success of the Southern Mobility Movement demonstrates that non-essentialized civic identities, such as region, can be powerful unifying and mobilizing forces that inspire mass mobilization. Therefore, if theorists of secession want to understand the preconditions and circumstances under which secessionist movements are likely to develop, they should pay closer attention to instances of civic secession.

In “Reflections on the Revolutionary Wave in 2011,” Colin Beck notes that revolutionary “surprises” like the Arab Spring call attention to what we know, and do not know, about the causes and dynamics of revolutions. Revolutionary waves are a particularly thorny puzzle for scholars as they occur across multiple societies. Beck contends that world cultural models played a key role in the Revolutions of 2011 in the Arab world. He suggests that current revolutionary theory is ill equipped to explain events taking place across multiple levels of analysis and multiple cases. Moreover, he notes that the global dimension of revolution has never risen to a paradigmatic concern and that theorization has been lacking in comparison to state- and mobilization-centered processes. To address this issue and escape the trap of “methodological nationalism,” Beck introduces a meta-framework for the analysis of revolutions. He argues that “revolutions take place across multiple levels of analysis (i.e. mobilization, state, and transnational); multiple units of analysis (whether individuals, groups, movements, regimes, societies, or state systems); and through interactions of levels and units.”

As an application of this model, Beck analyzes the Revolutions of Spring 2011 in the Arab world, highlighting the role of world cultural factors and developing a conceptualization of how global dimensions affected the occurrence and course of revolutions. Models of governance and scripts of political action were globally legitimated which created direct and indirect effects on regimes and movements as world cultural forms strengthened and penetrated societies. World cultural models also brought societies closer together, creating the conditions under which more rapid diffusion of contention became possible. Beck writes: “globalization of the last few decades increased both the
actual and perceived similarity between Middle Eastern countries and other regions.”

In the revolutions of 2011, autocratic states, out of step with democratic norms, faced increasing tension as the revolutions approached. Subnational actors and movements, sharing the script of human rights, became increasingly empowered to act in the political sphere and confront regimes. Further, the growth of global linkages allowed for the increasing possibility of importing models of collective action from other regions or contentious episodes and tied societies even more tightly together. Global factors combined with strains on states and mobilization processes to yield revolutions across multiple societies.

Yang Zhang’s paper, "Rebellious Ecology and the Rise of Taiping Rebellion, 1846-1853," examines a conflict that was more or less concomitant with the American Civil War but vastly exceeded it in casualties. In the middle of the nineteenth century, a native of Southeastern China, claiming to be the younger brother of Jesus, aimed to create a new society and rebelled against the Qing dynasty. Estimates of the death toll range between 20 million and 50 million.

Zhang develops an ecological theory to consider why the Taiping Rebellion became much more successful than the other local insurgencies that had been occurring in China since the late 1840s. Instead of using structural, preexisting or internal, organizational factors to explain large-scale, long-lived, and successful revolutions/rebellions, he argues that the totality of rebellious and repressive forces constituted a “rebellious ecology,” which favored some rebellions over others. Furthermore, the state reacted to the insurrections ecologically when it faced multiple enemies, which further drove the divergence of rebellious development. The Taiping managed to consolidate in a way that other protests did not such as the Triads and other local rebellions on the 19th century scene. Zhang writes that, “one crucial question is why these Triad rebels failed to become national rebels and why they did not unite together in order to fight against Qing.”

Drawing on both court records and local gazetteers, the paper presents a picture of rebels, pirates, bandits, communal feuding, and other kinds of contentious forces in the rebellious ecology of Guangxi Province in the late 1840s. Employing most of its regular forces to fight against those familiar Triad rebels and bandits, the Qing state overlooked the assembly of Taiping insurgents and had even not identified Taiping as rebellious until 1850. Even after the outbreak of Taiping in early 1851, the Qing state was unable to redeploy its regular forces for pacifying Taiping, since it needed to cope with other rebellions as well. The paper concludes that the emergence and development of major rebellions/revolutions can best be understood within the context of a changing rebellious/revolutionary ecology theorized in a relational and processual perspective.

In “Similar Beginnings, Different Endings: The Semiabsolutist States and Revolutionary Outcomes in Germany and Russia,” Pavel Osinsky uses comparative history to ask how two semi-absolutist states came to look so different over time, from the early 19th century to the 20th century. He argues that early bureaucratization and bureaucratic autonomy in Germany led to the preservation of social institutions and social stability. By contrast, the Russian bureaucracy never developed the same autonomy and fell with the czar, leading to a complete state breakdown and revolution. Osinsky puts an interesting spin on earlier studies in the field by making the Prussian case and its bureaucracy central in his comparison with the Russian Empire. Such a fine-grained examination allows him to tease out the dynamics of a fully rationalized bureaucracy and the crucial role of early bureaucratization in preventing state takeover. His research richly shows how government’s capacity to deal with popular unrest was a function of bureaucratization of state institutions or, more precisely, bureaucratic autonomy. A thoroughly bureaucratized and rationalized system of administration decoupled from the patrimonial structures of a supreme authority had a greater capacity of ensuring continuity in the functioning of the state institutions and preventing a possible takeover by radicals than a bureaucratic system subordinated to the interests of a patrimonial ruler.

The study starts from the empirical observation that in the early nineteenth century, the ruling institutions of Russia and Prussia (which later became the core of the German Empire) each exemplified a classical Polizeistaat, or a typical military-absolutist regime of an East European variety. To explain the drastically different outcomes of their
political development a century later, with survival of the bureaucratic machinery in Germany versus the disintegration of the administrative system in the Russian Empire, the study focuses closely on the issue of bureaucratic autonomy or the extent to which bureaucracies in these countries were able to extricate themselves from subordination to the monarchy and the royal court. Capitalizing on a conflict between the monarchy and the parliament dominated by the liberal parties in the mid-nineteenth century Prussia, bureaucracy was able to carve out an independent place in politics and establish itself as a “general estate” guided by raison d’état and the rule of law. Pursuing a policy of “stick and carrot” with regard to the labor movement, Bismarck’s bureaucracy was able to incorporate the lower classes in the political system and stabilize the state-society relations. The experience of the First World War strengthened a movement toward bureaucratic managerialism and helped to establish functional relations between the bureaucracy and the labor organizations. By developing a political alliance with the moderate opposition, which assumed state power during the revolution, the ruling elite was able to preserve the state machinery from further disintegration.

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Together, the papers invite comparative historical sociologists to consider new questions in the study of revolutions, whether they are past or present. They ask that we pay more attention to civic secession, the importance of world cultural models, the ecology of rebellions occurring at the same time, and the significance of early bureaucratization. All these issues can be brought to bear on a range of revolutions and suggest new directions for research.

Dan Breznitz and Michael Murphree (Georgia Institute of Technology) have been awarded the British International Studies Association’s Susan Strange Best Book Award for 2012 for their book Run of the Red Queen: Government, Innovation, Globalization, and Economic Growth in China (Yale University Press, 2011).

Ivan Ermakoff (University of Wisconsin-Madison) is the recipient of the 2012 Lewis A. Coser Award for Theoretical Agenda-Setting. This prize “recognizes a mid-career sociologist whose work holds great promise for setting the agenda in the field of sociology.” Ivan Ermakoff will be delivering the Coser Lecture at the August 2013 ASA meetings in New York.

Julian Go (Boston University) has won the 2012 Prize for Best Book in Global and Transnational Sociology from the American Sociological Association, and the American Political Science Association’s J. David Greenstone Book Award for Best Book in Politics and History (2010-11) for his Patterns of Empire: the British and American Empires, 1688 to the Present (Cambridge University Press, 2011).

Drew Halfmann (University of California, Davis) has won the 2012 Charles Tilly Best Book Award given by the Section on Collective Behavior and Social Movements of the American Sociological Association for his book Doctors and Demonstrators: How Political Institutions Shape Abortion Law in the United States, Britain, and Canada (University of Chicago Press, 2011).

Anthony J. Spires (The Chinese University of Hong Kong) was named a co-winner of the 2012 "Distinguished Contribution to Scholarship Award" offered by the ASA Political Sociology Section. He received the award for his 2011 article in the *The American Journal of Sociology*, "Contingent Symbiosis and Civil Society in an Authoritarian State: Understanding the Survival of China’s Grassroots NGOs" (Vol.117, No.1, 1-45). He was also awarded an Academic Writing Residency at the Rockefeller Foundation Bellagio Center for his project “Developing Democratic Culture in Chinese NGOs”.

Enrique S. Pumar (The Catholic University of America) will coordinate the Latino History Project at the Smithsonian Institution in 2012-13.

### Member Publications

#### Articles, Book Chapters, and Encyclopedia Entries


Books


The thirteen essays in this volume challenge conventional scholarly approaches to the sociology of religion. They urge readers to look beyond congregational settings, beyond the United States, and to religions other than Christianity, and encourage critical engagement with religion’s complex social consequences. Religion on the Edge offers groundbreaking new methodologies and models, bringing to light conceptual lacunae, re-centering what is unsettled by their use, and inviting a significant reordering of long-accepted political and economic hierarchies. The book shows how social scientists across the disciplines can engage with the sociology of religion. By challenging many of its long-standing empirical and analytic tendencies, the contributors to this volume show how their work informs and is informed by debates in other fields and the analytical purchase gained by bringing these many conversations together. Religion on the Edge will be a crucial resource for any scholar seeking to understand our post-modern, post-secular world.


It is commonly assumed that there is an enduring link between individuals and their countries of citizenship. Plural citizenship is therefore viewed with skepticism, if not outright suspicion. But the effects of widespread global migration belie common assumptions, and the connection between individuals and the countries in which they live cannot always be so easily mapped.

In The Scramble for Citizens, David Cook-Martin analyzes immigration and nationality laws in Argentina, Italy, and Spain since the mid 19th century to reveal the contextual dynamics that have shaped the quality of legal and affective bonds between nation-states and citizens. He shows how the recent erosion of rights and privileges in Argentina has motivated individuals to seek nationality in ancestral homelands, thinking two nationalities would be more valuable than one. This book details the legal and administrative mechanisms at work, describes the patterns of law and practice, and explores the implications for how we understand the very meaning of citizenship.


Claiming Society for God focuses on common strategies employed by religiously orthodox, "fundamentalist" movements around the world. Rather than employing terrorism, as much of post-9/11 thinking suggests, these movements use a patient, under-the-radar strategy of infiltrating and subtly transforming civil society. Nancy J. Davis and Robert V. Robinson tell the stories of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Shas in Israel, Comunione e Liberazione in Italy, and the Salvation Army in the United States. They show how these movements, grounded in a communitarian theology, are building massive grassroots networks of religiously based social service agencies, hospitals, schools, and businesses to bring their own brand of faith to the center of society.

Although inequality in Latin America ranks among the worst in the world, it has notably declined over the last decade, offset by improvements in health care and education, enhanced programs for social assistance, and increases in the minimum wage. This volume argues that the resurgence of democracy in Latin America is the key to this change. In addition to directly affecting public policy, democratic institutions enable left-leaning political parties to emerge, significantly influencing the allocation of social spending on poverty and inequality. But while democracy is an important determinant of redistributive change, it is by no means the only factor. The authors present quantitative analyses of eighteen countries and comparative historical analyses of the five most advanced social policy regimes in Latin America, showing how international power structures have influenced the direction of their social policy. They augment these analyses by comparing them to the development of social policy in democratic Portugal and Spain.


Bringing together the author’s major scholarly work on Weber over the last 30 years, offering a rich examination of the major themes in his sociology alongside a reconstruction of his mode of analysis and application of his approach, this book will appeal to scholars around the world with interests in social theory, German and American societies, cultural sociology, political sociology, the sociology of knowledge, comparative-historical sociology and the sociology of civilizations.


Fundraising may not seem like an obvious lens through which to examine the process of nation-building, but in this highly original book Lainer-Vos shows that fundraising mechanisms - ranging from complex transnational gift-giving systems to sophisticated national bonds - are organizational tools that can be used to bind dispersed groups to the nation. *Sinews of the Nation* treats nation-building as a practical organizational accomplishment and examines how the Irish republicans and the Zionist movement secured financial support in the United States during the first half of the twentieth century. Comparing the Irish and Jewish experiences, whose trajectories of homeland-diaspora relations were very different, provides a unique perspective for examining how national movements use economic transactions to attach disparate groups to the national project.

By focusing on fundraising, Lainer-Vos challenges the common view of nation-building as only a matter of forging communities by imagining away internal differences: he shows that nation-building also involves organizing relationships so as to allow heterogeneous groups to maintain their difference and yet contribute to the national cause. Nation-building is about much more than creating unifying symbols: it is also about creating mechanisms that bind heterogeneous groups to the nation despite and through their differences.


In 1996, President Bill Clinton hailed the “end of welfare as we know it” when he signed the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act. The law effectively transformed the nation’s welfare system from an entitlement to a work-based one, instituting new time limits on welfare payments and restrictions on public assistance for legal immigrants. In *They Say Cutback, We Say Fight Back*, Ellen Reese offers a timely review of welfare reform and its controversial design, now sorely tested in the aftermath of the Great Recession. The book also chronicles the largely untold story of a new grassroots coalition that opposed the law and continues to challenge and reshape its legacy.

While most accounts of welfare policy highlight themes of race, class and gender, *They Say Cutback* examines how welfare recipients and their allies contested welfare reform from the bottom-up. Using in-depth case studies of campaigns in Wisconsin and California, Reese argues that a crucial phase in policymaking unfolded after the bill’s passage. As counties and states set out to redesign their welfare programs, activists scored significant victories by lobbying officials at different levels of American government through media outreach, protests and organizing. Such efforts tended to enjoy more success when based on broad coalitions that cut across race and class, drawing together a shifting alliance of immigrants, public sector unions, feminists, and the poor. The book tracks the tensions and strategies of this unwieldy group brought together inadvertently by their opposition to four major aspects of welfare reform: immigrants’ benefits, welfare-to-work policies, privatization of welfare agencies, and child care services. Success in scoring reversals was uneven and subject to local demographic, political and institutional factors.

In California, for example, workfare policies created a large and concentrated pool of new workers that public sector unions could organize in campaigns to change policies. In Wisconsin, by contrast, such workers were scattered and largely placed in private sector jobs, leaving unions at a disadvantage. Large Latino and Asian immigrant populations in California successfully lobbied to restore access to public assistance programs, while mobilization in Wisconsin remained more limited. On the other hand, the unionization of child care providers succeeded in Wisconsin – but failed in California – because of contrasting gubernatorial politics. With vivid descriptions of the new players and alliances in each of these campaigns, Reese paints a nuanced and complex portrait of the modern American welfare state.

At a time when more than 40 million Americans live in poverty, *They Say Cutback* offers a sobering assessment of the nation’s safety net. As policymakers confront budget deficits and a new era of austerity, this book provides an authoritative guide for both scholars and activists looking for lessons to direct future efforts to change welfare policy.


From World War II to the early 1970s, social science research expanded in dramatic and unprecedented fashion in the United States, which became the world's acknowledged leader in the field. This volume examines how, why, and with what consequences this rapid and yet contested expansion depended on the entanglement of the social sciences with the Cold War. Utilizing the controversial but useful concept of "Cold War Social Science," the contributions gathered here reveal how scholars from established disciplines and new interdisciplinary fields of study made important contributions to long-standing debates about knowledge production, liberal democracy, and human nature in an era of diplomatic tension and ideological conflict.


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**Section Members on the Job Market & Recently Defended Dissertations**

**Barry Eidlin**  
American Sociological Association-National Science Foundation Postdoctoral Fellow  
University of Wisconsin–Madison  
(Ph.D., University of California, Berkeley, 2012)

*The Class Idea: Politics, Ideology, and Class Formation in the United States and Canada in the Twentieth Century*

Why is working class organizational power weaker in the U.S. than in Canada, despite the two countries' cultural, social, and economic similarities? The analysis offers a fresh reinterpretation of the problem of American exceptionalism through a cross-national comparison with Canada. Many view this cross-border distinction as a byproduct of long-standing differences in political cultures and institutions, but I find that it is actually a relatively recent divergence resulting from how the working class was politically incorporated in both countries during the Great Depression and World War II. My central argument is that in Canada, this incorporation process embedded “the class idea”—the idea of class as a salient, legitimate political category—more deeply in policies, institutions, and practices than in the U.S., where class interests were reduced to mere “special interests.”

Using archival and statistical data gathered over a year from collections across the U.S. and Canada, the analysis proceeds in two parts. The first section systematically challenges the conventional wisdom regarding the weakness of working class organization in the U.S. The second section then articulates my “political incorporation” explanation in three steps. Through detailed studies of party-class relations, postwar Red scares, and labor policy regime development in both countries, I show how U.S. labor’s incorporation as an interest group within the Democratic Party and its de-linking from an independent political left weakened working class organizational strength over time, while Canadian labor’s incorporation as a class representative and the maintenance of organizational links with the left led to relatively stronger working class organization.

Dissertation Committee: Kim Voss (chair), Neil Fligstein, Dylan Riley, Margaret Weir, Paul Pierson (external, Political Science)

Research Interests: My research grapples with the complex interplay between political institutions, social structure, and social action. More specifically, I examine how class conflict and partisan politics interact to shape social classes, modern states, and contemporary dynamics of power and inequality. Methodologically, I bring qualitative and quantitative analysis to bear on comparative, cross-national, and historical evidence.

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The Formation of Contention Cycles: Participation Growth during Strike and Lockout Waves in the United States, 1881-1894

My dissertation addresses how participation in collective action waxes and wanes over time. I further research on contention cycles and protest waves by arguing that participation grows and declines according to influences from previous collective action events. The theories used draw upon relationships between events, including the timing between events, actor similarity, and oppositional mobilization. To ascertain participation growth, I analyze strikes and lockouts in the United States from 1881 to 1894. This period marked the American labor movement's organizational nascence, enabling insight into a young movement's expansion. The data come from the US Commissioner of Labor and represents firm-level details on the population of strikes and lockouts. I supplement this data with accounts on conflicts and other historical circumstances. In the three substantive chapters I perform a comparative case study, an exploratory analysis of wave growth, and daily time series regressions to understand how previous events influence future conflicts. Focusing on daily changes, I found pronounced fluctuation in growth between days. Gains in new participants one day were typically followed by relatively fewer new participants the next, resulting in generally brief wave durations. Likewise, influence between events tapered quickly, lasting just one day to one week after previous event initiation. While I found considerable evidence supporting event initiation influence, outcome effects had limited support. Participants did somewhat respond positively to similar workers, yet this mild homophily effect did not drive general conflict growth. For this effect to mobilize actors, the causes behind the conflicts must have general appeal and use an inclusive organizing strategy. Lastly, though the oppositional mobilization forms (strikes and lockouts) exhibited many similarities, I conclude that the phenomena are incomparable due to lockout rarity.

Dissertation Committee: Judith Stepan-Norris (Chair), David S. Meyer, Carter T. Butts, David A. Snow

Research Interests: In addition to historical and comparative sociology, my other research interests include social movements, social networks, labor and labor movements, organizations, and political sociology.

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Section Awards

Barrington Moore Book Award

The section presents the Barrington Moore Award every year to the best book in the area of comparative and historical sociology. Nominated publications should have been published during the two years prior to the year of the award (i.e., for the 2013 award only books published in 2011 or 2012 will be considered). Books may be nominated only once for this prize. Thus, books nominated last year cannot be considered again for the 2013 award.
Books may be nominated by authors or by other section members. Non-authors may nominate a book by sending a letter or email to the prize committee members. Non-authors should ask authors to arrange to have the book sent to each member of the committee. Authors may nominate their book by sending a letter or email to the prize committee members and making arrangements for each member to receive a copy. Nominations must be received by February 15, 2013 to be considered.

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**Charles Tilly Best Article Award**

The section awards this prize every year to the best article in the area of comparative and historical sociology. Nominated publications should have appeared during two years prior to the year of the award (i.e. for the 2013 award only articles published in 2011 or 2012 will be considered).

Authors or other members of the section may nominate an article by sending a letter or email to each member of this prize committee along with a paper copy of the article. The letter and copy of the article must be received by each member of the committee by February 15, 2013 to be considered.

The committee members are:
Theda Skocpol Dissertation Award

The section presents the Theda Skocpol Award every year to the best doctoral dissertation in the area of comparative and historical sociology. Eligible dissertations must have been defended and filed between January 1, 2011 and December 31, 2012.

Dissertations may be nominated by dissertation chairs, advisors or current department chairs. We ask that each nomination letter include a brief discussion of the specific strengths and contributions of the dissertation. Self-nominations are not allowed for this award. Dissertations may be nominated by sending a letter or email to each member of this prize committee. Authors are then responsible for providing each member of the committee with a printed copy of the dissertation. Both the nominating letter and the dissertation must be received by each member of the committee by February 15, 2013 to be considered.

The committee members and their email and mailing addresses are:
Reinhard Bendix Student Paper Award

The section presents the Reinhard Bendix Award every year to the best graduate student paper in the area of comparative and historical sociology. Submissions are solicited for papers written by students enrolled in graduate programs at the time the paper was written. Both published and unpublished papers will be considered.

Students may self-nominate their finest work or it may be nominated by their mentors. Authors and mentors may nominate a paper by sending a letter or email to each member of this prize committee along with a paper copy of the article. The letter and copy of the article must be received by each member of the committee by February 15, 2013 to be considered.

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