Return to Empire: The New U.S. Imperialism in Comparative Historical Perspective*

GEORGE STEINMETZ
University of Michigan

The widespread embrace of imperial terminology across the political spectrum during the past three years has not led to an increased level of conceptual or theoretical clarity around the word "empire." There is also disagreement about whether the United States is itself an empire, and if so, what sort of empire it is; the determinants of its geopolitical stance; and the effects of "empire as a way of life" on the "metropole." Using the United States and Germany in the past 200 years as empirical cases, this article proposes a set of historically embedded categories for distinguishing among different types of imperial practice. The central distinction contrasts territorial and nonterritorial types of modern empire, that is, colonialism versus imperialism. Against world-system theory, territorial and nonterritorial approaches have not typically appeared in pure form but have been mixed together both in time and in the repertoire of individual metropolitan states.

After developing these categories the second part of the article explores empire's determinants and its effects, again focusing on the German and U.S. cases but with forays into Portuguese and British imperialism. Supporters of overseas empire often couch their arguments in economic or strategic terms, and social theorists have followed suit in accepting these expressed motives as the "taproot of imperialism" (J. A. Hobson). But other factors have played an equally important role in shaping imperial practices, even pushing in directions that are economically and geopolitically counterproductive for the imperial power. Postcolonial theorists have rightly emphasized the cultural and psychic processes at work in empire but have tended to ignore empire's effects on practices of economy and its regulation. Current U.S. imperialism abroad may not be a danger to capitalism per se or to America's overall political power, but it is threatening and remaking the domestic post-Fordist mode of social regulation.

Take up the White Man's burden—
Send forth the best ye breed—
Go bind your sons to exile—
To serve your captives' need;

Rudyard Kipling ([1899] 1982)

America is, so to speak, the greater island that could administer and guarantee the balance of the rest of the world.

Carl Schmitt ([1955] 2003b)

*Address correspondence to: Prof. George Steinmetz, University of Michigan, Sociology Department, 1225 S. University Ave., Ann Arbor, MI 48104. Tel.: +1 734 764 6324. E-mail: geostein@umich.edu. Thanks to Craig Calhoun, Fred Cooper, Kevin Moore, the editors of this journal, and two anonymous reviewers for comments on earlier versions of this article. Figure 1 is reproduced here courtesy of the Freiburg Military Archives branch of the German Federal Archives, from the personal papers of Otto von Diederichs (Nachlaß 255, volume 7, “Die Bestzung von Tsingtau – Fotos,” vol. 1).
But the real question is still: will the whole world eventually be dominated by America, or is there to be a reshuffle, a new distribution of power?
Albert Memmi (1968)

There seems to be little doubt that the United States today is the controlling center of a global empire. In just the past year the New York Times carried an article entitled “Lessons for the American Empire” (Bernasek 2005) and an analysis of the design of the Freedom Tower in Lower Manhattan as evoking “ancient obelisks, blown up to a preposterous scale...an ideal symbol for an empire enthralled with its own power” (Ouroussoff 2005:B1). The bookstore shelves groan with new treatises on the American empire.1

At the same time there is little agreement in the academic literature on what exactly an empire is and what type of empire the United States might be. Of course, the inherent multivocality of language means that signifiers are attached to diverse and sometimes contradictory semantic meanings. Because social science categories draw on everyday language, they are inevitably permeated with “political” assumptions. Contemporary writing on empire is additionally complicated by intellectuals’ variable modes of insertion into U.S. foreign policy making and the diverse ways this affects their position taking within academic fields. Due to their overwhelmingly leftist orientation, U.S. sociologists are typically critics of power rather than consultants to it, in contrast to political scientists and economists (Burawoy 2004; Steinmetz 2005a:500). But even on the critical left, there is a plethora of different understandings, such that some identify “empire” with the decline of the nation-state (Hannah Arendt) or the centerless system of global capitalism (Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri) while others continue to define empire as a political form centered around an expansionist state. Even individual texts reveal a sliding among definitions.2 As Arendt ([1948] 1968:131) remarked, there is a “wild confusion of historical terminology” in this area.

One way to attain some initial analytic distance on the question of U.S. empire is to historicize, drawing on the work of historians of other empires. Until recently, however, public discussions of the U.S. empire have been either noncomparative or based solely on contrasts with a highly idealized British empire or a poorly understood Roman one. As in the 1950s and 1960s when the United States was last involved in large and assertive overseas imperial wars, there has been a trend toward the domination of public intellectual discussions of empire by members of the more presentist disciplines, and with the exception of a few defenders of empire such as Neill Ferguson, colonial and imperial historians have been quiet.3

This leads me to the questions about empire in general and the U.S. empire in particular that I will address in this article. First, I will define imperialism as a nonterritorial form of empire in contradistinction to colonialism as a territorial one, and I will argue that the United States is by this definition imperialist. Then I will explore problems that until recently have been addressed mainly within postcolonial theory: the diffusion of practices and identities from the imperial core to the dominated peripheries and back in the opposite direction. These “reverberations between

---

1Of course, a sample survey found Americans still reluctant to embrace the language of American empire; see Bowman (2003).
2An example of extreme slippage in definitions of empire is an influential essay by Arthur Schlesinger (1956).
3One exception is the forthcoming volume edited by Calhoun, Cooper, and Moore (2005), in which specialists in particular historical empires discuss current U.S. politics.
An colony and metropole” (Stoler and Cooper 1997:1) sometimes make one overseas dependency look very different from the other. Overseas European and U.S. colonialism did not involve uniform national models exported to the periphery, contrary to an earlier historiography that sought to identify nationally-specific British, French, Spanish, or German approaches. Nor were variations in overseas colonial practices a simple response to real economic, social, ecological, or cultural conditions on the ground. Instead, modern overseas colonial practices flowed partly from colonizers’ racial/ethnographic preconceptions of the people they were colonizing—images that preexisted colonial context and were often quite resilient in the face of countervailing evidence. Modern colonizers thus pursued different sorts of “native policy” in East Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Oceania and even in different parts of these regions, due to stereotypes about the differences between, say, “Melanesians” versus “Polynesians” or Tahitians versus Hawai’ians (Thomas 1997). By contrast, U.S. nonterritorial imperialism does not usually adjust its policies according to racial or ethnographic categories but applies more generic models such as democratic tutelage, neoliberalism, or human rights. This is not to say that these models are any less “cultural” than the ethnographic discourses that underpinned earlier colonial activity, but that they often present themselves in the universalizing languages of economics or human nature. Because these models are not adjusted to spatially varying cultures, the diverse sites of one imperial power’s interventions in any given historical period often receive quite similar treatment.

The forms of overseas imperialism do change over time, however, and these changes reflect—among other things—ongoing developments in the metropole. The American foundations of the quasi-independent state in contemporary Iraq, for example, stem partly from the neoliberal and post-Fordist approaches to organizing social life that are currently dominant within U.S. ruling circles. This is very different from the American-led processes of state formation in postwar Japan and Germany, which corresponded more closely to the Fordist and welfare-statist models of regulation that dominated U.S. home politics at that time.

Activity at the outposts of empire is thus shaped in various ways by processes occurring in the metropole, by interests that quite exceed the search for markets, raw materials, and cheaper labor forces. At the same time, peripheral extensions of empire wash back onto the shores of the metropolitan core and remake its culture. Again, colonial bullion and labor migrants are a central part of this backwash. But post-colonial theorists have also shown how to track the play of colonial treasure and racial tropes at the heart of Jane Austen’s novels or Victorian domestic daily life. Along parallel lines, we need to investigate not just the impact of outsourcing and foreign oil on life in the United States but also the ceremonial trappings and scattered signifiers of power that give the country its increasingly imperial flavor. Rather than engaging in an affirmative inquiry into the lessons for American empire, this way of posing the problem emphasizes a critical investigation of the lessons that are learned by empires. By asking what determines the variable forms of empire, and what, if anything, is distinctive about contemporary American imperialism, we may be able to learn historical and theoretical lessons that cannot easily be redeployed by empire builders. I will return to this political/epistemological issue in the conclusion.

4I have demonstrated this for the German colonies in Steinmetz (2002, 2003a). On the derivation of U.S. and British colonial native policy from ethnographic representations, see Goh (2005).

5For an example of lessons for empire, see Dobbins et al. (2003).
IMPERIAL PRACTICES: SOME DEFINITIONS

We can specify **territorial** and **nonterritorial** imperial practices as the two basic types—each of which has several subtypes. These varieties of empire do not necessarily exist in a pure or isolated form but often in mixed and varied combinations. Territorial forms include: (1) classical land-based empires; (2) expansionist nation-states such as early-modern- and modern-century France enfolding the hexagon into the state or the United States in its westward continental expansion; (3) early-modern colonialism, for example, New Spain or Portuguese Sri Lanka during the 17th century; and (4) modern colonialism.\(^6\) Nonterritorial empire, which involves the control of space rather than the annexation of territory and sovereignty, also took distinct forms in the early-modern and modern periods. Portugal represents the apotheosis of the *early-modern* type of nonterritorial empire, with precursors such as the Hanseatic League and the Italian mercantile city-states of Genoa and Venice. All of these early nonterritorial empires tried to create order beyond their “national” boundaries in the interest of protecting trade, by repressing pirates and brigands, supporting friendly foreign rulers, and opposing (or deposing) unfriendly ones. *Modern* nonterritorial empire, also known as *imperialism*, has a much more sweeping agenda of controlling the world or a region for reasons that include economic ones alongside security, glory, and order. As Jürgen Osterhammel notes “imperialism” is therefore “in some respects a more comprehensive concept” than colonialism because it “presupposes the will and the ability of an imperial center to define as imperial its own national interests and enforce them worldwide in the anarchy of the international system.” This means that colonies may be seen “not just as ends in themselves, but also as pawns in global power games” ([1995] 1997:21–22).

Let us examine these categories in a bit more detail and in their historical contexts. The overarching category in this discussion is *empire* itself. This referred initially to large, land-based agrarian political empires; Rome was the European prototype.\(^7\) Like modern empires, traditional ones combined militarization with restless expansion and various mechanisms aimed at stabilizing and pacifying geopolitical relations.\(^8\) Classical empires were characterized by the subjection to a single supreme power of a multiplicity of peoples who were offered promises of peace and prosperity while being compelled to yield tribute to the center (Pagden 2003:xvi–xxiii, 13, 26). One result of conquest and incorporation was that antique empires were inherently multinational—or as we might say today, multicultural, but they combined this with a cult

---

\(^6\) I am using the adjectives “classical,” “early modern,” and “modern” in a strictly chronological sense. The distinction between a “modern” and a putative “postmodern” era is not important for the current discussion, despite the efforts of Hart and Negri to claim a fundamentally new quality for contemporary empire.

\(^7\) I should emphasize that, like Pagden (2003), I am not treating empires outside of the European linguistic and cultural realm here. The problems with lumping political formations like that of Ming or Qing China into categories that were developed historically with reference to experiences in another part of the world have been discussed in the recent literature on comparison; see Steinmetz (2004a). This does not mean that European forms of empire evolved in isolation from political experiences elsewhere in the world, of course. These resonances cannot be explored here, but see, for example, Grosrichard ([1978] 1998).

\(^8\) This combination may appear contradictory, but it is essential to Carl Schmitt’s concept of a *Nomos* (a regulating principle for international relations), which does not preclude warfare among the parties encompassed within its territory but specifies the form that warfare can take (I will return to Schmitt below). The combination of warfare and mechanism stabilization also recalls, in a very general way, Gramsci’s definition of hegemony as a combination of leadership (consent) and force. Similarly, David Harvey, while reducing empire to imperialism and the latter to a process of capital breaking out of its spatial “bondage,” recognizes that the U.S. empire opted for “order and stability” over democracy in its relations to the outside world during the Cold War. See Harvey (2003:59); but compare Mitchell (2002).
of the Emperor (as with the self-deifying Roman emperors) and often with a universal religion. Despite their vaunted multinationalism, classical empires sometimes integrated peripheral populations or elites into the core culture to such an extent that they lost their distinctive ethnic identities. The Ottoman Janissaries—an elite corps within the Ottoman army—were recruited from the Balkans and elsewhere as children and raised within the official Islamic culture. But this form of integration may have been less thoroughgoing than the assimilation policies that are characteristic of modern nation-states (and of some early modern colonies), as Hannah Arendt ([1948] 1968:125) argued.

Expansionist nation-states retained many of the features of traditional empires through the 19th century: the dual emphasis on stabilized peace and military strength, turbulent expansiveness, and a mixture of multiculturalism and universalizing ideology. Some of these empire-states encouraged a kind of emperor worship, including Napoleonic France and the Germany of Kaiser Wilhelm, Nazi Germany, and the USSR under Stalin (Eisenstadt 1963:50–68). The 19th-century Austrian Habsburg Empire was no longer expansive, but its long history of growth through the 16th century remained central to official Habsburg culture, and the imperial principle of multinationalism was enshrined in the dualistic constitution of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, founded in 1867. Bismarck’s unified Germany called itself an empire 14 years before Bismarck gave any indication of his overseas colonizing ambitions. Germany was considered an empire because it united various formerly independent states under the aegis of the Prussian king, who was now called the Kaiser. With its Polish, Alsatian, and other linguistic minorities, Bismarck’s empire was also multinational, although not to the same extent as its Austrian-Hungarian or Russian neighbors. Wilhelm Riehl observed in the middle of the 19th century that there was “a Protestant Germany and a Catholic Germany,” and for the most part, these groups were still distributed into separate states even at the end of that century. Whereas most European states in 1900 continued to reflect the legacy of the non-imperial jus publicum Europaeum created in 1648, which operated under the motto cujus regio, ejus religio, Bismarckian Germany exhibited a relatively high level of internal religious heterogeneity. But Germany also had recurrent episodes of

---

9The main European examples of multiethnic empire, after Rome, included the Hapsburgs and the Romans; the Ottomans, on the edge of Europe, represent a third example (Aron 1974:254, 259).

10Unlike the Chinese emperor, however, who for centuries was able to make Europeans kowtow to him, Kaiser Wilhelm was unable to elicit much of a response among fellow Europeans or his German subjects other than ridicule. The dances performed in German East Africa on the Kaiser’s birthday contained elements of political satire (Iliffe 1979:238–39).

11The Habsburgs did obtain the Hungarian crown in 1687, Galicia and Lodomeria from the First Partition of Poland in 1772, and the Bavarian Innviertel in 1779, and recovered various territories after the fall of Napoleon and the Congress of Vienna, but for the most part their history after Philip II of Spain was one of decline.

12It is perhaps counterintuitive to insist that neither emperor nor monarch is a necessary component of empire. But Rome acquired most of its extended empire while it was still considered a republic in political terms; the United States has been a nonfeudal republic since its independence from Britain but was called an empire by its founding fathers. Andreas Kalyvas argues, in a forthcoming article, that the republican form is particularly suited to imperial expansionism. On the imperial characteristics of the U.S. presidency, see Blackburn (2002).


14Indeed, the German Empire’s religious makeup—its Protestant cultural and political dominance combined with a sizable Catholic minority (36 percent) and a small Jewish minority—most closely resembles that of the United States. On Catholics in Germany, see Berghahn (1994:97). The official political response to the large Catholic minority during the 1870s and 1880s was the Kulturkampf (and legislation against the public speaking of Polish), but Catholic and Polish resistance slowed these assimilationist policies. Germany of course lacked the ethnic components associated with the indigenous Americans and the formerly African slaves (or ex-slaves and descendents of slaves), but by the late 19th century a large proportion of native and African Americans were Christians, which is the issue at stake here.
dynamic, militarized expansion, from the 18th-century partition of Poland (1772–1795) to Hitler’s bid for a European-scale “Third Empire.” Prussia/Germany’s recurrent attempts to encompass neighboring lands between the 1770s and 1945 were interrupted by periods of stasis in which the fruits of previous annexations were integrated into the overarching state structure and efforts were made to assimilate the new populations.\footnote{Arendt was certainly incorrect in contrasting “normal” nation-state building with imperialism, arguing that the former was based on a homogeneous population and active consent while the latter was based on heterogeneity and nationalist resistance. Bismarckian Germany—one of her examples of a “normal” nation-state—refutes this, especially in light of the anti-German resistance in Alsace after 1871.}

Like classical empires, these modern imperial states exercised a strong regional influence beyond their formal political borders. Just as the United States has become the global center of gravity for a myriad of processes located outside its own borders, ranging from filmmaking and the Internet to the legal processing of human rights cases and reparation claims by overseas victims against overseas perpetrators,\footnote{German filmmakers now often translate their screenplays and have them rewritten by U.S. screenwriters, whose versions are then translated back into German. On the use of U.S. courts for processing foreign crimes, see Torpey (2003) and “Reviewing Foreigners’ Use of Federal Courts,” \textit{New York Times}, December 2, 2003, p. A22.} imperial Germany emerged as a kind of regional model and focus of attention for central and eastern Europe in this period. Germany began to change after the 1880s from a land of emigration to one of immigration (\textit{Stürmer} 1983:58). This sort of imperial radiance can be distinguished from the deliberate exercise of political power outside national boundaries.

A third type of territorial empire, \textit{colonialism}, entails the annexation, occupation, and rule over regions and populations beyond the global core.\footnote{\textit{Osterhammel} ([1995] 1997:4) usefully distinguishes between \textit{colonization} as a process of territorial acquisition involving the settlement of migrants (or colonizers) and \textit{colonialism} as a system of domination. Colonialization, by contrast, may involve the settlement of groups inside the sovereign territory of another power, or in unclaimed territories.} Colonialism entails the seizure of sovereignty from locals and the formation of a separate colonial state apparatus. I have deliberately avoided speaking of “economic” motives until now, although these are often seen as fundamentally constitutive of modern empire. Many (although not all) modern colonies were acquired and discussed in terms of trade, investment, economic exploitation, and all of the processes that David Harvey calls “accumulation by dispossession.” But even some Marxist theorists (Harvey 2003:28–30; Arrighi 1994:33–34) now acknowledge that modern empires are co-constituted by capitalist and irreducibly territorial logics (even if territorialist motives eventually end up being described in these texts as ultimately driven by capitalist logics). The acquisition and shaping of modern colonies—two different processes that are often conflated—were propelled not just by economic motives but also by diplomatic and military considerations, dreams of national glory, religious or civilizing missions (the “white man’s burden”), and images of Africans and Asians as inferior. Thus Bismarck’s decision to acquire colonies in Africa and Oceania—a shift that triggered the international scramble of the 1880s—was \textit{not} motivated by any belief on his part (or any realistic possibility at the time) that these colonies would become profitable outlets for German capital or significant German emigration. Nor was there any assurance that these colonies would provide German access to raw materials, although this was sometimes given as an official justification (Drechsler 1996; Fieldhouse 1961:205–07).\footnote{Southwest Africa did not become a plausible recipient of more than a handful of German settlers until after the genocidal war of 1904–1907. Copper mining had slowed by the 1880s, and diamonds were not discovered until 1908.}
Once the modern colonial states began operating, “native policy” quickly became their central activity. But this was immediately oriented toward security and order rather than capital accumulation. The German strategy of protecting Samoans from settlers’ demands to turn them into wage labor was driven by concerns of social stabilization, not economic development, and was antithetical to the settlers’ pursuit of profits. The genocide against the Namibian Ovaherero people in 1904 was triggered by hallucinatory security concerns and actually deprived the colonial economy of its main labor force for at least a decade; it also provided ammunition to Britain in its successful attempt to disqualify the Germans as a colonial power after World War I. The shift to a more conciliatory native policy in the German Qingdao colony after 1904 was motivated above all by a growing emphasis in Berlin on cultivating China as an international ally in response to the powerful Triple Entente of Britain, France, and Russia. This shift had a geopolitical or diplomatic logic, not an economic one. Germany could not protect its national mining and railway interests in Shandong without a more aggressive military stance in the province. Even within Qingdao, proper Chinese and Japanese businessmen were overshadowing German ones in the years leading up to World War I.

Modern colonial policies were organized according to a “rule of difference” (Partha Chatterjee) between colonizers and colonized. Discriminatory practices emerged almost automatically to legitimate the colonizers’ presence in the colony to themselves and the other core powers. As Arendt ([1948] 1968:226) wrote: “no nation state could with a clear conscience ever try to conquer foreign peoples”—much less to keep them in a permanent state of inequality—unless it could define those peoples as irredeemably inferior. Of course, the structural requirements for the reproduction of any social system are not necessarily realized. The colonial rule of difference, like all “rules,” was sometimes broken. Where this overarching binarism faltered in a more systematic way, as in the late phases of German colonialism in Qingdao and British and French colonies in West Africa after 1945, colonial states were turning into mixed systems of some sort or into something postcolonial (Cooper 1996:468).\(^{19}\)

One salient distinction between early-modern and modern colonialism concerns this rule of difference. Early-modern colonizers had less difficulty justifying overseas conquests to themselves because the foreign Other was seen as heathen and Christianity was (as Althusser used to say) the dominant level in the social formation. At the same time, Christianity allowed for genuinely assimilatory policies. The enfolding of indigenous Americans into the Church was not nonsensical for Las Casas or for the early French colonizers of Canada, who believed that Amerindians were intrinsically equal (Belmessous 2005; Todorov 1984).\(^{20}\) Most of the Jesuits in China treated Chinese elites as equals as long as they were willing to convert (and, in some cases, even if they were not; Mungello 1985). By the 18th century, these basically Christian assumptions were no longer unchallenged in the colonizers’ worldview. Discourses of the rights of man and abolitionism now jostled with scientific racism for precedence,

\(^{19}\)In private comments to the author Fred Cooper noted that “Great Britain and France were trapped by the logical and political consequences” of their own universalism in the mid-20th century: notions of development, citizenship, equal pay, and social benefits, which were introduced to reform colonialism, soon began to point beyond colonialism altogether and toward independence. French and British colonizers in the mid-20th century swung back and forth between “reifying differences and pretending that a little more time and effort” would make those differences go away.

\(^{20}\)At the same time, Las Casas supported enslavement of Africans. As Belmessous shows, however, the French state in the 17th century pursued assimilation of Amerindians in its Canadian colony in ways that were anathema to missionaries seeking to acculturate them to French laws and mores via francisation (Frenchification) before converting them to Christianity. The French state turned against francisation at the beginning of the 18th century but did not ban intermarriage until somewhat later.
and no single meta-code was able to dominate European representations of the colonized or precolonial Other. It became necessary to justify colonial conquest in terms other than Christian ones, but it was unclear just what those terms might be. However circular the logic, the colonial state’s resistance to assimilation and its insistence on treating the colonized as both different and inferior was one means of justifying their continuing subjugation.

The colonies that emerged in the 19th century were defined largely by their emphasis on practices that came to be called “native policy” (Eingeborenenpolitik in German), which involved defining and attempting to stabilize the culture and identity of colonized groups. To define native policy theoretically (rather than accepting the colonizers’ definition of it), we have to recall that the populations that were colonized during the 19th century were almost always already familiar with the people that came to conquer them. This was due to the swarming of European explorers, missionaries, and merchants into the farthest reaches of the globe in the prior centuries. As a result of this exposure to their future colonizers, prospective colonial subjects were widely believed to be capable of strategically manipulating the codes of their would-be rulers, in a kind of precolonial cultural bilingualism. The perceived illegibility or undecidability of the colonized was expressed in ubiquitous European discussions about lying, cheating, mimicry, and tricksters. This pointed in turn to a definition of native policy as a project of stabilizing the colonized by urging, even compelling them to adhere to a single, uniform definition of their own culture. Native policy became the colonial state’s central task, or at least a precondition for all other colonial policies.

Although the quest for markets, raw materials, and land was a leading motive in the acquisition of many colonies in this period, the problem of native regulation became paramount as soon as these regimes were up, and running, and it often overshadowed economic and diplomatic/geopolitical considerations.

The colonizers’ bid to stabilize the colonized took place within the assumptions of the rule of difference, which meant that full assimilation was disallowed. The goal of stabilization meant that the colonial state could not tolerate incommensurable, undecidable difference, which escaped legibility and therefore escaped control. Modern colonialism was thus torn between an impetus to commensurate and to codify the colonized Other, and a countervailing pressure to prevent the colonized from

---

21 As one German colonial journal (Die deutschen Kolonien) stated on its masthead, “colonial policy is, above all, native policy.” I discuss the structural similarities and differences between modern colonial and noncolonial states in more detail in Chapter 1 of Steinmetz (forthcoming).

22 Albert Memmi (1968:75) referred to this phenomenon as “colonial bilingualism,” without, however, casting it in a suspicious light. By contrast, early-modern colonialism did not confront populations that were already familiar with their colonizers, meaning that precolonial bilingualism and native policy were probably not as central to these colonies, at least at the outset. As they developed, however, it seems likely that code-switching would not have generated the same anxieties among the colonizers, leading to an early-modern analogue to native policy (even if that term was not yet used). The journals of Van Riebeck, the first commander of the colony at the Cape of Good Hope, and other papers from the 17th century there, reveal that concerns about cultural bilingualism were voiced very early on with regard to the Khoikhoi (Moodie [1838] 1960:240).

23 The other alternative was to exterminate the indigenous population, as in the Caribbean, Tasmania, and parts of North and South America. The states erected on such depopulated terrains may have pursued colonization, but according to my definition they were not instances of colonialism, which is structured around the colonizer-colonized relationship.


25 There are always exceptions, but these are usually marginal. Despite the alleged nonracialism of Portuguese colonialism, for instance, less than 1 percent of the Africans in Angola were considered “assimilated” under Portuguese (pre-1961) law (Bender 1978:xxiii).
becoming so similar to their rulers that the colonizer would be forced to acknowledge the unconscionable arbitrariness of his claim to suzerainty.

Modern colonial states often had dualistic legal codes in which native legal disputes were processed by indigenous authorities—or according to a European rendering of indigenous law—while the colonizer was subject to a separate, supervenient framework of laws and rules. Native crimes that were considered serious violations of European mores or that pitted Europeans against natives were adjudicated within the colonizers’ own legal system. In some colonies there was a unified legal code with native testimony being granted less weight than colonizers’ claims (Benton 1999).26

Another area in which the rule of difference was both policed and transgressed was interethnic cohabitation and marriage. Here again there may be a broad distinction between early-modern and modern colonies. There was extensive intermarriage (almost always involving European men and non-European women) in Portuguese Goa and Macao, Dutch Indonesia, New France, and the Cape Colony through the 18th century, and also in some 19th-century precolonial frontier zones such as Transorangia and Polynesia. But at the end of that century and during the 20th century, colonial states and lawmakers hardened intimate racial boundaries.27 Modern colonial states could tolerate a few individual cases of colonized individuals slipping over the boundary into the dominant category, but a systematic mobility of this sort would undercut the colonizers’ claim to superiority as surely as equal citizenship.

The encoding of inherent native inferiority into the sinews of the modern colonial state precludes the creation of loose political federations in which dependencies or client states are allowed to govern themselves, along the lines of some antique empires, British “commonwealth” settler colonies, and modern imperialism. France gestured toward such a federated structure by granting citizenship to the free inhabitants of the French settlements in the “four communes” of Senegal (St. Louis, Gorée, Rufisque, and Dakar) in 1834 and to the entire male population of French Senegal in 1848, and after 1945 they tried to preserve their empire by ceding more autonomy to the

26 There were exceptions such as the legal system established by the British at the Cape Colony in the second and third decades of the 19th century, which “did not make racial distinctions in assigning different status to litigants, witnesses, or defendants” (Benton 1999:581). But, I know of no detailed study of court cases at the early-19th Cape, which would be necessary to determine whether there was actually no discrimination against Khoikhoi in practice.

27 On the shift against intermarriage in Dutch Indonesia, see the work of Ann Stoler (2002); on the relaxed attitude of the Portuguese toward cultural syncretism and mixed marriage in Goa and Macao, see Bitterli (1989:ch. 2); on interracial couples in precolonial Namibia, see Zimmerer (2003b). Racial and cultural mixing at the early-modern Cape is also evidenced by the existence in the 19th century of a sizable population of so-called Basters—descendents of Khoikhoi and Boers (or other Europeans); see Steinmetz (forthcoming:ch. 3) and Bayer ([1906] 1984). On precolonial liaisons and marriages in Samoa, see Salesa (1997). The intimate implications of the modern rule of difference were powerfully expressed in colonial fiction: romances between colonizer and colonized became increasingly ill-fated, even catastrophic during the 19th century. Whereas the mixed couple in Kleist’s Betrothal in St. Domingo (1811) is destroyed by a racism whose source lies outside the two lovers, the couples in later narratives of colonial Polynesia come to catastrophic ends as a result of an internalized racism on the part of the European husbands and a seemingly inexorable slippage back into an uncivilized native nature on the part of their Polynesian wives. Two examples of this are Friedrich Gerstäcker’s long novel Tahiti (1885) and one of Somerset Maugham’s Samoan tales, “The Pool” (1953). Both of these texts also reflected a situation of established colonialism: Gerstäcker’s novel was written well after the French annexation of Tahiti in 1842, and discusses that colonial endeavor in great detail, while Maugham’s story was written in 1960–1962, in the final years of New Zealand’s colonial dominion in western Samoa. German colonial historians sometimes suggest that racial barriers to intermarriage were more severe in German than in other European colonies after the turn of the century, but this does not seem to have been true. For example: “In the United States, laws in at least four states (North Carolina, Nevada, Arizona, and Oregon) prohibited sexual relations between Indians and whites” (Manuelito 1996:296). In the 19th- and 20th-century United States “miscegenation was encouraged as a means of eliminating Native Americans,” but this reflected the overwhelming numerical superiority of the colonial settlers—the non-Indians—by this time (Belmessous 2005:par. 5; Wolfe 2001: 885–93). The differences between settler and nonsettler colonies have not yet been systematically theorized.
This definition of modern colonialism casts doubt on certain metaphorical and polemical uses of the term. Where conquered subject populations are offered the same citizenship rights as conquerors in exchange for their assimilation into the ruling culture, we are better off speaking of modern state making rather than colonialism. The activities of the U.S. occupation forces in Iraq have often been reminiscent of European colonialism, and the news media initially described former “Ambassador” Paul Bremer as Iraq’s Governor, a term redolent of colonialism. But the United States has long perceived greater advantages in informal and indirect imperialism as opposed to direct colonialism; Iraq was released into ostensible self-sovereignty in mid-2004. The U.S. aim, despite the urgings of Niall Ferguson and others that Americans take up their Kiplingesque burden, was never to emulate the British colonizers and subject Iraq to direct foreign government. Nonetheless, the United States has attempted to cultivate a friendly client regime there via handpicked transition leaders. The U.S. embassy in Baghdad will be the largest diplomatic mission in the world, and as Donald Rumsfeld admitted in June 2005, U.S. troops are likely to

28Clearly, much hinges on definitions here, and these are inherently political. According to my definition, Hawai’i would probably not be counted as a U.S. colony today (although it might well be one kind of postcolony), because ethnic Hawai’ians have the same rights as other U.S. citizens. But Hawai’i is part of the history of an expansionist nation-state territorial empire. (President Clinton signed Public Law 103–150 on November 23, 1993, which apologized to Hawai’ians on behalf of the United States for the overthrow of the Kingdom of Hawai’i in 1893, but he did not offer to release them from their status as a state of the Union). The residents of Washington, D.C. do not have electoral representation in the U.S. Congress, but because they are not the territory’s indigenous inhabitants it would be arbitrary to call them “colonized.” American Samoa and Guam exist in a kind of political limbo—they are neither fully independent nor fully colonies. But these are exceptional statuses. The vast majority of states—all of Africa and East Asia, for example—is non- or postcolonial. Nor can most of the formerly independent territories that have been conquered and incorporated into other states, like Languedoc in France or Wales in England/Britain, be called colonized because their inhabitants have rights identical to people elsewhere in France or Great Britain.

29Ali’s (2003) discussion of the U.S. campaign, for example, conflates imperialism and colonialism, according to these definitions, as does Went (2002).

30The explicitly colonial American moment at the end of the 19th century is an exception to this rule. As General Clark (2003:24) pointed out in a critique of the neoconservative celebration of the idea of U.S. empire, “Americans tended, on the whole, to be ‘leavers,’ not colonizers” during the 20th century. Clark equates “classical empire” with colonialism.

31I wrote this paper before reading Michael Mann’s Incoherent Empire (2003), which uses somewhat similar categories and also argues that the United States is reluctant to engage in territorial forms of empire. But Mann follows the orthodox Hobsonian and Leninist tradition in failing to distinguish between imperialism and colonialism, calling the latter “territorial imperialism,” which leads to an underspecification of the problems of sovereignty and colonial ideology. Like most leftist writers, Mann exaggerates U.S. economic weakness and defines hegemony as total control rather than dominance and leadership (thus he can claim, at the very end of the book, that Britain was not hegemonic in the 19th century) (2003:264). Continuing this discourse of lack, Mann (2003:27) claims that the United States lacks an imperial culture, which he defines in terms of self-denial, obedience to authority, and racism. Here Mann actually agrees with Niall Ferguson, who identifies imperial culture with the culture of the previous British imperialist hegemon, and ignores the possibility of different models. Mann also contradicts himself later in the book, now arguing that Americans are in fact imperialists (“like all imperialists, Americans are self-righteous. . . .”). (2003:100), engaging in “spectator sport militarism” and a “quasi-racial contempt for Arabs” (2003:203, 101–02) and being generally uneducated and undemocratic. Mann agrees with Todd (2003) that the United States suffers from a “decline of genuine ‘anthropological’ knowledge of its targets of imperial policy” (Mann 2003:102), ignoring investigations by U.S. scholars of the ideological contributions of European ethnology to colonialism and the history of 19th-century race science and Orientalism more generally. Other statements suggest a failure to fully decolonize sociology: Mann repeats the claim of the 1918 British Blue Book that the Germans “were the least successful colonizers,” reinvigorating an old interimperialist dispute and failing to tell us what colonial “success” would be (Union of South Africa 1918). It makes sense to define a genocidal colonialism as a “failure” only if one assumes that colonialism is not inevitably a moral and humanitarian catastrophe, that is, if one is willing to accept the violation of indigenous sovereignty and dignity. The genocide in Southwest Africa created politically stable and secure conditions for the German colonizers. And if the colony suffered economically in the short term, it became profitable after the discovery of diamonds in 1908. The colony’s eventual failure was not because it was less modern than other colonies, but because of the South African invasion in 1915.
remain in Iraq for many years to come. The new socioeconomic constitution bequeathed to Iraq by the United States is a neoliberal utopia of hyperprivatization combined with a state that emphasizes policing and security while refraining from socioeconomic interventions, in minimalist “night watchman” fashion. Overseas imperialist interventions, such as the modern colonies of the 19th and 20th centuries, function as fields of social experimentation for the core states. The Iraq case also points to a more direct and deliberate transfer of models than would be possible under completely indirect forms of influence.

This brings us to the nonterritorial forms of empire. The term imperialism has had almost exclusively economic connotations, so much so that in the writings of some Marxists capitalism becomes coterminous with imperialism.\textsuperscript{32} Most Marxist writing has also failed to distinguish between colonialism as a form of direct, ongoing control of a foreign state (usually within the context of a rule of difference) and the various sorts of indirect foreign influence that have long been the main geopolitical modus operandi of the United States.\textsuperscript{33} Indeed, imperialism cannot be distinguished from colonialism by its motives, which in both cases encompass a hodgepodge of economic, territorialist, diplomatic, and ideological considerations. The difference lies in the character of the foreigner’s activity and the locus of sovereignty. Like colonial powers, imperialist ones intervene to depose regimes or to create new ones, but unlike colonizers they subsequently recede into the background, leaving behind a military base, a new constitution, loyal local leaders, advisors, ambassadors, and political operatives. They typically show little interest in micromanaging local conditions and ostensibly respect the autonomy of the peripheral state, intervening militarily or with other means only when conditions are perceived as threatening to their political or economic interests.

Of course, there is a continuum rather than a sharp dichotomy between a colonialism that smashes native sovereignty and governs in its stead and an imperialism that respects foreign sovereignty except in emergencies. Many regions within modern colonies were governed by indirect rule, and that category can itself be subdivided into varying degrees of directness, with the Princely States of British India at one extreme and appointed tribal leaders (chiefs) at the other. The key point, however, is that even the best-known instances of the strategy of colonial domination that historians call indirect rule (as in British Nigeria and India) were ultimately subordinated to an overarching colonial state. Indirect rulers—chiefs, headmen, captains, or princes in the nominally independent “princely states” of the British Raj—were approved, supervised, tolerated, and sometimes appointed by their colonial overlords. The colonial state claimed ultimate authority and legal jurisdiction over the putative subjects of indigenous indirect rulers. The category of indirect rule is an official one that was originally elaborated by the British colonial administrator F. D. Lugard in his \textit{Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa} (1922), where he suggested that preserving the office of the traditional chief was both economically and politically effective because it preserved traditional hierarchies or at least appeared to do so (Newbury

\textsuperscript{32}See Harvey (2003), who draws on Lenin and Luxemburg, who defined imperialism as a stage rather than a form of capitalism. Even Hannah Arendt, for all her subtlety, failed to distinguish between colonialism and imperialism and followed Hobson in arguing that “imperialism was born when the ruling class in capitalist production came up against national limitations to its economic expansion” (1948:126) and in equating the distinction between colonialism and imperialism to a difference between white settler Commonwealth colonies as opposed to nonsettler situations (1948:131; also Hobson (1965:27).

\textsuperscript{33}Indeed, in most of the Marxist literature there is little specific discussion of colonialism or colonies at all (see Lenin [1916] 2002; Harvey 2003; Brewer 1980). The Francophone neo-Marxist literature was more precise about colonialism, however, as in Rey (1973) or Fanon ([1952] 1968).
The term was adopted by colonial historians without being subjected to much critical scrutiny. It occludes the fact that most aspects of colonial rule, not just those called “indirect rule,” involve cooperation of some sort by the colonized and thus a degree of “indirectness”. The indigenous collaborator—as a “client” or “agent”—typically mobilizes people over whom he already has some sway and is often able to use the colonial state to strengthen this influence. For instance, the staffing of colonial armies with native troops—a ubiquitous feature of modern colonies (including the German ones, pace Mann 2003)—was often similar to “indirect rule” because it relied on native leaders’ ability to mobilize their own networks of followers or fellows.

In sum, colonial reliance on “indirect rule” does not undercut the distinction I am drawing between colonialism and imperialism. Whereas the modern colony’s inhabitants are ultimately subjects of the colonizer, imperialist powers do not make this claim. The United States does not claim legal jurisdiction over the people of Latin America, for example, even if it has intervened there at will for many decades to overthrow and replace leaders it finds disruptive. The United States may menace, curtail, or even temporarily cancel state sovereignty in Afghanistan or Iraq, but it does not make those countries into formal territories of the United States. Although the CIA abducts criminal suspects from Italian streets for interrogation—undercutting the investigations of Italian authorities—the United States does not claim jurisdiction over Italy but only the right to punctually violate its sovereignty in the interests of its global war on terrorism.

The recent demand raised by people outside the United States for the right to vote in American presidential elections draws its rhetorical power from the fact that the United States disclaims political sovereignty over them.

To clarify the difference between colonialism and imperialism, we can follow Carl Schmitt in distinguishing between the acquisition of territory and the authoritative political ordering of space. The latter refers to the creation of what Schmitt called a Nomos or global division of spheres of influence (Großraum, “large spaces”) within which states extend the tentacles of their power beyond their political boundaries. As Schmitt noted with respect to the Monroe Doctrine, which declared that the United States would prohibit any other foreign power from intervening in the Western Hemisphere, “every true empire around the world has claimed such a sphere of spatial sovereignty beyond its borders.” In the 19th century, the United States was making a bid only to become a regional hegemon, not yet a global one. The 1939 Declaration of Panama then “forbade warring states from undertaking hostile acts within a specified security zone”—waters adjacent to the American continent—and thus effectively “extended Großraum thinking over the free sea.” The containment doctrine after World War II subsequently “established the boundaries of . . . [the] informal [U.S.] empire” (Harvey 2003:40). American empire, especially since 1945, has been oriented toward a total “domination of sea and air” in the interest of the free movement of capital, commodities, and people and the stabilization of conditions within the Nomos, and not toward claims to new territory (Schmitt [1950] 2003a:281–83, 355; also Chase 2002:1–9). The existence of a dense web of U.S. military installations in more than 140

34 An exception is Mamdani (1996), who transforms indirect rule into a theoretical Marxist category.
35 At the time of writing, an Italian judge has issued arrest warrants for 13 alleged CIA agents accused of kidnapping a Milan-based imam in 2003 and flying him to Egypt for interrogation. The fact that “Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi has told the United States to respect Italian sovereignty” (CNN, Friday, July 1, 2005) and that the United States insists that “the CIA obtained the approval of Italian intelligence counterparts before capturing the cleric” underscores the importance of maintaining the appearance of national sovereignty.
countries around the globe does not gainsay this argument because these bases are usually located within the sovereign territory of other states or carve out a small space of exception within an unpopulated foreign geobody (e.g., Guantánamo Bay in Cuba, which is itself a remnant of America’s colonial acquisitions from the Spanish-American war).

Some of the nonmilitary control mechanisms used by the United States include setting conditions for loans or investments, denying trade with the United States, granting or withholding diplomatic recognition, freezing foreign assets, training foreign police and military forces, running media campaigns, and denying recognition to the new barbarians, the nonindividualistic “Asiatic societies” and “tribal cultures of Africa” (Habermas), the morally burdened, disorderly, nonliberal, and nondecen peoples (Rawls), while tolerantly offering them the chance to regain their inherent status as equals.

Imperialism is thus distinctly modern (in the chronological sense). But it has early-modern precursors. Whereas the Spanish empire in America and Asia was oriented toward the creation of permanent colonies and had a “clearly enunciated policy of conquista y reducción,” the early Portuguese empire in Asia and Africa was more like the current U.S. “empire of bases” in that it had no plans (at least until the late 19th century) to create “a territorial empire by force of arms.” Its network of bases did slowly become militarized, taking the form of fortalezas, “each of which had a military force,” and feitorias, which were also strongholds (casas fortes). There was no pretension of exercising “sovereignty in theory” or “hegemony in practice” over the indigenous societies that surrounded these fortified centers (Villiers 1986:40–41, 44–45, 50; also Pons [1999] 2002). Like contemporary U.S. imperialism, the Portuguese intervened periodically to prop up friendly governments, as when they helped the Ethiopian Emperor Geladewos repel an Ottoman-backed Muslim invasion in the 1540s (Newitt 1973:49). Although the African continent was not the primary target of Portuguese imperial efforts, it was here that they created a string of coastal forts and enclaves along the northern and Atlantic coasts during the 15th century, as well as a number of slave-based plantation economies on islands such as Madeira, the Azores, and Cape Verde (Blackburn 1997:chs. 2, 4). Slaves for these insular mini-colonies and, somewhat later, for Portuguese Brazil and the Spanish colonies in America were assembled at slaving bases such as São Tomé and Fernando Pó (Bitterli 1989:59). For the most part, Portugal emphasized trade rather than colonization. Starting in the 16th century the Portuguese set up prazos along the banks of the Zambezi River—land estates that engaged in plantation agriculture, mining, and traded gold and eventually also slaves. The prazos were sometimes heavily fortified, but they did not try to conquer the surrounding areas or even to put their stamp on

---

36See Le monde diplomatique, June 2003, for a map of U.S. and British bases, military facilities, and ongoing military interventions. The number of countries in which the United States has overseas bases is given as 59 in “U.S. Military Bases and Empire,” Monthly Review (March 2002); the total number of countries with installations of any sort is given by Ellen Meiksins Wood (2003:1) as 140. Chalmers Johnson finds 153 countries in which the United States was deploying military personnel in 2001, 33 to 38 countries with bases employing at least 100 active-duty military personnel, and a total of 725 military bases worldwide. But as Johnson points out, counting bases is extremely difficult due to both the existence of “officially nonexistent sites” and the difference between the number of nominally and physically distinct bases (2004:153–55, 195).

37Habermas (2001:124); Rawls (1999). This is not to deny the importance of human rights violations, but simply to call attention to the difference it makes when it is the imperialist hegemon doing the tutelage. On another aspect of this problem, see Bourdieu and Wacquant (1999), an article that, as the authors’ own analysis would have predicted, was thoroughly misunderstood by its American discussants.

38Similarly, the Hanseatic League in northern Europe during the 12th through 14th centuries became involved in policing the entire Großraum of its trading space by suppressing bandits and pirates and constructing lighthouses.
the indigenous culture of the Africans (colonos) living within their jurisdiction: they were “bases,” not colonies.  

There are also some differences between Portuguese imperialism in this period and contemporary U.S. practice. Portugal’s overriding goal in the early-modern era was profitable trade, in contrast to the more diverse array of modern imperialist goals. In contrast to the United States today or Britain in the 19th century, Portugal was neither a global hegemon nor dominant within its core region. Unlike the United States today, some of Portugal’s spheres of imperialist influence evolved into formal colonies in the latter part of the 19th century in the context of the European scramble for Africa. The Portuguese begin to extend direct, formal colonial rule over the entire Mozambiquan countryside in this period (Isaacman and Isaacman 1976; Isaacman 1972:162). In Angola, Portuguese settlement and systematic conquest of the hinterlands began at the end of the 19th century, after the slave trade ended there (1878). Before that, Portuguese settlement was concentrated along the Angolan littoral, mainly in Luanda and Benguela, and their principal contact with the interior was during raiding expeditions (Henderson 1979:68, 105; Bender 1978). Effective colonial control over Angola was only established after 1920.

The other leading example of an imperialist power before the United States, and the example that gave rise to systematic theoretical reflections on the concept, was Great Britain. World-system theory sheds some light on the mid-19th-century British emphasis on an “imperialism of free trade” as opposed to colonialism, through its account of the alternating metropolitan emphasis on colonialism versus imperialism in different eras (Bergesen and Schoenberg 1980; Fieldhouse 1961; Gallagher and Robinson 1953). Historical periods in which the core is dominated by a hegemon are characteristically imperialist, according to this theory. The hegemon is oriented toward preserving order and openness in global exchange because it will dominate trade anyway by virtue of its economic paramountcy. Thus mid-19th-century Britain organized the assault on China in the Opium Wars (1839–1842 and 1856–1860) and was successful in opening China to trade and missionaries in the Treaties of Nanjing (1842) and Tianjin (1858). Britain (and France) infringed on the Chinese state’s sovereignty but did not try to smash it or to colonize China—with the exception of Hong Kong island (ceded to Britain in 1842). Nor did Britain block other powers from trading in China. Where hegemony collapses, the core dissolves into a protectionist squabble among competing core states. Each of the powers tries to carve out exclusive rights to specific parts of the periphery, and this typically involves setting up overseas colonies. Thus Britain only began to annex new Chinese coastal territories such as Weihaiwei and the Hong Kong New Territories in 1898 after its hegemony had started to wane and Germany had seized Qingdao (in 1897).

39 The prazos gradually passed out of Portuguese royal control and became Africanized (and Indianized or South-Asianized) culturally and “racially,” as their overlords lost contact with Europeans and intermarried with Africans and Goanese (who dominated prazo society by 1789). The leading historian of the prazos describes them as a precocial institutional (Isaacman 1972:24, 28, 30, 35–36, 59–62, 159). The prazos officially belonged to the Portuguese crown and the lessees had to pay taxes and provide military and other services (Isaacman 1972:ch. 7; also Newitt 1973:58–64).

40 The other early-modern Portuguese colony was Sri Lanka, most of which was under Portuguese control by 1619 (by 1658, however, the Portuguese were replaced as the colonial rulers of Sri Lanka by the Dutch). The Portuguese also claimed Timor as part of their Estado da India after 1681 and began to set up a systematic administration of the islands in 1702, but they had little power outside their fortresses until the colonial era of the 19th century (Villiers 1986:57–60).

41 The treaty ports were not really colonies, even if they infringed on Chinese sovereignty, because they did not subject Chinese citizens to their rule but were mainly intended to protect European traders from Chinese law (Fairbank 1953).
If the British example seems at first glance to support the world-system account it also provides evidence against it, however, because colonialism and imperialism coexisted in world time and were pursued simultaneously by the same European power. There was no cycling between these two forms of empire, even if the final decades of the 19th century marked a dramatic uptick in colonial annexation. Britain engaged in both forms throughout the 19th century and it continued to relate to China and Latin America mainly in an imperialist rather colonialist manner after 1900, as did the United States. Germany also began to favor a noncolonialist approach to China after 1904. The next section will investigate these complications and combinations, examining in more detail the examples of imperial Germany and imperial America.

HYBRID EMPIRES, MIXED HEGEMONIES

Empires often assume mixed forms. Britain’s loss of its colonies in North America was followed by a mid-19th-century abstinence from new colonial conquests—with the important but crucial exception of India, over which Britain assumed governmental control in 1858. India was not just any colony but the “jewel in the Crown,” which had more than 90 percent of the entire population of Britain’s colonial empire even in 1900. Britain was involved in both an informal imperialism of free trade and territorial colonialism during the 1860s, when it was at the height of its hegemonic dominance within Europe. Nor was there any clear historical trend in which one form of empire gradually gave way to another. Individual trading factories or revictualing stations with no claim to govern their hinterlands were gradually transformed into fully colonial states, as in the cases of Mozambique, Angola, and the Cape of Good Hope. Conversely, the United States’ involvement in Puerto Rico after 1898 was initially colonial but gradually became less territorial. U.S. citizenship was given to the inhabitants (1917), who were later granted the right to elect their own governors by popular vote (1947). There was a similar trend in the Philippines colony (Go 2000).

Between 1870 and 1945, Germany and the United States both combined all of the modern forms of empire. The United States pursued a nonterritorial “Open Door” policy in China at the same time as it was completing its continental territorial expansion and its colonial takeover of Puerto Rico and the Philippines. Hawai‘i and Alaska became U.S. possessions in the 19th century and only exited from crypto-colonial status (type 4 in the typology set out earlier) and entered the modern expansionist nation-state (type 2) by attaining statehood in 1959. But colonialism remained a secondary arrow in the American imperial quiver overall, even after the Spanish-American war (which also marked the end of Spain’s five-century-old career in overseas colonialism; Balfour 1997). The United States not only eschewed colonialism for itself after World War II, but also began to actively oppose European colonialism in the mid-1950s, beginning with the Suez Crisis, after having supported the Europeans in the immediate postwar period as a means of checking Soviet

---

42A combination of both approaches was characteristic of Portugal, which governed Sri Lanka and Brazil directly while sticking to the coastlines in the rest of Africa and East Asia. Great Britain assumed control of India at the height of its leadership of the capitalist core.

43As Hobson (1965:18) calculated, one-third of the British overseas empire “was acquired in the last 30 years of the 19th century.” Bergesen and Schoenberg (1980) tally the number of colonial annexations and correlate these with fluctuations in global hegemony, but they do not count the number of indirect imperialist interventions. Indeed, because the latter take so many different and often secret forms (warnings issued behind closed doors and sanctions that are anticipated without any direct threats), it would be virtually impossible to quantify these forms of pressure or weigh their importance as against formal colonial conquest. How many nonterritorial imperialist interventions does it take to outweigh the takeover of Indian or Algerian sovereignty?
expansionism. The main motive for this American anti-colonial turn was to compete more successfully with the USSR for third-world solidarities (White 1999; Louis and Robinson 1993; Louis 1977).

Germany was more involved in territorial than nonterritorial empire between the 1860s and 1900. The forging of the German state between 1864 and 1871 was a violent process of engulfing and integrating new lands that resembled the contemporaneous westward continental expansion of the United States and the extension of Russian power from the Caucasus to the Amur River. This process began with the annexation of Holstein from Denmark in 1864 and continued with the Prussian annexation of Hanover and several other states in the Austro-Prussian war of 1866 (which allowed the eastern and western parts of Prussia to become contiguous by integrating Hanover and other states and also to form the Prussian-dominated North German Federation). Territorial aggrandizement was completed with the occupation of Alsace-Lorraine in 1871. The Versailles treaty then stripped Germany not just of its overseas colonies but also of substantial European territories, including Alsace-Lorraine and the province of West Prussia. A new round of continental growth began in 1938 with the Anschluss of Austria and Sudetenland, followed by western Czechoslovakia, Poland, and the invasion of the Soviet Union. Germany lost the provinces of East Prussia, Silesia, and most of Pomerania after World War II.

In the decades before unification in 1870 Prussia had emulated Britain in seeking to influence China, the Ottoman state, and other parts of the global periphery through non-annexationist means. After the turn of the century imperial Germany increasingly focused on influencing noncolonized parts of the periphery through methods other than conquest. This included the policies that contemporaries called “cultural imperialism”: funding programs to spread German influence in places where Germany had colonial projects, like China, and where it had none, like Latin America and the Ottoman Empire (Kloosterhuis 1984). Germany’s engagement in China before 1914 illustrates the contradictory mixture of territorial and nonterritorial approaches to empire. Prussia and Germany pursued something like the American “Open Door” policy in China beginning in the 1860s. In 1897 Germany departed from this approach by invading the coastal village of Qingdao in Shandong province and forcing the Chinese government to lease the territory the Germans called “Kiautschou” (Jiaozhou) for 99 years. The existing settlements on Jiaozhou Bay were razed, and the city of Qingdao (Tsingtao) was laid out in classical segregationist colonial style with opposing European and Chinese districts and two distinct legal systems. The Germans quickly extended their military power into the surrounding province, occupying villages, and attacking local Chinese authorities. This aggressive approach was endorsed by all relevant branches of the German government, from the Legation in Beijing to the Navy Secretary and Kaiser in Berlin. As the wife of the German Envoy to Beijing wrote in 1897: “Whatever the Chinese might have been in the past, today they are nothing but dirty barbarians who need a European master and not a European ambassador, and the sooner the better!” (Von Heyking 1926:205).

Beginning around 1904, however, influential groups started to urge that Germany try to win China as an ally given the Kaiser’s increasing international isolation in the buildup to World War I. Around the same time, advocates of “cultural imperialism” started to argue that Germany would be better able to counter American and British influence in China through scientific, medical, and educational assistance than via military conquest. One instantiation of this revisionist program was the Qingdao German-Chinese University, which opened in 1909. Its curriculum combined German/European and Chinese material, and there was a mixture of German and Chinese professors. The
Chinese Educational Ministry posted a permanent representative at the school. The colonial governor of Qingdao, Truppel, tried to torpedo this project, arguing that the colonizers would be making a colonial "category mistake" (Begriffsverwirrung) if they granted the Chinese equal status in the university. The Chinese, he insisted, were not the Germans' partners but rather "our charges [Schutzgenossen], our subjects." Truppel was overruled, however, and soon afterward he was dismissed from his post as governor. Imperialist motives trumped colonial ones here as in other aspects of Qingdao administration, undercutting the racial justification for the colony. Significantly for the world-system theoretical account, this shift did not occur in a period in which the core was under the hegemony of a single leading power. Quite the opposite: it was the collapse of any semblance of hegemony among the European powers that was paving the way to world war at this time. Germany's turn toward less territorial types of interventions in Asia occurred in conditions directly opposite the predictions of the world-system approach. Germany continued this approach to China until its alliance with Japan in 1938. Hitler rejected overseas colonizing plans, closing down the Kolonialpolitisches Amt (Office for Colonial Policy) altogether after the defeat at Stalingrad in 1943.

In sum, both the form of empire and its underlying determinants reveal a complex mix. German overseas interventions, just like those of the United States, Great Britain, and Portugal combined territorial and nonterritorial approaches at any given time, rather than shifting from one to the other as the structure of global hegemony changed. German interventions in China did move from an imperialist to a colonial approach and back again between 1860 and 1914, but not for the reasons emphasized by world-system theory. Moreover, even though the German trend toward formal colonialism occurred at the predicted time (1880s through 1900), it did so for the "wrong" reasons—not to ensure access to raw material or markets but for a variety of diplomatic and domestic political reasons. Germany's official goals included an appeal to public and military sentiment (Samoa), the creation of a settler

---

44German Federal Archives, Berlin Records of the German Legation in China (R 9208), vol. 1259, p. 35 (Truppel to German Minister Rex, September 1, 1908).
46In both Southwest Africa and Samoa, an informal system of German influence was transformed into explicit colonialism after 1884 and 1900, respectively. Bismarck initially hoped to run Southwest Africa on the cheap by delegating its government to a chartered trading company and letting indigenous polities continue themselves. The Berlin government was compelled to assume more direct colonial administering control in both places. A colonial state replaced the chartered company in Southwest Africa in 1885 at a time when no significant natural resources had yet been discovered. Starting in the 1890s the colonial economy was being planned around a structure of white settlers who would displace indigenous pastoralists. This plan led eventually to a genocidal war that engulfed most of the colony and lasted from January 1904 until at least the end of 1907 and that drove the colony's overall balance sheet even deeper into the red. The German annexation of western Samoa in 1900 corresponds to the timing that economic Marxist theories would suggest, but again, once we examine the actual events we find that capitalist and statist considerations were far from paramount. The Samoan plantation economy had been dominated by a German firm since the 1860s in the absence of any colonial government at all, but by the 1890s that sector was no longer expanding. In 1899 the three powers that were most active in Samoa, Germany, the United States, and Great Britain, decided to partition the islands and assign them to colonial overlords. This was driven not by economic motives but by the fact that the three powers were repeatedly being drawn into internal Samoan politics and ending up on opposing sides. In 1898–1899 this had led to fighting among local naval representatives of the three powers, and their metropolitan governments wanted to avoid starting a world war over a tiny archipelago in the Pacific. The insignificance of economic and even strategic motives was underscored by the negotiations over Samoa in 1899. Great Britain offered Germany the economically promising Volta River Delta in West Africa and the neighboring Polynesian island of Tonga, whose harbor was considered superior to those in the Samoan islands of 'Upolu and Savai'i. These alternatives were rejected by the business-oriented Colonial Council (Kolonialrat) in Berlin and the German Navy, which should have preferred the island with the better harbor if it were oriented strictly toward military strategy. A more important consideration was that the German public and the Kaiser himself were extremely fond of Samoa and that the Navy had "sentimental" attachments to the island of 'Upolu due to the German marines who had been killed in battle there in 1888 (Kennedy 1974:219–24).
economy by violent force (Southwest Africa), the frustration of a settler economy in the interest of a regulated preservation of indigenous culture (Samoa), gaining international allies (China/Qingdao after 1904), and frustrating Cecil Rhodes’s “Cape to Cairo” plan by acquiring the South African Caprivi Strip (which was useless economically and unsuited for German settlement). The search for a “spatial fix” (Harvey) to undergird expanded capitalist accumulation was just one motive among many.

In addition to combining institutionally distinct forms and being shaped by a heterogeneous array of determinants, empires often parcel out their hegemony, or tolerate subhegemonies (Harvey 2003:37). British global leadership underwrote the rules of international behavior in the 19th century. In dealings with China, for instance, Britain claimed to be “the representative of all the West,” including the United States (Fairbank 1953:212). Yet the Western Hemisphere came increasingly under the influence of the United States. Nonetheless, Britain was often able to contain U.S. ambitions even within its continental territory, when it wanted to. The 1846 Treaty on the Oregon Territory, for example, guaranteed that “British subjects, with their goods and produce, shall be treated on the same footing as citizens of the United States” in navigating the Columbia River.\textsuperscript{47}

American hegemony in the post-1945 period has also been content to allow other core powers to exercise local hegemonies within their regions even while the U.S. claims authority in the final analysis. Germany, for example, has been a crucial staging ground for U.S. military interventions (although this may end if the United States reallocates its forces globally according to plans announced recently) and is the country with the largest number of extraterritorial U.S. military personnel.\textsuperscript{48} In both Germany and Italy (which also operates a certain subhegemony over its immediate region), the United States has frustrated law enforcement efforts—undermining a German trial of suspected terrorists by refusing to make key witnesses available and kidnapping a suspected Islamicist terrorist against whom the Italians had been building a legal case (Grey and Van Natta 2005; Mayer 2005). Yet the United States did not oppose German unification in 1990, that allowed Germany to at least begin to construct a regional hegemony in central/eastern Europe and increase its power within the dual hegemony it tries to exercise over Europe with France. By lifting restrictions on German sovereignty that had been in place for decades, the United States paved the way for Gerhard Schröder’s independent German foreign policy, including his defiance of the U.S. war plans in Iraq in 2003. Since 2003, however, Bush has worked assiduously to hive off eastern Europe from the German-French alliance, putting an end to any hopes for an easy German hegemony there.

\textbf{CORE-PERIPHERY REVERBERATIONS: THE DETERMINANTS AND EFFECTS OF EMPIRE}

Empire is defined as a relationship of political domination over a periphery by a core and therefore encompasses the transfer of various practices from center to margin. In the

\textsuperscript{47}More generally, the 1846 Treaty established the border between the British and American parts of the Oregon Country at the 49th parallel.
\textsuperscript{48}The United States had 199,950 military and Department of Defense civilian employees and their dependents on September 30, 2003, in Germany—a larger U.S. military presence than in all of East Asia and the Pacific combined. Of these, 74,796 were military and 32,927 were Department of Defense civilians (figures from Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information, Operations and Reports (DIOR), “Worldwide Manpower Distribution by Geographical Area” (September 30, 2003), at http://web1.whs.osd.mil/MMID/M05/m05sep03.pdf). Japan is the country with the second largest number of U.S. troops. The numbers for September 2003 include forces deployed in Iraq but based in other countries.
German case, domestic ideologies—above all, precolonial representations of the to-be-colonized—decisively shaped colonial native policy. Class struggles among representatives of the splintered German elite—the nobility, the bourgeoisie, and the university-educated middle class—were transposed into the colonial state and fought out there in a different register of contending claims to superior *ethnographic acuity* (Steinmetz 2002). Material practices and objects were shipped out to the German colonies, such as the prefabricated “tropical houses” (*Tropenhäuser*) and architectural styles (Figure 1).

One distinctive aspect of present-day U.S. imperialism is the way it exports well-established *neoliberal* approaches to governance and *post-Fordist* patterns of “flexible specialization” from the domestic and “economic” spheres into overseas military and imperialist practice, while simultaneously threatening certain key features of “domestic” post-Fordism. The U.S. military increasingly models itself on a post-Fordist firm surrounded by a network of independent producers delivering custom batches at a moment’s notice. The post-Fordist emphasis on shorter, more specialized, computerized production lines is echoed in the turn to smaller, lighter, more flexible military formations, precision-guided “smart bombs,” computerized battlefields, and other elements of what has been called the “new American way of war” (Boot 2003; Boyer 2003).

The post-Fordist emphasis on niche markets is paralleled in the efforts by the United States to discourage the European Union from creating an autonomous army and to encourage individual NATO members “to concentrate individually on carving out ‘niche’ capabilities that will complement U.S. power rather than potentially challenge it” (Layne 2003:25). Post-Fordist “just-in-time production” is paralleled by what we might call “just-in-time” political coalitions and alliances, like the one the United States cobbled together on the eve of the 2003 war in Iraq. Tim Mitchell’s interpretation of the relations between oil and U.S. foreign policy suggests that the war in Iraq is part of a larger historical trend toward *financialization* or rentier capitalism—another central element of post-Fordism.49 Most tellingly, the economic rules and regulations implemented by Paul Bremer’s Coalition Authority followed a neoliberal, post-Fordist guidebook almost to the letter, underscoring the point that colonies or imperial dependencies often become the experimental testing grounds for social experiments that cannot be pursued in such radical forms in the metropole (Klein 2004).50 We should not read this exported model of societalization as a strictly economic one, even if it presents itself as such; instead, it entails an entire social and psychological ontology.

Figure 1. Panorama of German-era Qingdao, circa 1900.

50 On colonies as experimental fields, see Rabinow (1989).
Post-Fordist neoliberalism is expressed most dramatically in the privatization of military services (Avant 2005; Johnson 2004:ch. 5; Avant 2002; Singer 2001/2002; Silverstein 2000). Entire U.S. overseas military bases are being run by private companies. For example, Kellogg Brown & Root, a Halliburton subsidiary, built Camp Bondsteel in Kosovo and organizes every aspect of life there except the performance of military duties (Johnson 2004:143). Early-modern European colonial regimes also relied on private armies, but the more relevant contrast is with the *modern* colonial period of the late-19th and early- to-mid-20th centuries, in which the (colonial) state assumed most military obligations (even if the soldiers were often drawn from the ranks of the colonized). During the Fordist era from the mid-1950s to the mid-1970s, it was still possible to criticize relations between the military and private industry as an unnatural “military-industrial complex.” In the current period the involvement of private contractors is so extensive that army officials and soldiers at the Abu Graib Prison in U.S.-occupied Iraq often have no idea whether an interrogator is from the army, the CIA, or a private contracting company (Danner 2004).

Empire also reshapes the imperial metropole itself. The 1907 “Hottentot election” in Germany was the result of the emperor’s dissolution of the parliament (*Reichstag*) after the majority, including the Social Democratic Party (SPD), voted to refuse further funding to conduct the genocidal war against the Khoikhoi/Nama peoples of Southwest Africa. The SPD lost 38 of its 81 seats in the Reichstag as a result. The distant colonial war thereby contributed to the genesis of the World War I by breaking the Socialists’ previous momentum toward an absolute majority. One insight of postcolonial scholarship is that these traces of empire do not necessarily advertise themselves as such but need to be deciphered. Indeed, the backflow of colonial practices and images to imperial Germany was doubly encoded, particularly indiscernible. Because the German colonial empire was smaller and only lasted for 30 years, there were relatively few direct effects of the specifically German colonies on the metropole. Most of the streets named after German colonies and monuments to German colonial heroes were the fruits of revanchiste organizations active after 1920 (Zeller 2000). But pre-1918 German culture was influenced in myriad more subtle ways by a generic pan-European colonial culture that was itself the product of a broad European colonial contact zone. The figure of the Moor or Black had been widespread in Germany since the middle ages, even though the only German slave-trading fort in Africa, operated on the Gold Coast by the Brandenburg-African Trading Company starting in 1682, had lasted only four decades (Van der Heyden 2001). Books about European precolonial explorations and overseas missions were translated into German from English, French, Spanish, and other languages during the entire early-modern era. Shops in German-speaking lands sold “Colonialwaren” (colonial wares, i.e., tropical fruits and vegetables) during the 19th and 20th centuries, but none of these products were grown in German colonies. Literary fantasies proliferated about cultures in Asia, Africa, and America where Germany had no colonies; by contrast, the specifically German colonial literature is extremely sparse and largely forgotten, and much of it was written after 1918. German racists still use

---

51 A few investors in Hamburg, Bremen, and Flensburg participated in the triangular slave trade. An excellent study of images of Africans in early-modern Germany is Martin (1993). See on images of Africa and Africans in German literature referring to a non-German colonial setting, see Hell (1992). German images of native Americans are discussed by Zantop (1997). On the afterlives of pan-European colonial-racist images in contemporary German culture, see Steinmetz and Hell (2006).

52 The great exception was Gustav Frenssen’s (1908) novel *Peter Moor’s Journey to Southwest Africa*, which went through numerous editions and was even translated into English. This is not to say that German colonial literature is not revealing of broader colonial and German trends; see Noyes (1992) and Berman (1998:ch. 5).
the word “Kanaken”—a term originally designating an indigenous people from French New Caledonia—to disparage their enemies.53

What about the backwash of contemporary U.S. overseas imperialism into the “homeland”?54 The relative invisibility of U.S. imperialism to many people living at that empire’s center is striking. But the flocking of overseas students to American universities from all over the world recalls the mass immigration to the imperial Roman homeland. Similarly, the influx of luxury goods (e.g., 60 percent of the world’s beluga caviar comes into the United States) recalls Pagden’s (2003:26) comment about traditional empires offering to its conquered peoples “the lure of luxury, opulence.” Americans’ increasing monolingualism is partly a rational response to the fact that the rest of the world speaks English and is educated in American-style schools, from Nairobi to Hamburg.55 Hollywood’s treatment of the Roman and Alexandrian empires and Agamemnon’s war on Troy emphasizes not just the ancient military campaigns but also the impetus of these expansionist polities to integrate foreigners who are willing to subordinate themselves to the emperor and the imperial collective.56 Television shows like “24” train viewers to accept the latest in imperial innovations such as the use of torture and the practice of “rendition.” A lawyer who wrote memos for the Bush administration justifying torture is now Attorney General and is being described as a “moderate” potential candidate for the Supreme Court. Other examples of the “domestic” resonances of empire are more overtly military in character: civilians driving Hummers (Peters 2005); the Navy welcoming almost 8,000 civilians aboard its vessels for publicity purposes in a single year; universities and schools (under the “No Child Left Behind” Act) being compelled to admit military recruiters or risk losing federal funds; 500,000 high school students currently enrolled in the Junior Reserve Officer Training Corps of the Army, Navy, and Air Force; and so on. Although the frenzy of private gun ownership in the United States is partly anchored in distrust of a government perceived as a threat to liberty, it is also constituted as a mirror image of that martial Leviathan (Johnson 2004:111–12, 117; Schneider 2003). Of course it is not evident that these domestic extensions of the global American military machine are fundamentally new. After all, the Bikini bathing suits of the 1950s were named after the site of the explosion of the first hydrogen bomb, a coral atoll in the Pacific whose indigenous inhabitants are still not able to return to their homeland. But there does seem to be an intensification of “spectator sport militarism” and of the permeation of everyday life by imperial concerns.57

As military imperialism becomes more neoliberal and “flexible,” imperial political life in the U.S. Heimat has gradually become more authoritarian (Steinmetz 2003b).58

53 The epithet “Kanak” (also spelled “Kanack”) was embraced by some German hip-hop and Turkish-German writers; see Zaimoglu (1995).

54 As one reviewer of this article pointed out, the neoliberal experiments in Pinochet’s Chile “are now being used by Bush to justify both charter schools and Social Security privatization.” A point well taken, although it also demonstrates that there is not simply a backwash by rather a constant cycling between metropoles and peripheries; see Krauss (2000), which traces the influence of U.S. neoliberal school reform on Joaquin Lavin, former mayor of Santiago.

55 Although some argue that English is chosen as a lingua franca in places like continental Europe because it is nobody’s native tongue and therefore does not privilege one group over another, this does not explain why it is English, rather than Swahili or Samoan, that has been selected; compare De Swaan (2001).

56 Wolfgang Petersen’s 2004 Trojan emphasizes the dialectic between Achilles’ “restlessness” and his subordination to the warrior and political collective. On the connections between “restlessness” and empire, see Pagden (2003).

57 At the moment of writing, the musician formerly known as Cat Stevens, who sang peace songs during the Vietnam War and who later converted to Islam still is being denied entry into the United State as a potential terrorist threat.

58 Harvey (2003) discusses the same phenomenon but does not consider its possible reconfiguration into a new mode of domestic regulation.
This shift toward an intensified authoritarianism and a resurgence of state strength after several decades in which the state was being “hollowed out” (Jessop 1993) is generating contradictions within the overall mode of regulation, which during the 1990s had been premised on ever-greater openness and liberalization. The emerging social formation seems to be a strange mixture of market liberalism and sociopolitical closure. There have been a few tentative movements in the direction of revived protectionism (i.e., as with the March 2002 steel tariffs and the opposition of some economic sectors to Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA)) and some tendencies away from the privatization of state functions (i.e., as in the initial structure of the Transportation Security Administration). But these neoprotectionist tendencies have not become dominant. Free trade and “openness” are still central goals in the 2002 National Security Strategy paper and of Bush administration policy since then. As Michael Mann (2003:58) points out, the average level of tariffs in the United States is “only 4 percent, low by historic standards,” and “the most protected sectors” in the United States, such as agriculture and textiles, are not the leading ones but rather “those in which poorer countries specialize.”

The administration lifted the steel tariffs in December 2003 in an effort to win the automaking vote in the 2004 election. Congress narrowly approved CAFTA in July 2005 with strong support from “business groups, including even some parts of the textile industry,” and with Bush administration officials arguing that “the ultimate goal was... an opening of the United States to greater competition and engagement with poorer countries in its own backyard, a liberation from trade barriers that would benefit Americans as well as their neighbors” (Andrews 2005:A1). Private security companies took over security screening at certain airports at the end of 2002.

The more serious threats to the extant version of post-Fordist regulation are the curtailments on civil liberties and the restrictions on international flows of people and products. For example, the Pentagon’s new regional command for the defense of North America, created in 2002, has demanded “that all significant foreign acquisitions of American companies be subjected to a national security review” (Johnson 2004:122). Where U.S. post-Fordism had been characterized by a proliferation of regional economic zones that spanned international borders (e.g., el Paso and Ciudad Juarez, Detroit and Windsor), traffic along such borders has been hampered by security measures since September 2001. The exchange of students and scientific visitors has also been damaged, and the flow of international students is being redirected away from the United States and toward Europe and other parts of the world. After a decade in which information was touted as the cutting edge of profitability and democratization, government secrecy in the United States has “reached a historic high by several measures, with federal departments classifying documents at the rate of 125 a minute” (Shane 2005). Domestic responses to the blowback of American imperialism will, at the very least, require adjustments to the mode of regulation that emerged in the 1990s. It remains to be seen whether the countervailing imperatives of restrictiveness and openness can be reconciled in a way that permits a renewed and prolonged period of capital accumulation and profitability.

04memo.html.

60 For an analysis that looks at some of the same aspects of neoliberalism but reads the United States today as primarily protectionist, see Pieterse (2004).

61 For a pessimistic reading of the U.S. economy, see Brenner (2004). Ironically, the radically neoliberal U.S. blueprint for postwar Iraq is also being threatened by the socialist "closure" preferred by certain sectors of Iraqi society and by the authoritarian closure promoted by Islamic fundamentalism.
CONCLUSION: SCHOOL OF THE AMERICAS

The past few years have witnessed an abrupt reversal in the fortunes of the “declinist school of analysis” of U.S. power and rising acceptance of the idea that the United States is not just a global “hegemon” but an “empire.” The declinist school insisted that U.S. global hegemony was reaching exhaustion due to “imperial overstretch” and a decreasing American share of overall world production. This thesis was complemented by the idea of the diminishing importance of the nation-state, according to which, in Habermas’s (1998:150) words, “the external sovereignty of states” had become “an anachronism.” In a sweeping analysis of capitalist history, Giovanni Arrighi (1994) interpreted the financialization of the U.S. economy in the 1980s and 1990s as a sign that American hegemony was flagging because earlier hegemons had also shifted to finance in their waning years. Hardt and Negri (2000) painted the contemporary world as a decentralized network of criss-crossing partial sovereignties. Their most original and paradoxical intervention was an attempt to resignify the term “empire” away from its age-old association with the idea of state domination and toward the supposedly centerless, deterritorialized global capitalist system itself.

Since 2001, however, these predictions of the end of American hegemony and state-based imperialism have started to look like wishful thinking or the mirror image of a hyperpower that, during the initial period after the collapse of the USSR, was content to focus on “multilateral” foreign policy. A certain reluctance to fully embrace America’s lone superpower status was evident during the administration of the first President Bush, which continued to adhere to the Cold War premises of containment, deterrence, and working through international organizations such as the United Nations and NATO. Bush Sr. disavowed the program of “lone superpower” U.S. hegemony set out in the Pentagon’s “Defense Planning Guidance for the Fiscal Years 1994–1999,” and signed in 1992 by Paul Wolfowitz. The United States during the Clinton presidency was described by Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers (1998:34–35) as the “first nonimperialist superpower.” The Clinton administration publicly expressed regret for U.S. support for military coups in Iran and Guatemala in the 1950s, signed the most international treaties of any U.S. president since the founding of the UN, including the Kyoto Treaty and the Treaty on the International Criminal Court (both of which were rejected by Bush the Younger). World-systems theorists found evidence for a decline in U.S. economic predominance that would threaten U.S. hegemony in this American reluctance to wield its full

62 The “School of the Americas,” renamed the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation (WHINSEC) in 2001, is located at Fort Benning in Columbus, Georgia, and is the U.S. Army’s “principal Spanish-language training facility for Latin American military personnel” according to its own website. See Gill (2004).

63 For a critical discussion of the declinist school of geopolitical analysis, see Cumings (1999:271–82); for examples of geopolitical declinism, see especially Kennedy (1987:514ff) and Keohane (1984). World-system theorists have argued for American economic (and hence geopolitically) decline throughout the entire period since the mid-1980s: see Bergesen and Sahoo (1985), recently restated by Wallerstein (2003).

64 Of course, at a different level Hardt and Negri’s dissolution of empire into the stateless global economy strongly recalls discussions of economic imperialism by writers such as Lenin and Hilferding, who also downplayed the significance of the state and specifically colonial forms of domination. Hardt and Negri’s more recent book adheres doggedly to the idea that “the national space… is no longer the effective unit of sovereignty” while acknowledging that the United States is the “only remaining superpower” (2004:4, 8).

65 The Gulf War does not represent a counterexample because it (1) was not a preemptive strike; (2) was not unilateralist, or even crypto-unilateralist; (3) did not seek “regime change” in Iraq or even to capture Saddam Hussein; and (4) was justified as a defense of (Kuwait’s) state sovereignty.

66 Conservatives agreed with this description, although they derided Clinton’s foreign policy as “social work.” According to Condoleezza Rice, the Clinton administration had replaced the “national interest” with “humanitarian interests” or the interests of the “international community” (Rice 1999; Mandelbaum 1996).
military might (Boswell 2004; Wallerstein 2003). Their prediction was that the United States would either be replaced by a new hegemon or that entire capitalist “core” (that is, the rich countries of the global north) would dissolve into protectionism and perhaps new forms of colonialism (because colonialism, for this perspective, tends to arise in the absence of a global hegemon; see above). Evidence for these predictions was weak even in the 1990s, however, given the rise of NAFTA and the other aspects of openness codified in the literature on globalization at the time.

At the same time, during the 1990s, the United States moved farther and farther ahead of the rest of the world militarily. This does not mean that the United States became omnipotent or was now able to turn its every policy whim into reality, as the current quagmire in Iraq indicates.67 The more salient point is that the degree of unipolarity—the military gap between the United States and its contenders—is unprecedented in modern global history, surpassing even British hegemony during the mid-19th century.68 As Niall Ferguson (2002:368) points out: “Britain’s share of total world output was 8 percent” in 1913; “the equivalent figure for the United States in 1998 was 22 percent.” Nor did Britain ever enjoy the same “lead over her imperial rivals” in terms of military expenditures. The United States now spends more than all other countries combined. The United States now has over 2 million military and civilian Department of Defense personnel deployed worldwide, along with another 2 million of their dependents, constituting at the very least an unprecedented “empire of bases” (Johnson 2004:188). And if the United States has been unable to stabilize postwar Iraq or Afghanistan, its ability to dispose of states or regimes has been demonstrated powerfully in the past three years. American economic supremacy is not as absolute as during the decades after 1945, but it is still remarkable. Even today, U.S. growth, employment, and production levels continue to exceed those of the European Union, despite the latter’s larger population.69 The American foreign debt is huge, but at the same time, the rest of the world cannot refuse to extend credit to the United States without plunging the global economy into crisis. The sheer scale of U.S. dominance matters for the form of American empire, since the United States is less compelled than earlier hegemons to share or delegate hegemony. U.S. leaders feel that they can squelch any assertion of regional subhegemonies, as in the standoff with Germany and France since 2003 or American opposition to Germany’s bid to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council.

67 Some counterarguments against the description of U.S. military power as enormous and unprecedented point to its frequent inability to create order, for example, Mann (2003). But as Timothy Mitchell (2002:14–16) points out, this result is not necessarily a failure from the standpoint of American policy; indeed, Mitchell argues, between the late 1970s and the recent past the United States often tried to prevent the resolution of conflicts in the Middle East and to spread chaos and disorder there (most obviously in the case of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Iran-Iraq War). The ability of the United States in the post-1945 period to prevent most countries in the Western Hemisphere (with the major exception of Cuba) from going over to socialism/communism for more than a fleeting historical moment (Nicaragua under the Sandanistas, Grenada) should be read as sign of America’s considerable ability to project its power in crude but effective ways. Similarly, the violence and chaos in Iraq at the time of writing should not distract us from the equally salient historical fact of the elimination of the Baathist regime there.

68 The difference, as Carl Schmitt suggested in The Nomos of the Earth, was that even if Britain was unchallenged militarily on the high seas in the mid-19th century, the center of the global Nomos, or spatial-legal order, was still continental Europe, with its Westalian system of controlled anarchy and its self-definition against the outside. The human rights universalism of contemporary American hegemony does not constitute a Nomos because it has no spatial demarcation against an outside, but only a moral demarcation that runs within states (like the United States) as well as across them.

69 For figures comparing U.S. and E.U. population and economic production, see “Die neue Unbefangenheit,” Der Spiegel (2003), 30:33; on the relative decline of the United States vis-à-vis the rest of the world, especially Europe, between the 1950s and the 1980s, see Bergesen and Sahoo (1985).
Until recently, U.S. imperialism seems to have continually regenerated the mirage of its own insignificance or dwindling importance. This self-euphemization corresponded to the informal nature and universalistic self-presentation of American geopolitical engagements. The blindness of most of American society to the very existence of this empire is mirrored in the near invisibility of the topic in the main sociology journals. But surely it is incumbent on sociologists to look beyond and beneath the official rhetoric and leftist millennial dreams of American decline and to explore the topic in more detail. This silence stands in sharp contrast to the journals in political science and even in history. Of course, one reason for this difference is that these groups are more likely than sociologists to be called on to give lessons to the imperial state. But rather than avoiding the topic altogether, sociologists could explore the possibility of giving lessons about (or against) empire. The refusal to provide lessons for empire is not just a normative objection to polices that violate foreign sovereignty and dignity but also an analytic argument rooted in some of the characteristic ontological features of social life. Society is an “open system,” in the sense that social events are typically overdetermined by a multiplicity of causal structures rather than being produced by a single cause (as in the ideal production of an effect in a scientific laboratory experiment) or by a constantly recurring cluster of causal factors. The openness of the social means that we will never attain the positivist grail of the “constant conjunction of events.” Although we may be able to explain events such as the 19th-century European scramble for colonies retroductively, or extrapolate patterns into the very near future under highly constrained contextual conditions, we will never be able to predict such events except by sheer luck. As a result, the only kind of affirmative lesson we would ever be able to give to empire, even if we were so inclined, would be to prescribe policies whose outcomes would be impossible to foresee. The science of public policy, in other words, has the choice of being either thoroughly and willfully political or resolutely historical and nonpredictive. To avoid having one’s work functionalized by empire, then, one should create accounts that are ontologically and epistemologically adequate to the processual, conjunctural, contingent nature of social life, and hence irreducible to simple policy statements. That is not to say that one cannot diagnose conditions that generate inequality or distorted knowledge about the social world, and call for their absenting; here there is no prediction but rather a retroductive analysis specifying social determinants.

This article has focused mainly on authoritarian efforts to control social life and dominate foreign societies and cultures. It has also sketched some of the forms of

---

70 In a quick and informal survey, I failed to find a single article on U.S. empire in any of the leading mainstream U.S. sociology journals since 2000. The left-wing journals Monthly Review, Journal of World-Systems Research, Rethinking Marxism, Public Culture, and Political Power and Social Theory all carried at least one article on the topic, but only the last one is predominantly based in sociology rather than the social or human sciences more generally. Theory, Culture & Society, Social Identities, Studies in Political Economy, Current Sociology/La Sociologie Contemporaine, and Archives Europeennes de Sociologie/European Journal of Sociology all have a strong basis in sociology and have published articles on the question of U.S. empire, but none of them is edited primarily in the United States.

71 I am thinking here of the subtitle of Ferguson’s book Empire, which includes the phrase “lessons for global power”; see also Dobbins et al. (2003:iii), a “study of best practices in nation-building,” which concludes each of its seven case studies from Germany to Afghanistan with a section on “lessons learned.” On the different political and epistemological situations in the U.S. social sciences, see the essays in Steinmetz (2005c).

72 The increase in inequality and poverty that accompanies neoliberal policies is less a predictable outcome than part of the very definition of those policies: by failing to provide assistance, social insurance, job training, and so on, we are automatically heightening inequality.

73 On this problem, see Steinmetz (2004b).
chaos that are produced by empire, emphasizing especially the rising contradiction between domestic authoritarian closure and the neoliberal impetus to smash barriers to the flows of capital, commodities, and labor. If this is a “lesson” about empire, it is probably one that the people in charge of U.S. foreign policy will be reluctant to accept.

REFERENCES


