

## PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS: SOCIOLOGY FOR WHOM?\*

ALFRED MCCLUNG LEE

Brooklyn College

The City University of New York

American Sociological Review 1976, Vol. 41 (December):925-936

*The credibility, privileges and opportunities of sociological work constitute a kind of territory over which professional practitioners and, to a lesser extent, politico-economic interest groups contend for influence and control. All orientations but the one locally called "scientific" are to be taken to be distortions. Its hegemony involves chiefly fidelity to a label, to an associated rhetoric and to a network of persons. Individuals and groups put sociologies together in the context of the competition and conflict of interest groups within which they live and work. This diversity of sociologies presents disparate definitions of terms, contrasting methodologies and assorted theories that may or may not appear to deal with the same genus homo sapiens considered socially. Sociologists need to comprehend the significance of contrasts among sociologies and perceive their own relationships to the major conflicts over "sociological turf." We have not yet learned enough about how to permit the growth of necessary institutionalization of our discipline without diminishing opportunities for creative dissent. Steps to cope with this situation are outlined.*

"Sociology for whom?" is not a new question. It is one that is eternally fresh and controversial. Keen members of each new undergraduate generation rediscover it. When trained sociologists recognize it as a question, it can either trouble them or open up new vistas for intellectual exploration, self awareness and historical perspective.

The character of any sociological inquiry depends upon by and for whom it is conceived and applied. This means that the credibility, privileges and opportunities of sociological work constitute a kind of territory over which professional practitioners and, to a lesser extent, politico-economic interest groups contend for influence and control. It also means that sociologists usu-

ally do not transcend their own habitual intellectual orientations related to their sexual, social class, ethnic, racial and other identities.

Professional sociologists as individuals and as members of "schools" or like-minded cults struggle to obtain a hold upon more of the discipline. They do this through accepting, elaborating and pushing an orientation or ideologized version of sociology. They propagate followers and convince others to accept their group's views as having special claims upon accuracy, authority and vendability. They demonstrate what they believe to be the technical and theoretical serviceability of their sociology to adherents and to potential sources of funds. Too many come to believe that "truth" and "scientific objectivity" are things to be packaged for the tastes and services of "important" denizens of the worlds of commerce and politics.

"Respectable" sociological professionals shore up the legitimacy of their kind of sociology through use of existing scientific symbols, philosophies and methodologies known to be acceptable to ruling politico-

\* Presidential address delivered at the Annual Meeting of the American Sociological Association, New York, N.Y., August 30, 1976. I am grateful to Leo P. Chall, Charles P. C. Flynn, Ted Goertzel, S. L. Greenblatt, Glenn Jacobs, Robert E. Kennedy, Jr., James M. O'Kane, Kenneth T. Skelton and Irwin Sperber for critical comments on a previous draft of this paper. In this and other efforts, my wife and fellow sociologist, Elizabeth Briant Lee, has, as always, been most helpful.

economic-academic elites. Some who differ with the "respectable" attempt to relate to an existing rebel cult. Still others, even fewer in number, take the more difficult path of individual investigation, conceptualization and expression. Interestingly enough, even though individual ways are the most speculative ones professionally, some of the few taking such a path have out-produced the respectables as well as the rebel cult members. W. G. Sumner, W. E. B. Du Bois, P. A. Sorokin, W. I. Thomas, R. S. Lynd, O. C. Cox, R. E. Park, Willard Waller and C. W. Mills exemplify such creative individuals. Whether working within or outside of an academic setting, they are the ones who rise to what heights there are in sociology. The trivialization and neglect to which the works of these scholars have been subjected evidence the ideological censorship and organizational repression that operate so widely in the profession.

To the extent to which politico-economic interest groups find sociology to be of possible use or concern, such groups try to influence, for their own ends, the techniques, findings and credibility of cooperating and also of noncooperating sociologists (Pettigrew and Green, 1976). Through dispensing foundation grants and consultation fees as well as through controlling prestigious universities and other employers, these groups have impacts that outweigh their actual interest in or use of the discipline. The great foundations and family fortunes "are the masters of much of the country's prestige and status system. They hand out the goodies and they don't have any civil service commission to attempt to make the distribution equitable" (von Hoffman, 1975; cf. Lundberg, 1968; 1975). Or, as Irving Louis Horowitz (1968:271) notes: the "sources of funds for research tend to be exclusively concentrated in the upper classes," and he adds: "This fusion of government and corporate wealth makes it difficult to bring about a countervailing pluralistic system of power with respect to social science funding" (cf. Lazarsfeld, 1959; Horowitz, 1968:ch. 10).

Sociological scientists, as such, presumably serve only their own curiosity. They

contend that in doing so they perform a useful social role. Somehow they try to devote themselves to "science for its own sake." Such a "purely scientific" sociological attitude is often taken to be a value-neutral or a naive one. It may yield results ranging in social significance from dilettantish verbal fretworks to seemingly radical syntheses of existing social knowledge.

Individuals and organizations support or at least put up with the work of sociological scientists because of the useful possibilities they think might come out of such endeavors. So far as subsidizers are concerned, critical revisions and other innovations in existing social knowledge—unless such changes appear obviously to further the subsidizer's vested interests—are usually unintended and even undesired byproducts of sponsored research. The subsidizers invest in more props and/or ornaments for the *status quo*, but occasionally they fail. They use all screenings and other precautions at their disposal to avoid such failures. The fate of such scholars as W. G. Sumner, P. A. Sorokin and C. W. Mills testifies to the success of repressive efforts to compensate for mistaken subsidization. All three were ritualistically canonized only after they were safely dead and their work bowdlerized or rationalized.

In American society, sociological scientists are almost always professionals. As such, they are caught up in the practical expediences of careerism and, therefore, inclined to act robotlike in terms of the mandates of the marketplace. They are disposed to obligate themselves to the demands of academic administrators, to political and business establishments that operate educational and research organizations, to book publishers, and to those who provide subsidies for special projects of research, writing and consultation.

As an alternative to the pretense of value-neutrality and the uncritical acceptance of conventional wisdom in their discipline and in the larger society, sociologists can go beyond copying or celebrating the latest intellectual fashions that sweep across the discipline (Sperber, 1975). They can go beyond such fads as those P. A. Sorokin discussed in his 1956 book: so-

ciological operationalism, testomania, quantophrenia, social physics and their ilk. They can comprehend the significance of contrasts among sociologies and perceive their own relationships to the major conflicts over "sociological turf."

Those who become assimilated into the profession usually learn soon enough that variations in sociological orientation are not to be tolerated as equally useful or valid or, perhaps, even equally "stimulating." All orientations but the one locally called "scientific" are to be taken to be distortions. The "unscientific" sociologies of other schools of thought result at best from misperception and at worst from prejudice or from lack of data. At the same time, the "scientific" sociology locally sanctioned by a given group—the hegemony of which involves chiefly fidelity to a label, to an associated rhetoric and to a network of persons—is not recognized as the variable or restrictive lens that it is. It is the careerist pathway to sociological success.

From such maneuverings, as Francis Bacon (1620:283) noted, "proceed sciences which may be called 'sciences as one would.'" And so, as Bacon continues, their promulgators reject "difficult things from impatience of research, sober things because they narrow hope, the deeper things of nature from superstition, the light of experience from arrogance and pride. . . . Numberless, in short, are the ways, and sometimes imperceptible, in which the affections colour and infect the understanding." Among a great many groups, this means an orthodox sociology that can be expressed in abstract symbols and formulas. It is to be tested with computerized and thus highly simplified or even caricaturized data—the data so proudly called "hard."

Aspiring students and untenured teachers perceive and want to discuss the professional intrigues and conspiracies their mentors gloss over with proper academic disquisitions from behind moralistic façades. The mentors make it clear that lack of respect for the local orthodoxy leads inevitably to something called either "the revolving door" or "the tomb of the untenured teacher." Thus, statistical technicians dictate to students their dehumanized manner

of perceiving and living with society much as welfare and unemployment caseworkers and counselors dictate the way those under their control shall live (Jacobs, 1970:ch. 11; Wiseman, 1975; Lee, 1976). This common emphasis upon quantophrenia and other intellectual rituals turns away many persons who might develop into sensitive observers and literate recorders and interpreters of social behavior. Unless such persons are fortunate in their selection of a graduate department and of professorial guides and sponsors, they may find that their irreverent curiosity will be stigmatized as "unprofessional."

Novices quickly grasp the scenario, the ceremonials, what courtiers to the tenured need to "understand." In too many graduate schools, they come to sense that they are being initiated into a kind of secular religion replete with revered personages, revealed doctrines, rites of passage and ceremonials performed by the ordained. Early on in most sociology curricula, fledglings thus come to take for granted that they have only these options: (1) commitment to an orthodoxy or (2) cynical acceptance of an orthodoxy as a cover for a life of hustling, of entrepreneurship or (3) training in enough dehumanized techniques to fit themselves for a bureaucratic slot in government or industry or (4) autonomous creativity accidentally protected by university tenure or supported by some sort of independent resources (Znaniecki, 1940: ch. 4) or (5) some other discipline or way of life.

The fledgling's usual choice among these alternatives is not a single one. That is to say, it is a "mature," a multivalent one. She/he may be idealistically committed to the orthodoxy or to autonomous creativity, but the other options are reserved as possible practical steps toward that career goal.

When fledglings are performing in terms of the role expectations of the first three alternatives, they take the position that only the obtuse or immature or malcontented pry too sympathetically into unfashionable doctrines (Shils, 1961: esp. 1421-4). Future professionals convince their sponsors that they will conform and not naively face an individualistic struggle. Like prison

trusties, American slave-time "house boys" and Irish "castle Catholics," they indicate that they know their "place" and "proper functions" in a society controlled by others (Lee, 1973:12). Some even promise themselves that once they gain the power to act independently they really will be autonomously creative (Lewis, 1925; Soskin, 1933).

In other words, would-be sociological professionals try to have as many career options open to themselves as they feel they safely can. They learn to perform when necessary as middle-class instruments of social control without worrying too much about their hypocritical stance or their rigidifying influence upon society. They learn to do "research" that helps elites cope with rebels against the "social system" and with other problematic deviants from normalcy and stability by buttressing the undefinable and changing myths of the "system." They learn to promulgate theories and text materials that reassure students, interpreters for the mass media and sociologists themselves that nothing at all is gained from "radicalism," from anything more disturbing than cosmetic changes in social theory and in society. The "system" is allegedly great, albeit wobbly, cannibalistic and carelessly destructive of its own increasingly exhausted resources, but sociological jargon can provide "the spurious resolution of problems by naming them" (Middleton, 1976; cf. Sorokin, 1956: ch. 2).

Thus, despite their idealized goals, many sociologists take on tasks differing notably from what they say they would like to do. How belittling of the games of professionals is the observation of Francis Bacon (1620: 280) that "words plainly force and overrule the understanding, and throw into confusion, and lead men away into numerous empty controversies and idle fancies"! Or, as a belletrist observes, often "the simple translation of a statement in clear English into its counterpart in sociologese will be hailed by the uncritical as creative thinking, whereas it is nothing but high-flown tautology" (Middleton, 1976; cf. Gusfield, 1976)! Of the statement of a wise modern chemist (Eyring, 1959:10) that individual success in research is associated with "a

shedding of any undue veneration for embalmed science of the past." This chemist contends "that if one wanted to become a creative chemist one should certainly learn all he could about chemistry. He should then decide to refuse to believe any of it. From then on he would be free to select on the basis of his own thinking the relevant ideas and reject the irrelevant" (Eyring summarized by Anderson, 1959:125).

How many nascent sociologists are so encouraged? The advice is at least as pertinent to sociology as it is to chemistry. Sociologists-in-training have to be recognized as people already long conditioned by their environment in a set of social views. They often assume that the first contradictions they perceive with their views are due to their own lack of understanding. If they are sensitive, however, "glaring inconsistencies . . . bring [their] conceptual world into serious question. The necessary reconstruction is the beginning of a creative process limited only by the expertness of the innovator and the time devoted to it" (Eyring, 1959:1). Those who wish to pursue this process in sociology as well as it has been in disciplines less obviously entangled with the social *status quo* might remember characterizations of Charles Darwin and of Albert Einstein. A Darwin biographer (Ward, 1927:13) tells how young Charles "insisted on seeing, for himself," and he adds: "The more I ponder that boyish skepticism, the more amazing it seems. . . . That is the rarest impulse of the intellect. The human mind almost always prefers two other ways of solving problems—either to ask an authority or to use pure reason." Similarly, it has often been said of Einstein: he was either unable or refused to comprehend the obvious in the manner in which others did. He, too, had to find things out for himself.

Two of my predecessors in this office commented sharply on this point: in his 1946 presidential address before the American Sociological Society, Carl C. Taylor (1947:8) told how it takes young sociologists "from five to ten years to recover from what happens to them in their graduate training." The process, he asserted, makes many "incapable of patient, pain-

staking analyses of living social phenomena." Seventeen years later, Everett C. Hughes (1963:890), in his presidential address before this body, said much the same thing: "While professionalizing an activity may raise the competence of some who pursue it by standardizing methods and giving license only to those who meet the standard, it also may limit creative activity, by denying license to some who let their imagination and their observations run far afield and by putting candidates for the license (Ph.D.) so long in a straightjacket that they never move freely again. Our problem, as sociologists, in the next few years," Hughes continued, "will be to resist the drive for professionalizing, and to maintain broad tolerance for all who would study societies, no matter what their methods." Now I can do no better than to underline what my two perceptive predecessors in this office have said. Fortunate are the undergraduates and graduate students who participate in irresponsible rap sessions with stimulating associates, in "radical caucuses" organized within and outside of professional societies, and in the academic seminars of the occasional offbeat professor.

But it is a gamble professionally—albeit an enticing one to free spirits—to look forward to a career devoted to reconstructing social ideas and society. This "heritage of treason," as an interpreter of science, Gerard Piel (1965:259), calls it, is an "honorable distinction" of the Western intellectual. He continues his characterization by observing that the Western intellectual "has ever been a heretic and political dissenter; the subverter, again and again, of the institutions and arrangements of arbitrary power. His most revolutionary enterprise, by far, is science." It is unfortunate that this legacy of the Enlightenment is so often suppressed or forgotten in the contemporary social sciences (Lee, 1975b).

To be a conformist is indefensible as an intellectual stance for a scientist of any kind, but it is a practical and comfortable characteristic of a profitable professional role pattern. A reputation for originality or cleverness or erudition or being critical can always be acquired in sociology by

offering fresh embroiderings of established bourgeois "classical theories" or plausible defusings of explosive facts or conceptions. The theories are "classical" and respected because the ruling elites whom those theories tend to support or ornament favor those who conform to such ways of thought and action—as evidenced by the career patterns and policy decisions of editorial and employment gatekeepers and other functionaries.

To reinforce this point, one needs only to read an assortment of "standard" introductory texts or the papers typically published in the periodicals of the American Sociological Association. Reading them reminds me of Mark Twain's (1900:214) remark: "You tell me whar a man gits his cornpone, en I'll tell you what his 'pinions is." The usual excuse for the jargonized superficiality and quantophrenia of the A.S.A. periodicals is thus set forth by an A.S.A. editorial board member: "Any editor is no better than the papers that are submitted to him and the referees on which [*sic*] he relies to evaluate them" (Freese, 1975).

An editor lists as members of her/his editorial board those she/he knows to be dependable or whose published work she/he admires. The previous work of the editor and of the editorial board members thus then gives the journal a certain public image. In consequence: "Certain kinds of papers are not submitted because of a belief that 'this editor will not publish that sort of thing' and, since few thus are submitted, indeed that editor rarely publishes that sort of thing for lack of much opportunity to do so." So this editorial board member contends, and I have heard the same sentiment expressed many times in the few meetings of the Publications Committee I have attended. Then, he—like his fellows—goes on to assert that A.S.A. periodicals actually do "provide a mirror for what the sociological profession is doing" (Freese, 1975). Actually those periodicals reflect, rather, the ideological coloration dominant among the A.S.A. committee members who select the editors. The "mirror" theory is an expedient rationalization.

The national coordinating editor of the Federal Writers' Project in 1937–39 (Man-

gione, 1972) gives a quite different perspective upon creativity. In that stimulating and relatively permissive program of those depression years, writers blossomed who might otherwise never have had the courage or an incentive to make such an effort. We do not know how much innovative sociology dies aborning for want of an incentive for its creation and of a medium for its publication.

What I am saying is that individuals and groups put sociologies together representatively. Their products reflect what they understand human relationships to be within the social arrangements—the so-called social structures (Lee, 1966:ch. 14)—they experience or learn about by report. They write out such understandings in the context of the competition and conflict of interest groups within which they live and work. Despite their frequent anxiety to preserve their scientific status distinct from that of “politicians” and from that of “mere journalists” for the mass media, they are quite mindful of issues uppermost in the mass media and thus in the decision-making processes of grant donors. One must appear to be fresh and fashionable! In consequence, we have a variety of sociologies born of diverse definitions of social situations (Odum, 1951:442–4; Znaniecki, 1952:243). Many of them bear labels—functional, structural-functional, cultural, ethnomethodological, biosocial, ethological, symbolic-interactionist, Marxist, humanist neo-positivist—to mention only certain prominent ones.

This diversity of sociologies—some fairly distinct, some modest variations or translations of others—presents disparate definitions of terms, contrasting methodologies and assorted theories that may or may not appear to deal with the same genus *homo sapiens* considered socially. Even dehumanized scientists, if there should really be any such, and their computers, could not develop a single sociology that would transcend group concerns and values and still be useful as a social instrument. Its abstractions would lack a sufficient sense of nearness to human affairs, sufficient focus, to yield a comprehension of actual social processes. To the extent that we have ap-

proached such an “ideal,” we have contributed chiefly to the complexities of the rhetorical and statistical games so many academicians and other researchers now play as pretentious substitutes for trying to perceive and understand both social constructions of “reality” and whatever lies behind or stimulates those constructions (cf. Berger and Luckman, 1966).

Can sociologists—as so many of us claim—have it both ways? Can we be scientists and thus reasonably dependable sources for accurate data and for useful theories at the same time that we are professional careerists organizing to raise our statuses and incomes in the commercial scramble within society as it exists today? Vernon Parrington (1930:vol. 3, p. 189), the historian of literature, spoke of “the imperious subjection of the individual to a standardizing order, the stripping away of the slack frontier freedoms in the routine of the factory, the substitution of the ideal of plutocracy for the ideal of Jacksonian democracy.” Can sociological scientists somehow withstand that pressure and maintain their creative drive?

The basic issue is not at all unique to sociologists. It is the basic issue of freedom to perceive, to express, to create, to question, to promulgate, whether as an artist or as a scientist. The basic issue is whether or not so many sociologists must follow the same hypocritical career pattern as so many clergymen, lawyers, merchants, educators, labor union executives and manufacturers. Must sociologists use the moral or ethical pretensions of sociology as a cloak or a mask for their role in a social conspiracy? Must sociologists share in the control and manipulation of the masses through appearing to practice a humanity-serving discipline and through actually serving—whether they know it or not—narrow interests of society’s ruling elites? In other words to what extent are sociologists part of a culturally enslaved instrument of exploitative control and of technocratic manipulation? As Henry David Thoreau (1860:vol. 14, p. 292) stated it, slavery “exists wherever men are bought and sold, wherever a man allows himself to be made a mere thing or a tool, and surrenders his

inalienable rights of reason and conscience. Indeed, this slavery is more complete than that which enslaves the body alone."

For sociologists, the issue of autonomy raises a host of related questions such as: how freely can dissident and critical sociologists including those working outside the mainstream of current institutionalized sociology, gain access to the principal media of communications in the discipline? These media are controlled by formal and visible, as well as by informal and invisible, networks of professional influence and persuasion. When we learn this, why do so many of us continue to attribute so much *intellectual* distinction to the formality of publication in an allegedly prestigious medium? After all, there are a great many—at least some 200—periodicals of a substantial sort in our field now available for serious contributions

Gregor Johann Mendel (1866) is only one of many whose outstanding contributions to physical, biological and behavioral science first appeared in an obscure periodical. That is one of the reasons why the editors of the principal science abstracting services (Rowlett, 1968; D. Baker, 1969; Parkins, 1969; Parkins and Kennedy, 1971)—including Leo P. Chall of *Sociological Abstracts*—insist upon obligating themselves to be inclusive rather than selective of the periodicals and papers of the discipline they cover. Fortunately for the development of sociology as a humanity-enhancing discipline, regional, state, university and independent journals are multiplying in number in spite of poor financial prospects.

What biases are typically prevalent among the profession's gatekeepers to academic degree, to employment, to promotion, to distribution of acclaim, grants and prizes, to honorific lectureships and to other kinds of professional preferment? Why do we fail so often to see those biases behind their façades? What do these and other transmitters of influence do to sociologists as scientists and, even more importantly, to sociologists as human beings? To what extent and by what standards do they select the imaginative, the excellent, or the mediocre, the predictable? To what degree do

they blunt or sharpen, muffle or free, distort or extend the development of sociology as a field of inquiry? To what degree do they recognize the social utility of sociology as a human instrument and not merely as an instrument for manipulative elites?

To complicate even further the changing patchwork proclaimed to be a single discipline, sociologists in trying to be both scientists and professionals intertwine conflicting conceptions of science and professionalism. It is little wonder that one or another of the positivistic cults becomes an attractive roadway to intellectual comfort and practical success. Such cultists claim that they are busily constructing "the" single, all-purpose "scientific" sociology. This is to be a sociology comparable in comprehensiveness and in systematization to an ideally fabricated, verifiable physical or biological science (Lee, 1975a). Albeit man-created, this would be a sociology so reflective of "nature" as to be beyond human manipulation, considerations of human values, and wishful thinking (Hauser, 1969; cf. Colfax, 1970). On the contrary, to judge from the healthy controversies still raging in physics and biology, these disciplines themselves have not reached such a finished stage of development. They include among their practitioners skeptics like the thoughtful chemist I quoted, and they thus continue to unfold and to change. They still bear traces of their human creators, of their sponsors and of their social settings (Flynn, 1975).

The questions raised about trying to be both scientist and professional suggest ideological struggle, manipulation and rationalization—in other words, politicization—as integral parts of a mixed career. They also point to the operation of the scientist's own attitudinal multivalence, that complex product of her/his assimilation into a variety of contrasting social groups and social roles (Lee, 1966). In public pronouncements, she/he may reject vehemently the notion that her/his work cannot help but be part of politico-economic and other social processes. Personal politicization and, even more the political maneuvers of others are profane, vulgar, anti-intellectual. Years of deprivation and discipline as a neophyte in

a cult are required to obtain certification and to build personal relationships which lead to prestige in a science. Any other procedure is said to undermine the very bases of the scientist's psychological and professional integrity, security and autonomy. It would substitute something other than "rational" criteria for policy-making decisions as to academic admissions, employment, upgrading of status, certification, publication, subsidization of study and research, and other professional facilitations and recognitions. It looms as an attempt to change or even to brush aside the rules of the intellectual's traditional life plan and to allot to others rewards for which she or he sacrificed so much. And yet, few who gain recognition in sociology, as in other sciences, do not join in what they look upon as appropriate political maneuverings.

To those who have taken active part in a variety of social organizations, differences from the academic are likely to have been experienced as more those of superficialities than of basic interests. Moral, legal and technical frameworks vary to fit tasks peculiar to a given organization but, within most of the status groups of a given social class, in-group mores of mutual understanding and operation, of competition and cooperation are fairly well set for a given time and place and not too dissimilar. Exploitations of financial and/or political controls for personal and group gains pervade almost all types of social organization in our society. When something gives, it is rarely in replacement or reorganization of obvious aspects such as moral façade and rhetorical symbols. Nor is it in the mores of operation of groups that continue to be powerful. It is chiefly in the rationalized reinterpretation of moral symbols that change takes place. Only groups consisting of off-beat marginals of whatever class deviate notably from the slightly contrasting mores typical of groups of entrepreneurs, bureaucrats and technicians, whether of the academic or of some other middle-class field (Lee, 1966:chs. 15-6; 1973:ch. 7).

Especially in the social sciences, politicization distracts attention from the pronouncements of experts possessing only academic status and influence. It often

places academicians at a disadvantage in competition for authority with spokesmen openly identified with special interests. Whether within or outside of the academies, those with access to kinds of legitimate social power other than the academic overshadow the influence of those who share mere academic accomplishment as a basis for their authority. A researcher is thus most often valued not by her/his intellectual impact upon a discipline but by the hundreds of thousands of dollars she/he attracts in the form of research grants or contracts, by the volume of consultantships and the power they imply, and by appointments to corporate boards or governmental commissions (Lazarsfeld, 1962; Hillman and Ararbanell, 1975; K. Baker, 1975).

Struggling sociologists admittedly pull in many directions. The numerous groups in all sorts of departments who constitute aggressive ideological cults, or what Willard Waller called "the compacts of incompetents" (Lee, 1966:317), try to erect bulwarks against what they often term "uncollegial behavior" as well as against administrative pressures and incursions and against interdepartmental efforts at empire building. "Uncollegial behavior" might be anything from a disagreeable personality to ideological nonconformism or to notable virtuosity in teaching, research, community work or other professional activities. Those bulwarks include academic tenure and grievance procedures, often now bolstered by trade-unionism. Such recourses do protect the jobs of the vindictive and the vegetative, but they can also provide some of the freedom we have to produce controversial innovations. Few enough of the creative and disputatious who manage to transcend graduate indoctrination, even exploitation, survive the years of nontenured courtiership that precede the magical "continuing contract" of the tenured and, eventually, the full professorship.

The current contraction of teaching and research budgets now makes politicization a most pressing consideration. It is pushing many sociologists to become aggressively defensive about their claims to reputable and legitimate authority. They are less secure concerning the viability of our dis-



cipline. Thus, they lean all the more on the purloined sham of legitimacy provided by scientism and by investigative assignments serving the special interests of profit and power.

Traditionally, the academic pattern idealized the individualistic artisan researcher who spent spare time and summers (perhaps aided by small grants for expenses) on projects strengthening the discipline. These projects were both personal research and the encouraging of graduate students to write autonomous dissertations. For some time now, this ideal has been overshadowed by that of the big-time grantsperson who is excused from much or all teaching responsibilities in order to direct the work of junior staff assistants and of graduate students who are given the "opportunity" to use part of a subsidized group project as a Ph.D. dissertation.

But now grantspersonship is giving way more and more to contractspersonship! Sources of funds for "research" grants often worry about the "irresponsibility" of academic research institutes or individual grantees. Such grantees are said sometimes to be too free-wheeling, too interested in combining a gain in academic prestige with the solving of a grantor's problem. What they might produce often cannot be predicted clearly enough. So the academic "research" institute or individual grantee—as well as the nonacademic—may now have to become more precisely exploitable in order to survive in these austere times. It may become even more the routinized factory situation and provide even less opportunity for exploratory work. And what will the dissertation writers such a contract subsidizes and controls know about autonomous, curious, probing investigation? As a federal official (K. Baker, 1975:211) bluntly sums up the matter: "The academician must learn to live with contracts if he wants the applied research dollar. . . . Compared to a grant, a contract gives the agency more control over the research. . . . Further, if the investigator fails to do what is specified in the statement of work the government is not obligated to pay him." In other words, when the sociologist agrees to be bought, she or he must stay bought and

produce the agreed results—or else! No wonder that sociological "research" institutes have been productive chiefly of more and more complicated methodological ploys and gimmicks (Lazarsfeld, 1962).

The traditional academic pattern not only gives us dilettantes, tired job holders and kindly parent substitutes. It also provides us with a wealth of the products of artisan scientists and artists. Some of those artisans in sociology—like W. I. Thomas (Barnes, 1948:ch. 40; Young, 1962–63) and Thorstein Veblen (Veblen, 1918; Mills, 1953; Riesman, 1953)—cared much more for their intellectual preoccupation than they did for the meeting of the requirements of an academic or other position. Some grantspeople have also created impressive products—as in the cases of the Middletown projects of Robert S. and Helen M. Lynd (1929; 1937)—so long as they remained artisan scientists and did not become mere entrepreneurs. As Florian Znaniecki (1940:164) put it: "All new developments in the history of knowledge have been due to those scientists who did more in their social roles than their circles wanted and expected them to do."

The professional's critical concern with career insurance gives advantage not only to the merely conservative but also to the stodgy. It is increasingly difficult now to attract the experimentally minded, the perceptive and the literate into the field. Once they are enticed, it becomes more and more unlikely that they will obtain academic positions and remain in our field. How many free intellectual spirits will devote their lives to working on controlled assignments, to using hackneyed scientific analogies as standards not at all necessarily applicable to sociology, and to conforming to "establishment" social science terms, theories and procedures? If continuing tenure becomes even more difficult to obtain or is eliminated, how many creative people will face endless years in the toadying world of short-term contracts?

To cope with some of the critical judgments I have been outlining, let me ask: how can sociology continue to survive and thrive unless sociologists see themselves as part of the social and intellectual struggles

to make more dignified human life and living possible for our grandchildren? Look at what we owe now to outside suggestions and criticisms. Merely mentioning the names of Marx and Freud is enough without adding those of outstanding psychologists, cultural anthropologists, historians, economists, political scientists, human geographers, journalists, belletrists and philosophers. Sociologies cannot be things apart from the human condition they are developed to understand. They commingle with the other currents of our general intellectual and cultural stream. Social scientists might well make special pleas for intellectualism and sociology as broad-ranging, daring, adapting and varying instruments for search, discovery, problem solving, model building, hypothesis construction and testing, and social struggle (Mills, 1959: 195-226; Miller, 1965; Lee, 1970; 1975b; 1976; Lee and Lee, 1973-74; 1976).

Basically, then, the problem of "Sociology for Whom?" can be perceived as the struggle of would-be sociologists—creative and otherwise—to function somehow in a necessarily institutionalized discipline. An institutionalized discipline is one that is bureaucratized, served chiefly by routine technicians and subject to entrepreneurial manipulation. It may possibly be kept alive and fresh in spite of the foregoing by questioning, dissenting and creative participants.

Because of my long-time devotion to sociology as a science and as a profession, I have, during my tenure as president, tried to do what I could to push the A.S.A. toward a more representative performance. I am mentioning my goals in that work here briefly in the hope that those who have supported me will continue to work for their implementation in the years to come. My goals in this office have been:

(1) to bring about a manner of nomination and election of members of the A.S.A. Council and key committees that would make the Council and those committees more representative;

(2) to turn over to an outside agency the detailed job of collecting and tabulating votes in A.S.A. elections in the manner now widely employed by organizations of our size;

(3) to provide and disseminate an open and detailed A.S.A. budget and record of expenditures so that all members will know quite specifically where the money comes from and how, for what and by whom it is spent;

(4) to develop a "social science news service" in cooperation with other appropriate disciplinary bodies in order to bridge the gap as accurately as possible between social science research reports and mass media interpretations of them—in other words, to give sociology its full public image;

(5) to obtain more funding for many small research grants-in-aid of \$1,000 and less to be distributed by a committee of the A.S.A.;

(6) to open all A.S.A. Council and committee meetings to A.S.A. members as observers;

(7) to make our work in defense of freedom of research and teaching more effective through developing a network—a comprehensive, investigative and implementative one—in cooperation with other disciplines and with civil liberties bodies;

(8) to convert the A.S.A. Committee on Professional Ethics into an effective ethical guide;

(9) to bring minority groups and women more prominently into the activities of the A.S.A.;

(10) to help assure continued leadership by sociologists in such specialties as family studies, urban and rural studies, educational sociology, social planning, criminology and corrections, preprofessional social work, social organization work and many others;

(11) to widen sociological discussions—especially in the manner demonstrated by this 1976 convention—by encouraging the expression and participation of representatives of the wide spectrum of sociological perspectives; and

(12) to re-emphasize the priority of curiosity and of human service in the social roles of sociologists and, thus, to broaden our occupational opportunities.

The A.S.A. has moved toward each of these goals to the extent that resources, staff time, Council cooperation, and mem-

bership support and pressure were available. I am not happy about the greater concern of our Council members with matters other than the rights and needs of sociologists dedicated to human service and understanding through a wide range of approaches. The excuse for the existence of a sociological association is not just the maintenance of academic employment and research funding. The chief excuse is to answer the question, "Sociology for Whom?" in this manner: sociology for the service of humanity. This answer refers to the need to develop knowledge of direct service to people as citizens, as consumers and as neighbors. This includes studies of ways in which people can protect themselves from manipulation in undesirable ways by those in positions of power, of how to achieve more livable homes and communities, of constructive alternatives to domestic, civil and international violence, and of many more.

Whether or not I have been able to accomplish much toward the achievement of the goals I have listed remains to be seen. At any rate, I am resolved to continue to work for them in whatever ways are available to me.

## REFERENCES

- Anderson, H. H. (ed.)  
1959 *Creativity and Its Cultivation*. New York: Harper.
- Bacon, Francis  
[1620] "Magna Instauration." Pp. 237-363 in 1937 R. F. Jones (ed.), *Essays, Advancement of Learning, New Atlantis, and Other Pieces*. New York: Odyssey.
- Baker, D. B.  
1969 *Chemical Abstracts Service. Encyclopedia of Library and Information Service* 2:479-99.
- Baker, Keith  
1975 "A new gamesmanship." *American Sociologist* 10:206-19.
- Barnes, H. E.  
1948 "William Isaac Thomas." Ch. 40 in H. E. Barnes (ed.), *An Introduction to the History of Sociology*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Berger, P. L. and Thomas Luckman  
1966 *The Social Construction of Reality*. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday.
- Chall, L. P. (ed.)  
1953- "Sociological Abstracts. 1-.
- Colfax, J. D.  
1970 "Knowledge for whom? Relevance and responsibility in sociological research." *Sociological Inquiry* 40:73-84.
- Eyring, Henry  
1959 "Scientific creativity." Pp. 1-11 in H. H. Anderson (ed.), *Creativity and Its Cultivation*. New York: Harper.
- Flynn, C. P. C.  
1975 "Quantification: no substitute for insight." *ASA Footnotes* 3 (4):2-3.
- Freese, Lee  
1975 "ASA editors not paradigm enforcers: mirror work of profession." *ASA Footnotes* 3 (6):2.
- Gusfield, Joseph  
1976 "The literary rhetoric of science." *American Sociological Review* 41:16-34.
- Hauser, P. M.  
1969 "The chaotic society." *American Sociological Review* 34:1-18.
- Hillman, Howard, and Karin Ararbabel  
1975 *The Art of Winning Foundation Grants*. New York: Vanguard.
- Horowitz, I. L.  
1968 *Professing Sociology*. Chicago: Aldine.
- Hughes, E. C.  
1963 "Race relations and the sociological imagination." *American Sociological Review* 28:879-90.
- Jacobs, Glenn (ed.)  
1970 *The Participant Observer*. New York: Braziller.
- Lazarsfeld, P. F.  
1959 "Reflections on business." *American Journal of Sociology* 65:1-26.  
1962 "The sociology of empirical social research." *American Sociological Review* 27:757-67.
- Lee, A. McC.  
1966 *Multivalent Man*. New York: Braziller.  
1970 "On context and relevance." Pp. 3-16 in G. Jacobs (ed.), *The Participant Observer*. New York: Braziller.  
1973 *Toward Humanist Sociology*. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall.  
1975a "Humanist challenges to positivists." *Insurgent Sociologist* 6:41-50.  
1975b "Humanism as demystification." *Sociological Analysis and Theory* 5:267-88.  
1976 "What kind of sociology is useful to social workers?" *Journal of Sociology and Social Welfare*: in press.
- Lee, E. B. and A. McC. Lee  
1973- "The Society for the Study of Social Problems: visions of its founders." *SSSP Newsletter* 5:2-5.  
1974 "The Society for the Study of Social Problems: parental recollections and hopes." *Social Problems*: in press.
- Lewis, Sinclair  
[1925] *Arrowsmith*. New York: Modern Library.  
1933
- Lundberg, Ferdinand  
1968 *The Rich and the Super-Rich*. New York: Lyle Stuart.

- 1975 *The Rockefeller Syndrome*. New York: Lyle Stuart.
- Lynd, R. S. and H. M. Lynd  
1929 *Middletown*. New York: Harcourt, Brace.
- 1937 *Middletown in Transition*. New York: Harcourt, Brace.
- Mangione, Jerre  
1972 *The Dream and the Deal*. New York: Little, Brown.
- Mendel, G. J.  
[1866] "Experiments in plant hybridization." Pp. 335-79 in William Bateson (tr.), *Mendel's Principles of Heredity*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Middleton, T. H.  
1976 "Light refractions: name your problem." *Saturday Review* April 17:58.
- Miller, S. M.  
1965 "Prospects: the applied sociology of the inner city." Pp. 441-56 in A. W. Gouldner and S. M. Miller (eds.), *Applied Sociology*. New York: Free Press.
- Mills, C. W.  
1953 "Introduction." Pp. vi-xix in Thorstein Veblen, *The Theory of the Leisure Class*. New York: Mentor.
- 1959 *The Sociological Imagination*. New York: Oxford.
- Odum, H. W.  
1951 *American Sociology*. New York: Longmans, Green.
- Parkins, P. V.  
1969 "Bioscience information service of biological abstracts." *Encyclopedia of Library and Information Science* 2: 603-21.
- Parkins, P. V. and H. E. Kennedy  
1971 "Secondary information services." *Annual Review of Information Science and Technology* 6:247-75.
- Parrington, V. L.  
1930 *Main Currents in American Thought*. 3 vols. New York: Harcourt, Brace.
- Pettigrew, T. F. and R. L. Green  
1976 "School desegregation in large cities: a critique of the Coleman 'White Flight' thesis." *Harvard Educational Review* 46:1-53.
- Piel, Gerard  
1965 "The treason of the clerks." *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society* 109:259-66.
- Riesman, David  
1953 *Thorstein Veblen*. New York: Scribner.
- Rowlett, R. J., Jr.  
1968 "Key to world's chemical knowledge." *Chemistry* 41:12-7.
- Shils, Edward  
1961 "The calling of sociology." Pp. 1405-8 in Talcott Parsons, Edward Shils, K. D. Naegele and J. R. Pitts, (eds.), *Theories of Society*. New York: Free Press.
- Sorokin, P. A.  
1956 *Fads and Foibles in Modern Sociology and Related Sciences*. Chicago: Regnery.
- Soskin, William  
1933 "Introduction." Pp. v-x in Sinclair Lewis, Arrowsmith. New York: Modern Library.
- Sperber, Irwin  
1975 *Fashions in Science: A Study of the Fashion Process in Sociological Inquiry*. Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Berkeley.
- Taylor, C. C.  
1947 "Sociology and common sense." *American Sociological Review* 12:1-9.
- Thoreau, H. D.  
[1860] *Journal*. 14 vols. Bradford Torrey (ed.), New York: AMS Press.
- Twain, Mark (S. L. Clemens)  
[1900] "Corn-pone opinions." Pp. 214-8. In Maxwell Geismar (ed.), *Mark Twain and the Three R's*. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill.
- Veblen, Thorstein  
1918 *The Higher Education in America*. New York: Huebsch.
- von Hoffman, Nicholas  
1975 Editorial column. *Washington Post* and other newspapers: October 23.
- Ward C. H.  
1927 *Charles Darwin: The Man and His Warfare*. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill.
- Wiseman, Frederick  
1975 *Welfare* (film). Boston: Zipporah Films.
- Young, Kimball  
1962- "The contribution of William Isaac Thomas to sociology." *Sociology and Social Research* 47:3-24, 123-37, 251-72, 381-97.
- Znaniecki, Florian  
1940 *The Social Role of the Man of Knowledge*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- 1952 *Cultural Sciences*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.