RACIAL PESSIMISM

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ABSTRACT

Racial Pessimism—In the last two decades skepticism has been growing as to the validity and permanence of Western civilization. (1) Is Civilization Bankrupt? Pessimists base their belief on biological and psychological grounds. There is an apparent deterioration of the race under the pressure of a cultural equipment which grows ever more complex and artificial while psychic equipment remains simple. High specialization of industrial life has increased the rift. (2) The Peril of the White Race. The whites, and particularly the Nordics, appear to be the special victims of this strain. The ethnic interpretation of history has recently had many advocates. This doctrine underestimates the cultural factor in social evolution. It is true that the non-whites are developing an aggressive color-consciousness and that the whites are relatively declining in numbers, but the future of civilization does not depend on racial solidarity alone. (3) Pluralistic Loyalty. Racial and national types of social organization retain something of tribalistic particularism. Culture interests have not yet attained their proper place as a basis of organization and control. They make for harmony and are the best agencies of peace in national and class relations. Multiple groupings involve multiple loyalties. The social sciences should give more attention to developing loyalty, which must be the basis of a new social synthesis.

When the nineteenth century came to sum up its own achievements there were but few notes of dissent amid the flamboyant exultation. Apparently civilization had gained such enormous increments that men, having mastered the material world and achieved a surplus economy, were ready to begin developing those cultural and social capacities which had been held in abeyance by the struggle for existence. But in the decades that have since intervened there has emerged a mood of questioning and disillusion. What if the works of hand and brain prosper while brain and hand are losing their zest? The Great War brought this questioning to a head, for it demonstrated that high technical achievement may be a perilous thing in the hands of men unable or unwilling to use it prudently. It was as if a sardonic world-spirit had suddenly arrested the Occident in the flower of its boasted culture in order to audit an overdue account, or as if a parent had detected a precocious, naughty child playing with forbidden implements suited only to the elders. The question is not merely whether Western civilization has become bankrupt. Extremists discover a still graver situation and affirm that it is now finally demonstrated that the race cannot live at all under a complex civilization. They insist that, instead of going forward to
more elaboration and artificiality, we must seek safety by reverting to simpler adjustments in a life close to the instinctive level.

Amid the general disillusionment two questions stand out, one general and one special in scope. Is the present culture system an economy under which the race can continue to live and prosper? Is the white race, as the special exponent of that system, threatened with extinction, or at least with loss of hegemony?

IS CIVILIZATION BANKRUPT?

On the side of technical equipment, civilization is clearly solvent, nay even prosperous. Those material achievements which the past century vaunted were genuine, and there is reason to believe that we are still in the early stages of scientific world-mastery. For science, which has hitherto been occupied chiefly with the grosser aspects of phenomena, is now entering hopefully into what seems to be the realm of ultimate forces. It has already gone far toward acquiring safeguards against physical dangers; it has explored and mapped the earth; it has located the sources of power and devised machinery for their utilization. Human culture has gained a fairly sound material basis and a good working capital, by means of the release of energies hitherto required for existence alone. The roads to a still higher material civilization, if not already built, are surveyed or at least traced out.

But it is precisely this wealth of technology, this surplus of accumulated capital, which is the despair of the pessimist. Writing at the darkest center of the war period, Principal Jacks questioned “whether man is a being who can safely be trusted with the control over nature which science gives him. What if he uses this power, as he plainly can do, for his own undoing?” Archdall Reid, from the biological and neo-Darwinian point of view, implies that science has hastened physical deterioration by interfering with natural selection and by creating a situation where regressive variations tend to be of greater magnitude than progressive variations.

Sir E. Ray Lankester gives even more drastic form to biological pessimism. Civilized man, says he,

has proceeded so far in his interference with extra-human nature, has produced for himself and the living organisms associated with him such a special state of things by his rebellion against natural selection and his defiance of nature’s pre-human dispositions, that he must either go on and acquire firmer control of the conditions or perish miserably by the vengeance certain to fall on the half-hearted meddler in great affairs . . . . In his greedy efforts to produce larger quantities of animals and plants convenient for his purposes and his eagerness to mass and organize his own race for defence or conquest, man has accumulated unnatural swarms of one species in field and ranch, and unnatural crowds of his own kind in towns and fortresses. Such undiluted masses of one organism
serve as a ready field for the propagation of previously rare and unimportant parasites from individual to individual.

Economists and psychologists detect greater peril in uneven or too rapid progress than in the inherent faults of civilization itself. Man’s instinctive equipment has changed but slowly, while technical equipment has progressed so fast and so far that he is at last fairly distracted by lack of adjustment between the two. It may not be wholly true, as sometimes stated, that our psychic nature has changed in nothing but in its capacity for change; nevertheless the power of adaptation has proved laggard when confronted by the mass of recent technical advances. Man still carries his primeval backgrounds, and his principal mental patterns were standardized in an age when he was still a hunter. The danger is not merely that he may be made unhappy by present maladjustment, but that civilization itself may turn and rend him.

That a sense of this maladjustment has grown with growing artificiality in the arts of life is manifested by the old yearning for a return to nature, a yearning visionary in Rousseau and the nature poets, militant in Tolstoi and Edward Carpenter. Civilization is branded as a disease which affects individual and society alike, or which vitiates the individual through social corruption. But civilization is not an objective entity; it is rather a relationship among degrees of artificiality. What the apostles of the simple life really demand is a larger place for instinctive interests in the process of living. They point backward admiringly to an uncorrupted past into which the virus of civilization had not entered, to a life little removed from the vegetative processes, or, in the case of Tolstoi, to an economy of living suited to the unlettered peasant. In Short, their prescription for the malady of civilization is the exact opposite of Lester Ward’s proud slogan, “not back to nature, but forward to art.”

In our own day Gregory Zilboorg warns us that the civilizing process has reached an impasse. He declares:

We must now realize that continuous progress has at last made life unbearable, and has thus made the main task of our generation nothing less than a paradox. We can achieve salvation only by stopping progress! We must stop it lest it bring us to ultimate destruction.

Bertrand Russell believes that the disease is located in our Western mentality rather than in civilization itself, but, since this only pushes the trouble deeper, it is not a comforting diagnosis. Our excess of energy and its rationalization, thinks Mr. Russell, is responsible for our demoralization. “Our industrialism, our militarism, our love of progress, our missionary zeal, our imperialism, our passion for dominating and organizing, all spring from a super-flux of the itch for activity.” These words remind us of Bagehot’s famous tirade against the tearing restlessness of modern man, uttered more than a generation ago. Mr. Russell commends to us, as a corrective, something of the silent, brooding calm of China and her instinctive sympathy with nature. The outstanding contribution of eugenists to the literature of pessimism is their showing that the race is dying at the top through failure of the superiors to
reproduce, just at a time when superior talent is needed as never before. McDougall puts the case thus: “Our civilization, by reason of its increasing complexity, is making constantly increasing demands on its bearers; the qualities of those bearers are diminishing or deteriorating rather than improving.” The eugenist believes with the biologist that science and philanthropy are saving alive inferior types that once would have been shorn away by a ruthless natural selection. Education and equalized opportunity are instilling into weaklings ambitions which are increasingly harder to realize because of more exacting standards. Through efforts to better itself society thus augments maladjustment among its constituent members.

From a wide variety of sources come similar notes of despondency. James Mackaye finds that, while instrumentalities of welfare have multiplied, there is less happiness today than in simpler ages. Freeman contends that we have made great progress in details, both have failed of improvement in the large, because machinery has become a tyrant rather than a servant. Santayana suggests that we may be drifting into a new Dark Age, and Spengler, restating the cyclic theory, holds that the civilization of the West has had its appointed season and is now approaching its winter. Irving Babbitt complains of a lack of centrality in the culture of our neurotic age. Others bemoan the world-weariness of our surfeited intellectuals who refuse to undertake parenthood, dreading to project offspring into a sordid existence, on the theory, I suppose, that the process of generation, if continued, would always produce little tired radicals. Critics discover an increasing decadence in literature, music, and art, where all the noble motives are already worn out. Observers of the trend of social thought detect an augmenting distrust of our fine theories of equality, and a conviction that democracy as we have known it is a failure.

Perhaps the most notable common factor in all these despairing views is the idea of disharmony between achievement and power of assimilating achievement, of the rift between what modern man can create and what he can advantageously use. In the midst of plenty, civilization is represented as starving because it cannot digest. All of this is in striking contrast to Ward’s glorification of achievement. Ward does, indeed, argue the necessity of cultivating the power of assimilation, but he seems hardly to have imagined that man could ever acquire a technical equipment that would transcend his capacity to consume advantageously. Superlative as were his merits as a sociologist, Ward’s approach to the social problem was intellectualistic. He assumed that whatever will satisfy the demands of logical analysis will also prosper in human experience. But to increase the supply of goods is not to benefit men unless the goods satisfy actual wants. The creative act may satisfy a higher want in the inventor, and for him a perpetual process of innovation would be wholesome, but creators are always few in number. Whether the general mass shall benefit by innovation and elaboration depends on their ability to use new goods in wholesome ways.

It is not by accident that awareness of this maladjustment should have become acute in an age which is overindustrialized. Since the Industrial Revolution the productive process has become always more high-gear, monopolizing not only energies and resources but social prestige as well. Now, as just remarked, the productive process
in and of itself can satisfy no want except the creative urge of the worker, and
specialized machine technique reduces even this satisfaction to a minimum. However
plausibly we may urge the benefit of cheap and abundant goods, or use this as a
screen to hide the confusions and dislocations of our social life, it remains true that
social and psychic harmony can exist only when there is a just balance between
production and consumption, that is, when the productive act responds to conscious
need and is itself a part of the satisfaction gained. Pecuniary society is always in
danger of missing this vital harmony. However complex and artificial our wants may
be, they rest finally on simple fundamental dispositions which have changed little
since the primitive ages, while the techniques which satisfy them have grown into
almost incredible complexity and specialization.

This overstrain of production is responsible for the unnatural drifts and deposits of
population which create maladjustment not only in living conditions but in social
attitudes. Excessive urbanization is indeed not wholly due to labor conditions, but
employment is the chief factor in massing people in great centers. If the dominating
fact is employment while the dominating interest is something else, there can be no
harmonious stabilization of life. Bitterness and unrest may find actual vent in wage
demands or complaints about employment conditions, though the real grudge springs
from repression or disharmony in the fundamental dispositions. Undue wear and tear
on the human elements, unnatural physical deterioration, dislocation of the moral life
are only symptoms, not the disease itself.

Numerical aggregation under pathological conditions may indicate an even more basic
derangement. Under the pressure to get a cheap labor supply, there is a constant
temptation to dilute and degrade the social population by tapping ever lower levels of
migration in order to secure laborers who can underlive and therefore undersell the
existing supply. Of such displacement and substitution there are examples wherever
the modern industrial system has penetrated. We Americans have listened, sometimes
assentingly, to pleas for a liberal immigration policy that would provide cheap labor,
to the neglect of all other social and cultural values. But let us be fair to the
economic interests, for they are not alone in ignoring the quality of population.
Idealists and doctrinaires have refused to co-ordinate principles of national well-being
with their abstract ethical dogmas about our duty to the downtrodden abroad.
Religious leaders have demanded uncontrolled immigration and unrestricted birthrate
in order to secure a population amenable to ecclesiastical control. Some racial groups
oppose the exclusion of their oppressed or retarded brethren; and the booster is
always for a wide-open policy that will make his town grow.

To the mind easily made despondent it is no wonder that the race appears brittle
under the pressure of these varied strains. And, exaggerated as are some of the
jeremiads about Western civilization, it is folly to ignore or lightly dismiss them. We
actually are in a world-crisis, and it is possible that our particular type of civilization
may be suffering from a disease that is incurable, or curable only by heroic remedies.
The alarmist may conceivably be right in saying that to continue in our present course
is to insure burning up the best elements of our population, or at least breeding
fundamental antagonisms that will ultimately dissolve society into chaos. Yet we may recognize the gravity of the situation without concluding that destruction is the only possible outcome, even without indulging in the fantastic railings of George Bernard Shaw or the kaleidoscopic imaginings of Mr. Wells. For it always remains open to us to consider whether the present strains and maladjustments will necessarily be permanent. Society, or rather human nature itself, is as yet imperfectly stabilized after the revolutionary dislocations of the immediate past, and we do not know whether gradual adjustment is possible. It may be that, if we survive the period that lies between natural selection and intelligent self-guidance, a new and sounder order will be evolved.

And in the meantime the warnings of the alarmists may have their utility by directing attention to the weak points in our cultural system. A little of the acid of pessimism is, perhaps, a needed corrective for the mushy, saccharine optimism which assumes that all’s well with the world at large so long as our personal and parochial affairs are prosperous. All’s not well with the world by any means. Moreover, every age is prone to exaggerate its own troubles. Despondency about the future is both a recurrent and a continuous phenomenon, and this old world has been going to the dogs ever since the first grandfather. Our present entanglements are due to the very complex and far-reaching changes which are occurring, and it is inevitable that less buoyant spirits should view with anxiety the experiment in readjustment which must be undertaken.

THE PERIL OF THE WHITE RACE

I thus summarize these counsels of despair about the race as a whole, and pass on to consider the special peril of the whites. For upon the white race, as its special exponent, the pressure of modern civilization is assumed to be particularly heavy. It is not in place here to take up at length the vexed question of comparative race capacity. Much as the race factor has been bemuddled by sentiment and pseudo-science, we cannot ignore it as some sociologists insist we should. The fact that certain ethnic types have achieved a higher culture status than others is not denied, whatever the cause; and the other fact that men have believed and do believe in difference of racial capacity is at least a factor in determining their behavior. Among the whites, and particularly among two divisions of them, have developed the great civilizations which have thus far ranked highest. Whether others could have achieved as much with the same opportunity, or whether this type alone is capable of high achievement under any conditions, the world is still organized on the theory of white superiority, and it is the continuance of this hegemony which is now at issue. A new age of discovery has within these last generations disclosed human and cultural materials of which the older world was but dimly aware. Less conspicuous because its significance is only gradually perceived, this new knowledge has brought about a revolution in world concepts as decisive as that which followed the work of the great discoverers four centuries ago. As the known world once huddled about the Mediterranean, so the domain of culture history has been thought to be mainly Europo-centric. The classic Mediterranean civilizations, with their daughter-cultures in Northern Europe, were supposed to represent all of man’s career on the planet that
really counted. European experience is now merging with world-experience, and it is perceived that in many outlying regions other important culture systems have long existed, some of them closely parallel with those which are familiar to us. In China, in Japan, in India, in Central Asia, in Peru, in Yucatan, in Mexico, in Polynesia, in Africa, we are in contact with cultures some of which are still vital and all of which have had their share in man’s evolution. Through its aggressive qualities, largely through colonization, the white stock still maintains pre-eminence over most of these culture groups, but it is now a question whether this paternal system is to continue either in political control or cultural hegemony.

Until recently there was every indication that it would. But it is now clear that white supremacy faces two grave perils: first, the whites, and especially the more aggressive of them, are especially affected by declining numbers, so that the steadily augmenting colored races threaten to overrun the earth; and secondly, the whites appear to be breaking under the strain of their complex civilization. In their contact with masterful European peoples, the colored have begun to acquire the technology upon which mastery is supposed to be based, and are disposed to use the equipment thus gained to destroy white control. Education and the assimilation of European culture have accentuated instead of mollifying racial jealousy and racial self-consciousness. To be leveled up to white standards is usually to gain the instruments of civilization as a means of throwing off white mastery. However we may belittle their capacity to go their own way in culture autonomy, the colored races are no longer content to be colonial dependencies, and threaten to try for a new world-order in which they shall be equals if not masters.

The present phase of world-history, therefore, is one wherein the doctrine of racialism is on all sides actively assertive. Although its career has lacked the dramatic unity of the other two, the ethnic interpretation of history had its origin in the same decades which produced the Darwinian theory and the Marxian doctrine of economic determinism, and it has had a parallel growth. Gobineau, a contemporary of Darwin and Marx, first erected the doctrine of racial inequality into a dogma. Lapouge and Ammon later sought to demonstrate by statistics the stratification of particular societies on a racial basis. Houston Stewart Chamberlain elaborated Gobineau’s theory into a system of historical dynamics that was much exploited in imperial Germany. Professor Pearson made an impassioned appeal for turning Australia, the last of the great lands open to European settlement, into a continental stronghold which should hold white civilization safe against colored invaders. Putnam Weale indicated the perilous situation in which the whites of all the world are placed by the numerical increase and the growing color-consciousness among non-whites, a warning recently echoed by Lothrop Stoddard. Madison Grant lamented the passing of the Nordics, that “Great Race” whose disappearance would turn the world into a desert or a jungle. Mr. Grant’s words are worthy of quotation:

If this great race, with its capacity for leadership and fighting, should pass, with it would pass what we call civilization. It would he succeeded by an unstable and bastardized population, where worth and merit
would have no inherent right to leadership, and among which a new and
darker age would blot out our racial inheritance.

The ethnic philosophy of history is therefore both a theory of social placement and a
warning of social peril. If the fate of civilization is bound up with Nordic destiny, then
is the situation indeed perilous, for all present indications seem to predict that the
Nordic stock will be finally submerged as other stocks have been submerged in the
past, either through extinction or amalgamation. Three great movements have been
especially destructive to it, the barbarian migrations which diffused and submerged a
great portion of the Nordics among alien peoples, the Thirty Years War and the Great
War which depleted them through fighting. Now the Nordic is characteristically a
fighter and an adventurer. After the Age of Discovery, Nordics scattered over the
earth as they had before scattered over the disintegrating Roman Empire. Now that
the world is settling down into routine, still other perils as acute as war and
hybridization are beginning to emerge.

A static life is precisely the kind to which the expansive Nordic temperament is least
adapted. While he is fighting or adventuring or inventing, the Nordic flourishes; when
he settles down he withers. For in him “the instinct of curiosity is stronger, the herd
instinct is weaker.” It appears to be his historical mission to create innovations which
he must leave more passive types to enjoy. He lacks the toughness and Asiatic
stolidity which insure persistence in conditions of commonplace experience. Properly
the Nordic belongs to the springtime, and, unless a new bloom period should arise, he
may sink into that autumnal quiescence to which he is particularly unadapted.
Since the conception of racial brittleness is too vague to serve as a scientific
hypothesis, the more thoughtful pessimist turns for support to declining fecundity.
There is no such thing as a pure race in the modern world, but to the extent that the
Nordic stock can be segregated from others, exact evidence on this head can be
secured. It can at least be demonstrated that a falling birth-rate is found in districts
peopled chiefly by Nordics. Whether the environment be urban or rural, European or
colonial, congested or population-hungry, *Homo Europaeus* is failing to maintain a
rate of propagation which would insure numerical persistence. And almost
everywhere, too, even in the Nordic homelands, other racial types are increasing. In
North Germany where Slays are congregating as agricultural laborers, in England
where the Mediterranean type is steadily becoming more apparent in the population
mass, in the United States and Canada where the brachycephals are crowding into
industrial employments, the population type is altering and the Nordic sinking into a
diminishing minority. Racial displacement on a world-scale appears to be a
demonstrated fact.

Two questions suggest themselves at this point. If the Nordic is breaking under the
stress of a cultural order which he himself has created and which he still dominates,
might not other types also break if subjected to the same pressure? And if the Nordic
cannot persist in static conditions of living, does he not thereby demonstrate his
unfitness for survival, however fruitful may have been his past career, and ought he
not to suffer the fate of other types that have outlived their day and vanished?
The racialists—and I confess myself a racialist, though of a quite chastened kind—have persistently underestimated the influence of cultural factors in ethnic survival. Falling birth-rate normally accompanies growth in cultural complexity as Spencer long ago pointed out, although not necessarily or always for the reason he alleged. There is at present no good reason for believing, as radical eugenists do, that any group can escape the law of selective elimination, even when the selective agent is intelligence or culture. Just as the explorer is often unfitted to be a settler and the inventor to be a business organizer, so a racial type with a genius for innovation may have to give place to plodding routineers with an aptitude for utilization rather than creation. In our philosophy or social change we need not necessarily be fatalists, though we can hardly escape being pragmatists.

Unmodified natural selection is concerned only with the organic. It secures persistence for types adapted to the situation then and there, without reference to ulterior qualities. With the expansion of life other standards emerge, chiefly psychic and social, whereby new values are created. That there is a subtle conflict of standards—Huxley thought the conflict not at all subtle, but gross and patent—is proved by the tendency to burn out at the top on the fact of advanced culture groups, to which reference has already been made. Qualities that make for cultural progress may in particular cases be fatal to physical welfare and survival. Failure of gifted elements of the population, whether individuals or groups, to reproduce themselves would be less disconcerting if there remained unlimited stores of ability to draw upon for the future. To fear that exceptional achievement, unless carefully guarded, may deplete the reserves of hereditary talent is by no means to align one’s self with the alarmists. Education itself may become a factor in contra-selection, by picking out superior talent and sending it on into activities which are inimical to reproduction. We may compare the situation with that of our wasteful exploitation of natural resources, where we lavishly consume wealth for present ends, taking no account of the future, but lightly assuming that when present supplies are gone substitutes will be found. Is it ever safe to believe that there are inexhaustible reserves of hereditary ability, or that substitutes for innovating genius are likely to appear? It might be held that a liberal expenditure of present racial capital would accumulate such a store of achievement that the race could in the future live upon its income without much additional innovation. If a static civilization were the ideal this policy might answer; but a static civilization would soon become a retrogressive one. Progress depends on differentiation and effort, never on enjoyment alone.

**PLURALISTIC LOYALTY**

Thus far I have used the term civilization in its ordinary loose and comprehensive sense, as connoting the totality of advances beyond the minimum of human beginnings. It may be well to adopt a more precise terminology which will clearly set off the separate phases of progress. Civilization in the strict sense implies the formation and growth of those control groups, with their working machinery, which finally culminate in the political state. Logically distinct from it is culturization, the process of acquiring and assimilating those techniques which minister to material or
aesthetic wants, and socialization, which means the grouping and discipline of individuals or constituent bodies for the purpose of co-operation in economic or psychic concerns. Although the three processes must be kept distinct if we are to think accurately about social evolution, they are hardly ever actually segregated in action, and are generally going on concurrently.

Some of the present group-making forces go back in unbroken line to tribal loyalty, and continue in the form of racial or national patriotism the non-rational solidarity of kinship society. That race is still a factor in nation-making is proved by the recent reconstruction of the map of Europe in order to harmonize ethnic and political boundaries. Though the nation supposedly has a cultural basis, it sometimes develops a kind of particularism even more narrow than does race. Both inculcate a spirit of isolation, an intensive allegiance to clearly delimited group interests, and a hostility, latent or active, toward outsiders. Political nationalism has perhaps augmented racial sensitiveness by furnishing it a working machinery and accentuating the ambition for self-realization.

It by no means follows, however, that, because politico-ethnic nationalism has perpetuated some of the shortcomings of tribalism, it deserves to be obliterated or merged into any such cosmopolitan organization as radical idealists picture. Both race and nation must be preserved because they have certain permanent and necessary functions, and because they are the natural centers of that loyalty which can never be swallowed up in world-loyalty, since human nature cannot live wholly in universals. “A man’s shirt is nearer to him than his coat,” as the old French adage has it. On the other hand, there are some interests which are human and universal, and it is with respect to these that race and nation fail as centers of loyalty. Scholarship, science, music, art, ethics, are not fundamentally French or Japanese; they are not white, or frizzy-haired, or dolichocephalous, any more than chemistry is Presbyterian or mathematics Baptist. Most of the higher-culture goods are generalized, and cultural particularism is irrational when applied to things which all men must share if they are to have any measure of the good life.

Between these two sets of loyalties there is a dear distinction; the one is local and particularistic, the other is human. A well-rounded social organization, whether within the single group or among groups, will give practical scope to both. So long as tribalistic loyalty continues to monopolize the social machinery, antagonism and competition will survive, because it is based on the conflict principle. Civilization in the narrow sense just described must be practically co-ordinated with culturization and socialization in social functioning, for human interests have grown so complex that ethnic and political groupings no longer coincide with the pluralistic loyalties of men. As the political unit has its efficient organization in the state, so must cultural units be organized to take their due share of control in the collective life. In a practical way men must recognize that, since they have multiple interests, they may have multiple allegiances. Pluralistic loyalty as a working principle assumes that in their major interests people will organically cooperate with other like-minded people wherever they live and whatever their physical type.
Conceptions of associational loyalty may be either too narrow or too wide. Tribal and national loyalty, which hampers the humanistic interests, is a type of the one; the other is represented by that utopian world-communism which thinks in a vacuum and soars into the empyrean above the facts of common experience. In strictly political matters men will continue to be ruled by the spirit of the primary group, and it is not likely they will consent that all nations be merged into a superstate, or that all the races be scrambled in a universal blend. But loyalty to a particular unit with a well-defined function in no way collides with allegiance to other bodies with quite other outlooks. Our general social organization has long outlived the kinship principle, yet it is still in the family that the individual gets his first social experience. Later contacts with complex and varied groups do not destroy family loyalty; they only cause it to take its place as the most intimate and enduring among many loyalties. Men may still remain good national patriots while loyally accepting the controls exercised by world-standards in science, art, or music: “The poet as a man and citizen,” says Goethe, “will love his native land; but the native land of his poetic powers and poetic action is the good, noble and beautiful, which are confined to no particular province or country.”

Those who unreservedly accept the race-preservation dogma hold that specific capacities pertain to certain races and that these capacities indicate an exclusive natural division of labor among ethnic groups. In a very limited way they may be right, for some races do contain a notably larger number of individuals with aptitude for particular achievements—music, for instance. And yet, as Thomas has remarked, the real variable is the individual, not the race. The distribution of cultural ability may and does cut straight across racial and national boundaries. We may admit variation in the distribution of talents without holding that capacity for any special type of cultural achievement is a racial monopoly. If, then, we were forced to believe that extinction of the Nordics would cause our present civilization to perish for lack of adequate bearers, we should have to conclude that this civilization lacks the absolute and universal values with which we have been accustomed to credit it. If on the other hand it has the quality of universality, its future may safely be allowed to rest not on racial or national solidarity, but on co-operation among selected groups of individuals who have common cultural interests.

During those tragically tense days of July, 1914, many of us hoped and believed that war would not come, because we thought that the nations were, at the lowest, bound together by such a mass of economic interests as would overbalance the primitive instinct of pugnacity. Well, we were doubly mistaken then, for it turned out that economic interests had themselves caused the war. But a time will come when men will refuse to fight for egoistic ends, because to do so would destroy other values which they will have learned to hold equally dear. For the present perhaps national wars are still possible, not necessarily because the fighting points that divide peoples are what individuals at bottom value most, but because the higher interests which make for harmony are not yet sufficiently integrated to have much weight in control. In class antagonism also it is still the elemental egoistic drives that largely determine
behavior. Men are usually loyal to the best they know, but they will remain in the realm of conflict while their public actions are determined mainly on the plane of egoistic motives such as the economic and political. The best peace propaganda both for nations and classes is aggressive organization of the higher loyalties.

In another direction this is equally true of political reform and social technology. Dynamic loyalty will doubtless be the working principle of that new social religion which Galton required for the success of his eugenic program and for checking race suicide among the superiors. Without it, improved institutions and scientific social programs must remain as sterile as a card index. Tinkering with the social machinery, pottering about among individual and class maladjustments, or promoting pinchbeck reforms without injecting the dynamic of a higher emotional drive, is as futile as repairing or remodeling an engine from which steam is withheld. Liberalizing emotion has a way of doing quickly and easily what mere technical efficiency fails to accomplish. If we analyze the career of great leaders in constructive reform, it is invariably found that their success is due not to superior methodology, but to their ability to inspire contagious loyalty. Perhaps the social sciences need to unbend a little, giving less attention to institutions and formal categories, and more to the dynamics of social action. Nor are good examples sufficient in themselves, for good examples are always available in the persons of priggish formalists and well-meaning plodders. One is forced to believe that civic virtue must have amazing vitality to survive the load of methodical dulness to which it is perpetually subjected. Against dulness even the gods fight in vain.

Are these hopes for a broader and more human social alignment utopian? Perhaps. And yet some men are already beginning to regroup themselves on the line of culture solidarity, albeit as yet without much rational or systematic volition. Further, in both world-problems and class relations the present rate of movement is so rapid that some changes which a generation ago would have seemed visionary or destined for a distant future have already become sober realities. Pessimists fail to take into account the enormous release of energy which has been produced by those very changes which frighten them, or that shift in world-relations which the unsettling of the old order has suddenly brought about. Platitude and pious aspiration cannot take the place of science in determining and controlling the new forms or combinations which this energy shall take. So much at least is clear. Should the newly liberated forces be allowed to drift or run wild, should they fall under the control of egoistic passions, the situation would actually be as desperate as the apostles of despair now believe it to be. That they can be tamed and co-ordinated is, on the other hand, not quite so certain as the optimists imagine. The basis for rational hope lies in a scientific control infused with contagious passion for creating harmony. To undertake a new social synthesis by reorganizing the higher loyalties is the task to which the social sciences in particular must address themselves, and it is one beside which all others sink into insignificance.