TOWARD A THEORY OF PANETHNICITY:
EXPLAINING ASIAN AMERICAN COLLECTIVE ACTION

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This analysis extends theoretical models of ethnic boundary formation to account for the shifting and layered nature of ethnic boundaries. It focuses on the underlying structural conditions that facilitate the expansion of ethnic boundaries or the construction of a pan-national identity, and explores how organizing along an ethnic boundary affects collective efforts at the panethnic level. Two processes could be occurring: (1) Competition with other ethnic or racial groups could lead groups with different national origins to engage in collective action based on a pan-national boundary, or (2) occupational segregation could foster pan-national interests and networks that lead groups to participate in pan-national collective action. Using a new longitudinal data set of collective action events involving Asian Americans, the analyses indicate that the segregation of Asians as a group raises the frequency of pan-national collective action, while the segregation among Asian subgroups depresses the rate of pan-Asian collective action. The results also show that intragroup competition discourages pan-Asian collective action, and organizing along ethnic lines generally facilitates it. Overall, these findings are consistent with the cultural division of labor theory, which suggests that segregation processes influence panethnic collective action due to intragroup interaction, common economic interests, and membership in a community of fate.

Recent research has documented a curious phenomenon among ethnic and racial groups: the “layering” of ethnic identities that enables the expansion and contraction of ethnic boundaries. Ethnic identities based on national-origin boundaries can shift upward to be based on a pan-national boundary. For example, Waters (1994, 1999) finds that under some circumstances, West Indian immigrants identify as black, acknowledging their similarities to native-born blacks in both color and ancestry. At other times, however, these same immigrants resist racial categorization and emphasize ethnic identities that are culturally distinct from American blacks. Similarly, Padilla (1985) finds that identity options for Cuban, Puerto Rican, and Mexican Americans are based on national origin and the larger, panethnic boundary of Latino, but these two levels of ethnic identification are often complicated by differences in language (Spanish vs. non-Spanish speaking) and immigration histories. Under what conditions, then, are distinct national-origin groups who often differ in language, culture, religion, and immigration status, able to construct a pan-national identity and organize collec-
tively under such an identity? Given the shifting, layered nature of ethnic boundaries, how does organizing based on national origin influence the use of a pan-national identity for mobilization?¹

Past research on panethnic boundary formation in the United States has consisted largely of in-depth case studies of particular groups. In general, these studies have focused on the historical and social processes that led different national-origin or tribal groups to interact in common locations. Within the context of the civil rights movement, external threats from the majority, and government policies encouraging racial group formation, pan-national identity formation and collective action resulted among Latinos, Asian Americans, and Native Americans. For example, Nagel (1995) finds that successful land claim awards, increased federal spending, and affirmative action and minority set-aside programs during the 1980s increased the symbolic and material value of Native American identity, leading group members to identify across tribal boundaries. Padilla (1985) tells a similar story of how a new Latino identity consciousness among Mexican Americans, Cuban Americans, and Puerto Ricans developed in response to new civil rights laws, equal employment opportunities, and affirmative action policies in Chicago during the 1970s. Finally, Espiritu (1992) provides an historical overview of the emergence of an Asian American identity, focusing on examples of national-origin groups organizing under a pan-Asian banner in electoral politics, protest activity, and the formation of social service organizations, all of which are interpreted as instrumental responses to external threats and government policies.²

These case studies have provided important empirical contributions to our understanding of the emergence, complexity, and process of pan-national identity formation and change, but they have revealed less about the continuing structural conditions that produce mobilization efforts based on such identities. Even though political policies may provide incentives for groups to form along certain ethnic or racial lines, these policies alone cannot explain collective action based on a pan-national or pan-ethnic boundary. Similarly, threats directed against an ethnic group may encourage pan-national collective action, but such attacks are considered immediate precipitants and may not result in protest behavior based on pan-national identities (Lieberson and Silverman 1965; Spilerman 1970, 1971). Certain underlying structural conditions must be in place to bring different national-origin groups together to engage in collective action and respond to threats and political policies. Thus, I focus here on understanding how changes in demographics and spatial concentration produce collective action based on pan-national identities.

Past research does not directly address the relationship between national-origin and pan-national identities and mobilization. Within a context of shifting ethnic boundaries, it is unclear how ethnic identity influences panethnic identity formation and mobilization efforts. Several studies have detailed the fluid and changing nature of identities, such that both ethnic and panethnic identities are used depending on certain contexts and circumstances (Cornell and Hartmann 1998; Nagel 1994; Waters 1999), but no study to date has examined how organizing along an ethnic boundary affects collective efforts at the panethnic level.

Here I complement earlier studies on boundary formation to make further empirical and theoretical progress toward understanding pan-national identity and collective

1 I use the terms “ethnic” and “national origin” interchangeably throughout this paper. I also use the terms “panethnic” and “pan-national” as interchangeable. I use these latter two terms rather than “racial” to highlight the fact that these categories are composed of different national-origin groups, and that a certain level of agency on the part of group members is necessary to create such an identity. I also acknowledge that national-origin groups are often composed of even smaller groups based on prefecture, village, or tribe.

action. Using event history methods and a new longitudinal data set on collective action based on an emergent pan-national Asian American identity in the United States, I focus on the underlying structural factors that facilitate the construction of a pan-national identity. My results also provide a preliminary understanding of the relationship between ethnic/national-origin and pan-national organizing.

COLLECTIVE ACTION AND IDENTITY

Broadly speaking, collective action refers to joint action in pursuit of a common objective (McAdam and Snow 1997). In this study, collective action represents organized, group-based efforts that are publicly enacted, change-oriented, and tend to be noninstitutional (Benford 1992; Turner and Killian 1987; Zurcher and Snow 1981). Specifically, I define pan-national mobilization as the public action of people from two or more national-origin groups who express grievances or claims on behalf of the collective, pan-national group. These collective efforts are often directed at local, state, or federal governmental agencies, other public institutions, or the general public.

Since the 1970s, political activity based on a collective identity has become an increasingly prevalent and significant option for social change efforts. Taylor (1989) defines collective identity as “the shared definition of a group that derives from its members’ common interests and solidarity” (p. 771). Such a definition can be applied to the identity that precedes and results from pan-Asian collective action efforts. According to new social movement theorists, one of the main goals of a movement based on a collective identity is to gain recognition or acceptance for stigmatized or new social identities (Cohen 1985; Melucci 1985, 1989; Pizzorno 1978; Touraine 1981). Bernstein (1997) further explains what types of activities might be used in such a movement, claiming that the deconstruction of racial categories and expression of identity at the collective level can serve as a political strategy aimed at cultural or instrumental goals. The collective action events I document here are based on a collective pan-Asian identity and can also be conceptualized as part of a larger social movement that occurs “with some degree of organization and continuity outside of institutional channels with the purpose of promoting or resisting change in the group, society, or world order of which they are a part” (Snow and Oliver 1995: 571).\(^3\) Theories of ethnic boundary formation illuminate the underlying structural conditions that encourage pan-national collective action and identity.

TWO THEORIES OF ETHNIC BOUNDARY FORMATION

Two structural theories of ethnic boundary formation seek to explain ethnic boundary shifts and maintenance. However, these theories have never been applied to the formation of pan-national identities and collective action based on such identities. I review these two theoretical perspectives and then formulate predictions about pan-national collective action, focusing on how the structural configurations of ethnic groups might lead to different processes, either facilitating or discouraging boundary shifts up to a broader level.\(^4\)

**Competition Theory**

Competition theory posits that when two different ethnic or racial groups compete for resources, collective action will occur because both groups are attempting to maintain or improve their standing in the social hierarchy (Banton 1983; Barth 1969; Hannan 1979; Nielsen 1980; Olzak 1992; Park 1950). Ethnic boundaries are activated

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\(^3\) See Lien (1998) and Wei (1993) for a detailed documentation of the Asian American movement.

\(^4\) Most scholars recognize that identities and mobilization do not flow in a linear direction, but that participation in social movements and collective action can foster a sense of both collective and individual identity (see Bernstein 1997; Nagel 1995). The data I use are based entirely on collective action events. However, I draw implications from these data to understand pan-national identity formation because increasing rates of pan-national activity suggest that pan-national identities are salient prior to and/or after an event.
when economic and demographic changes, such as a breakdown in labor market segmentation or a surge in immigration, increase contact between different ethnic and racial groups, intensifying competition. Competition perspectives also recognize that certain economic conditions, such as high unemployment and high poverty, spur labor market competition among ethnic and racial groups because of the reality or perception of scarce resources.

Several empirical studies have provided support for the central claims of competition theory: When economic and political arenas become less racially segregated and when resources appear to be scarce, competition between ethnic populations will ensue, leading to ethnic collective action in the form of protest or conflict (Beck and Tolnay 1990; Bonacich 1972; Nagel and Olzak 1982; Nielsen 1980; Olzak 1992; Ragin 1979). For example, antibusing protests and race riots across the United States were explained by competition variables, such as changes in racial residential segregation and exposure between racial groups (Olzak, Shanahan, and McEneaney 1994, 1996).

Cultural Division of Labor Theory

The cultural division of labor theory is based on the idea that identity and solidarity form in response to structured conditions of society (Blauner 1972; Hechter [1975] 1999; Yancey, Erickson, and Juliani 1976). The theory predicts that ethnic group boundaries are likely to be heightened when a cultural division of labor develops: where ethnic populations are differentially or distinctively distributed in an occupational structure on the basis of cultural markers (Hechter [1975] 1999, 1978). Segregation processes will result in ethnic boundary formation due to resulting intragroup interaction, common economic interests, and membership in a community of fate. In other words, a common social identity based on ethnicity instead of class will arise among ethnic group members who are segregated into certain occupations because of similar work experiences, similar structural positions, and daily interaction (Hechter [1975] 1999, 1978). The cultural divisions of labor that are important in boundary formation processes can be segmental (measuring the extent to which groups are occupationally specialized) or hierarchical (measuring the degree to which groups are concentrated at the bottom of the occupational hierarchy).6

Several empirical studies have found support for the cultural division of labor theory (Diez Medrano 1994; Hechter [1975] 1999, 1978; Nielsen 1985). For example, Mettam and Williams's (1998) data on employment patterns in Estonia indicate that segmental cultural divisions of labor contributed to Estonian nationalist identity at the end of the Soviet era. In addition, the cultural division of labor has been used to account for political conflicts among Israeli Jews (Peled 1990, 1998).

Overall, empirical studies support both theoretical traditions. This is interesting given that competition theory and cultural division of labor theory have traditionally been framed as opposing each other. Early tests of the two theories generated a handful

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6 The cultural division of labor theory argues that occupational specialization “fosters, and in turn is fostered by, the establishment of culturally distinct social networks” (Hechter 2000: 100). In other words, it could be group adherence to ethnic networks and culture that sustains the pattern of occupational segregation. But the theory also clearly acknowledges that occupational hierarchies tend to persist, not necessarily because of group adherence to traditional ethnicsities, but because groups at the upper levels of the hierarchy tend to profit from the labor of those beneath them (Hechter 2000). In my analyses, I include measures of occupational specialization and occupational hierarchy, but with the current data I am unable to determine which process—group adherence to culture or group relegation to certain occupational positions—is at work. Given the logic of the theory and past work on ethnic networks and occupational mobility, it is likely that both processes are at work (Waldinger 1996; Waters 1999).
of prominent articles focused on the debate about the role of structural processes in producing nationalist solidarity and mobilization in Wales, Quebec, and Belgium (Hechter 1975 1999, 1978, Liefer 1981, Nielsen 1980, Olzak 1982, Ragin 1977, 1979). Empirical results were also mixed, indicating that both theoretical perspectives had merit depending on the country and historical period examined (Nielsen 1985). My research builds on this tradition and broadens the scope of earlier work. Using original longitudinal data on collective action that are based on the emergent pan-national Asian American identity in the United States, I test the extent to which both theoretical perspectives are useful in explaining pan-national collective action.

The Relationship between the Two Theories

Instead of conceptualizing the two theories of ethnic boundary formation as competing, recent reviews have suggested that competition theory and cultural division of labor theory are actually interdependent and complementary (Hechter 1994; Hechter and Okamoto 2001). As defined here, competition occurs in the wake of a cultural division of labor. In other words, an ethnic group must dominate an occupational niche before other groups challenge this monopoly. Once this monopoly is challenged and occupational barriers decline, competition erupts and collective action results. In this sense, the two processes—segregation and competition—are interdependent. As conceptualized and measured here, competition can also occur when a group does not dominate or has never dominated an occupational niche. For example, competition theory predicts that economic processes and demographic changes, such as surges in immigration and unemployment, will lead to higher rates of collective action due to real or perceived competition. Even if an ethnic group does not dominate a niche, these economic processes should lead to competition and collective action. Strong support for competition theory would show that both types of competition—the lowering of occupational boundaries and changes in economic processes/demography—influence ethnic collective action, whereas strong support for the cultural division of labor theory would show that increasing levels of occupational segregation affect rates of ethnic collective action.

Theoretical Predictions

Applying Boundary Formation Theories to Panethnicity

Both competition theory and cultural division of labor theory have clear predictions about the conditions under which collective action based on an ethnic boundary will occur. These theories can also be applied to the case of panethnic collective action. To understand the conditions that affect panethnicity, I argue that both theories need to recognize that intergroup relations become increasingly complex when boundaries can expand or contract under different structural conditions. When these dynamics are accounted for, the theories provide a more complete understanding of the conditions that not only increase panethnic behavior but of conditions that decrease panethnic behavior as well.
nic groups will decrease the rate of panethnic collective action.

**Cultural Division of Labor Predictions**

Applying the cultural division of labor theory to the construction of pan-national identities and group boundaries, panethnic group behavior should increase when ethnic or racial groups experience high levels of occupational specialization (segmental cultural division of labor) or find themselves concentrated together in the same, low-paying occupations (hierarchical cultural division of labor) (Hechter [1975] 1999). Like competition theory, the cultural division of labor theory does not specify the degree to which the occupational segregation of different national-origin groups will counteract or enhance panethnicity. I extend the theory to make predictions about the effect of cultural divisions of labor on pan-Asian collective behavior: (1) The occupational specialization of a panethnic group will increase the rate of panethnic collective action, whereas occupational specialization within panethnic groups (i.e., among ethnic groups that comprise the panethnic group) will decrease the rate of panethnic collective action; and (2) the concentration of a panethnic group into low segments of the occupational structure will increase the rate of panethnic collective action, whereas the concentration of ethnic groups into low segments of the occupational structure (vis-à-vis other ethnic groups of the same panethnic group) will decrease the rate of panethnic collective action.

For the Asian American case, this means that the occupational segregation of Asians should heighten pan-Asian boundaries and increase the rate of panethnic collective action. Conversely, the occupational segregation of Asian ethnic groups will lessen the ability of pan-Asian group action because each group will have fewer common economic interests and social ties if they are specialized in different occupations.

**ETHNIC AND PANETHNIC ORGANIZING**

The second objective of this analysis is to explore the relationship between national-origin and pan-national identities and mobilization. Given past evidence of the layered nature of ethnic boundaries, how does organizing along national-origin lines influence mobilization based on a pan-national identity? Several studies have attested to the greater stability of ethnic or national-origin identities compared with pan-national ones (Garcia 1997; Itzigsohn and Dore-Cabral 2000; Omi and Winant 1994; Trottier 1981), which suggests that the use of an ethnic or national-origin identity would preclude the use of a pan-national one. Alternatively, Hannan (1979) claimed that over time, identities based on smaller boundaries such as villages and tribes would be superceded by identities based on a larger boundary because of the need to be successful competitors for resources. In addition, past research also shows how ethnic identities are not rigidly ascribed, but are socially constructed such that ethnic and panethnic identities can be evoked under varying social conditions (Cornell and Hartmann 1998; Horowitz 1975; Nagel 1994; Waters 1999).

In general, research in the area of social movements and collective action emphasizes the importance of formal organizations and prior organizing by groups in facilitating collective action. Organizations based on collective identities are considered to be mobilizing structures because they bring groups of potential participants together, provide social locations where mobilization may be generated, and serve as structures of communication contributing to successful collective action (Kriesi 1996; McCarthy 1996). This literature also shows that prior events increase the current rate of collective action events. For example, Olzak et al. (1996) find that prior unrest affects rates of ethnic protest and riot activity. Thus, given past research, an increasing number of panethnic organizations and prior panethnic events should increase the rate of panethnic activity. But what effect do ethnic organizations and events have on panethnic mobilization? The literature on social movements and collective action does not explicitly recognize the complexity of layered identities, and no study to date has explored whether ethnic and panethnic organizing are mutual or competitive processes. Given the lack of a clear under-
standing of intergroup mobilization and identity dynamics in the literature, I use the new data set of collective action events to explore the relationship between ethnic/national-origin and pan-national identities and mobilization.

**THE CASE OF ASIAN AMERICANS**

Asian Americans are often considered “honorary whites” (Tuan 1998) and the “model minority” (Hurh and Kim 1989; Wong et al. 1998), and yet they are a minority group in American society that has experienced racialization (Omi and Winant 1994). In 1950, the U.S. census identified Japanese, Chinese, and Filipinos as separate racial groups, as did group members themselves (S.M. Lee 1993). The term “Asian American” is a contemporary construct that was first used by student activists during the civil rights era and since then has been popularized by formal pan-Asian organizations and voluntary associations, Asian American Studies programs on university campuses, and pan-Asian publications such as *A. Magazine*, *Asian Week*, and *Amerasia Journal* (Kibria 1998; Omatsu 1994; Wei 1993). Such organizations and institutions have provided a context for the perpetuation of an Asian American constituency and identity that encompasses more than 30 ethnic groups, each with its own language and culture (Espiritu and Ong 1994; Kibria 1997; Lien 2001).

Asian ethnic groups, often viewed as homogeneous, differ in several important ways. To begin with, they have different immigration histories, which affect how groups are subsequently incorporated into the host society. Chinese, Japanese, Filipinos, and South Asians immigrated to the United States in large numbers after the Immigration Act of 1965 removed national-origin quotas (Chan 1991). These populations were often highly educated because of immigration restrictions. Cambodians, Laotians, Vietnamese, and Hmong came to the United States largely because of the Refugee Act of 1980 and also had very different backgrounds; these groups tended to come from rural areas, had low levels of education, and many had experienced emotional and physical trauma from war and conflict in their homelands. Researchers have found that the mix of new immigrants, refugees, and native-born young professionals among the Asian American population has led to increased polarization (Min 1995; Omatsu 1994).

Many of the Asian ethnic groups also have current and past antagonistic histories that continue to affect intergroup relations. Chang (1997) documents the atrocities that occurred in China and Korea at the hands of Japanese soldiers; this history still haunts Chinese and Korean Americans. For example, in interviews with Asian high school students, S.J. Lee (1996) reports that her informants often talked about how their parents did not socialize with Asians who were from different national-origin groups because of the political differences between their countries of origin. Similarly, in Kibria’s (1997) interviews, second-generation Koreans and Chinese spoke of how their parents would have a difficult time accepting a son-in-law or daughter-in-law of Japanese descent, given the memories of the brutal Japanese occupations of Korea and China.

Religious differences still persist among the multitude of Asian national-origin groups. Chinese, Japanese, and Koreans tend to share Confucian traditions, while the majority of Cambodians and Thais practice Buddhism (Kim 1977; Min 1995; Tran 1988). In addition, a significant proportion of Vietnamese refugees and Filipinos are Catholic, and South Asians follow Hinduism, Islam, and Sikhism (Pido 1986; Williams 1988).

Finally, there are even phenotypical differences among Asian ethnic groups. South Asians, who fought to be identified as Asians in the 1980 census, do not conform to established notions of the Asian phenotype and thus there is often confusion about their racial identity (Espiritu 1992; Fisher 1980). Thus, understanding the construction of pan-national identities among Asian Americans is of empirical interest because of several factors—demographic, religious, class, cultural, linguistic, phenotypical—that would preclude the emergence of pan-Asian solidarity and identity.
DATA

Data Collection Procedures

To understand pan-national boundary formation processes among Asian Americans, I used data from three national newspapers to construct a systematic, reliable index of publicly visible collective action events involving Asian Americans from 1970 to 1998. I focus on publicly visible events because not only do they provide a strong leading indicator of the level of pan-Asian activity across the United States, but they also are potentially relevant for social and political change. Such events are important for the participating communities and the larger social movement: Organizers stage events to call public attention to their communities, claims, and concerns, and when these events are noticed by the national press, they become visible and are used to communicate with other communities across the nation (Oliver and Myers 1999).

Newspapers are frequently used as a source of data among researchers who study collective action and social movements (e.g., Jenkins and Perrow 1977; Kriesi et al. 1995; McAdam 1982; Olzak 1992; Spilerman 1970, 1976; Tarrow 1998). This method has a number of merits (see Olzak 1989), but the main advantage is that no other data source provides systematic coverage over continuous periods of time on such a vast array of social activity (Koopmans 1999; Rucht and Neidhardt 1999; Rucht and Ohlemacher 1992).

Even though newspapers are widely used as a source of event data, their use has been subject to criticism. The most common criticism involves selection bias: Newsworthy events are selectively chosen by editors and thus not all collective action events that take place are reported by the press. Until recently, to understand the extent of selection bias, scholars were not able to compare newspaper accounts with the total population of events because such data were rarely available. However, a number of recent studies have used extramedia sources, such as police records, to gather information on events, and subsequently have compared the results with newspaper coverage. These studies consistently find that local and national newspapers tend to report on large, disruptive events rather than small, nonconflictual ones (Fillieule 1996; Hocke 1999; McCarthy, McPhail, and Smith 1996; Oliver and Myers 1999). Other studies that address selection bias have also noted that newspapers tend to focus on events closer to the location of the newspaper itself.

The events in my data set do not represent a complete enumeration of all collective action events but are a sample of publicly visible events. In constructing the data set, I attempted to minimize problems of selection bias. First, given that newspapers select newsworthy events based on size and degree of confrontation or violence, I chose to use the “generic descriptor” search strategy to find data on collective action events. This search strategy (described in detail below) has been more successful at picking up small events, indoor events, and institutional events than other search strategies (Maney and Oliver 2001). Second, to reduce regional selection bias, I chose not to use regional or local newspapers, nor did I include ethnic and panethnic newspapers as sources of data. Instead I draw upon three large, na-

7 Less than 5 percent of the events in my sample constituted a disruptive event where police were present and made arrests, or where violence broke out. None of the pan-Asian events were associated with police presence or violence.

8 English-language ethnic and panethnic newspapers tend to serve particular regions. For example, a large number of ethnic and panethnic newspapers, such as Asian Northwest Weekly, Asian Reporter, Nikkei West, Nichibei Times, and India West, provide coverage on events occurring in California or the West Coast. Sampling events from these sources would produce a regional bias.

Another important reason for not using ethnic and panethnic newspapers is that the addition of less reliable sources introduces further bias into the sample. Most, if not all, ethnic and panethnic newspapers are unavailable for the entire time period of interest. For example, Asian Week, the most widely read English-language weekly newspaper for the Asian American community, began production in 1979. Introducing data from this source would inflate the number of events that occurred after 1979. Three other panethnic newspapers currently serving Asian American communities, Northwest Asian Weekly, Asian Reporter, and Asian Pages, began production in 1982, 1986, and 1990, respectively. In addition, some scholars have suggested that adding more
tional newspapers in different regions of the country, ranging from the West to East Coast. Given that my interest lies in analyzing protest and solidarity events that are publicly visible and potentially relevant for social and political change, the use of national newspapers as a data source is more appropriate because these events are not only disseminated to the larger public, but they are also likely to reach political elites. Rucht and Neidhardt (1999) suggest that for studies focusing on events as political inputs, event data collected from the mass media result in a higher level of validity than would the whole range of actual events.

Even though national newspapers are not free from regional bias, they primarily focus on national news in comparison with regional or local papers that cover a higher proportion of regional or local issues. In addition, the statistical models I use for the analyses control for any regional effects when predicting the rate of panethnic collective action. Finally, given that newspaper accounts may not provide complete information about the events, I was able to cross-check information when events were reported in more than one of the newspapers in my sample.

To find visible events involving Asian Americans, I used the “generic descriptor” strategy and searched under any relevant keyword in each annual index of the Los Angeles Times, New York Times, and Chicago Tribune from 1970 to 1998. I then looked up each article on microfilm and coded characteristics of the events if they met the criteria of an ethnic or pan-Asian collective action event (defined below). This strategy has been used by other researchers (e.g., McAdam 1982; Olzak 1992) and is an improvement over those studies that sample from only one national newspaper. This strategy is also an improvement over studies that sample during specific time periods. For example, some European studies of protest activity focus on the Monday issue of newspapers to capture events that occurred during the previous weekend (Kriesi et al. 1995; Rucht and Neidhardt 1999). Such a strategy may underestimate the number of publicly visible events because not all events occur on weekends and coverage of events can appear weeks, and even months, after an event has occurred (Maney and Oliver 2001). Thus, I sample from the entire time period of interest, using annual indices from three national newspapers to find candidate events.

**Coding Strategy**

I define *ethnic collective action* as the public action of two or more persons that articulates an ethnic or racial grievance (Olzak 1992); this includes political protests and events that commemorate triumph over past discrimination. Given that social movements and protest events researchers have typically focused on particular kinds of claims or events that are contentious and disruptive (Oliver and Myers 1999), I include protest events but also widen the net to include solidarity events that could be political and community-oriented in nature.

I coded a *protest event* as any event in which the general public or an office of government was the audience and a grievance was presented on behalf of the ethnic group, often regarding changes in laws or ethnic policies. I coded a collective action event as *panethnic* or *pan-national* when it was clear that the grievance posed was pan-Asian, such that two or more Asian national-origin groups were representing an “Asian” or “Asian American” cause. The content of protest events ranged from demonstrations to stop the viewing of movies that portrayed Asians and Asian Americans in demeaning and stereotypical ways, to voter registration drives by and for Asian American communities, to public complaints by community members about racial profiling of Asians as gang members. A specific example of a pan-ethnic protest event was when Asian Americans came together in 1992 to protest the damage done to Korean, Filipino, Chinese, and Vietnamese businesses in the Los Angeles riots. Asian Americans felt their businesses had been unfairly targeted and collectively attempted to influence the state gov-
ernment to contribute to the rebuilding of their businesses and the Los Angeles economy at large.

A solidarity event was coded as any event in which ethnic group members gathered for a celebration or commemoration of their ethnic heritage and customs. The solidarity events in the sample were largely cultural and educational, but they also tended to be political in the sense that many were responses to past grievances. A solidarity event was coded as pan-national or pan-ethnic if the event represented the collective effort of two or more Asian national-origin groups and represented an "Asian" or "Asian American" celebration or commemoration. Solidarity events generally consisted of festivals, ceremonies, or celebrations that encouraged and enabled different national-origin communities to come together and interact. A specific example of a panethnic solidarity event was when different Asian national-origin groups commemorated the death of Vincent Chin, which had occurred 10 years earlier. In 1982, Vincent Chin, a Chinese American, was mistaken for a Japanese national by two white perpetrators who beat him to death because they blamed him for the depressed auto industry in Detroit. This case galvanized the Asian American community because it signified the threat of anti-Asian violence that all Asians face. The focus of the solidarity event 10 years later was to reflect on how far the Asian American community had come since Chin’s death.

Overall, I documented 374 collective action events involving Asian Americans from 1970 to 1998. Of the 374 events, 59 were coded as panethnic (see Figure 1). Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for the pan-Asian events. More than half of the sample was comprised of protest events (66 percent), and the majority of events (64 percent) were considered grievances tied to previous events in which ethnic group members protested or brought claims against institutions or individuals for improper or discriminatory behavior. One-third of the events were characterized as "pro-rights," in which ethnic group members publicly took up an issue or set of issues that were not responses to particular events. Only a few pan-Asian events were coded as relating to redress and repara-
tions or homeland politics. This is not surprising given that national-origin groups are more likely to organize separately for the purposes of homeland politics and redress and reparations.

As evidenced by the variety of forms used, there was no event form that clearly dominated the strategies used by Asian Americans to make their claims heard. Interestingly, 25 percent of the pan-Asian events involved participation by group members from seven or more national-origin groups. One might surmise that the groups who have historically been in the United States longer would predominate in protest and solidarity activities. Of the events for which data on the number of national-origin groups were available, several different groups are represented at about 50 percent of the pan-Asian events. Finally, it is interesting to note that ethnic organizations were reported to have been present at one-third (34 percent) of the panethnic events, while panethnic organizations were present at about two-fifths (42 percent) of the panethnic events. These descriptive statistics should not be taken as representa-

### Table 1. Frequency Distributions for Descriptive Characteristics of 59 Pan-Asian Collective Action Events, 1970 to 1998

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event Characteristic</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Type of Event</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protest event</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>66.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solidarity event</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>33.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Purpose of Event/Claim</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-discrimination/pro-rights</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>30.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grievance tied to previous event</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>64.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activity directed against another ethnic group</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Redress and reparations</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homeland politics</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3.4</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Form of Events</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Claim, accusation, complaint</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>15.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rally, demonstration</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>March</td>
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<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Picketing</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Press conference</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meeting, conference, workshop</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petition</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voter registration drive</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Filing of a lawsuit</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Letter writing campaign</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other campaign</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural celebration</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>15.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commemoration</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ceremony</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event Characteristic</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number of Ethnic Groups Involved</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 to 3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 to 6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 or more</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>25.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unable to code a</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>52.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Types of Organizations Involved</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panethnic organization</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>42.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic organization</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>33.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None b</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>23.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Length of Event</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than 3 hours</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 to 24 hours</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>22.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 to 5 days</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>16.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than 5 days</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unable to code c</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>42.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Size of Event</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than 100 participants</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>16.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100 to 1,000 participants</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>39.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,000 to 9,000 participants</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>33.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9,000 to 20,000 participants</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than 20,000</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unable to code c</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a These events could not be coded because the newspaper articles simply described the participants as Asians or Asian Americans.

b No organizations—ethnic or panethnic—were reported as being present at the event.

c These events could not be coded because the newspaper articles describing the events did not include enough information.
tive of all pan-Asian collective action events, but they describe this sample of the most visible events.

EXPLANATORY VARIABLES: STRUCTURAL AND DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGES


Economic Processes: Standard Competition Variables

Following researchers who test competition theory (e.g., Olzak 1992; Olzak and Shanahan 1996; Soule 1992), I included independent variables that measure increases in contact between ethnically distinct populations (immigration rate) and economic indicators that measure the level of resources available in a particular geographical area (poverty rate, unemployment rate). All variables are predicted to intensify competition and lead to collective action based on a pan-national or panethnic boundary.

I also constructed unemployment ratios (Jacobs and Wood 1999; Ong and Valenzuela 1996), comparing Asians to whites and nonwhites, and specific Asian ethnic groups to all other Asians, in order to measure relative resources between groups of interest. When the value of the ratio increases, the relative resources (measured as percent unemployed) of the two groups are becoming more equal and intergroup competition should erupt. For example, if the Asian/nonwhite unemployment ratio increases in value, this indicates that nonwhite percent unemployed is decreasing and/or Asian percent unemployed is increasing.11 In this situation, Asians are likely to feel threatened by the gains made by Latinos and blacks, and the result will be competition and collective action based on pan-national boundaries. Likewise, when relative gains are made by all other Asian groups, specific Asian groups will compete for resources, diminishing the ability of groups to come together and engage in panethnic collective action.

Segregation Processes: Cultural Division of Labor Variables

Previous studies testing the cultural division of labor theory have used general occupational segregation indices as explanatory variables. For example, Olzak (1992) used the isolation index (P*), a measure of occupational segregation that does not distinguish between specialization in particular occupations and concentration in low-paying occupations, as the theory specifies. In addition, the isolation index is affected by group participation in the labor force (or more simply put, group size) and has only been used to compare two groups at a time, which is inaccurate for an analysis comparing the level of segregation relative to other ethnic or racial groups in the same geographical location.

To test the cultural division of labor perspective, I use explanatory variables that measure the degree to which segmental and hierarchical cultural divisions of labor occur within a local labor market.12 I constructed

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10 Variables measuring Asian characteristics (i.e., unemployment and occupational segregation) are calculated by compiling data on Japanese, Chinese, Koreans, and Filipinos. Because data for South Asians and Vietnamese, as well as other numerous national-origin groups, were not reported until 1980, the focus remained on the four major Asian groups.

11 Appendix A presents the average level of unemployment for all groups.

12 I use measures of occupational segregation because the cultural division of labor theory focuses on how the occupational distribution of ethnic and cultural groups affects levels of ethnic collective action. Competition theorists have also used measures of occupational segregation
an Asian labor market segregation index (Charles 1992; Charles and Grusky 1995) that measures the degree to which Asians as a group experience occupational specialization in each MSA relative to other ethnic/racial groups. To calculate the index, I used the following equation:

$$\frac{1}{I} \sum_{i=1}^{I} \ln\left(\frac{A_i}{N_i}\right) - \frac{1}{I} \sum_{i=1}^{I} \ln\left(\frac{A_i}{N_i}\right)$$

(1)

to understand competition effects (Olzak 1992). Earlier models included residential segregation variables, but they had no significant effects on the dependent variable, nor did they change the magnitude of estimates and levels of significance of the other independent variables.

where $A_i$ is the total number of Asian workers in occupation $i$, $N_i$ is the total number of Latino/white/black workers in occupation $i$, and $I$ is number of occupational categories. The main advantage of this index over other measures of segregation (such as $D$ or $P^*$) is the fact that it is not influenced by the occupational structure (i.e., the relative sizes of segregated and integrated occupations) or the ethnic/racial composition of the labor force. In a perfectly integrated labor market, the index equals 0. As the index increases, Asians experience higher levels of occupational segregation relative to the other racial groups. I also constructed a measure of
Asian ethnic group segregation, or the degree to which specific Asian ethnic groups are occupationally specialized compared to all other Asian ethnic groups combined.

The *Asian labor market hierarchy index* (Diez Medrano 1994) measures the degree to which Asians as a group are concentrated in low-paying occupations. To calculate the hierarchy index, I used the following equation:

\[ H = \frac{A_{ls}}{W_{ls}} - \left( \frac{1}{k} \sum_{i} \frac{A_i}{W_i} \right), \]

where \( A_i \) is the number of Asian ethnic group members in occupation \( i \), \( W_i \) is the number of Latino/white/black workers in occupation \( i \), \( A_{ls} \) is the number of Asian low-skill workers, and \( W_{ls} \) is the number of Latino/black/white low-skill workers. Because this index is calculated by subtracting the average ratio of Asians to other racial groups from the ratio of Asians to other racial groups in low-skilled and low-status occupations, the ethnic/racial composition of the labor force does not influence the index. As the hierarchy index increases, there is a high degree of concentration of Asians at the bottom of the labor market structure. In addition, I calculated this index to measure the extent to which a particular Asian ethnic group is hierarchically segregated compared with all other Asian ethnic groups.

Given that census data were not readily available at lower levels of aggregation for some ethnic groups, I used 13 broad occupational categories, defined by the census, to calculate the segregation and hierarchy indices. Past studies employing these indices have also used broad occupational categories (e.g., Charles 1992; Diez Medrano 1994). The categories I use include: (1) executive, administrative, and managerial; (2) professional; (3) technicians and related support; (4) sales; (5) administrative support, including clerical; (6) private household; (7) protective service; (8) service, excluding protective and household; (9) farming, forestry, and fishing; (10) precision production, craft, and repair; (11) machine operators, assemblers, and inspectors; (12) transportation and material moving; (13) handlers, equipment cleaners, helpers, laborers.

The *levels* of Asian segregation and hierarchy are used to test the cultural division of labor theory: An increase in Asian labor market segregation and hierarchy should lead to an increase in panethnic collective action via the mechanisms of intragroup interaction, common economic interests, and membership in a community of fate. These mechanisms are more closely related to the level of segregation rather than the change in segregation; as the level of segregation increases, these elements should develop, leading to collective action. But within the context of a dynamic analysis, a change in the level of segregation would be consistent with the theory as well. Nonetheless, the levels of Asian ethnic group segregation and hierarchy are used to test the theoretical extension: An increase in the occupational segregation of different Asian ethnic groups should lead to a decrease in pan-Asian behavior because these groups are segregated from one another and are unable to create ties that transcend ethnic or national-origin boundaries.

To test competition theory, I created *five-year change variables* for Asian labor market segregation and hierarchy. The theory suggests that a breakdown in labor market segregation will lead to an increase in contact and competition between racial and ethnic groups, resulting in higher levels of panethnic behavior. Because competition theory explicitly focuses on changing levels of segregation (or integration) that are perceived as threatening to group interests, I use change variables here. I also constructed change variables for individual Asian ethnic group segregation and hierarchy to test the theoretical extension. According to competition theory, a breakdown in Japanese, Chinese, Filipino, and Korean occupational specialization should lead to an increase in contact and competition between Asian ethnic groups and pan-Asian collective action should decrease. In sum, by using both level

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13 The labor market segregation index is a general occupational index that measures the extent of segregation throughout the occupational structure, whereas the labor market hierarchy index is a more specified measure of occupational segregation, emphasizing the degree to which groups are segregated into the lower levels of the occupational structure.

14 Additional descriptive statistics of the segregation index are provided in Appendix B.
and change variables, two different mechanisms are being tested in the models.

The descriptive statistics in Table 3 show that over a five-year period, there has been an average decrease in the level of occupational segregation of Asians as a group, but the average change in level of occupational hierarchy has increased slightly. For all Asian ethnic groups, with the exception of Japanese, occupational segregation has, on average, decreased over a five-year period. Concentration in low-status occupations has decreased for Chinese and Koreans, and increased for Japanese and Filipinos. The average level of occupational segregation for Asians as a group is moderate, with the highest level associated with Koreans and the lowest with Chinese. Finally, the average level of occupational hierarchy for Asians is relatively low, indicating that the ratio of
Asians to other racial groups located in low-skilled occupations is slightly higher than the average ratio across occupations. For Filipinos, Japanese, and Koreans, the average levels of occupational hierarchy are also relatively low, but indicate that concentration in low-skilled occupations is slightly lower than the average across occupations for all other Asian groups.

OTHER VARIABLES

CONTROL VARIABLES

To ensure that the results are not affected by population differences among MSAs, I controlled for size of geographic region by including the log of population in all models. I also included the number of pan-Asian events within each MSA that occurred prior to each pan-Asian collective action event to control for unobserved heterogeneity introduced through lack of independence among repeated observations in a geographic region. The event history model used in the analysis controls for the influence of the location or any unmeasured quality of the location that might have an effect on the rate of protest and solidarity events. This means that the model automatically controls for New York, Chicago, and Los Angeles effects, which is important given that the event data came from three national newspapers in these locations.

I included percent Asian for each MSA as a control for group size. I also constructed a heterogeneity index (Lieberson 1969; Shanahan and Olzak 1999) that measures the diversity of Asian ethnic groups in an MSA. The index is calculated using the following equation:

\[ A = 1 - \sum n_i^2, \]  

where \( n \) is the proportion of ethnic group(s), and \( k \) is the number of Asian ethnic groups in the geographic area. The index represents the probability that randomly paired individuals in the Asian population come from different countries of origin. The values of the index range from 0 (no diversity) to 1 (maximum diversity). The heterogeneity index controls for the fact that simple demographics could explain group formation processes (Blau, Beeker, and Fitzpatrick 1994; Blau, Blum, and Schwartz 1982). In other words, if several Asian ethnic groups reside in one area, where one group alone cannot mobilize successfully based on an ethnic boundary, pan-Asian behavior may be more likely to occur. On the other hand, when one Asian ethnic group is dominant in size and there is less of a need to form a coalition across ethnic boundaries, pan-Asian behavior might be less common (Cheng and Yang 1994; Espiritu 1992).

In addition, I constructed a variable to measure the number of prior racially or ethnically motivated attacks on Asian Americans in each MSA. The data used to create this variable were taken from the New York Times, Los Angeles Times, and Chicago Tribune. An event reported as a racially motivated attack of an Asian person by a non-Asian person was considered an attack. The article had to specify that the attack was racially motivated (i.e., racist remarks were made by the perpetrator). This variable provides an indicator of the level of threat that Asians may experience due to continuing attacks and press coverage of continuing attacks.

Finally, given that formal organizations based on collective identities tend to facilitate collective action by bringing groups of potential participants together and serving as solidarity and communication linkages (Kriesi 1996; McCarthy 1996; McCarthy and Zald 1987), I control for the number of pan-Asian organizations located in each MSA in each year. This variable was constructed using a nonnewspaper source, the Encyclopedia of Associations (Gale Research Co. 1970–1998), which contains more than 144,000 detailed listings for nonprofit membership organizations.

ETHNIC AND PANETHNIC ORGANIZING

I explore the relationship between ethnic and panethnic organizing with four main variables. Two of the variables have already been described: number of prior pan-Asian events in each MSA, and number of pan-Asian organizations in each MSA. The remaining two variables measure ethnic collective action: number of prior collective action events, and number of organizations located in each MSA that are based on a national-origin or
Data on pan-Asian collective action events were collected first and then matched with structural characteristics and demographic changes associated with 30 MSAs with the largest Asian American populations. The dependent variable is the duration between collective action events, or the rate of collective action events in each of the 30 MSAs (see Appendix C for a list of MSAs). There are 404 spells in the analysis: Three hundred forty-five (345) are censored (either ending in an ethnic event or representing a final spell for each of the MSAs), and 59 are uncensored, representing the occurrence of a pan-Asian collective action event.

**RESULTS**

**Intergroup Dynamics**

The results in Table 4 show the effects of competition and segregation variables on the rate of pan-Asian collective action events. The baseline model (Model 1) includes only the control variables and provides a starting point for the evaluation of the other models. In Model 2, occupational segregation variables are added. The estimate for the current level of occupational segregation is not significant, but the change variable is positive and significant. The cultural division of labor...
Table 4. Partial Likelihood Effects of Asian Competition and Cultural Division of Labor Variables on Rate of Pan-Asian Collective Action Events, 1970 to 1998

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variable</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Economic Conditions</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigration rate</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment rate</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty rate</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian/white unemployment</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian/nonwhite unemployment</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Occupational Segregation</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian labor force segregation</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in Asian labor force segregation</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Control Variables</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heterogeneity index</td>
<td>1.871*</td>
<td>4.725*</td>
<td>.832</td>
<td>4.748</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Heterogeneity index)²</td>
<td>-1.418*</td>
<td>-3.354*</td>
<td>- .867</td>
<td>-3.903</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log of population</td>
<td>-3.674</td>
<td>-4.048</td>
<td>1.409</td>
<td>2.106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of prior pan-Asian events</td>
<td>.286**</td>
<td>.373**</td>
<td>.156</td>
<td>.267</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of pan-Asian organizations</td>
<td>.182</td>
<td>-.154</td>
<td>.552*</td>
<td>.770</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Asian</td>
<td>-3.593</td>
<td>-5.377</td>
<td>-4.150</td>
<td>-2.617*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of prior attacks on Asians</td>
<td>-.016</td>
<td>.017</td>
<td>-.064</td>
<td>.180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degrees of freedom</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-2 log-likelihood</td>
<td>360.56</td>
<td>328.53</td>
<td>355.67</td>
<td>316.37</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Numbers in parentheses are estimated standard errors. Number of uncensored spells = 59. Values for likelihood ratio tests are as follows: Model 1 vs. Model 2 = 32.02 (p < .01, d.f. = 2); Model 1 vs. Model 3 = 4.88 (n.s., d.f. = 5); Model 3 vs. Model 4 = 39.30 (p < .01, d.f. = 2); Model 2 vs. Model 4 = 12.17 (p < .01, d.f. = 5).

*p < .05       **p < .01 (one-tailed tests)

bor theory predicted that increases in the level of occupational specialization for Asians as a group would increase the rate of collective action, but this is not supported here. The statistical significance of the correlations below .40 between the independent variables measuring competition and cultural divisions of labor. In all models, the variation inflation factors were below 3.0. The results remain robust when the squared term is included, and therefore I present those results here. In addition, I estimated models with protest and solidarity
regation (or alternatively, the integration of occupations) would spur intergroup competition and collective action. Here, I find that the opposite dynamics are occurring: The positive change in the level of Asian occupational segregation facilitates pan-Asian protest and solidarity events. The estimates for the level and change in Asian labor force hierarchy do not have significant effects on the rate of pan-Asian collective action events, and therefore are not shown here.\(^\text{17}\)

The estimates for competition variables are shown in Model 3. Predictions derived from competition theory claimed that immigration would have a positive effect on pan-Asian collective action, as the entrance of new ethnically distinct immigrants would lead to competition for scarce resources and pan-national activity to maintain or increase collective resources.\(^\text{18}\) In addition, it was predicted that the poverty rate and unemployment rate—indicators of declining economic conditions—would also have positive effects. The estimates for the general competition variables are not significant. However, the estimate for Asian/white unemployment is significant and negative, suggesting that when the relative resources of the two groups become more equal (i.e., when Asian unemployment begins to increase and/or white unemployment begins to decline), this leads to a decrease in the rate of collective action among Asian Americans. This is counter to competition predictions, which state that increasing equality between the two groups should lead to higher levels of intergroup competition and collective action because one group is making gains relative to the other.

In the full model (Model 4), the estimates for Asian occupational segregation and Asian/white unemployment are highly significant. The results show that net of competition variables and controls, an increase in the change in occupational specialization raises the rate of pan-Asian collective action. In addition, as the relative resources of Asians and whites become more equal, this leads to a decrease in the rate of pan-Asian collective action. These findings, along with the nonsignificant estimates of the general competition variables, suggest that competition between racial groups is not driving pan-Asian collective action.

Note that some of the control variables in Table 4 are significant. As expected, the number of prior pan-Asian events is highly significant and positive, suggesting that past pan-Asian activity increases the rate of pan-Asian collective action. In addition, increasing numbers of pan-Asian organizations, as well as Asian ethnic heterogeneity, increase the frequency of pan-Asian collective action events. The squared term for heterogeneity is negative and significant in two of the models, indicating that after a certain threshold, the level of Asian diversity depresses the rate of pan-Asian activity.

When comparing across models, the goodness-of-fit measures indicate which model fits the data best. To compare the log-likelihood ratios for Model 1 and Model 2, the two ratios are subtracted from one another and the difference is a chi-square of 32.02, which is statistically significant at the \(p < .01\) level with two degrees of freedom. This means that including occupational segregation variables in Model 2 improves the fit of the model. Comparing the log-likelihoods of Models 1 and 3, the difference is 4.88, which is not statistically significant and indicates that the addition of the five economic condition variables does not improve the fit of the model. The log-likelihood ratio comparisons suggest that Model 4 is a significant improvement in fit over Model 3 and that there is a significant difference between Model 2 and Model 4. Thus, these comparisons show that Model 4, which includes economic conditions and occupational segregation variables, fits the data best.

**Intragroup Dynamics**

How do competition and segregation between Asian ethnic groups affect pan-Asian

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\(^{17}\) The model is available upon request from the author.

\(^{18}\) Additional models were run including percent Asian immigration, percent non-Asian immigration, and the respective change variables. None of the immigration variables had significant effects on pan-Asian collective action.
Table 5. Partial Likelihood Effects of Asian Subgroup Competition and Segregation Variables on Rate of Pan-Asian Collective Action Events, 1970 to 1998

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variable</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Economic Conditions</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigration rate</td>
<td>.085</td>
<td>-.118</td>
<td>.020</td>
<td>.113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(a)</td>
<td>(.059)</td>
<td>(.077)</td>
<td>(.030)</td>
<td>(.103)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment ratio</td>
<td>.858</td>
<td>1.071</td>
<td>-.069</td>
<td>-5.141**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b)</td>
<td>(1.325)</td>
<td>(1.963)</td>
<td>(.082)</td>
<td>(.207)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Occupational Segregation</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic labor force hierarchy</td>
<td>-4.084</td>
<td>-3.713*</td>
<td>-7.169**</td>
<td>-8.087</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c)</td>
<td>(3.375)</td>
<td>(1.917)</td>
<td>(2.939)</td>
<td>(13.756)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in ethnic labor force hierarchy</td>
<td>-8.912**</td>
<td>-5.051</td>
<td>3.065</td>
<td>-2.571</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(d)</td>
<td>(3.898)</td>
<td>(4.350)</td>
<td>(2.460)</td>
<td>(1.788)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Control Variables</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heterogeneity index</td>
<td>3.894</td>
<td>1.368</td>
<td>4.179*</td>
<td>7.218**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2.232)</td>
<td>(1.620)</td>
<td>(1.970)</td>
<td>(2.872)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Heterogeneity index)^2</td>
<td>-3.480**</td>
<td>-1.257</td>
<td>-3.526**</td>
<td>-5.486**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1.563)</td>
<td>(1.100)</td>
<td>(1.479)</td>
<td>(2.122)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population (log)</td>
<td>-1.510*</td>
<td>-4.269</td>
<td>.438</td>
<td>-3.362**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(e)</td>
<td>(.851)</td>
<td>(7.003)</td>
<td>(1.159)</td>
<td>(1.366)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of prior pan-Asian events</td>
<td>.636**</td>
<td>.532**</td>
<td>.524**</td>
<td>.262</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(f)</td>
<td>(.212)</td>
<td>(.178)</td>
<td>(.186)</td>
<td>(1.181)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of pan-Asian organizations</td>
<td>3.265**</td>
<td>.622*</td>
<td>1.980*</td>
<td>1.027*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(g)</td>
<td>(1.333)</td>
<td>(.325)</td>
<td>(.938)</td>
<td>(.548)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent ethnic group</td>
<td>-2.656</td>
<td>2.952</td>
<td>5.298*</td>
<td>4.537</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(h)</td>
<td>(1.743)</td>
<td>(4.841)</td>
<td>(2.714)</td>
<td>(5.954)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of prior attacks on Asians</td>
<td>-.054</td>
<td>-.167*</td>
<td>-.024</td>
<td>-.027</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(i)</td>
<td>(.107)</td>
<td>(.086)</td>
<td>(.112)</td>
<td>(.104)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian labor force hierarchy</td>
<td>9.833*</td>
<td>-3.063</td>
<td>7.523*</td>
<td>-6.070*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(j)</td>
<td>(5.900)</td>
<td>(4.003)</td>
<td>(3.953)</td>
<td>(3.302)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in Asian labor force hierarchy</td>
<td>1.975**</td>
<td>1.877*</td>
<td>-4.889</td>
<td>5.971*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(k)</td>
<td>(.725)</td>
<td>(1.106)</td>
<td>(4.901)</td>
<td>(3.057)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>–2 log-likelihood</td>
<td>308.14</td>
<td>325.21</td>
<td>311.88</td>
<td>317.51</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Numbers in parentheses are estimated standard errors. Number of uncensored spells = 59. The four models test the effects of unemployment ratio, immigration rate, and occupational segregation for each national origin group on the rate of pan-Asian collective action. The models include group-specific variables for Chinese, Filipinos, Japanese, and Koreans respectively.

a Immigration rate measures the rate of Asian out-group immigrants who move to metropolitan areas. For example, in Model 1, the immigration rate measures the percentage of non-Chinese Asian immigrants who enter particular MSAs.

b The unemployment ratio measures the relative resources of specific Asian ethnic subgroups (measured as percent unemployed) compared with all other Asian ethnic subgroups combined. For example, in Model 1 the unemployment ratio measures the relative level of unemployment between Chinese and all other Asian subgroups.

c Ethnic labor force hierarchy measures the degree to which specific Asian ethnic subgroups are concentrated in low-status occupations. For example, in Model 1, the ethnic hierarchy index measures the degree to which Chinese are concentrated in low-status occupations relative to all other Asian subgroups.

*p < .05  **p < .01 (one-tailed tests)
outcomes? Event history models including occupational hierarchy indices, immigration rates, and unemployment ratios specific to each Asian ethnic group (Chinese, Filipino, Japanese, Korean) are shown in Table 5. None of the estimates for the levels and changes in occupational segregation were significant, and thus they are not shown here. The immigration rates included in each model in Table 5 measure the rate of immigration for out-group members. For example, in Model 1, which includes measures of occupational hierarchy and unemployment ratios for Chinese compared with all other Asian groups, the immigration rate measures the percent of non-Chinese Asian immigrants entering a metropolitan area in a given year. The estimates for this variable are not significant in any of the models, suggesting that competition between different Asian ethnic groups does not affect pan-Asian activity.

Only one of the unemployment ratios is significant. Specifically, the estimate in Model 4 indicates that the ratio of resources between Koreans and all other Asian ethnic groups affects pan-Asian activity. When percent unemployed increases for Koreans and/or percent unemployed declines for all other Asian groups, the rate of pan-national activity among Asian Americans decreases. As relative resources become more equal, competition theory predicted that each national-origin group would feel threatened by the gains made by other Asian ethnic groups and the result would be competition, which would have a dampening effect on pan-Asian activity. This relationship is supported in Model 4.

The effects of the occupational hierarchy variables for Asian ethnic groups on the rate of protest and solidarity events are also shown in Table 5. The levels and changes in Asian occupational hierarchy are included in each model as controls; Asian ethnic group segregation indices could simply be a measure of overall Asian segregation and including these variables controls for this possibility. Thus, the estimates for specific group segregation indices are net of these effects.

To further test competition theory, I examined the changes in the level of occupational hierarchy for each national-origin group in each of the four models presented. The coefficient for the change variable is negative (Model 1), which indicates that an increase in the concentration in lower levels of the occupational hierarchy for Chinese decreases the level of pan-Asian activity. The theoretical extension of competition theory predicted that a breakdown in occupational segregation would decrease pan-Asian collective action, which is not supported here.

Turning to the levels of ethnic labor market hierarchy, two estimates for this variable are significant and negative, indicating that the occupational segregation of Filipinos and Japanese is important for understanding pan-Asian activity. Specifically, as these groups become more occupationally segregated, the frequency of pan-Asian collective action events decreases. This effect is in the predicted direction in support of cultural division of labor theory, as segregation along ethnic lines should diminish panethnic ties. This result can be interpreted in an alternative way, however: As segregation declines over time and integration among Asian ethnic groups increases, there is a rise in the frequency of pan-Asian collective efforts.

Ethnic-Panethnic Dynamics

What is the relationship between ethnic and panethnic organizing? Does one preclude the other? The results in Model 1 in Table 6 show that the number of prior pan-Asian events and the number of pan-Asian organizations within each MSA increases the rate of pan-Asian activity. This finding supports past research regarding the effects of prior

19 Reduced models are available from author. Means and standard deviations for Asian out-group immigration rates are shown in Appendix A. Additional models were estimated including overall immigration rate and the results remained the same.

20 Analyses for Vietnamese and South Asians were also conducted for 1980 to 1998. In these models, none of the independent variables were significant. Given their different immigration histories, it is interesting to note that the structured relations of the two groups did not significantly affect pan-Asian efforts. It may be that Vietnamese and South Asians have not yet been incorporated into Asian American communities and therefore have not had a chance to influence the rate of pan-Asian collective action.
unrest on rates of ethnic protest and riot activity (Olzak et al. 1996) and past work regarding the key role of organizations in creating resources, connecting potential participants, and framing relevant issues, all of which contribute to successful collective action (McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996).

The results thus far indicate that the relationship between ethnic and panethnic events is competitive; the occurrence of one form does not improve, but stifles, the chances for success of the other form. Model 3 shows the estimates for ethnic and panethnic collective action variables in the same model, net of controls. In this model, the positive effect of pan-Asian organizations disappears, and the estimate for ethnic organizations becomes significant and positive. The effect of the number of prior ethnic events remains significant. These findings indicate that pan-Asian organizations are not needed to increase the rate of pan-Asian activity if there are also increasing numbers of Asian ethnic organizations. The estimate for ethnic organizations suggests a mutualistic relationship in which ethnic organizations create viable models for pan-Asian collective action and provide the necessary foundation for the formation of pan-national identities. The nonsignificant effect for pan-Asian organizations indicates

\[ \text{Panethnic Collective Action} \]

\[
\begin{array}{l|cccc}
\text{Number of prior pan-Asian events} & .453^{**} & .588^{**} & .491^{**} & .422^{*} \\
\text{Number of pan-Asian organizations} & .404^{*} & -.107 & -.084 & 1.288^{*} \\
\end{array}
\]

\[ \text{Ethnic Collective Action} \]

\[
\begin{array}{l|cccc}
\text{Number of prior Asian ethnic events} & -.009^{*} & -.010^{*} & -.040^{**} & -.009 \\
\text{Number of Asian ethnic organizations} & .251 & .403^{*} & .385 & 1.412^{*} \\
\end{array}
\]

\[ \text{Interactions} \]

\[
\begin{array}{l|cccc}
\text{Pan-Asian events} \times \text{ethnic events} & .002^{*} & .001 & \text{Pan-Asian organizations} \times \text{ethnic organizations} & -.062^{*} \\
\end{array}
\]

\[ \text{Degrees of freedom} \]

\[
\begin{array}{llllll}
12 & 12 & 14 & 15 & 15 \\
\end{array}
\]

\[ \text{–2 log-likelihood} \]

\[
\begin{array}{llllll}
328.35 & 331.08 & 321.45 & 317.76 & 314.36 \\
\end{array}
\]

\textit{Note:} Numbers in parentheses are estimated standard errors. Number of uncensored spells = 59. Control variables are included in the models but are not shown here. Control variables are all measured at the MSA level and include the heterogeneity index, heterogeneity index squared, log of population, number of attacks against Asians, percent Asian, immigration rate, unemployment rate, poverty rate, occupational segregation index, and five-year change in occupational segregation index.

\[ * p < .05 \quad ** p < .01 \text{ (one-tailed tests)} \]

\[ \text{Table 6. Partial Likelihood Effects of Ethnic Collective Action on Rate of Pan-Asian Collective Action Events, 1970 to 1998} \]

\[ \text{Independent Variable} \]

\[ \text{Model 1} \quad \text{Model 2} \quad \text{Model 3} \quad \text{Model 4} \quad \text{Model 5} \]

\[ \text{Panethnic Collective Action} \]

\[ \text{Ethnic Collective Action} \]

\[ \text{Interactions} \]

\[ \text{Degrees of freedom} \]

\[ \text{–2 log-likelihood} \]

\[ \text{Note:} \] Numbers in parentheses are estimated standard errors. Number of uncensored spells = 59. Control variables are included in the models but are not shown here. Control variables are all measured at the MSA level and include the heterogeneity index, heterogeneity index squared, log of population, number of attacks against Asians, percent Asian, immigration rate, unemployment rate, poverty rate, occupational segregation index, and five-year change in occupational segregation index.

\[ * p < .05 \quad ** p < .01 \text{ (one-tailed tests)} \]
that there may not be enough resources for ethnic and panethnic organizations in the same metropolitan area, but this does not preclude ethnic organizations from facilitating pan-Asian activities.

To explore the relationship between ethnic and panethnic events, Model 4 introduces an interaction term between the number of prior panethnic events and the number of prior ethnic events. The interaction term is significant and positive, net of controls. The estimate for ethnic events remains negative and the magnitude is small, suggesting that prior ethnic events has a slight dampening effect on the rate of pan-Asian collective action. But the positive interaction term indicates that when the number of pan-Asian events increases, the effect is less negative (and may even turn positive).

In other words, there is an initial competitive effect of ethnic events that is tempered by an increasing number of panethnic events. It may be that as more pan-Asian events occur and are visible to local communities and to communities across the nation, an infrastructure (i.e., organizations, networks, resources) to support pan-Asian collective action develops. The organizations, networks, and resources directed at facilitating ethnic activities are no longer being used to encourage both ethnic and panethnic collective action. Thus, the events have a less competitive effect when more panethnic events occur.

In Model 5, I include the interaction between the number of ethnic and panethnic organizations. The negative and significant estimate of the interaction term indicates that the positive effect of ethnic organizations on panethnic collective action diminishes as the number of pan-Asian organizations increases. This finding suggests that ethnic organizations initially provide a foundation for pan-Asian collective action, and as more pan-Asian organizations form and develop stronger ties in the community, a division of labor develops. In other words, as pan-Asian organizations increase in numbers, there is less of a need for ethnic organizations to facilitate panethnic collective action.

Overall, the results in Table 6 suggest that the relationship between ethnic and panethnic collective action is complex. On one hand, higher numbers of ethnic events decrease the rate of pan-Asian activity; on the other hand, increasing numbers of pan-Asian events lessen the negative effect of ethnic events. In addition, the increasing number of Asian ethnic organizations facilitates pan-Asian collective action, supporting the notion of a layering effect in which identities expand and contract under certain circumstances.

**DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION**

Ethnic boundaries are not static but instead have a shifting and layered character that responds to structural factors outside of the group. I have focused here on the expansion of group boundaries based on national origin, which results in the emergence of panethnic identities and collective action. What structural conditions promote the expansion of group boundaries to construct a new, broader solidarity that transcends differences in language, culture, national origin, collective history, and past mutual animosities? What factors give rise to panethnic collective action among Asian Americans?

To address these questions, I began with two well-established and competing theories of boundary formation—competition theory and cultural division of labor theory. Competition theory argues that labor market competition between ethnic groups leads to a heightening of ethnic boundaries. The cultural division of labor theory posits that it is not contact and competition, but labor market segregation that encourages higher levels of ethnic solidarity. Given the clear predictions for ethnic solidarity and collective action, I extended these theoretical perspectives in two ways. First, I applied the theories to the phenomenon of panethnicity. Specifically, two alternative labor market processes were hypothesized: (1) Competition between Asians and other ethnic/racial groups should lead various Asian national-origin groups to engage in panethnic collective action, or (2) the occupational segregation of Asians as a group should foster pan-national interests and networks that lead Asian national-origin groups to participate in pan-national collective action. Second, a theoretical extension was needed because the theories did not address processes of
competition and segregation at the larger, panethnic level and at the smaller, national-origin level. In other words, both theories could not account for the increasing complexities associated with intergroup relations in a context where boundaries can expand and contract. Thus, I constructed new predictions about intragroup dynamics, or the dynamics that occur within panethnic group boundaries. Extending competition and cultural division of labor theories, the hypotheses specified that labor market competition between Asian national-origin groups should detract from panethnic collective action, or that the occupational segregation of different national-origin groups from one another should foster ethnic interests and networks, detracting from participation in pan-national collective action.

To test these hypotheses, I used event history methods and a new, longitudinal data set from 1970 to 1998 of publicly visible collective action events involving Asian Americans. The results are consistent with the cultural division of labor theory: An increase in the level of Asian occupational segregation increases the rate of pan-Asian collective action. This suggests that occupational segregation generates panethnic group identity via the mechanisms of intergroup interaction, common economic interests, and membership in a community of fate. The results also reveal that when Asian ethnic groups are occupationally segregated from one another into low-status occupations, national-origin or ethnic identities are likely to be heightened because of their propinquity in the workplace, similar economic interests, and being part of community of fate; this has a dampening effect on pan-Asian collective action. In other words, segregation processes occurring within the panethnic group shape pan-Asian collective action.

Intragroup competition processes also contribute to decreasing rates of collective action based on a pan-national boundary. The results indicate that labor market competition between Asian ethnic groups diminishes panethnic efforts. However, economic and demographic changes predicted to give rise to intergroup competition—competition between Asians and non-Asians—had no effects on the rate of pan-Asian collective action. This is particularly interesting given that in several studies the competition model has successfully predicted the structural conditions that facilitate dominant group protest and attack (see Olzak 1992; Olzak et al. 1996; Soule 1992; Soule and Van Dyke 1999). In these studies, the protest activities and attacks by whites against other ethnic groups were responses to real or perceived economic and/or political gains. Yet competition processes in the standard sense were not central in understanding increasing rates of panethnic collective action. There is no evidence that Asian Americans engaged in protest and solidarity events because they felt threatened by other groups who were making gains and potentially moving up the racial hierarchy ahead of them. Instead, Asian Americans participated in pan-national events in order to fight against the prejudice, discrimination, and violence directed at them, which might have been the result of competitive efforts by the dominant group. The collective action data reveal that the majority of pan-Asian events were reactive, a grievance or claim tied to a previous event that usually involved some form of prejudice or discrimination against Asian Americans (see Table 1).

Another reason why this analysis may not have supported the competition mechanism is because competition theory takes salient ethnic identities for granted; economic processes and demographic changes that occur in any context may not result in collective action. Given the right conditions, specifically when ethnic and racial identities have been made salient, competition mechanisms might be useful. The cultural division of labor theory specifies the conditions that produce ethnic solidarity, and by extension, panethnic solidarity. It may be that when competition is introduced in such a context, collective action will occur. The two theories presented here may in fact be explaining related but distinct processes: The cultural division of labor theory is more relevant to emergent group boundaries because it can explain how and why group boundaries form; competition theory takes these group boundaries as given and emphasizes the conditions that solidify preexisting boundaries (Hechter and Okamoto 2001; Okamoto 2001).
Even though the competition and cultural division of labor theories have competing hypotheses and suggest different causal mechanisms for understanding panethnic collective action, these theories can be viewed not only as interdependent but as part of the same historical process. Labor market segregation and competition should be viewed as outcomes of a larger competitive process that shapes group formation and collective action. Intergroup competition may occur in the wake of a cultural division of labor. When a group dominates an occupational niche, other groups might challenge that monopoly. But competition, broadly construed, also shapes occupational segregation. A cultural division of labor can be generated by a queuing process in which immigrants and ethnic minorities are often at the bottom of the queue and subsequently become concentrated in certain occupations left unfilled by those ahead of them in the queue (Reskin 1990; Waldinger 1996). This queuing process may be seen as part of a competitive process in which certain groups are pushed into particular occupations to create a buffer for dominant groups, and subordinate groups enter particular occupations to create a buffer for themselves (Bonacich 1972, 1973; Portes and Manning 1986). The dominant group works to maintain its position at the top of the hierarchy, while the other racial and ethnic groups below attempt to stake out secure positions of their own. Thus, when one takes a broader historical view, segregation and competition, as specified by the competition and cultural division of labor theories, are shaped by the same competitive processes.

Finally, the analyses exploring the relationship between ethnic and panethnic organizing focused on understanding whether these two distinct ways of organizing compete with or reinforce each other. In general, the results indicate that ethnic and panethnic organizing is mutualistic, not competitive. Ethnic organizations facilitate panethnic activities, but this effect diminishes as the number of pan-Asian organizations increases and begins to manage that activity. Ethnic organizations thus provide a foundation for pan-Asian efforts, and as more pan-Asian organizations form, there is less need for ethnic organizations to facilitate panethnic collective action. Ethnic collective action events initially play a competitive role in relation to panethnic events, but as more pan-Asian events occur, there is less competition between ethnic and panethnic events. This is consistent with Espiritu’s (1992) interpretation of the Vincent Chin case. Before this case, Asian Americans in Detroit (and in other locations) tended to organize along ethnic lines. When Asian Americans realized that the Chin case affected all national-origin communities, protests and demonstration erupted, organizations were created, and networks between organizations and communities were formed—all along a pan-Asian boundary. Ethnic organizations promoted pan-Asian activities that used up resources that could have been directed toward ethnic activities. But over time, as more pan-Asian events occurred, ethnic and panethnic collective action often provided different functions and needs, supporting the idea that identities are layered, not competitive and exclusive. In sum, these analyses show that mobilization efforts based on an ethnic or national-origin identity do not preclude pan-national collective action. Ethnic and panethnic organizing are mutual processes in which ethnic organizations are a necessary building block for successful pan-Asian collective action.

Overall, this research identifies the key structural factors that promote and hinder emergent panethnicity. I find that the same dynamics occur at the larger, panethnic level and at the smaller, national-origin level: A change in overall Asian segregation increases the rate of pan-Asian collective action, while segregation among Asian ethnic groups depresses the level of pan-Asian collective action. At both levels, the same mechanism is at work—segregation processes foster common interests, networks, and identities. In addition, intragroup competition dampens pan-national collective action efforts, while ethnic or national-origin organizing contributes to higher rates of panethnic activity.

More research needs to be done to find out whether these key factors can explain group formation processes among different ethnic and racial groups within, as well as outside of, the United States. It can be ar-
guessed that the relationships uncovered here for Asian Americans would not necessarily apply to other groups because of unique historical processes and intergroup relations that have contributed to Asian American panethnicity. However, given that other groups have experienced racialization and tend to be concentrated occupationally, the approach developed here might be productively applied to the development of panethnicity among groups such as Latinos or African Americans. As long as the dominant group perceives and defines other groups racially—as subordinate groups in the racial hierarchy—segregation processes in the labor market and other locations such as residential communities, should heighten panethnic boundaries and collective action.

My results might not generalize to whites as a panethnic group in the United States because of their location of racial privilege and dominance vis-à-vis nonwhites. Occupational segregation may not have the same consolidating effects for European Americans because their ethnic identities have not been expressed as a shared sense of peoplehood or as a response to disadvantage and subordination in the larger stratification system, but rather as “the legitimation of dominance or the defense of group position in the face of real or perceived challenges by the subordinate groups” (Doane 1999:75; also see Doane and Bonilla-Silva 2003; Waters 1990). Thus, it is unlikely that occupational segregation will foster panethnic identities and collective action among whites. However, occupational segregation could heighten group boundaries, and when economic processes and demographic changes spur competition, collective action in defense of dominant positions could occur. It may be more fruitful, therefore, to explore the countervailing condition of intragroup competition in regard to dominant groups. The negative effect of intragroup competition found in my analyses suggests a new approach for understanding the layering of identities for dominant groups, such as whites, and for groups who have been construed as monolithic, such as U.S. blacks. Given that these groups are often segregated both residually and occupationally, it may prove difficult to calculate the degree to which national-origin groups within racial categories, such as black and white, are segregated from one another. It may be more useful to examine the extent to which competition occurs within these groups, specifically based on class for blacks and based on ethnicity and/or class for whites, and whether these dynamics can advance our understanding of the relationship between intragroup dynamics and panethnic group formation and collective action. In sum, this research moves toward a general theory of panethnicity, providing a strong foundation upon which to continue to explore and expand our understanding of ethnic and panethnic processes in contemporary society.

Dina G. Okamoto is Assistant Professor of Sociology at the University of California, Davis. She is continuing research on panethnic group formation and identity among Asian Americans in addition to undertaking cross-national work on minority group collective action in the form of protest, rebellion, and migration. Her research interests include race and ethnic relations, immigration, social inequality, and social psychology.

APPENDIX A


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Mean (S.D.)</th>
<th>Min.</th>
<th>Max.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percent Unemployed</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>.047 (.009)</td>
<td>.026</td>
<td>.072</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>.045 (.012)</td>
<td>.021</td>
<td>.082</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Filipino</td>
<td>.041 (.009)</td>
<td>.022</td>
<td>.074</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japanese</td>
<td>.025 (.006)</td>
<td>.213</td>
<td>.588</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korean</td>
<td>.047 (.012)</td>
<td>.020</td>
<td>.166</td>
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<tr>
<td>Non-Chinese</td>
<td>.112 (.197)</td>
<td>.047</td>
<td>.266</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Filipino</td>
<td>.117 (.024)</td>
<td>.047</td>
<td>.283</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Japanese</td>
<td>.133 (.027)</td>
<td>.073</td>
<td>.312</td>
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<td>Non-Korean</td>
<td>.111 (.022)</td>
<td>.027</td>
<td>.182</td>
</tr>
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<td>White</td>
<td>.052 (.016)</td>
<td>.019</td>
<td>.093</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nonwhite</td>
<td>.209 (.047)</td>
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<td>.445</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian Immigration</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Chinese</td>
<td>.787 (.096)</td>
<td>.566</td>
<td>.980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Filipino</td>
<td>.704 (.074)</td>
<td>.496</td>
<td>.885</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Japanese</td>
<td>.811 (.096)</td>
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<td>.960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Korean</td>
<td>.797 (.070)</td>
<td>.547</td>
<td>.963</td>
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</table>
APPENDIX B
Occupational Parameters for Segregation Index

To calculate the occupation-specific parameters generating the segregation index, I used the following equation,

\[ \ln(A_i/N_i) - \frac{1}{J} \sum_i \ln(A_i/N_i) \]

and the specific terms in this equation are defined in the text (see p. 823).

The values in Table B-1 indicate the representation of Asians compared with other racial groups in 13 broad occupational categories, on average, for 1970, 1980, and 1990. The value for each occupation can be interpreted as the deviation from proportional Asian representation. In general, positive values indicate overrepresentation, and negative values indicate underrepresentation. For example, Asians as a group are slightly overrepresented in executive, administrative, and managerial jobs; sales; and administrative support (including clerical) in 1990. Asians as a group are substantially overrepresented in technician and related support jobs; professional; precision production, craft, and repair; machine operators, assemblers, and inspectors in 1990.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
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<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1980 (Continued)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Executive</td>
<td>−1.551 (.701)</td>
<td>−3.853</td>
<td>−.616</td>
<td>Precision</td>
<td>−.223 (.251)</td>
<td>−.800</td>
<td>.240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>−.483 (.695)</td>
<td>−1.523</td>
<td>.944</td>
<td>Protective</td>
<td>.473 (.302)</td>
<td>−.089</td>
<td>.982</td>
</tr>
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<td>Sales</td>
<td>−2.071 (1.296)</td>
<td>−5.089</td>
<td>−.178</td>
<td>Machine operator</td>
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<td>−.462</td>
<td>1.360</td>
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<td>Administrative</td>
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<td>−1.973</td>
<td>−.144</td>
<td>Transportation</td>
<td>−.982 (.529)</td>
<td>−2.221</td>
<td>.335</td>
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<td>Housing</td>
<td>−1.240 (1.253)</td>
<td>−4.500</td>
<td>.820</td>
<td>Handlers</td>
<td>−.186 (.242)</td>
<td>−.829</td>
<td>.266</td>
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<tr>
<td>Service</td>
<td>1.372 (.601)</td>
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<td>2.981</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farming</td>
<td>−.648 (1.432)</td>
<td>−3.469</td>
<td>2.460</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Precision</td>
<td>−2.399 (1.391)</td>
<td>−6.351</td>
<td>−.014</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machine operator</td>
<td>−1.133 (1.169)</td>
<td>−5.185</td>
<td>.706</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Handlers</td>
<td>−1.810 (1.475)</td>
<td>−4.493</td>
<td>.232</td>
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<td>1980</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1990</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive</td>
<td>.142 (.373)</td>
<td>−.651</td>
<td>1.051</td>
<td>Executive</td>
<td>.062 (.232)</td>
<td>−.317</td>
<td>.633</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>.686 (.549)</td>
<td>−.414</td>
<td>1.545</td>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>.401 (.407)</td>
<td>−.521</td>
<td>1.329</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technician</td>
<td>.889 (.464)</td>
<td>−.209</td>
<td>1.777</td>
<td>Technician</td>
<td>.597 (.552)</td>
<td>−1.420</td>
<td>1.391</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sales</td>
<td>−.045 (.487)</td>
<td>−1.893</td>
<td>1.295</td>
<td>Sales</td>
<td>.075 (.362)</td>
<td>−.016</td>
<td>.611</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative</td>
<td>.006 (.252)</td>
<td>−.515</td>
<td>.588</td>
<td>Administrative</td>
<td>.053 (.324)</td>
<td>−.606</td>
<td>1.367</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household</td>
<td>−.006 (.959)</td>
<td>−3.330</td>
<td>1.301</td>
<td>Household</td>
<td>−.042 (.610)</td>
<td>−1.078</td>
<td>1.498</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service</td>
<td>−1.041 (.394)</td>
<td>−1.909</td>
<td>−.352</td>
<td>Service</td>
<td>−.838 (.416)</td>
<td>−1.769</td>
<td>−.037</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farming</td>
<td>−.281 (1.06)</td>
<td>−2.908</td>
<td>1.491</td>
<td>Farming</td>
<td>−.638 (.672)</td>
<td>−2.064</td>
<td>.652</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>−.066 (.344)</td>
<td>−.542</td>
<td>1.111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.499 (.250)</td>
<td>.129</td>
<td>1.058</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.759 (.398)</td>
<td>−.153</td>
<td>1.495</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Transportation</td>
<td>−.703 (.323)</td>
<td>−1.241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Handlers</td>
<td>−.161 (.241)</td>
<td>−.797</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: There are only 10 occupational categories for 1970. The categories of technician and transportation were included in 1980.

APPENDIX C
Thirty MSAs with the Largest Asian American Populations, 1990

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MSA</th>
<th>Asian American Total Population</th>
<th>MSA</th>
<th>Asian American Total Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anaheim–Santa Ana–Garden Grove, CA</td>
<td>250,136</td>
<td>Bergen–Passaic, NJ</td>
<td>65,679</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atlanta, GA</td>
<td>49,965</td>
<td>Boston, MA</td>
<td>94,285</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baltimore, MD</td>
<td>41,870</td>
<td>Chicago, IL</td>
<td>229,475</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Continued on next page)
Dallas–Ft. Worth, TX  95,825  Philadelphia, PA–NJ  81,204
Denver, CO   36,687  Phoenix, AZ   35,208
Detroit, MI   56,122  Portland, OR–WA  50,837
Fresno, CA   57,278  Riverside–San Bernardino, CA  100,232
Honolulu, HI  527,410  Sacramento, CA  114,820
Houston, TX  124,723  San Diego, CA  198,675
Los Angeles–Long Beach, CA  954,065  San Francisco–Oakland, CA  666,452
Middlesex–Somerset–Hunterdon, NJ  56,830  San Jose, CA  261,574
Minneapolis–St. Paul, MN  64,748  Seattle–Everett, WA  135,468
Nassau–Suffolk, NY  61,099  Stockton, CA  59,789
New York, NY   553,987  Vallejo–Fairfield–Napa, CA  47,189
Newark, NJ  52,309  Washington, D.C., MD–VA  201,502

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